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Title: Investment Timing and Social Welfare under Feed-in Tariff Contract
Authors: Barbosa, Luciana
Rodrigues, Artur
Sardinha, Alberto
Keywords: Investment Analysis
Real Options
Social Welfare
Duopolistic Markets
Issue Date: 2020
Publisher: CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa
Abstract: This paper presents a novel model to analyze the effects on the investment timing and social welfare of three feed-in tariffs (FIT) within an oligopolistic market structure. The FIT contracts are the fixed price, the fixed premium, and the minimum price guarantee. The model allows the identification of the optimal time to deploy a renewable energy project and the value of the tariff that maximizes the social welfare for each FIT design. These optimal tariffs generate the same investment timing and the same social welfare.
Peer Reviewed: no
Appears in Collections:WPs_2020

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