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NOTES AND REFLECTIONS

NATO, CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY:

THE ARCTIC MISSING IN MADRID STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022

CÉLINE RODRIGUES

celineceli@hotmail.com

Oficial do Exército na disponibilidade (Portugal), experiência me várias empresas portuguesas

como International Relations. Mestrado em Relações Internacionais e Diplomacia - especialização

em diplomacia Política na Universidade Portucalense com dissertação Human Security of Inuit

and Sámi in Canada and Finland: comparing Arctic policies. Supervisão Porf. stefan Kirchner do

Arctic Center, Universty of Lapland, Finlândia e Prof. André Matos, Universidade Portucalense.

Atualmente aluna de Doutoramento em Relações Internacionais - Especialização Globalização e

Ambiente na Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Participação em conferências, IDN Jovem 2021, aulas

abertas e publicações. Bilingue Francês-Português e fluente em inglês e espanhol (licenciatura

em Francês-Inglês e mestrado em Espanhol). Pretendo seguir carreira na investigação

Climate change and security are two topics that are advancing in importance and

relevance in International Relations studies in the 21

century. Anthropocene activities

are confirmed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2014 AR5

the main factor for what we are witnessing in the first quarter of this century. Ecosystems,

of which humans are part of, are being destroyed around the world downgrading human

living conditions, rising ocean waters and leading to scarcity of resources. In what

concerns the Arctic region, it is the first place to suffer from those changes, being

considered the bell for the rest of the world. The Arctic is warming four times faster

than

the rest of the world and this proven scientific fact challenges security and how it is

perceived and understood nowadays. With climate change comes scarcity of resources

and competition in a region that has been an example of cooperation and peace as

expressed and whished by Gorbachev in 1987 in Murmansk

. The Arctic region is back,

and tensions and conflicts too. The security of people, indigenous and non-indigenous, is

central. This brings something new to security, labelled as nontraditional security.

IPCC. (2014). AR5. Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers.

https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf

World Economic Forum. (2022). The Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the rest of the world.

How concerned should we be? https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/arctic-warming-four-times-

faster-than-world/

Gorbachev, M. (1987, October 1). Mikhail Gorbachev's Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on

the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star to the City of Murmansk.

https://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf

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Notes and Reflections

NATO, climate change and security: the Arctic missing in Madrid Strategic Concept

Céline Rodrigues

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In the topic of climate change, the Alliance expects “to take the lead in understanding

and adapting to the impact of climate change on security” as mentioned in the report

NATO and Climate Change: A Climatized Perspective on Security (Rico, 2022, p.1). Shall

it be remembered that climate change is considered a threat by the United Nations since

2009 (A/64/350, 2009, p. 6)

. Over the 70 years of existence, the Washington Treaty

1949, has been challenged to adapt to new contexts and threats. Though, it seems that

the NATO, that came back to life and got out of the “brain-death” (using Emmanuel

Macron´s expression in 2019

) state with the War in Ukraine that started in 24 February

2022, is still pretty much in sight of traditional security.

After the Second World War, the Washington Treaty 1949 is signed by twelve countries

(Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States) known as North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) with the goal of defending its members against the Soviet

Union

. A security community, in the lens of Karl Deutsch, created by allies that seemed

to have the same values and committed to keep and maintain democracy and the rule of

law; what would allow to work in a collective way for defence and security through

dialogue and cooperation with a specific objective: to live in peace. The world has been

changing since its inception, compelling the organisation to adapt and review constantly

its strategies and actions. This fact is considered as the legacy, success and longevity of

the Alliance (NATO 2030, 2020, p. 7). As such, the organisation is still the unique and

essential transatlantic forum for consultations on issues such as territorial integrity,

political independence and security of its members. A relevant note here is that climate

change does not care about territory and borders. Only by looking at it as a security issue

can actions be taken and the regions more affected, as the Arctic, will be a priority.

In order to better analyse the presence of the Arctic region in the Madrid Strategic

Concept 2022 and NATO´s adaptation to climate change, it makes sense to frame this

paper within the Green Political Theory which has been evolving since the 1960s. This

theory can also be aligned with the Copenhagen school (1985). In that sense, the author

John Barry indicates in his chapter, entitled “Green political theory”, (2014) three

moments, or waves, in the evolution of the term green political theory: i) the first wave

begins in the 1990´s by identifying “ecologism” as an ideology and green political theory

as a “distinctive approach”; ii) the second one is the period of the development of other

schools of thought (such as feminism, liberalism, critical theory) expanded debates

between those schools and green political theory. It is during this wave that Green theory

is recognized within International Relations with the transnationalism question of

problems caused by climate change, as mentioned by Robyn Eckersley (Ari and Gokpinar,

2019, p. 166); iii) the “third generation” of green theory is the more recent generation,

which interdisciplinary is integrated with practical and empirical research of a “range of

United Nations. (2009). Climate change and its possible implications: Report of the Secretary-General.

A/64/350. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/667264

France 24. (2019, November 28). France's Macron defends 'brain death' criticism after talks with NATO

chief. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/20191128-live-france-s-macron-meets-nato-chief-to-

address-brain-death-criticism

It is relevant to enhance that “This is only partially true. In fact, the Alliance’s creation was part of a broader

effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism

in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political

integration.” (NATO. (n.d). A Short History of NATO.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm)

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Notes and Reflections

NATO, climate change and security: the Arctic missing in Madrid Strategic Concept

Céline Rodrigues

399

disciplines and knowledge outside politics, political science and political theory” (Barry,

2014, p. 4; idem). Scholars have been clarifying the difference between green politics -

who consider that the structure can be challenged - and environmentalists – “who accept

the framework and pursue the solution within the structures” (Paterson cited by Ari and

Gokpinar, 2019, p. 167). Consequently, the concept of security, which is also recent in

International Relations, changes its focus, placing the people at the center, as objects

(human security – non-traditional security, Padrtova 2020; Shiblee and Rashid, 2021)

leading states to provide them protection (Hossain, 2013). Consequently, the

traditionalist vision is broken when topics such as economic, military, political,

environmental and social are identified as sectors of security according to different

sources of threats (Padrtova 2020, p. 31; Hossain, 2017, p. 6; Waisová, 2003, p. 60).

Buzan, Wœver and De Wilde ´s vision is the basis for UN´s definition of human

security

. Once the object climate change is perceived as a threat, then it becomes a

“security issue only by being labelled as one” (Diskaya cited by Hossain, 2017, p. 6). The

figure 1 below presents the difference between “traditionalists”, “deepeners” and

“wideners” where the objects are connected to a category.

Figure 1 - Five Sectors (sources of threats) and different understandings of security

Source: Padrtova, 2020, p. 30

This confirms the link, nexus between climate change and security

as mentioned by the

IPCC, WGII (2022).

The development of the analysis is to be done according to the qualitative methodology

which allows an inductive reasoning through observation and analysis of official

See: United Nations. United Nations Development Programme (1994). Human Development Report

1994. https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf

See: United Nations. Commission on Human Security. (2003). Human security now: protecting and

empowering people. Commission on Human Security. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/503749

The author of the Belfer report presents a different theory called climatization, climatized perspective on

security. See: Rico, L.G. (2022). NATO and Climate Change: A Climatized Perspective on Security. Belfer

Center for Science and International Affairs. Harvard Kennedy School.

https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-and-climate-change-climatized-perspective-security (p. 15)

See: NATO (2022). Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1999:

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2009_07/20090728_strategic_concept.pdf

See: NATO (n.d). What is NATO’s Strategic Concept? https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Notes and Reflections

NATO, climate change and security: the Arctic missing in Madrid Strategic Concept

Céline Rodrigues

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documents such as NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan (2021), Madrid

Strategic Concept 2022, Report NATO and Climate Change: A Climatized Perspective on

Security (2022) and The Secretary General´s Report Climate Change & Security Impact

Assessment (2022). The analysis is complemented with reports of rapporteur such as

Jean-Charles Larsonneur (2021).

The development of this issue will be done by dividing the work in two parts: the first

part will give a brief overview of Strategic Concepts (SC) that will give the opportunity to

compare Lisbon Strategic Concept 2010 and Madrid Strategic Concept 2022 which appear

to be opposing. It will be possible to check how the new document addresses climate

change and if recommendations were taken into considerations during the elaboration of

the new document and if they were able to match with Climate Change and Security

Action Plan (2021) so it is not an isolated document. The second part will develop the

ups and downs, attention and forgetfulness in the 20

and 21

centuries of the Arctic

and how it is perceived within the Alliance. In the conclusion, it will be possible to confirm

that: i)- the Arctic is part of NATO, even if it is not expressed, written in the Strategic

Concept 2022; ii)- the Alliance still needs to adapt to a new context in a mix of traditional

and non-traditional securities linked to the climate change threat.

1. Strategic Concepts

: evolution

The Strategic Concept (SC) is considered a key document, having a second place after

the Washington Treaty 1949. It aims to define the Alliance strategy in a military and

political way according to the challenges and threats identified at the moment it is

elaborated. The aim of developing this kind of document is to be prepared for the future

This kind of document also reinforces the commitment to “the principles of individual

liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as well as to the purposes and

principles of the Charter of the United Nations, with the main priority of assuring and

maintaining international peace and security” (Strategic Concept, 2010, p. 6). Meaning

that three core tasks must be fulfilled by all members: collective defence, crisis

management and cooperative security.

The Strategic Concept is reviewed every decade since the end of Cold War

. Since its

birth, the Strategic Concepts have been prepared in two historic different moments (the

Cold War and the post-Cold War). 2022 might be categorised as the beginning of a third

moment. From 1949 to 1991, the strategy was mainly categorised by defence and

deterrence, without excluding dialogue and détente in the last two decades of the first

moment. During this period four Strategic Concepts were released with other

complementary such as “Strategic Guidance”, “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO

Military Strength for the Next Few Years” and “Measures to Implement the Strategic

Concept”.

In the second period, the Alliance focused on cooperation and security. The 9/11 terrorist

attacks in 2001 moved attentions to terrorism. During this post-cold war moment, three

For more information see: NATO. (2022, July 18). Strategic Concepts.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm

Larsonneur, J-C. (2021, October 9). Security

Challenges on the High North. Report. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. https://www.nato-pa.int/download-

file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-10/016%20DSCTC%2021%20E%20rev.%202%20fin%20-

%20SECURITY%20HIGH%20NORTH.pdf)

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Notes and Reflections

NATO, climate change and security: the Arctic missing in Madrid Strategic Concept

Céline Rodrigues

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Strategic concepts were presented in 1991, 1999 and 2010 with complementary texts

such as MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept, MC

Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy and MC Guidance MC

400/3. The Lisbon Strategic Concept turned to be out of context four years after its

presentation due to the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Consequently, the idea of peace

quickly did not apply to the geopolitical context as 2022 demonstrates. The wish of

cooperation with Russia and the absence of China in 2010 is the complete opposite in

time being, and are, in June 2022, are considered main threats in the new document.

Nonetheless, the concept of security has been evolving and has a holistic perspective. It

looks like some results and recommendation, namely report of Jean-Charles Larsonneur

were taken into consideration as it is possible to find references to climate change by

acknowledging that armed forces are also affected (number 19, 2022, p. 6) and human

security (number 19, 2022, p. 9) in the Madrid 2022 Strategic concept. But in a very

smooth way of expression.

If China and Russia are named and considered as threats, unfortunately, in what concerns

the Arctic region and its safety and security Buchanan´s observation of “lack of reference

to that region in the documents, with only one mention to High North in 2021 Brussels

Summit Communiqué” (cited by Bye, 2021) is sustained in the new document released

in the 8

Strategic Concept presented in Madrid 2022. Disappointingly, not even the

Baltic Sea, included in the recommendation d) of NATO 2030 (2020), is mentioned in the

SC 2022

, when it is stated that “Maritime security is key to our peace and prosperity”

(number 23, Madrid SC, 2022, p. 7). I add that the Arctic Ocean too is not mentioned.

Though, the document NATO 2030 (2020) in the Proposal number 7 states that climate

change is a defining challenge of our days and has security implications in different

regions included the Arctic.

Climate change and environment security, despite its recognition as potential threat had

occurred in 1969 as mentioned by Causevic, was not officially added and integrated in

the organization agenda until 2010 (2017, pp. 72-73) because it is still perceived at a

national level. Amar Causevic, author of the article “Facing an Unpredictable Threat: Is

NATO Ideally Placed to Manage Climate Change as a Non-Traditional Threat Multiplier?”

also informs that since 2010, much have been done regarding environment security and

the different Secretary Generals have discussed this subject in different moments:

- 2010 with the creation of the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) to focus

on the emerging security challenges;

- 2013 the Green Defense for more effectiveness and change in use of energy;

- and in 2014 with the Wales declaration and adoption of Resolution 427 on Climate

Change and International Security, at NATO Parliamentary Assembly, to reduce

pollution. This recent introduction of environment security in NATO`s discussion

shows the awareness of linkage between climate change and Arctic within the

organisation as a matter of security and of protection of sovereignty, not only at a

regional level but also at a global level.

See: Madrid 2022 Strategic Concept, number 45, p. 11 (NATO. (2022). NATO 2022 Madrid Strategic

Concept. https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/)

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Céline Rodrigues 
 
 
 
402 
  
Unfortunately, the recommendations below were not considered:    
l.  to  bolster  NATO’s  situational  awareness  in  the  Arctic  region,  including 
through greater  information sharing, the creation of a  working  group  on 
the Arctic, and training and exercises, and to maintain a good dialogue with 
Allies about search and rescue capabilities in the region;   
m. to  fully  recognise  climate  change-related  risks  as  significant  threat 
multipliers in their foreign and security policies, and increase the frequency 
of  military  and  political  consultations  on  climate  change  within  NATO.  
(NATO 2030, 2021, p.3)   
  
The Arctic, for some reason, is not identified and gives the idea that it does not exist for 
the Alliance. Is the Cold War period a ghost presence within the organisation?   
  
2. The Arctic region
12
 within NATO  
The Arctic is changing confirming that “What happens in the Arctic does not stay in the 
Arctic” (2017, Vidar Helgesen
13
). A statement that applies also in security context.  The 
Arctic  area  and  region  had  a  strategic  importance  during the  Cold  War, being highly 
militarized at that time. It was the shortest flight area for US and Soviet bombers. After 
this period and after the collapse of the USSR, a signal of cooperation approached the 
Arctic countries following the idea of a peace and cooperative zone expressed by Mikhail 
Gorbachev in 1987 in Murmansk. Gradually, NATO allies have turned their attention into 
other regions of the globe. The Arctic was no longer strategic and was forgotten. For the 
rapporteur Jean-Charles Larsonneur it was “a genuine desire to make the region one of 
peaceful cooperation” (2021, p. 3). According to Abbie Tingstad during the conference 
Conceptualizing the Arctic; a Zone of  Peace  or a Zone of Conflict? held on line on 22 
november 2022, the author affirmed that “we are not looking at the same Arctic zone, 
there is a growing conflict”
14
.   
Though, the 21st century places this region again as an important spot. This time as a 
victim of the climate change, done by external anthropogenic activities that are making 
the temperature rising four times more in the Arctic comparing to the rest of the world, 
as mentioned in the introduction. The changes are visible in numerous different ways in 
 
12
   The eight Arctic states (Canada,  Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and United States) 
created the AEPS that became in 1996 the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration). The Federation of Russia is 
the Chair (2021-2023) of the Arctic Council. The Joint Statement of 03
rd
 March suspended all activities with 
Russia  due  to  the  invasion  of  Ukraine.  Additionally,  Russia  has  been  excluded  from  other  forums  and 
meetings  since  the  illegal  annexation  of  Crimea  in  2014.  (Joint  Statement.  (2022). 
https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-
ukraine/).  
13
   NATO. (2017).  "What happens in the Arctic, does not stay in the Arctic” - climate change in the Arctic will 
have  global  consequences  and  cannot  be  ignored.  https://www.nato-pa.int/news/what-happens-arctic-
does-not-stay-arctic-climate-change-arcticwill-have-global-consequences   
14
   Geneva Graduate Institute. (2022), November 22). co-hosted by GGC, CIES & MINT. Conceptualizing the 
Arctic;  a  Zone  of  Peace  or  a  Zone  of  Conflict? 
https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/events/conceptualizing-arctic-zone-peace-or-
zoneconflict   

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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

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Notes and Reflections

NATO, climate change and security: the Arctic missing in Madrid Strategic Concept

Céline Rodrigues

403

the region: melting-ice and warmer currents from the Atlantic Ocean (known as

Atlantification of the Arctic) that affects melting ice, the rise of sea level and, in its turn,

allows navigability that will increase commercial transit (shorter than the Canal Suez,

idem, p.4) and consequently expand economic opportunities with a ride to natural

resources, more fishing and conflicts regarding territorial claims (extension of continental

shelf). This interconnected scenario is placing back the Arctic region as a strategic spot,

where Russia and China (the latter claiming to be an Arctic country). In this first quarter

of the 21st century, both countries have been increasing their investments and research

in the area. In what concerns Russia, the country has been remilitarizing, specifically

since 2007, with the Arktika expedition as the first voyage to the ocean floor at the North

Pole, placing its national flag. The rapporteur JeanCharles Larsonneur highlights the

Arctic Strategy 2035 of Russia, released in 2020, where there is a clear emphasis in the

“necessity of guaranteeing Russia´s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and “the goal

of developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a globally competitive national transport

corridor” (Klimenko, 2020 as cited in idem, p. 11). Confirming the New Perspectives on

Shared Security: NATO’S Next 70 Years (2019) acknowledgment expressed by the author

that “Moscow has built up the military capacity to complicate NATO´s ability to operate

in the Black, Baltic, and North seas as well as in the North Atlantic and the Arctic” (p. 2).

There has been a constant absence in the 70 years of the Alliance of this region on official

documents meanwhile many growing exercises in the Arctic, namely Cold Response in

Norway, the only country in the world with permanent military headquarters North of the

Arctic circle (Brekke, 2022; Coffey and Kochis, 2021) reinforce the military cooperation

between NATO and Arctic states. Finland and Sweden, Partners for Peace and Enhanced

Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE, launched in 2003 by United States

), closely

participate in NATO´s exercises. The possibility of full NATO membership is a reality since

both applications in May 2022. It is clear that “the Arctic remains a vital strategic region

for Euro-Atlantic security” (Charron, 2020). Due to those facts, it is almost

incomprehensible the Arctic region not expressly written in the official documents over

time. Perhaps with the turning point regarding this region in the United States of America

that presented its National Strategy for the Arctic Region in October 2022

, the texts of

official documents might assume, in the future, the Arctic region.

3. Conclusion

Now that, according to Causevic, NATO has “mastered in traditional security” (2017, p.

80), the Alliance needs to accelerate efforts to update climate and Arctic strategies

In this context, “cooperation takes place in three major areas: cooperative security, healthy societies and

vibrant economies” (U.S Department of state. (N.D). Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (E-PINE)

https://www.state.gov/enhanced-partnership-innorthern-europe-e-pine/)

The White House. (2022). National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf

Facing this lack of strategy some scholars have been arguing and recommending different options such as:

1) Arctic Military Code of Conduct (AMCC): the authors of the Briefing Note considered it would be of

relevance to define redlines (Depledge, et al. 2019); 2) According to Khorrami and Raspotnik one possibility

would be direct contribution from NATO to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) developing

hybrid partnerships and agreements (2022, p. 5). Both authors highlight also the importance of the Nordic

Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a regional security group that include Denmark, Finland, Iceland,

Norway and Sweden with the goal of strengthening participants’ national defence, exploring common

synergies and facilitating efficient common solutions, as mentioned in the NORDEFCO website:

https://www.nordefco.org/Files/nordefco-vision-2025-signed.pdf

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NATO, climate change and security: the Arctic missing in Madrid Strategic Concept 
Céline Rodrigues 
 
 
 
404 
it does not keep failing in “adopting the concept of human security” (Rico, 2022, p. 9).  
To conclude, NATO should be able to look all the regions its allies, and future ones, are 
included  in  so  it  can  properly  express  its  real  intention  to  protect  them.  If  one 
understands that the Arctic region is also threatened by Russia and China, Finland and 
Sweden´s applications to NATO speak for themselves and reinforces the presence of the 
Arctic in the Alliance. If the organisation can make a difference with the period of the 
Cold  War  in  what  concerns  the  harsh  region  that  is  becoming  more  navigable,  then 
perhaps it will be possible to look at it through a different lens and in connection with 
climate change. A region that has been there since its creation, with 5 of the 8 Arctic 
states  (Canada,  Iceland,  Norway,  USA  (Alaska)  and  the  Kingdom  of  Denmark 
(Greenland)) as part of the Alliance. In a short period of time (depending on Turkey) 
they will be 7 with Finland and Sweden. So, when referring to transatlantic relations (EU 
and North Americas) and defence, the Arctic is part of it. The oceans, Atlantic and Arctic, 
are meeting each other. The Arctic Council (non-traditional) and NATO (traditional) shall 
find a balance to work in a cooperative way in order to assure a safe and secure place 
for all in that region, so the “security vacuum”, mentioned by NATO´s Secretary General 
on  25th  March  of  2022  at  Bardufoss  Air  base  in  Norway,  disappears.    Even  if  not 
expressed, the Arctic is omnipresent within NATO and climate change is acknowledged 
as a threat multiplier (NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan (number 1, 2021). 
The different complementary documents mentioned in this paper seem to have not been 
crossed and fully taken into consideration while elaborating the new Strategic Concept 
2022.  
 
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NATO, climate change and security: the Arctic missing in Madrid Strategic Concept 
Céline Rodrigues 
 
 
 
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JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations 
e-ISSN: 1647-7251 
Vol. 14, Nº. 2 (November 2023-April 2024), pp. 397-406  
Notes and Reflections 
NATO, climate change and security: the Arctic missing in Madrid Strategic Concept 
Céline Rodrigues 
 
 
 
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How to cite this note 
Rodrigues,  Céline  (2023).  NATO,  climate  change  and  security:  the  Arctic  missing  in  Madrid 
Strategic Concept 2022. Notes and Reflections in Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. 
Vol.  14,  Nº  2,  November  2023-April  2024.  Consulted  [online]  on  date  of  last  visit, 
https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.14.2.02 
 
 
 
 
 