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e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023

PERSPECTIVES ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE EU-CHINA

COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT

CARMEN AMADO MENDES

carmen.mendes@fe.uc.pt

President of the Macau Scientific and Cultural Centre (Portugal). Associate Professor of

International Relations with tenure, accredited at the School of Economics of the University of

Coimbra, where she established the course “China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries in

World Trade”. Former head of the International Relations department and coordinator of the

School of Economics International Office at the same university. Holds a Ph.D. degree from the

School of Oriental and African Studies – University of London, a Master degree from the Institute

of Higher European Studies – University of Strasbourg, and a Bachelor degree from the Institute

of Social and Political Sciences – University of Lisbon. She was a Post-doctorate scholar at the

Institute of Political Studies of the Portuguese Catholic University of Lisbon and visiting professor

at the University of Macau, the University of Salamanca and the University of Lyon. She was a

board member of the European Association for Chinese Studies, and the organizer of the 2014

EACS conference in Coimbra; and president of the International Relations Section and member of

the board of the Portuguese Political Science Association. Principal Investigator at the University

of Coimbra on a research project on the role of Macau in China´s relations with the Portuguese

speaking-countries, funded by the Portuguese national funding agency for Science, Research and

Technology; and on a project on South-South Cooperation for the Europe China Research and

Advice Network, supported by the European External Action Service. Auditor of the Portuguese

National Defense Institute. Co-founder of the consulting company ChinaLink, and of the

Observatory for China in Portugal. Author of China and the Macau Negotiations, 1986-1999

(HKUP) and China’s New Silk Road: An Emerging World Order (Routledge), as well as other

publications available for consultation at: www.uc.pt/feuc/carmen

Abstract

The decision reached by the European Parliament (EP) to suspend ratification of the

Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) introduced a new phase into EU-China

relations. This paper examines some of the events leading up to the EP decision, and considers

some of the larger consequences of the decision. When on 20 May 2021 the European

Parliament passed a motion recommending a formal freeze on the CAI, it brought an abrupt

interruption, and possible final conclusion, to seven years of negotiations. The decision

resulted in considerable comment in the EU and China. Beyond the question of how China

reacted to this unexpected block to future negotiation, and whether the EU Parliament vote

could have been foreseen, the paper considers, among other topics, the role of public opinion

in the EU. The paper reviews the changing evaluations of China in advanced economies, as

mirrored in Pew Research Center surveys. What brought about the suspension was not

investment or trade-related differences, but was directly related to human rights issues and

labour law issues, and sanctions imposed upon China on members of the European Parliament,

with the CAI being signed in the context of crackdowns in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Accepting

the view of Mario Teló that the CAI must be seen not only as a new investment regime, but

also as a relevant international event affecting international relations, this paper examines

indications of changes in Chinese attitudes towards the EU. While some of those in the EU

Parliament who voted for the motion previously might have held a positive view towards

developing a new framework, more recent events demonstrate that even were there to exist

any resolve towards future negotiations, they could not occur at the price of fundamental

European values.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 61-79

Perspectives on the suspension of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

Carmen Amado Mendes

Keywords

EU, EU Parliament, China, EU-China Comprehensive Agreement for Investment (CAI), Public

Opinion.

Resumo

A decisão do Parlamento Europeu em suspender a ratificação do EU-China Comprehensive

Agreement for Investment (CAI) deu início a uma nova fase das relações entre a União

Europeia (UE) e a China. Este artigo analisa alguns dos eventos que levaram esta decisão e

considera algumas das suas consequências mais abrangentes. O congelamento formal do

Acordo, a 20 de Maio de 2021, levou a uma interrupção abrupta e, provavelmente, pôs fim a

sete anos de negociações. Para além da questão da reação chinesa a este inesperado bloqueio

de negociações e se o voto do Parlamento Europeu poderia ter sido previsto, o artigo considera

o papel da opinião pública europeia e as alterações às percepções da China nas economias

avançadas, de acordo com os inquéritos do Pew Research Center. O que levou à suspensão,

não foram dissensões na área do investimento ou comércio, mas sim sobre questões de

direitos humanos e de legislação laboral, bem como as sanções impostas pela China a

membros do Parlamento Europeu, num contexto da repressão chinesa em Xinjiang e Hong

Kong. Seguindo a visão de Mario Teló de que o CAI deve ser visto, não apenas como um novo

regime de investimento, mas também como um evento internacional relevante com impacto

nas relações internacionais, analisamos os indicadores de mudança nas atitudes chinesas em

relação à UE. Enquanto alguns dos que votaram a favor da moção podem ter tido,

inicialmente, uma visão positiva em relação ao desenvolvimento de um novo enquadramento,

os eventos mais recentes demonstram que, mesmo que se dê o reatar negociações, estas não

irão pôr em causa os valores fundamentais defendidos pela UE.

Palavras-chave

UE, Parlamento Europeu, EU-China Comprehensive Agreement for Investment, Opinião

Pública

How to cite this article

Mendes, Carmen Amado (2023). Perspectives on The Suspension of the Eu-China Comprehensive

Agreement on Investment. Janus.net, e-journal of international relations. VOL14 N1, TD1 –

Thematic dossier “European Union-China relations”, September 2023. Consulted [online] in date

of last visit, https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.DT0123.3

Article received on October 24, 2022 and accepted for publication on January 25, 2023

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 61-79

Perspectives on the suspension of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

Carmen Amado Mendes

PERSPECTIVES ON THE SUSPENSION OF THE EU-CHINA

COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT

CARMEN AMADO MENDES

Introduction

The decision reached by the European Parliament (EP) to suspend ratification of the

Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) introduced a new phase into EU-China

relations. The suspension of the ratification of the agreement in 2021 has been widely

commented upon, and the literature concerning it is considerable. Several leading

Chinese researchers have published in English on the topic, providing invaluable insights

into non-western perceptions of the situation. When the two major global trading

partners could not finalize the accord, it became de facto a major IR event. As was widely

reported at the time, the average daily trade in goods in 2019 between China and the

European Union (EU) was two billion dollars. The stock Chinese direct investments to the

EU in the same year was over 93 billion dollars, and the stock of the EU’s investments in

China was over 136 billion dollars (Chen, 2022). While substantial, there nevertheless

existed a real potential for further development since EU investments in China only

amounted for about 5% of the total foreign investment, and similarly China’s investments

only reached 3.4% of the EU’s total foreign investment. The agreement that would

improve these investment figures, as well as level the playing field, and improve access

for European companies to the Chinese market was incontrovertibly impeded. However,

in 2022 China remained the third largest partner for EU exports of goods (9.0 %), and

the largest partner for EU imports of goods (20.8 %). For the period January 2021 to

December 2022 EU imports from China increased by 39%, while exports increased by

1.6% (Eurostat, 2022). Trade thus continued, and grew, despite the suspension of the

Agreement.

What brought about the suspension was not investment or trade-related differences, but

was directly related to human rights issues and labour law issues, and sanctions imposed

upon China on members of the European Parliament, and signed in the context of

crackdowns in Xinjiang and Hong Kong (Nicolas, 2022). Mario Teló has suggested that

the CAI must be seen not only as a new investment regime, but also as a relevant

international event affecting international relations (Teló, 2021). This paper examines

some of the events leading up to the EP decision, and considers the larger consequences

of the decision. Teló makes what, in my opinion, is a central, yet often insufficiently

emphasized point in discussions regarding the CAI and its fate, namely that the EU

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 61-79

Perspectives on the suspension of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

Carmen Amado Mendes

elected assembly is under the influence not only of the general trade politicization, but

also, more specifically of multiple very vocal public opinion campaigns based on large

flows of information against the perceived authoritarian turn of the Chinese regime of Xi

Jinping (Teló, 2021).

The CAI and Public Opinion

Regarding the economic relationship between the EU and China, it is the EU that has the

formal responsibility for trade and investment (Freeman, 2022). Although the CAI was

formulated by officials from the European Commission in dialogue with representatives

of the Chinese government, over a period of seven years, it was known from the

beginning of the process that the CAI eventually to be ratified by the European Parliament

(EP). Since the members of the EP who are elected through a democratic process,

represent a variety of national and political interests, a degree of diversity of opinions

regarding issues related to trade and investment were to be expected. The leaders and

governments of non-democratic nations are well aware of the democratic process, and

know that it does not function in the same way as authoritarian regimes. Members of the

European Parliament (MEPs) are directly influenced by the opinions of their constituents

to a degree not experienced in authoritarian states. Public opinion can, and often does,

develop into a political force in authoritarian regimes, but runs the risk of being quashed

by the authorities, and is often quashed with violence. Examples of such outcomes are

too numerous and well-known to require examples here. The suppression of public

opinion is not the case in elections held in the European Union, although some EU citizens

might beg to differ, and they have the legal right to do so. Indeed, it is the legal right to

entertain and express different opinions, without threat of reprisal, which underpins the

democratic system. The point here is public opinion campaigns have an importance in

the democratic system that cannot be overlooked, and that a valid means to

understanding how political change occurs in the EU is to consider changes in public

opinion regarding specific issues.

This paper considers the changes that can be seen in public opinion regarding China, and

regarding increased and enhanced trade and investment cooperation with China,

primarily in the developed countries of the EU, that occurred over time from the years

preceding the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment that was

announced on 20 December 2020, and up to the decision by the European Parliament

not to ratify the CAI on 20 May 2021. As Zhang Li notes, Europe’s view of China is

increasingly complex, and the complexity derives in part from the increasing number of

member states, and as a result of China’s developing relations with Central and Eastern

European nations (Zhang, 2022). China’s economic leverage, through the funding of

projects in Greece and Hungary, appears to have enabled China ‘to disrupt a united

European policy on China’ (Cooper, 2019). The results of three Pew Research Surveys

are taken up, and set in context, and they are followed by examples of media reactions

to the failure of the European Parliament to ratify the CAI that were published in China

and the EU.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 61-79

Perspectives on the suspension of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

Carmen Amado Mendes

Chen Xin, Director of the Economic Division at the Institute of European Studies at the

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, identifies a central problem that conditions EU

decision making processes, noting that, “Everybody knows that if Europe desires to gain

its credibility, EU countries need to speak with a single voice and take concerted action.”

Chen continues to bluntly state, “if we look at concrete cases, the reality is totally

different” (Chen, 2022). Chen raises a number of valid questions regarding the timing of

the signing of the CAI, among which the questions of the participation of President

Emanuel Macron at the video conference, the urgency to finalize the negotiations prior

to the end of the German presidency, and the haste to sign the agreement before

President Biden assumed office in January 2021. The haste was attributed to the Chinese

by former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen who stated, ‘The Chinese

saw an opportunity to split the EU and the new Biden administration. The Chinese all of

a sudden moved’ (Burnay, 2022). Regarding the presence of President Macron, it is

arguable that it was predictable since Macron had invited German Chancellor Angela

Merkel and European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker to take part in a meeting

with President Xi Jinping in Paris in 2019. The efforts that Macron and Merkel exerted to

reduce tensions between France and Germany in 2020, and their common desire to the

achieve the signing of the CAI. Placed in this light, Macron’s participation is

understandable.

At time of the signing in 2020, following the call with President Xi Jinping, at which

European Commission President von der Leyen, European Council President Charles

Michel, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel on behalf of the Presidency of the EU

Council, as well as French President Emmanuel Macron were present, the President of

the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated among other things that:

“Today‘s agreement is an important landmark in our relationship with China and for our

values-based trade agenda,” and that, ” The agreement will rebalance our economic

relationship with China” (von der Leyen, 2020).

While it is clear that the possibility of a decision regarding non-ratification could be taken

by the European Parliament existed throughout the seven years of negotiation that

preceded the signing, the European Commission devoted considerable efforts towards

mitigating criticism and alleviating concerns. In one digital conference in July 2020, Ms

Maria Martin Prat, Director for Services and Investment, Intellectual Property and Public

Procurement, DG Trade argued that while much had been achieved in negotiations with

China, yet maintained that there existed broad support for the prioritisation of the

substance of the agreement over the speed of its conclusion (Martin Prat, 2020).

However, in responses to questions posed by several entities, Ms Martin Prat explained

that the critical situation in Hong Kong was beyond the remit of the CAI, that the CAI

does not cover cross-border trade of goods and services, and that the CAI would not

include a specific IP chapter. Regarding the question of prioritisation of substance over

speed, to which I shall return, it appears that in fact this was precisely the opposite of

what both Angela Merkel and Xi Jinping intended, with an eye on the impending

inauguration of Joe Biden as President of the United States of America on January 20,

2021. In other words, the ratification of the CAI was essentially a relevant international

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 61-79

Perspectives on the suspension of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

Carmen Amado Mendes

event affecting international relations, and not only an agreement between two trading

parties.

Matthieu Burnay and Kolja Raube argue convincingly that “the rise and fall of the CAI

testifies to both, on the one hand, a growing (geo-) politicisation of trade policy and, on

the other hand, a growing (geo-) politicisation of trade investments in the context of EU-

China relations (Burnay & Raube, 2022)”. Burnay identifies the separation of trade and

investments from other policy areas and fundamental values (such as human rights),

and the legal and political commitment to coherence in the EU’s trade and investment

policy, as a way to understand the growing tensions between the temptation to

compartmentalize in times of (geo-) politicisation. At the same time, it is relevant to take

note of the important point that while the EU seeks equivalence with China,

simultaneously the leaders of the EU socially distance themselves from China with ethical

forms to articulate their international identity (Song & Hall 2019).

The changing perception of the relationship between the EU and China since the

establishment in 2003 of the strategic partnership between the two parties was first

made, became obvious, from the EU perspective, with the publication in 2019 of the EU-

China Strategic Outlook. In this document, four perceptibly different, and arguably

incompatible, perspectives of China in the framework of EU-China relations that the EU

entertains, were presented, namely, “a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely

aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of

interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a

systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance” (EU-China Strategic Outlook,

2019).

To a western reader, this statement could appear to embody challenging undertones to

China to align itself more closely with the EU’s interests, and even reconsider its supposed

rivalry. While the EU was categorical in its depiction, the official Chinese response,

penned by Yao Ling, shrugged off any acceptance of the existence of diversities in

direction, blankly avoided making any direct criticism, and took a higher moral stance.

As often occurs, China preferred ’to control the narrative’ by realigning the substance of

the EU statement according to China’s own preferred perception of EU-China relations.

Yao’s views were published in the China Daily, which is owned by the Central Propaganda

Department of the Chinese Communist Party, and is relied upon to publish official

statements. Yao Ling wrote,

‘In March, the European Commission released a document "EU-China: A

strategic outlook", which has been interpreted as the transformation of the

EU's policy toward China. Although it assertively highlighted the EU's interests

more, China-EU cooperation remains the mainstay of bilateral relations. In

fact, China and the EU both regard each other as an important partner for

strategic cooperation. In December 2018, China issued its third policy paper

on the EU, identifying the direction, principles and specific measures to

deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the new era and

promote greater development of China-EU relations. On its part, the EU

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 61-79

Perspectives on the suspension of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

Carmen Amado Mendes

always looks upon the strategic partnership with China from the perspective

of common development and prosperity’ (China Daily, March 2019).

Having explained to the EU that, in fact, no great differences existed between China and

the EU, and that the EU was actually in full agreement with China, this view of the

fundamentally positive nature of EU-China relations was further reinforced by an article

a few weeks later by an article titled ‘Political trust has forged strong bonds’ by Shi

Mingde, former ambassador to Germany and Austria, who made it patently clear that the

Chinese view of relations between China and Germany, specifically selected as the

representative of the EU that China prefers, were that they were excellent. Referring to

the issues raised by the EU, Shi Mingde simply stated that, “The steady progress in China-

Germany relations can serve as a role model for cooperation between countries with

different political systems” (China Daily, May 2019). In this way, China successfully

diverted attention from the European Commission’s recently formulated views on EU-

China relations. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the EU-China Strategic Outlook

statement still rankled in China more than two and a half years later, and required

criticism. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and State Councilor Wang Yi stated, in

his end of year summation of Chinese diplomacy in 2021, that “Europe’s policy towards

China seems to suffer from “cognitive dissonance”. It is hard to imagine that on one

hand, Europe seeks to build a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, and on

the other hand, it defines China as a systemic rival. This logic has not only undermined

China-Europe relations but also brought confusion to European friends themselves”

(Wang Yi, 2021).

In December 2019, the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen

encouraged the DG for Trade to “step up negotiations with China” with the aim of

reaching an agreement by the end of 2020 (von der Leyen, 2019). The same month

Foreign Minister Wang Yi also supported the importance of reaching a conclusion

concerning the CAI in 2020 (MERICS China Essentials, 10 September 2020). However,

the CAI was not really ready for the EU and Chinese heads of state to sign. It lacked

relevant agreements on climate change, standards, or COVID-19 cooperation (Garcia-

Herrero, 2020). Furthermore, many of the commitments in the CAI were not novel, but

were already covered by Chinese laws (O’Reilly, 2021) Not only were the negotiations

far from completion, but during the seven years that they had taken, several EU Member

States had perceived flaws weaknesses in the proposals, some of which were related to

their own national interests (Burnay, 2022: 685), and within the European Commission

itself ‘promise fatigue’ on the part of the Chinese (Lai Suetyi, 2023). At the same time,

China urgently desired that the CAI be ratified before 20 January 2021, before Biden

became President of the USA, since a magic strategic goal of the PRC’s external policy

was, in the words of the resolute MEP Reihard Bütikofer, “to drive a wedge between the

U.S. and the EU” (Bütikofer, 2022).

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 61-79

Perspectives on the suspension of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

Carmen Amado Mendes

A Disruption of EU-China trade relations

Once on 20 May 2021 the European Parliament passed a motion recommending a formal

freeze on the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement for Investment, it brought an abrupt

interruption, and possible final conclusion, to seven years of painstaking negotiations

(van der Made, 2021). The vote of 599 in favour of the motion, 30 against and 58

abstentions signified clearly that resistance to continued discussions was fundamental,

beyond any simple alteration of a number of specific provisions, and not likely to be

reconciled for the foreseeable future. The resolution mentioned China’s deteriorating

human rights records, identifying violations in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and denounced

Chinese sanctions on members of the European Parliament and national parliaments that

had followed shortly after the EU had imposed sanctions on Chinese officials accused of

violating human rights in Xinjiang. The motion went even further calling on the EU to

intensify cooperation with the USA in the Transatlantic Dialogue with China, and also took

up the issue of trade with Taiwan. At the time that this motion was passed, the obvious

question of ‘What comes next in EU-China trade relations?’ arose. The questions of how

China reacted to this abrupt and unexpected block to future negotiation, and whether

the EU Parliament vote could have been foreseen the debacle, are important to consider.

Answers to these questions expose the power relationship between the EU and China in

mid-2021, and whether there was any clear path by which the EU-China economic

partnership could continue as previously.

The answer to the first question could have easily been predicted. Chinese media reacted

with vehemence and indignation, at the same time as diverting readers from any

consideration of the central reasons for the motion. The Global Times, the tabloid version

of the People’s Daily, as almost always spear-heading outrage and threatened

repercussions, called the MEPs motion “preposterous”, and stated that it made use of

“groundless claims concerning human rights as an excuse to block progress on a deal

that bodes well for European businesses and consumers (Global Times, May 2021).” The

Global Times took the EU to task, stating that the EU had “displayed an accelerating

confrontational attitude toward China, … by trying to interfere in China's internal affairs”,

an accusation that is repeatedly made against any country that criticizes a point of

concern in China, but does not appear to apply to China itself when it criticizes other

countries. With the Global Times deploying its usual rhetoric of recrimination, the China

Daily repeated the opinion of foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian who denied that

China had any responsibility in the matter, stating “China is unwilling to see the current

difficulties in China-European Union (EU) relations caused by the EU's unjustified

sanctions, and the responsibility does not lie with China.” In Zhao’s opinion, “the EU

disregarded facts, twisted right and wrong, and stubbornly made a wrong decision of

unilateral sanctions based on lies and disinformation.” Taking a position of moral

superiority, Zhao diplomatically “hoped that the EU side will make serious reflections” on

its actions, and stressed “Dialogue and cooperation is the right way forward.” Zhao

concluded by stressing that the “the China-EU investment agreement is a balanced and

win-win deal.” So much for the official Chinese response which projected the EU as being

at fault, and as being confrontational and misrepresenting the situation.

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 61-79

Perspectives on the suspension of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

Carmen Amado Mendes

The South China Morning Post (SCMP), rather than castigating the EU Parliament for

failing to acquiesce to the narrow parameters demanded by China for international

cooperation, looked at how China appeared to have misread the future of Germany’s

trade relations with China. One day after a speech made by Armin Laschet, the CDU

candidate for chancellor after Angela Merkel, who had promised strong trade ties with

China, and had stated that he would vote to ratify the CAI, at the same time as informing

his listeners that Germany accounted for 50% of EU exports to China, the European

Parliament vote left the deal, to quote the SCMP “dead in the water” (Bermingham,

2021). Regarding voting in the EU Parliament, not one MEP from Merkel or Laschet’s

party voted to save the CAI. Only one of the 83 MEPs for Germany voted against the

motion, along with a small number of abstentions. In other words, attitudes that may

have been widespread in Germany in 2013 at the beginning of negotiations appear to

have changed radically, and other priorities had come to the fore. Indeed, the only EU

state whose EU parliamentarians voted en bloc to save the CAI was Hungary, which has

21 MEPs, with all twelve MEPs from the ruling party Fidesz voting against the motion.

Not only did Laschet drastically misread his own MEPs, but so too did China.

Regarding the voting of the Fidesz bloc, of all the EU states, Hungary currently has the

closest political relations with China. Hungary is the only EU member state to have issued

Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certificates to Chinese producers of Covid-19 vaccine

in 2021. The first was issued for the Sinopharm vaccine on April 5 (Pharmaceutical

Technology, 2021), prior to the vote, and the second for Convidecia vaccine on 22 May,

soon after the EU Parliament vote. As Feng Duojia, president of the China Vaccine

Industry Association, told the Global Times when Sinopharm was approved, certification

increased confidence in Chinese vaccines in “small European countries” (Liu, 2021), and

would lead to more recognition of Chinese vaccines in the EU. Whether the expected

increase in Chinese vaccines was viewed as being a proxy for increased confidence in the

CAI in smaller European countries, both within the EU and in the process of applying for

EU membership, is not beyond consideration. Nevertheless, such confidence was totally

lacking the in the MEP representatives for these countries, apart from Hungary, which

consequently made a public demonstration of its pro-China stance by approving the

Convidecia vaccine.

Changing evaluations of China

Regarding the second question of whether the result of the vote could have been

foreseen, this should not have been a surprise for anyone. In October 2020, during the

Covid-19 outbreak, the Pew Research Center published a survey of changes in attitudes

between the years 2007-2020 towards China in fourteen advanced economies (Silver,

2020). In the majority of countries surveyed a dramatic increase in negative evaluations

of China are noticeable. The only country in the EU that did not demonstrate a significant

change was Italy with an average 62% negative evaluation for the period. In the UK

there had been an increase in negative evaluation from 16% to 74%, in Germany from

37% to 71%, in Spain from 21% to 63%, in the Netherlands from 34% to 73%, and in

JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations

e-ISSN: 1647-7251

VOL14 N1, TD1

Thematic dossier - European Union-China relations

September 2023, pp. 61-79

Perspectives on the suspension of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

Carmen Amado Mendes

Sweden most dramatically from 40% to 85%. Outside the EU, in the USA the increase

had been from 35% to 73%, in South Korea from 31% to 75%, and in Japan from 42%

to 86%, an even greater shift than for Sweden. In other words, increases of

approximately 40% in negative evaluation had been widespread in the advanced

economies with which China expects to cooperate, and not infrequently on its own terms.

When it came to the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, a median of 61% of those

surveyed expressed a negative evaluation of how China had conducted itself. The Pew

Survey also found that a median of 78% of those surveyed did not have much, or any

confidence in President Xi Jinping “to do the right thing regarding world affairs.”

Specifically, 78% of those surveyed in Germany had no confidence in Xi Jinping. This was

a significant, and worrying figure, that should have alerted Chinese diplomats to a

dramatic change in EU attitudes. At the same time, a plurality or majority in every EU

country surveyed had expressed the opinion that “China is the world’s leading economic

power”. Perhaps surprisingly, but also indicatively, different income levels and

educational levels did not influence the negative perception of China. The fact that a

negative view of China has grown continually in most cases since 2007, and has become

pervasive across large sections of the EU population, must be considered as one of the

central problems for China to successfully implement its international relations within the

EU, where public opinion exerts influence on political decisions. China’s failure to succeed

in its soft-power initiatives, and to provide at least a satisfying degree of transparency

regarding its ongoing activities and planned initiatives, was and continued to remain a

stumbling block to achieving widespread acceptance for many of its singular

achievements. However, at the same time, and perhaps not unexpectedly, there clearly

existed a consensus regarding China’s economic superiority.

The future of EU-China trade relations

The third question that this paper raises is ‘What comes next in EU-China trade relations?’

Once the rhetoric has abated, there still exist strong reasons for the EU to cooperate

more closely with its prime trading partner. The business reality expressed in the

following views of a Portuguese business developer, who will remain anonymous, provide

a pragmatic perspective, prior to the freeze on negotiations. Firstly, he hoped that the

CAI could allow for the definition of more equitable rules for the EU-China relationship,

since it still remained relatively difficult for European companies to enter the Chinese

market. European health companies were an example of European companies that would

benefit from better access to the Chinese market in the developer’s opinion. The second

point that the developer made was that Chinese capital is not infinite, with the result that

China needs to guarantee a constant flow of FDI. After the election of President Biden,

China’s need for a constant flow of FDI would become even more important due to the

fact that the Biden administration was continuing to blacklist Chinese companies. This

would mean that, sooner or later, Chinese companies would be forced to leave the US

market and search for new possibilities. Consequently, this developer understood the CAI

as potentially permitting Europe to position itself as the recipient for a new wave of

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Chinese investment. What the developer was pragmatically arguing for was the need for

more equitable and more transparent rules, and an adaptation to the presumed

departure of a number of Chinese companies from the USA, with a corresponding influx

to the EU, as a result of what we may call the ‘Biden effect’.

While the Global Times had predicted on 24 March, that “those holding ideological

prejudices in the European Parliament would ultimately lose ground to the prevailing

trend within the bloc that advocates for cooperation to fit into the actual development

needs” (Global Times, March 2021), this opinion was a total misunderstanding of the

underlying adherence to values, beyond simple profit margins, that exists within the EU.

The fact that the Global Times followed up its prediction with a warning that, in the case

of a failure to sign the deal, it “could deal a blow especially to EU vehicle manufacturers”,

is indicative of the Chinese negotiating strategy — considerably more stick than carrot.

It is now patently clear that the Chinese view, as expressed in the Global Times, that

there is the “utmost urgency for the EU to return to its China strategy that has proven

to be successful over the past decade”, was not the central problem. As matters stood in

June 2021, it was simply not possible to predict, with any degree of credibility, that in

the future a ‘return to the past’ would occur, or that an improvement in cooperation in

trade within the existing framework, without increased transparency, could take place.

The failure of the CAI should have hammered home the realization that sustainable global

trade would require China, as well as the EU, to make changes. While many of those in

the EU Parliament who voted for the motion remained positive towards developing a new

framework, it was now perfectly clear that there existed a resolve that it would not be at

the price of fundamental European values.

On 30 June 2021, the Pew Research Center published a follow-up survey to the one of

October 2020, that on this occasion covered results from seventeen advanced economies.

In all but one country, Singapore, favourable views regarding the US had increased

significantly. The overall median showed an average favourable view of the US being

61%, while only there was only a 27% favourable view of China, with only Greece and

Singapore having a favourable view over 50%. The negative views of China had

continued unchanged, and in some cases were even less positive than in the previous

survey. For example, broadly negative views of China were found in Japan (88%),

Sweden (80%), Australia (78%) and the US (76%). The only EU member state included

the survey to have a relatively favorable view of China was Greece (52%). As the Pew

Survey notes, “these unfavorable views are at or near historic highs”. At the same time,

confidence in President Xi Jinping remained low, with more than 50% of those surveyed

in Australia, France, Sweden and Canada saying that they had no confidence in President

Xi at all. On the other hand, confidence in President Biden at the time of the survey was

dramatically higher than the figures for President Xi.

However, views regarding the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic rated China as having

done a better job than the US with, among the EU member states surveyed, Greece,

Spain and Italy all placing China considerably higher than the US. But when it came to

choosing with which nation to have closer economic ties, the US outranked China in all

the countries surveyed, apart from Singapore. Among EU member states, Sweden was

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the most positive regarding economic ties with the US (82%), followed by the

Netherlands (69%), Italy (66%), Belgium (64%), Greece (64%). The overall conclusion

must be that negative views towards China remain prevalent, confidence in President Xi

Jinping is minimal, and closer economic ties with the US, rather than China, are the public

sentiment in all EU member states surveyed, as well as in Japan, South Korea, Australia,

Taiwan, and New Zealand. This public antipathy towards China indicates that any Chinese

soft-power initiatives aimed at the world’s most advanced economies have demonstrably

failed (Silver, 2021).

Chinese Policy towards the EU

The Diplomat pointed out that there exist three serious failings in China’s policy towards

the EU. Firstly, China has failed to treat the EU “as a serious political and security actor”,

and notes that the EU “holds strong soft power”, projecting its influence globally. The

author posits that China views the EU as being “a fragile bloc with deep divides”, and

considers the US as its unique target when making policy. Secondly, that China does not

take normative concerns, embracing democracy, human rights and rule of law, as

seriously as it should. China is overtly investment-oriented, and it has attempted to solve

the problem of normative divergences with offers of investment and trade. Thirdly, China

has failed to develop “a sophisticated diplomacy” to deal with Europe. This article

provides a potential insight into Chinese thinking with the comment that “Beijing does

not have a clear idea of its influence and potential threat to others (Xue, 2021).” The

result is, for example, that China repeatedly declares that it “aims to establish a deep

cooperative partnership with the EU, regardless of the changing perception the EU has

of China”. In other words, when China increasingly has deployed diplomatic ‘wolf

warriors’, to whom compromise is weakness, it has lost any accurate perception of the

impact of its policies on its partners, and the image it is creating and promoting.

There have been recent indications that a minor change of tactic, if not of policy, may

have been attempted, focusing on national governments more positively inclined towards

Chinese overtures. At the end of October 2021 Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister,

visited Greece, and continued on to Serbia and Albania, before ending his trip in Italy.

As noted previously, Greece is the only EU member state appearing in the Pew Survey

that has a relatively favourable view of China. Wang Wenbin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry

spokesperson stated that, “Greece, Serbia, Albania and Italy are important cooperation

partners of China in Europe. China and these four countries […] share fruitful outcomes

in BRI cooperation (Shannon 2021).” When Wang Wenbin pointed out that Wang Yi was

specifically visiting three of the members of the then so-called 17+1 group, formed by

China and seventeen countries in Central and Eastern Europe, most of which are EU

member states, e.g. Greece, and Italy, the only member of the G-7 to have joined the

BRI, it was a demonstrative statement, reminding the EU that China will favour countries

that are cooperating with China, particularly in connection with the BRI. Since the vast

majority of EU member states have been unwilling to join the BRI, and Portugal which in

2019 signed an extension MoU with China regarding the BRI but has done little to

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intensify its level of discussions since then (China-Lusophone Brief, May 2019), Wang

Yi’s visit may be viewed as a cautiously extended olive-branch, in hopes of resurrecting

a positive dialogue with the EU. This previously planned visit by Wang Yi came, somewhat

less than fortuitously, just a couple of weeks after a resolution passed by the European

Parliament for closer ties with Taiwan, and consideration of a possible future EU-Taiwan

bilateral investment agreement (Europa News, 2021).

Interestingly, the relative importance of the failure of the CAI, and the negative

international public opinion in the seventeen most advanced economies revealed by the

Pew Surveys, may possibly be less relevant for the direction that China’s IR, its economic

development and its economic diplomacy will take over the next five years. China’s 14th

Five Year Plan that was formally adopted in March 2021, and as researchers at MERICS

noted, “marks a shift away from the qualitative growth-focus of Beijing’s previous plans.”

China intends to prioritize a “great internal cycle (danei xunhuan 大内循环)”, with the aim

of achieving two targets, namely a strengthened domestic economy and a consolidation

of social development (Grünberg & Brussee, 2021). The idea of self-sufficiency has thus

emerged strongly. Self-sufficiency in essential resources, self-sufficiency in key

technologies, without any stipulated targets for growth of the GDP; this is a departure

from all previous plans. Ominously predicting “challenges unseen in a century”, that may

well be a reference to the sort of international negativity identified by the Pew Surveys,

the plan remained vague about how the goals stated are to be achieved.

Generally, prominence is allotted to national security, strengthening the domestic socio-

economic foundations of the country, and to supporting technology and innovation. While

digitization (including smart solutions in the economy), “opening-up” and international

economy, innovation and industrial modernization, and the economic system (including

market reforms), are prioritized, other fields appear to have been deprioritized. Less

emphasis appears to be given to agriculture and rural development, sustainability,

urbanization and regional coordination, and public services, and the absence of mention

of CO2 emission caps and a restatement of a climate policy is noticeable. The inclusion of

“opening-up” and international economy in the priorities marks the fact that de-coupling

is not a current consideration. Instead, we see the concept of resilient, efficient and

innovative domestic economy linked with a selective internationalization of the Chinese

economy, currently referred to as China’s Economic Dual Circulation. As the MERICS

analysis concludes, the lack of specificity in the plan suggest that the guiding principle

will be “upholding party leadership”, and that “where no concrete targets exist, central

party guidance will fill the voids …”.

China’s Economic Dual Circulation in practice

In the summer of 2021, a “regulatory storm” shook markets in China, and resulted in a

considerable loss of financial value, amounting to 1.5 trillion dollars, by high-tech moguls

and celebrities. The government had already announced policies that had significant

effect on high-tech companies, internet business and finance, as well as other sectors of

society, in something that Professor Bary Naughton, at the time, called an effort to

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exercise “grand steerage” of the economy. In fact, according to Bloomberg, the

expression “disorderly expansion of capital” first appeared in a Politburo readout from

December last year, and in the nine years of President Xi Jinping’s leadership, it had only

appeared five times in documents connected to him — all in the previous ten months

(Bloomberg, 2021). The expression appeared at least 38 times in the same period in the

People’s Daily. As with the announcement of the OBOR, that became the BRI, an

imprecise turn of phrase used by President Xi Jinping has become a central and irresistible

force. Regulation, rather than free-markets, now became the lead policy, suggesting as

Bloomberg wrote, a move “back toward more ideologically driven centralized planning.”

While there have been comments that regulatory crackdowns will end efforts “to get rich

overnight”, there has been a calibration of Xi Jinping’s message by leading authorities,

such Vice Premier Liu He, who was quoted as saying that private business “has not

changed and will not change in the future,” and Vice Premier Hu Chunhua who stated

that China wants foreign investments in advanced manufacturing and modern services.

While President Xi Jinping may wish to promote self-sufficiency in essential resources

and in key technologies, the Pew Surveys reveal that the world’s most technologically

advanced nations appear to be disincentivized by ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’, and that will

result in increasingly difficult negotiations concerning technology transfer. Cumbersome

regulations, and uncertainties regarding future sudden restrictions in China, may curb

the sort of rapid development that President Xi Jinping looks forward to. China’s bilateral

partners in the BRI will not be able to provide the sort of assistance that China seeks to

obtain. When these problems are coupled to a renascent US administration that, despite

the chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal, will probably re-assert its position as a global

economic leader. As a European Parliamentary Briefing published in December 2020

noted that “China is seeking to avoid the middle-income trap, while prerequisites for

growth are disappearing with China's rapidly aging working population and rising wage

levels, which have led to government-supported industrial offshoring to low-cost Asian

neighbouring countries”. This briefing also predicted the essence of the 14th Five-Year

Plan when it continued to state that “at 2.25 %, China's productivity growth has declined

steadily since the 2008 global financial crisis, and that against this backdrop technological

innovation and improving the efficiency of resource allocation are ideas crucial to raising

total factor productivity.”

The push towards increased self-sufficiency, and promotion of indigenous innovation, is

going to require a reform in China’s relationships with its technologically advanced

partners as sweeping as the Economic Dual Circulation policy. This reform would entail

greater transparency and an absence of arbitrary interventions, but while there is a clear

need for such a step to create a new Chinese economic diplomacy, the Pew Surveys

remind us that possible partners remain reluctant to enter any new negotiations or make

any new commitments. Nevertheless, the mutual symbiosis of China and the EU as major

trading partners means that solutions need to be reached to permit continued interaction.

The apparent trend towards a disarming tone in international diplomacy was continued

when, in a meeting with ASEAN leaders, President Xi Jinping stated that “China would

never seek hegemony nor take advantage of its size to coerce smaller countries” (CNN,

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November 2021), emphasizing that China would be “a good partner of ASEAN”. This

conciliatory tone comes when China is widely asserting its sovereignty in the South China

Sea, with resulting tension between China and Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan,

and Malaysia, and a recent US warning that “an armed attack on Philippine vessels would

invoke US mutual defence commitments”, a confrontation that could have far-reaching

consequences. However, the likelihood that China will submit its disputes with ASEAN

members concerning the South China Sea to international arbitration, as requested by

President Duterte of the Philippines in 2016, remains distant.

Where the Pew Surveys consider the world’s most advanced economies, the opinions of

less advanced countries towards China have until recently been more positive,

particularly when the countries in question have benefitted from BRI infrastructural

development projects. Among the EU member states, as noted above, Hungary has

developed strong ties with China. When the Global Times highlighted the resilience of the

rail transportation sector during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, it pointed out that the

number of China-Europe cargo trains exceeded ten thousand by the end of August 2021.

This was indeed a major achievement which came, as the Global Times could not fail to

remind its readers at a time when “the EU’s increasingly hostile actions against China

pose further risks to bilateral ties” (Global Times, September 2021), perhaps a reference

to disappointment at the failure of the EU Parliament to endorse the CAI. Without more

detailed information it is difficult to be able to concur that “the China-Europe trains have

become crucial life-saving routes during the pandemic”, but the importance of the

possibility of rail transport at a time when there was substantial global shipping disruption

is understandable. The question is whether this sort of success has been widely enjoyed

elsewhere in connection with rail transport development within the BRI.

Postscript

As of October 2021, it still appeared “very likely that some EU governments will seek to

resurrect the CAI, since many industrial associations across Europe support the deal”,

(Casarini & Otero-Iglesias, 2022), since China remained Europe’s second largest trading

partner, and investment flows between the EU and China were very substantial. For

example, the EU remained China’s third largest source of FDI. However, in 2023 the

outlook is very different. Despite Ambassador Fu Cong, the new Head of the Chinese

Mission to the EU stating that he would like to resuscitate the CAI (McElwee, 2023), and

the fact that there may be some parties interested in a revival, given China’s stance in

the war being waged by Russia on Ukraine, there is little likelihood of the CAI reappearing

on the table. The compartmentalization that allowed the separation of trade and

investments from other policy areas and fundamental values is no longer a possibility for

European policy makers.

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