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## INTRODUCTORY NOTE<sup>1</sup>

This thematic issue of Janus.net is dedicated to the Management and Resolution of Conflicts, and is part of the more general framework of a project on this subject in the OBSERVARE's course. With this initiative, we intend to contribute to the study of the Management and Resolution of Conflicts in a systematic and coordinated manner, fully convinced of its importance and the need for academia in Portugal devoted to it. The OBSERVARE is to be congratulated for the courage to promote this endeavour.

The conflicts of the twentieth/twenty-first century have shown a special capacity to threaten stability and peace on a global scale. Their complexity cannot sympathise with simplistic approaches. This special issue seeks to contribute reflections on these issues, both theoretically and practically, aware that efforts to inhibit the potential of aggression organised by and in States, or at least reduce it significantly, requires thorough analysis.

This exercise will be done by adopting a constructive approach to conflicts, seeking to minimise violence, overcome antagonism between opponents, persuade them to accept proposed political solutions and make them produce stable and lasting results.

Since the Management and Resolution of Conflicts is a complex domain with many interdependencies, in this edition we tried to explore the convergence and complementarity of knowledge in Conflict Resolution and International Relations, which have led scholars and practitioners of these disciplines to build links in communication between both communities.

Specifically, this special issue presents a range of approaches to the management and resolution of intra-state conflicts based on non-violent and violent methods used in times of war, negative peace and transition to positive peace.

The article by Gilberto Oliveira presents the theme of pragmatic pacifism, which conceptualises the strategic/pragmatic aspects of non-violent action. It is distinct from other non-violent approaches for its non-institutional agency and its "direct action" as a means of pressure and resistance. Pragmatism is based on the fact that political power and hierarchies depend, ultimately, on consent and cooperation. Through non-violent action, it is possible to deny or block this source of power and thus strengthen the power of resisting groups. Strategy is a requirement for success of non-violent actions of protest, persuasion, non-cooperation and non-violent intervention. Despite periods of negative peace being a more common method, such as in the recent "Arab Spring", it is also used in times of war, as was the case in the 1990s in the wars in the Balkans or in the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace movement in 2003.

The article by Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho discusses the institutional solutions of power-sharing as a way to avoid violence, which are often applied in multi-ethnic

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societies. Being closely related to democratic peace theory and avoiding zero-sum games, it is also found as a governmental solution in autocratic states. However, the frequent use of power-sharing models as mechanisms for conflict resolution in post-election or conflict escalation periods puts forward specific questions about power undermining the democratic model.

António Oliveira's article focuses on the transformation of conflict resolution goals with recourse to the use of force, an exclusively military intervention in war, but that also understands social and civil security. In the context of increasingly complex and multidimensional interventions, the article discusses the principles of the use of force, its challenges and effectiveness.

The article by Madalena Moita focuses on the evolution of the concept of peace in the United Nations, where ideas of peacekeeping and the concept of building peace are seen together in the spirit of Galtung's concept of positive peace. Through an analysis of United Nations interventions in Guatemala and Haiti, it is noted that the concept of positive peace has not been attained. Moreover, the evaluation processes used in the United Nations should be focused not only on results, but also on the processes through which mandates are implemented.

Ricardo Sousa's article seeks to identify the mechanisms of the genesis of the transition of negative peace into civil war as a way to better identify ways of resolving conflict. The paper tests the model of "greed" and "claims" together with the role of leadership and external interventions in four initiation and intensification periods of conflict in Angola between 1961 and 2002. The results suggest the saliences of external intervention during the Cold War, economic "greed" (associated with oil, diamonds, poverty and war capital) and leadership in the post-Cold War period to be important factors. The case study also identifies that "greed" and "complaints" may be interconnected and are not independent mechanisms.

The edition also includes notes and reflections from José Milhazes on the meeting of Francis I and Kirill I, head of the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church respectively, on 12 February 2016. The meeting is framed in its political aspects, and it also reflects on the role of the two churches in the "war between Christians" in the Ukraine.

**Carlos Branco and Ricardo de Sousa**

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## **PACIFIST APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW OF PRAGMATIC PACIFISM**

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### **Abstract**

This article explores pragmatic pacifist approaches to conflict resolution, i.e. the aspects that justify pacifist norms based on its strategic effectiveness and not on actors' belief systems. The article initially proposes a conceptualisation of pacifism and non-violence, seeking to show how these concepts interrelate and how they integrate in the field of conflict resolution. From this conceptual basis, the article focuses on the examination of pragmatic pacifist approaches, highlighting their theoretical base, their techniques and methods of action, as well as the major future challenges of research agendas on the theme.

### **Keywords**

Non-violence, Pragmatic pacifism, People power, Pacifist conflict resolution

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## **PACIFIST APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW OF PRAGMATIC PACIFISM<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Introduction**

It can be said that pacifism is defined by an essential norm: *before inter-personal inter-community or inter-State antagonisms, adopt non-violent social behaviour*.<sup>2</sup> For a long time, academic interest in pacifist norm remained practically restricted to a small niche of Peace Studies. The recent spate of non-violent campaigns – such as the peaceful revolutions of the so-called "Arab spring" – has renewed interest in normative and theoretical bases and practices involved in these demonstrations of "people power"<sup>3</sup>. This has placed pacifism and non-violence in the spotlight of academics from different disciplinary fields such as Political Science, International Relations and Public Policy Studies (Hallward and Norman, 2015: 3-4). While this renewed interest brings positive consequences for the expansion of reflection and more productive involvement of students, academics, activists and policymakers with this particular type of peaceful mobilisation, several issues continue to challenge those who seek an understanding compatible with the complexity and nuances surrounding the theme, such as: how to conceptualise pacifism and non-violence? How do these two concepts interrelate? How are these concepts integrated into the field of conflict resolution? What is its theoretical basis, working logic, techniques and method of application? What are its possibilities and limitations?

The purpose of this article is to explore these issues of pacifism, seeking to justify non-violent action based on its strategic effectiveness and not on its spiritual and moral principles that shape the beliefs and convictions of actors. With this purpose in mind, the first section of this article examines pacifism within a broad spectrum of positions, ranging from a pole based on principles to a more pragmatic view, which will place pacifist approaches within the field of conflict resolution. Thereafter, the article focuses

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<sup>2</sup> For a more elaborate discussion of this pacifist norm from a sociological point of view, see Galtung (1959).

<sup>3</sup> "People power", was the term originally used to describe the mass mobilisation of the civilian population in the process that led to the fall of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986. Since then, this expression came to be generally used to label the activism of the civil population in non-violent political actions (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994: i).



on the pragmatic pole of the spectrum by examining the theoretical background that supports pragmatic pacifism (second section), typifying the technique of non-violent action and the main methods by which it can be applied (third section). The paper will move on to examine the latest developments and key future challenges of this research agenda (fourth section).

## **The Pacifist Spectrum and Conflict Resolution: A Conceptual Delimitation**

Pacifism, as mentioned above in Galtung's suggestions (1959), defines an essential norm: *before interpersonal, inter-community or inter-State antagonisms, adopt non-violent social behaviour*. From this perspective, non-violent social behaviour – or non-violence – constitutes the conceptual core of pacifism. But what does non-violence mean? Although the debate on non-violence produces a multitude of viewpoints, only some definitions are deployed here in order to reach a conceptual demarcation that serves the analytical purposes of this article. Gene Sharp, for example, advises against the use of the term "non-violence" because it is vague, ambiguous and carries a heavy passivity that does not sit well with the active nature of what he prefers to call non-violent "action" or "struggle". Accordingly, Sharp offers the following definition:

*Non-violent action is a generic term that covers a variety of methods of protest, non-cooperation and intervention. In all of these methods, those placing themselves in a position of resistance leading to conflict, executing – or failing to perform – certain acts, using various means except physical violence. (...) In every form, the technique of non-violent action is passive. An action that is not violent.* (Sharp, 2005: 39, 41)

Kurt Schock provides a definition with similar elements but emphasises the institutional character of non-violent action, arguing that it operates outside of the official institutionalised political channels (2003: 6). Other authors like Randle (1994), Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) and Roberts (2009), follow the same line of thought, articulating the concept of non-violent action with the concept of civil resistance to highlight its civilian (and thus non-institutional) nature. From this perspective, non-violent action is characterised as occurring outside of conventional political organisations and structures of the State (Randle, 1994: 9-10), as non-military or non-violent in character and centred on civil society in the coordination and conduct of actions (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008: 7, 9; Roberts, 2009: 2). Similarly, Atack (2012: 7-8) notes that non-violent action acts as a collective political action conducted by ordinary citizens and organised directly through civil society groups or social movements.

What can be noted, on the basis of the work of these authors, that there is a clear effort to give conceptual autonomy to non-violence. They seek not only to emphasise the strategic-pragmatic character of non-violent action, but also unlink its particular perspectives from spiritual and moral bases of the so-called principled pacifism that characterises the movements of non-violent Christians and activism of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, which are its most iconic illustrations. There are authors,



however, who question these attempts to establish strict boundaries between non-violent action and pacifism, claiming that both terms belong to a single continuous spectrum of positions that range from that based on principles to more pragmatic ones. From this perspective, pacifism and non-violent action does not differ substantially and should be seen within the same tradition of thought. Cady (2010: 79-92), for example, believes that the pragmatic concern of non-violent action is one of the poles of the pacifist spectrum that offers valuable guidance for pacifist activism when it misses something: a clear vision of peace. From this point of view, instead of being attached to the negative pole of this spectrum, where ideological considerations keep pacifist activism stuck to the mere denial of war, pacifism must approach its positions more pragmatically and find more positive alternatives to military means and the use of force. A positive view of pacifism, according to Cady, "has to offer a general ideal to guide actions and goals and, at the same time, the particular methods through which ideals can be implemented" (2010: 83). In this way, continues Cady, the wide range of non-violent methods identified by Gene Sharp – all capable of being adopted by civil society and able to confront local, national and international instances of power – can make the abolition of war, oppression and the social injustices that feed the tradition of pacifism realistic.

An important consequence of this spectral vision of pacifism, according to Cady, is that it admits a plurality of positions. Therefore, if one can defend life as a supreme value and reject violence based on principles of right or wrong, the pacifist spectrum shows that it is also possible of making choices on a pragmatic basis, taking into account not what is absolutely right or wrong, but what is better or worse in certain circumstances (2010: 83-84). Howes presents a similar argument that considers the current success of the debate about non-violence instead of breaking with pacifism, offering an important way to revamp pacifism's pragmatic aspects in a way that takes into account a realistic understanding of the historical record of cases of non-violent action as an alternative to the use of military force and war (2013: 434-435).

The authors themselves, who prefer the term non-violence to pacifism, recognise some aspects that converge with the interpretations above. In their study of non-violence, Hallward and Norman (2015: 5) recognise that people engaging in non-violent action do not make their choices based exclusively on strategic reasons, but rather through blending principle and pragmatism, which makes it preferable to avoid reductionisms and adopt a comprehensive and diversified approach that considers non-violence within its various forms and contexts. Atack (2012: 8-10), while exploring non-violence in political theory, points out that the main icons of pacifism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King led their non-violent campaigns through pragmatic choices, even although they were heavily influenced by their spiritual and ethical traditions. If this overlap is found in pacifist activism, it must also occur among those trying to defend the autonomy of non-violent action. According to Atack (2012: 159), although Sharp emphasises the pragmatic character of non-violent action, seeking to keep away from the idealistic charge contained in pacifism, a "residual pacifism" remains present in his works that sustains a "moral preference" for non-violent political action. According to Atack, it is difficult to understand the commitment to non-violence and the centrality of this concern in pragmatic theorists' research agenda on non-violent action exclusively in terms of power relations, without also taking into account the underlying moral impetus of non-violence provided by pacifist



idealism. Atack's observation is important because it indicates that the research agenda on non-violence does not cease to be anchored in a normative preference derived from the pacifist tradition.

One can take from this discussion two important indicators for the conceptual delimitation sought in this section. The first is that, although there is a growing movement of conceptual independence of non-violence by unlinking it from the tradition of pacifism. There are also arguments that allow one to keep non-violent action under the general label of pacifism, accommodating more idealistic perspectives and more pragmatic ones in a continuum of positions that either approach, move away or overlap on a single conceptual spectrum. This implies recognising that, although pragmatic perspectives offer important insights into power relations involved in non-violent action, it does not cease to be part of a broader context where non-violence can be interpreted and practised for religious or ethical reasons, and, more importantly, for reasons that mix all these motivations. This line of argument allows for a more comprehensive, integrated and subtle shading between pacifism and non-violent action, which justifies the adoption of the expression "pacifist approaches" as a general label that integrates all the conceptual spectrum examined here.

The second important point in this discussion concerns the individualising of pacifist approaches within the field of conflict resolution. In this sense, the central issue is to understand how pacifist approaches differ from approaches traditionally associated with the field of conflict resolution. It is not just the character of non-violent pacifist approaches that matters; although this defining element is essential to differentiate pacifist approaches and approaches that admit the use of force, it is important to note that other approaches to conflict resolution also define themselves as non-violent. For example, the tools of conflict prevention and peacemaking in diplomatic alternatives – that are non-violent in nature – can resolve disputes (preventive diplomacy) and facilitate dialogue before they result in violence. This is done through mediation or intervention of third parties when conducting negotiations which can lead to peace agreements. Thus, although non-violence is a defining element of pacifist approaches, it is not enough for their individualising within the field of conflict resolution as a whole, as other approaches may also be defined as non-violent. We must therefore search in the above conceptual discussion for other elements that make it possible to refine this individualising.

Two aspects seem to be crucial in this regard. The first is the institutional character of the pacifist approaches. The tactics of pacifist approaches that demonstrate the previously examined definitions are born out of civil society and are conducted in the form of social movements that are outside of conventional policy and institutionalised channels of the State, distinguishing itself, therefore, from official or diplomatic procedures of conflict management. The second aspect has to do with the tensions and confrontations that characterise the "direct action" of pacifist approaches. As argued by McCarthy and Sharp (2010: 640), more traditional techniques and institutionalised conflict resolution, such as negotiation, mediation, the intervention of third-parties, as well as the methods that contribute to the effective functioning of these techniques, usually avoid confrontation, sanctions, pressures and direct action that characterise the activism of non-violent action. Although some specific pressures can be applied during official negotiation processes, traditional methods of conflict resolution, as a general rule, are oriented to the convergence and production of a peace agreement and not at



creating tensions, confrontations, demonstrations, blockades, non-cooperation and resistance that are part of the conflict resolution mechanisms defended by non-violent activism.

One could say, anyway, that the set of elements examined in this section – the activist commitment to non-violence and the abdication of the use of military force, the mobilisation of civil society, the non-institutional character, the use of non-conventional channels of political action and the logic of direct action as a mechanism for pressure and resistance – delimits the conceptual point of view of pacifist approach, giving them a distinctive character that allows their treatment inside a certain area of other conflict resolution approaches. When it comes to pacifist approaches to conflict resolution, however, one does not want to refer to a comprehensive debate on peace, institutional models and organisations for peacekeeping or structural mechanisms of peace-building and conflict prevention, but rather the particular type of approach derived from activism and the tradition thought of pacifism and non-violence.

### **Conceptual basis of Pragmatic Pacifism: The Theory of Consent**

As argued in the previous section, pacifist approaches form a continuous spectrum of positions that admit not just absolute viewpoints, but also more nuanced, flexible and merged positions. Thus, while this article is structured around references and central issues of pragmatic traditions, this does not signify that the means advocated in each approach should be seen as isolated and independent. In fact, there is a porosity between principled pacifism and pragmatic pacifism, which means that techniques and conflict resolution methods are often overlapping or partially complementary. When discussing pragmatic approaches, the reasons evoked to justify the pacifist norm and strategies defended for its application alter. To characterise this differentiation, pragmatic approaches use political arguments and theory of power sources to understand the logic and effectiveness of non-violence.

Sharp (1973; 2005: 23-35) and other authors such as Boulding (1999), for example, depart from the fact that the consent of the people conditions the way power operates in societies. This challenges, according to Atack (2012: 109), the more traditional perspectives that view the heavy coercive power in the form of military force or institutionalised violence, and material power in the form of economic wealth or the accumulation of resources, as the maximum expression and single power that really matters. Even if one adopts a pluralist perspective, recognising that various forms of power operate in society, proponents of pragmatic non-violence think that the relationship of consent constitutes a significant base for popular power that is capable of challenging all other sources of power, whether they originated in the authority or legitimacy of the rulers, in human resources at the disposal of governments, in skills and knowledge, in intangible factors such as beliefs and norms, in material resources or in the coercive apparatus of the State (Sharp, 2005: 29-30).

In a similar sense, Boulding argued that power is complex and multidimensional, and may assume at least "three faces". The more conventional face is "threat power", which is the ability to apply coercion through the imposition of internal mechanisms of the law or of the military apparatus against external aggressions. The second takes the form of "economic power"; from this angle, power is a function of the distribution of wealth between rich and poor and is defined in terms of "production and trade". The third face,



which Boulding calls "integrative power", is the "power of persuasion, legitimacy, fairness, community, etc." (1999: 10-11). What seems particularly relevant to Boulding, converging in some way with Sharp's point of view, is that power cannot be considered solely based on violence and coercion or economic capabilities, but should be seen mainly as a function of the ability that people and social groups have to join and establish mutual ties of loyalty. From this perspective, argues the author, "threat power and economic power are difficult to exercise if they are not supported by integrative power, that is if they are not seen as legitimate" (1999: 11). What is important to understand, therefore, is that these three faces coexist and fall – although in different proportions – within a framework of forces that integrates and affects the operation of power systems in societies. Within this framework, threat power does not only depend on the force of the author of the threat, but also on the threatened subject's response, which can be expressed in several ways: submission, challenge, counter-threat or through what Boulding calls "disarming behaviour", i.e. the incorporation of the threat's author within the community of threatened subjects by undoing the relationship of enmity. This latter type of response is, according to the author, one of the key elements of the theory of non-violence as it opens an important avenue for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Economic power also depends on the interaction between parties, being not only the function of the behaviour of the "seller" – as one can agree or refuse to sell – but also the response of the "buyer", who can also evaluate the benefits of buying or rejecting. Finally, integrative power can sustain the other forms of power or, in the opposite direction (and therein lies another crucial aspect to the theory of non-violence), cause the power system to break down by denying it loyalty, questioning its legitimacy or retracting support and cooperation (1999: 10-12).

What is crucial for these authors – constituting the basic political assumption of their perspectives on the peaceful resolution of conflicts, is the notion that the flow of sources of power can be restricted or blocked by the population (without needing to resort to violence) by denying opponents consent or cooperation. If oppressed groups repudiate the authority of the opponent, removing its support, refusing to cooperate and persisting in disobedience, it would represent a great challenge and a major blow to any authoritarian and oppressive social group or hierarchical system that depends on support, acceptance or the subjection of subordinate groups to survive (Sharp, 2005: 29, 40; Boulding, 1999: 11). In addition, it is important to note that this type of non-violent action tends to discourage violent reactions, causing the opponent to think twice about the consequences of repression that would use disproportionate coercion, especially the use of physical force. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 11-12) note that some dynamics favour this action's strategic logic. First, the repression of non-violent movements through the use of force usually backfires because it leads to a loss of popular support, as well as internal and external condemnation of those who resort to violence. This repression leads to changes in power relations as it increases domestic support and solidarity for the cause of the non-violent actors, creates dissent against violent opponents and increases external support for non-violent actors. Violent repression of non-violent groups demonstrates that physical force is not always the most efficient weapon for powerful groups. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 12) observe a second dynamic resulting from non-violent action: the opening of channels of negotiation. Although the pressures imposed by non-violent activism challenge opponents and question their source of power, the possible negative impact of a violent



reaction against civilians – when publicly taking on a non-violent behaviour – can discourage the use of force and show the opponent that negotiation offers the best alternative when seeking solutions to a conflict.

There is, in short, a pragmatic logic of peaceful conflict resolution that depends more on strategic interactions between social groups that coexist within a given power system than the principles that underlie its religious and moral beliefs. The key point for the pragmatic aspect of pacifist approaches, therefore, is the idea that the practice of non-violent action is possible and can be successful in resolving conflict between oppressors and the oppressed, not because their religious and ethical foundations are legitimised, but because the "operationalisation of this technique is compatible with the nature of political power and the vulnerability of all hierarchical systems" that depend ultimately on the consent and collaboration "of the people, groups and institutions subordinate to the supply of the necessary sources of power" (Sharp, 2005: 23). This means, in other words, that the effectiveness of non-violent action is the result of a relatively simple strategic logic: deny or block – without the use of physical violence – the necessary sources of an opponent's power in order to strengthen one's own position of power through peaceful groups of resistance.

### **Techniques and Methods of Pragmatic Approaches**

Sharp classifies non-violent action as a technique that can be applied through a set of methods of protest, non-cooperation and intervention (2005: 49). Based on the comprehensive historical analysis, the author notes that this technique is not limited to internal conflicts and democratic contexts, and that its effectiveness does not depend on the "kindness" or "moderation" of opponents, which have already been widely used against powerful governments, despotic regimes, foreign occupations, empires, dictatorships and totalitarian regimes. Among the cases highlighted by Sharp are the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in 1908, 1915 and 1919; non-violent German resistance against the French occupation of the Ruhr region and Belgium in 1923; non-violent resistance of the Indians under the leadership of Gandhi against the British Empire during the 1920s and 1930s; non-violent resistance against Nazi occupation between 1940 and 1945 in countries such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands; the overthrow of dictatorial regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1944 through a brief non-violent campaign; non-violent campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s in the United States against racial segregation; the non-violent struggle and the refusal to cooperate with the Soviets in Czechoslovakia for eight months between 1968 and 1969 shortly after the invasion following the Warsaw Pact; the non-violent struggles for freedom between 1953 and 1991 led by dissidents in communist countries, such as East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; the Solidarity trade union strikes initiated in 1980 in Poland which resulted in the end of the Polish communist regime in 1989; non-violent protests and mass resistance movements between 1950 and 1990 that contributed to weaken the regime of apartheid in South Africa; the non-violent uprising of 1986 that overthrew the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines; the non-violent struggles that led to the end of the communist dictatorships in Europe from 1989; symbolic student protests against corruption and oppression of the Chinese government in 1989 in hundreds of cities around the country (including Tiananmen Square in Beijing); several non-violent



campaigns and refusal to cooperate in the context of the wars in the Balkans throughout the 1990 (Sharp 2005, pp. 16-18). These cases clearly do not exhaust the examples of non-violent action of the last century and, as Sharp emphasises, still occur today. Enormous popular mobilisations, the discipline of non-violence, fearlessness and velocity of events of 2011 that put an end to the lengthy dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt in what became known as the "Arab Spring", give a clear demonstration of the currentness of the theme, contributing to a renewed academic interest in the study of the techniques of non-violent action (Sharp, 2014).

Nevertheless, the techniques of non-violent action, as Sharp stipulates, should not be seen as "magic" (2005: 43). It depends on well-defined objectives and a well-delineated strategy for their results to be effective. Sharp argues that, although some non-violent mobilisations start spontaneously and are often conducted without a great identifiable leader, this does not mean that the actions do not require discipline and that groups, even without outstanding individual leaders, do not require any organisation. Good strategic planning can be decisive for the success of non-violent action. Reproducing the military lexicon, Sharp sees four levels in the planning of actions: the "grand strategy", which serves to coordinate and direct all resources towards achieving the broader goals of the non-violent action; the "strategy", which applies to more limited phases and the definition of specific objectives; "tactics", which refers to the conduct of actions and involves the choice of the most appropriate methods for the confrontation of opponents; and the "methods" itself, which refer to the procedures and specific forms of non-violent action. Sharp also emphasises the importance of logistical work aimed at supporting the conduct of non-violent action in terms of financial arrangements, transport, communications and supplies. According to the author, this set of concerns allows one to focus and direct actions towards desired goals, exploit and exacerbate the weaknesses of the opponent, strengthen practitioners of non-violent action, reduce victims and other costs and make the sacrifices involved in non-violent action serve the main objectives of the action (Sharp, 2005: 444-446). In other terms, strategic planning should be able to strengthen the weakest social groups, weakening the oppressor and, with this, build power relations that lead to a more balanced resolution to the conflict.

In order to achieve the best results in the application of the techniques of non-violent action, Sharp believes that the choice of methods should not be made *a priori*, but rather in the last stage of planning. For the author, each particular strategy requires specific methods that should be chosen and applied in a skillful manner and contribute to achieving the objectives set. Sharp identifies at least 198 specific methods that suit the techniques of non-violent action (2005: 51-64) that shall not be exhausted here. These methods are grouped by author in three main classes: protest and non-violent persuasion; non-cooperation; and non-violent intervention (see examples in table 1).

**Table 1: Examples of methods used in the technique of non-violent action**

<b>Protest and persuasion</b>	<b>Non-cooperation</b>	<b>Non-violent intervention</b>
- Public speaking	- Social boycotts	- Self-exposure to the elements
- Signed manifestos	- Student strike	- Fasting
- Petitions	- Civil disobedience	- Hunger strike
- Slogans, cartoons, symbols	- Search for asylum	- Occupation of public places
- Banners, posters	- Collective emigration	- Occupation of means of transport
- Brochures, pamphlets, books	- Consumer boycott	- Non-violent intervention
- radio, television	- Non-payment of rent	- Non-violent obstruction
- Delegations	- Refusal to rent	- Oral intervention at events
- Pressure groups	- International boycott	- Guerrilla theatre
- Picketing	- Workers' strike	- Creation of alternative social institutions
- Act of undressing in public	- General strike	- Creation of alternative communication system
- Protest art	- Ineffective work <sup>4</sup>	- Reverse strike (excess production)
- Protest songs	- Withdrawal of bank deposits	- Occupation of land
- Offensive gestures	- Refusal to pay fees and taxes	- Defiance of blockades
- Haunting or ridiculing important people	- Refusal to pay debts and interest	- Creation of alternative markets
- Vigils	- International trade embargo	- Creation of alternative transport
- Satirical and theatrical representations	- Boycott elections	- overloading of administrative systems
- Marches and rallies	- Boycott government jobs	- Disclosure of identities of undercover agents
- Political fight	- Refusal to cooperate with agents of repression	- Seek imprisonment
- Mock funerals	- Non-compliance of military recruitment	- Dual sovereignty and parallel government
- Withdraw from events in protest	- uprisings	
- Renouncing of titles and honors	- Non-compliance with government	

Source: Sharp (2005: 51-64)

On the basis of this synthesis of the strategic-pragmatic perspective of Sharp, it is noted that the methods of non-violent action do not differ substantially from the methods employed in Christian resistance movements and pacifist campaigns led by Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Although the effort of systematisation of Sharp should be considered relevant, it is not the methods themselves that distinguish their pragmatic approach but the concern with the strategic issues and the untraveling of non-violent action of the spiritual and moral bases that are heavily present in principled pacifism. Thus, if Gandhi and Martin Luther King remain the classical references and inspiration when one thinks of pacifist approaches to conflict resolution, it is important to note that the pragmatic concerns of Sharp and the growing efforts to give the non-violent action greater effectiveness through the study of its strategic principles are the aspects that have influenced more the current wave of interest in non-violence and presented the greatest challenges for the future development of this research agenda.

<sup>4</sup> Type of strike where the employees work slowly.



## **Present State, Theoretical Challenges and Pathways to Future Developments**

Within the pragmatic tradition, it is important to note that the work inaugurated by Sharp has been developed by a new generation of academics committed to the revival of the study of non-violent action from a more empirical and objective point of view. As Nepstad argues in the preface to his *Non-violent Struggle: Theories, Strategies and Dynamics* (2015), the style of strategic analysis of Sharp and the first generation of pragmatic non-violence scholars that followed was limited to documenting and describing successful historical cases of non-violent movements and typify the technique and methods of non-violent action. This work takes on, according to Nepstad, a certain proselytising bias that seeks to convince readers that non-violence works strategically in various historical cases without, however, worrying about the documentation of unsuccessful cases or theories of non-violence. The author observes, however, that developing comparative analyses, including successful and unsuccessful cases, has begun in the last three decades, which has allowed the critical factors involved in the results achieved by non-violent action to be identified.

In fact, a new generation of researchers has proposed the use of quantitative techniques combined with case studies in the study of non-violence, which tries to overcome not only the criticism usually directed to the idealism of the tradition based on principles and its inability to significantly influence political science, but also the proselytising character identified by Nepstad in the first generation of studies of non-violent action. In this context, Sharp has realised the limitations of pragmatic pacifism and called attention to the biggest challenges, which are to advance the empirical studies, analyses, planning and practice of techniques of non-violent action in extreme conditions. These conditions include severe inter-ethnic conflicts where it is difficult to find compromises between rival groups, in regimes established by coups d' état, in resistance to external aggression and prevention or resistance to genocide attempts (Sharp, 2014). Although Sharp finds several historical examples of non-violent action in situations like these, he believes that the successes were partial and often did not reach their more comprehensive goals, due to a lack of strategic planning and understanding of the power relations involved in the situation. Thus, the author considers the need for further empirical study on what are the most effective non-violent action in these situations to be crucial. Sharp does not always consider the application of the technique of non-violent action to be appropriate against acts of extreme repression. For the author, this technique should not be axiomatically assumed to be superior in all situations and the feasibility of its implementation must be strategically evaluated on a case-by-case basis, compared with the appropriateness of the use of force and the potential problems raised by resistance through violent means. Hence the final challenge presented by Sharp (2014): expand academic investigation and strategic analysis of non-violent action in order to examine and refine the applicability of these techniques in the conflicts generated by coups, civil defence in place of military means (within what has been called the civilian-based defence) and on other matters of national security.

With these concerns in mind, the pragmatic tradition has driven the study of pacifist approaches in the direction of a more consistent empirical re-assessment on the



theories of non-violence of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, as well as on new understandings about how power and civil society mobilisation can be converted into a tool of social and political change. This effort, as Howes highlights, provides "a new basis and a robust set of reasons for pacifism" that complements and goes beyond its traditional normative basis (2013: 438). To explore the explanatory dimension of non-violence, the pragmatic tradition brings expectations of pacifist morality, which are sometimes exaggerated, to a more realistic and compatible level that considers its possibilities and limitations. In addition, this new generation contributes to the construction and testing of theories of non-violent action from a more consistent empirical basis (Nepstad, 2015: preface). These concerns have become increasingly visible in the work of several authors, who have been fuelling the current research agenda on non-violence.

Among these authors, Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) are highlighted for their dialogue with the work of Sharp and trying to refine and test the hypothesis that adherence to a few key strategic principles (for example, the definition of clear objectives, the expansion of the repertoire of non-violent sanctions, the consolidation of the strategic control of actions, the maintenance of non-violent discipline and exploitation of the vulnerabilities of an opponent's power) strengthens the performance and impact of resistance groups, whatever the social and political context of the action (1994: 318). This type of comparative work on non-violent action in different contexts can also be observed in the work of other authors. Nepstad (2011, 2013), for example, compares several successful and unsuccessful cases of non-violent action, aiming to demonstrate not only the impact of strategic variables on the achieved results, but also the influence of structural variables beyond the direct control of the groups involved in non-violent action, like the autonomy or the economic dependence of opponent regimes, the degree of partisan institutionalisation and cohesion of elite rulers, alliances and connections of the international system, the level of benefits received by the military and security forces or perception that soldiers have about the strength or weakness of their regime. In his research, the author shows that although the choice of strategic non-violent action has a major impact on results, structural conditions also matter as they demonstrate, for example, the greater or lesser vulnerability of opponents to the blockades, embargoes and international sanctions, internal divisions or fidelity or mutiny of the military class (2011: 6-9; 2013). Following the same line of comparative analysis, Schock (2005) examines successful and unsuccessful cases of non-violent action in the production of political transformations in non-democratic countries. With this work, the author seeks to empirically support the argument that the characteristics of peaceful movements cannot be isolated from characteristics of political contexts, because the strategic choices and the contextual conditions interact to shape the results.

The joint work of Stephan and Chenoweth (2008, 2011) also fits in this area of comparative analyses of non-violent demonstrations and seeks to identify their successes and failures. They propose a comparison between the effectiveness of the strategic use of violence and non-violent action in conflicts between State and non-State actors, which is perhaps where their most original work resides. Through systematic analysis of a database of more than 300 conflicts between 1900 and 2006 where violent and non-violent resistance were observed, the authors seek to not only identify the causal mechanisms that lead to the achieved results, but also compare



their statistical conclusions with historical cases that have experienced periods of violent and non-violent resistance. Based on this comprehensive set of analyses, the authors conclude that non-violent action is a viable alternative to violent resistance against both democratic and non-democratic opponents, showing itself capable of challenging opponents and influence the resolution of conflicts in a way that favours the resistance groups in 53% of cases (compared with only 26% observed in cases of violent resistance). For Stephan and Chenoweth, this conclusion defies the common sense that violent resistance is the most effective way of challenging conventional adversaries and achieving higher political goals of oppressed groups (2008: 8-9, 42-43).

Véronique Dudouet (2008; 2015) thinks non-violent resistance to be a necessary component for the transformation of conflicts in situations where asymmetrical power relations are observed, especially in the early stages of latent conflicts rooted in structural violence. According to the author, due to its potential for popular "empowerment", for pressuring opponents and gaining the sympathy of third-parties, non-violent action can be a useful tool in the hands of marginalised and disadvantaged communities when searching for a stronger position from which the path to negotiations of concessions can become conducive (2008 : 19). Considering the ability of non-violent action to transform power relations and transform identities through persuasion, continues Dudouet, a combination of principles and pragmatic concerns can make peaceful approaches an important tool of political action, which is able to act through a dual process of dialogue and resistance: dialogue with the most powerful opponent in order to persuade them about justice and the legitimacy of the causes defended by the weaker parties (conversion through principles), and resistance to unjust power structures with the goal of pushing for social and political changes (a more strategic focus). While investigating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2008: 14, 16-19) Dudouet notes, however, that conditions for the operation of this dialectical process tend to be hampered in the more advanced stages of the conflict or in situations which show a high degree of polarisation between opponents and non-negotiable aspects. In these extreme cases, the author considers that non-violent action alone may not be effective in the prevention of misunderstandings and overcoming of hatred between parties, and hypothetically suggests that there is a need to integrate non-violent action with a transformative strategy that includes multiple forms of intervention, such as negotiation, mediation, intervention of third-parties and other traditional techniques of peacemaking and peacebuilding. To test this hypothesis, the author considers additional empirical investigations to be important when identifying points of contact and favourable conditions for the combination of non-violent action with other traditional forms of intervention in asymmetric and sustained conflicts<sup>5</sup>, not only for parties in the conflict, but also for external parties interested in supporting or facilitating complementarity between these different approaches to conflict resolution (2008: 21).

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<sup>5</sup> Although the conceptualisation of asymmetric conflict is complex and feeds a growing agenda for research on the topic, one could say, in a simplified way, that the central defining element of this type of conflict is the significant power difference between the parties. As the editors of the journal *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* claim in its inaugural issue, traditional war balanced between organised military forces and state professionals has become rare, leading to asymmetric violence between State and non-State groups, which are becoming the predominant form of conflict in the world today. View: Editorial (2008) "Editors' welcome to the inaugural issue of *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*", *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 1 (1): 1-5.



What is critical to note from these indications is that a new horizon of research opens, taking the pacifist approaches of a certain type and inserting them within a broader framework, along with the approaches that traditionally have had greater visibility in the field of conflict resolution. However, this way is only the beginning; additional empirical investigations is required to allow for the examination of a wide range of issues. In addition to the previously highlighted aspect about the need to investigate the opportunities and favourable conditions for the combination of non-violent action with other traditional forms of intervention in asymmetric and prolonged conflicts, Dudouet (2008: 21) suggests new questions: to what extent does the technique and methods of non-violent action play a major role in post-conflict situations in the context of peacebuilding and democratic consolidation? To what extent can integration of negotiation techniques and traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in preparatory training programmes for non-violent action contribute to prevent polarisation between parties and ensure that the achievements of non-violent action leading to the emergence of new versions of the structures of the old system? How are external actors able to inspire and encourage civil society to adopt non-violent action, without them being perceived as imposing foreign models or attempting to "pacify" local activists? As one can see through the challenges and the range of issues suggested in this section, pacifist approaches are far from reaching a point of exhaustion.

## Conclusion

The purpose of this article is to present an overview of the pragmatic aspects of pacifist approaches. The efforts of conceptualisation and typification of non-violent action undertaken by the first generation debates on the topic – centred on the figure of Gene Sharp – were highlighted along with some developments and challenges faced by second generation authors, who are dedicated to refining and testing hypotheses about non-violence from a consistent empirical base. A clear shift of focus of the approaches based on principles to pragmatic approaches can be observed, and an effort to go beyond the assumption that non-violent action is superior in every situation and under any condition has also been highlighted. Thus, even when the researchers currently involved with the study of non-violence resort to classical references of principled pacifism like Gandhi and Martin Luther King, their concerns focus more on the question of the effectiveness of the authors' activism than the religious and moral principles that underlie their approaches. The current generation of authors involved with pragmatic pacifism derive techniques from Gandhi and Martin Luther King and the theory of power/consent of the first generation of pragmatic pacifism hypotheses that can be tested empirically. These recent developments reveal a currentness, a vitality and complexity for the research agenda of non-violence that can give a renewed practical and theoretical contribution to the field of conflict resolution that goes beyond the caricatures and stereotypes through which pacifist approaches have traditionally been seen.

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## **POWER-SHARING: CONCEPTS, DEBATES AND GAPS**

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### **Abstract**

Academic literature tends to reflect the two main objectives of power-sharing: promoting the construction of sustainable peace and serving to structure the foundations for growth and development of democracy in divided societies. reflecting this, two dimensions and discourses of analysis and evaluation stand out: a classical dimension centred on power-sharing as theory and a normative proposal for democracy in divided societies, and another focused mainly on power-sharing as a mechanism of conflict management. This article aims to introduce the reader to discussions about power-sharing, reviewing and critically analysing power-sharing literature to show its gaps and tensions, as well as suggesting some points where one can continue the debate.

### **Keywords**

Power-sharing; "Consociationalism"; Structuralism; Peace; Democracy; Conflicts

### **How to cite this article**

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## **POWER-SHARING: CONCEPTS, DEBATES AND GAPS<sup>1</sup>**

**Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho**

### **Power-sharing: Introduction**

The scientific literature dedicated to power-sharing emerged in the late 1960s as a normative proposal that aimed to provide democratic stability in divided societies<sup>2</sup> through the accommodation and inclusion of political elites along with incentives for the promotion of moderation and restraint. Driven mainly by the work of Arend Lijphart (1969; 1977a; 1977b) who defines power-sharing as a "government cartel of political elites"<sup>3</sup> that, in essence, is

*"a set of principles which, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide each significant group in a society with representation and decision-making capacities in general affairs and a degree of autonomy on matters of particular importance to their group"* (Lijphart 1977a: 25).

The scientific literature on power-sharing corresponds, according to Horowitz (2005), with the study of the political conditions in which violence in multi-ethnic societies occurs and, therefore, the identification of requirements to manage and prevent such conflicts. Therefore, they are studies of political "engineering" with a view to design an inclusive and peaceful institutional framework in divided societies.

Power-sharing studies focus on structuring options of political systems that can manage and combat the destructive potential of inter-communitarian divisions (or its manipulation for political purposes). Timothy Sisk (1996: 5) defined the theory of power-sharing as

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<sup>2</sup> Divided society should be understood as a society that is multi-ethnic and, simultaneously, where ethnicity as well as identity questions configure a politically salient division. Reilly (2001:4)

<sup>3</sup> Originally, Lijphart (1969:216) wrote "[...] *consociational democracy means government by an elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.*" The term *consociational* was, as Lijphart (2008:6) explains later, replaced by power-sharing.



*"a set of principles that, when carried out through practices and institutions, provide every significant group or segment in a society representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group".*

In theoretical terms, power-sharing allows the pacification of clashing groups involved in historical antagonisms and discrimination, in order to enable the construction of just and stable societies through more inclusive political representation. However, the way power-sharing is achieved institutionally is variable and diverse (O'Flynn and Russell, 2005).

Thus, power-sharing theories must understand the study of structural conditions in which violence in divided and multi-ethnic societies emerge, as well as the subsequent institutional requirements to prevent such conflicts in a way that is democratically sustainable and inclusive. Often named "constitutional engineering studies", power-sharing theories have the objective of developing an institutional framework that effectively combats the politics of ethnic exclusion of majoritarian models in plural and polarised societies.

### **The dangers of tyranny of the majority**

The different approaches of power-sharing theories – both in its dimension of democratic theory as well as conflict management) – share a mutual recognition of the limitations and dangers of (simple) majoritarian democracy in divided societies and advocate the benefits of political engineering in order to define more inclusive governance models that can mitigate latent conflicts. Both allude to the problems of exclusion in majoritarian systems, such as distortions in political representation and/or the potential of a "dictatorship of the majority", in which minority groups may be permanently unable to obtain political representation or access to political power:

*"[...] ethnic parties developed, majorities took power, minorities took shelter. It was a fearful situation, in which the prospect of minority exclusion from government underpinned by ethnic voting was potentially permanent." Horowitz (1985: 629-630)*

In the international context of the Second World War, newly independent countries had a tendency to assume the same constitutional rules previously established by the old colonial orders (Lijphart 2004). Power-sharing theories originated in this way, in product and response to independence and the difficulties in implementing and consolidating democratic processes in plural societies during the regression of the second wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991).

The main premise set out by proponents of power-sharing relates to the disadvantages of the applicability of (simple) majoritarian democracy in divided and plural societies. This assumption is based on an empirical assertion that, in plural societies with



majoritarian political systems, some segments of society face potentially permanent political exclusion from the electoral game. Larry Diamond (1999:104) summarises the disadvantage of majoritarian models in divided societies, affirming that:

*"If any generalisation about institutional design is sustainable (...) it is that majoritarian systems are ill-advised for countries with deep ethnic, regional, religious or other emotional and polarising divisions. Where cleavage groups are sharply defined and group identities (and inter-group insecurities and suspicions) deeply felt, the overriding imperative is to avoid broad and indefinite exclusion from power of any significant group."*

In a majoritarian democracy, divided societies tend to perceive electoral competition as a contest for possession and domination of the State and its resources, exacerbating the adversarial dimension of politics as well as its conduct. This perception tends to escalate during electoral periods, since access to political power can represent the guarantee of protection of rights and political, economic and even physical survival.

Robert Dahl (1973) refers to the concept of "mutual security" and emphasises its importance during electoral periods in ethnically divided societies, arguing that elections, being the primary forum for inter-group competition, need a minimum level of rights protection because a defeat in the electoral competition could pose a threat to survival. This notion of mutual assurance is, according to Dahl, a prerequisite for electoral competition in societies with deep divisions, and its absence underscores the nature of the zero-sum game of 'winner-takes-all' – a naturally adversarial political game.<sup>4</sup> Atuobi (2008), in his analysis of electoral violence on the African continent, states that electoral processes are moments where the stability and security of African States is undermined due to the threat of electoral violence, whose state is such that even elections considered fair and free are not immune to violence, before, during or after.

According to the proponents of "power-sharing" (Lijphart 1969, 1977a, 1977b and 2008; Horowitz 1985 and 1993), majoritarian models of multi-ethnic societies carry the risk of promoting the permanent exclusion of minorities from access to power (or access to the decision-making process), leveraging a situation of "tyranny of the majority" (where groups are permanently barred from the political decision-making process because of their demographic weight). However, this does not mean that the power-sharing model is anti-majoritarian, as Arend Lijphart explains (2008:12):

*"Power-sharing democracy (of both the consociational and consensus subtype) is often described as non-majoritarian, and even anti-majoritarian or counter-majoritarian – and I have used*

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<sup>4</sup> For the distinction between the adversarial nature of majority democracies and the "Coalescent" nature of power-sharing systems, please see Lijphart (1977). An example of the adversarial nature of a majority system can be observed in the main roots of conflict following the Kenyan general elections of 2007 (CIPEV, 2008), which deals with the history of several leaders and political elites, who exercised ethnic identity manipulation through mobilising their respective segment of the electorate (Mbugua, 2008). The adversarial nature of high-risk electoral competition and political conduct in Kenya was summed up in the title of a book by Michela Wrong (2009): "It's our turn to eat."



*those terms myself, too. In fact, however, power-sharing does not deviate much from the basic principle of majority rule. It agrees with that fundamental premise that majority rule is superior to minority rule, but it accepts majority rule as a minimum requirement: instead of being satisfied with narrow decision-making majorities, it seeks to maximise the size of these majorities. The real contrast is not so much between majoritarian and non-majoritarian but the between bare-majority and broad majority models of democracy".*

The concept of power-sharing is intrinsically linked to the concept of democracy: like the democratic model, power-sharing seeks the inclusion of segments of society that are excluded from the political decision-making process. The democratic model is inherently considered as a fair and stable system of conflict management in post-war contexts and/or divided societies (Lijphart, 1977a and 2008)<sup>5</sup> for its capacity to transform ethnic or group violence into participation and peaceful political competition.

Nevertheless, such a democratic claim does not imply that power-sharing is only successful or unique to a democratic institutional framework: as an example, Milton Esman (1986) recalls that the Ottoman Empire – whose population was predominantly Muslim – accommodated non-Muslim communities for five centuries, guaranteeing them a degree of autonomy, self-determination and self-management. Similarly, some post-colonial autocratic African regimes have managed informally to balance the executive among various groups, so that power (as well as its access) and resources are distributed proportionally. Rothchild (1986) refers to these executives as "hegemonic exchange regimes", where a portion of State power and its resources are shared proportionately among groups, which is crucial to ensure a degree of balance and accommodation whilst controlling democratic freedoms (Rothchild, 1995).<sup>6</sup>

### **Two perspectives on power-sharing: the no man's land between democratic theory and conflict management**

The academic literature tends to reflect the two major objectives of the sharing of power – i) to promote the construction of sustainable peace and ii) serve as a structure for the foundation, growth and development of democracy in divided societies. Reflecting this, two dimensions and discourses of analysis and evaluation tend to stand out: a (classical) dimension centred on power-sharing along with a theory of democracy for divided societies, and another focused mainly on power-sharing and conflict management mechanisms.

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<sup>5</sup> Lijphart argues "Not only have non-democratic regimes failed to be good nation-builders, they have not even established good records of maintaining order and peace in plural societies" (Lijphart 1977a).

<sup>6</sup> Kenya during 24 years under the tutelage of Daniel arap Moi is a good example of this proportional attribution of governmental and executive positions to different ethnic groups, even when it was a one-party State. The Kenyan government through several administrations often included representatives of various ethnic groups in different administrations, although the vast majority of power has always been entrusted to the ethnic group affiliated to the President (the most powerful position in the country's political structure) (Ng'weno 2009).



## Power-sharing as democratic theory

The debate about constitutional engineering in democratic theory revolves around two major philosophies: on the one hand, the theory of power-sharing, divided between the "consociational" – accredited to the pioneering work of Arend Lijphart (1977a 1977b; 1969;; 1985; 1990; 1996; 1999; 2004; 2008) – and the "integrative" or "structuralist" theory, which is more associated with Donald Horowitz (1985; 1990; 1991; 1993) and Timothy Sisk (1996); and, on the other hand, an alternative developed by Roeder and Rothchild (2005) of power-dividing<sup>7</sup> in line with the political-institutional framework of north American democracy. Hoddie and Hartzell (2005) raise caution, however, to the question of effects of sequential transition from a conflict situation to one of democratic peace through the mechanism/dynamic of power-dividing<sup>8</sup>.

The "consociational" theory as advocated by Lijphart defines four basic principles<sup>9</sup>, two of central importance, and two other of secondary relevance (Lijphart 1996: 258-268; 2008: 3-32):

- 1.** A Grand Coalition (i.e. an executive comprising of representatives of the main religious and language groups);
- 2.** Cultural autonomy to these groups (e.g., federalism; decision-making capacity on matters pertaining specifically to a group, etc.)
- 3.** Proportionality in political representation;
- 4.** Possibility of a minority veto regarding vital rights of minority groups.

Lijphart stresses that the institutions and the conduct that will incorporate these principles should be adopted according to the society. Given that each principle of the "consociational" theory can be applied for different models and formats, Lijphart recommends that this system includes the four basic principles. Lijphart also advocates the superiority of parliamentary models before presidential models<sup>10</sup>, as well as the preference for proportional electoral systems at the expense of majoritarian systems (such as the first-past-the-post model of Westminster). Although "consociational" democracy is not incompatible with presidential systems, electoral majoritarian systems and centralised governance structures, Lijphart considers that the most appropriate constitutional structure is provided by parliamentary regimes, proportional representation and, in the case of societies where there are geographical concentrations of ethnic or religious groups, federalism. Lijphart (2008) sets out some facilitative conditions favourable to "consociationalism":

- The absence of a solid majority who might prefer a majority system;
- Socio-economic inequalities (and to a lesser extent, linguistic and religious issues);
- Number of existing groups (complexity of negotiation);

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<sup>7</sup> For the purposes of brevity, this article does not focus on power-dividing and the evolution of the debate about constitutional engineering in divided societies.

<sup>8</sup> Initially increased measures of confidence (i.e. power-sharing institutions) are necessary, while the consolidation phase of a democracy is dominated by issues of stability, meaning that institutions of power-dividing are needed. To see more, please consult Roeder and Rothchild (2005)

<sup>9</sup> The first version of the definition of power-sharing by Lijphart in 1969 only included the first feature. The definition here is from his Indian case study of 1996, which contains a final formulation.

<sup>10</sup> About the limitations of presidential systems, also see Linz (1994).



- Dimension of these groups (balance of power and importance of non-dominance);
- Existence of external threats (that promote internal cohesion);
- Pre-existing alliances and loyalties;
- In the case of existing geographical concentrations of groups, federalism facilitates segmental autonomy; and finally,
- Traditions of compromise and accommodation.

For his part, Horowitz (1985), through an "integrative" or "structuralist" approach<sup>11</sup>, defended the adoption of five distinct mechanisms of the model presented by Lijphart to reduce conflict in multi-ethnic societies, namely:

1. The dispersion of power, often territorially (decentralisation), in order to avoid the concentration of power at a single point;
2. Devolution of power with the exception of certain places destined to have an ethnic basis in order to promote inter-ethnic competition at a local level;
3. Interethnic cooperation incentives, such as electoral laws that promote pre-electoral coalitions;
4. Regulatory policies that encourage alternative social alignments, such as class or territory, thus the emphasis on cross-cutting social cleavages;
5. Reduce inequalities between groups by managing the distribution of resources.

It should be noted that some recommendations of Horowitz match Lijphart on certain topics: e.g., both advocate the federal model and reveal the importance of proportionality and ethnic balance. It is important, however, to take into account that all of them (the models of power-sharing to power-dividing) are ideal conceptual frameworks where empirical combinations of the three theories are possible.

### **Power-sharing as a mechanism of conflict resolution**

*"It is easy for you and me and many others to sit there, deliberate and criticise power-sharing but there's a big elephant in the room: if we did not have power-sharing in Zimbabwe and Kenya, flawed as it is, what other option would we have had?" – Blessing Miles Tendi*

If the majority of scientific literature (classical theories in particular) on power-sharing was being developed throughout the second half of the 20th century (especially in the

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<sup>11</sup> The classifications "integrative" and "structuralist" come from the criticism that Horowitz establishes, which states that the "consociationalist" theory should stop punishing political radicalism, while its proposal tends to reflect a promotion of moderation and cooperation in inter-group politics. Other proponents of the "integrative" option: Reilly (2001); Sisk (1996).



1970s and 1980s), the debate on power-sharing was resumed at the turn of the century. However, this most recent literature is mainly focused on the sustainability of power-sharing applied as resolution mechanisms or conflict management. Such a resurgence has revealed new analyses concerning recent power-sharing that has, in turn, pointed in the opposite direction to that which the classical theories have defended. Indeed, several authors (Noel, 2005; O'Flynn and Russell, 2005; Spears, 2005; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Jarstad, 2008; Mehler, 2009a and 2009b; Levan, 2011) argue that power-sharing has gone against classical literature and intended to:

- Drive anti-democratic and radicalised behaviour;
- Inhibit the transition from conflict management to conflict resolution by encouraging extremism;
- Stifle internal diversity and its recognition in favour of community identities and collective concerns;
- Show difficulty in recognising and dealing with cross-segmental identities;
- Left insufficient space for individual autonomy;
- Damage relationships of transparency and accountability;
- Increase the economic inefficiency of governments;
- Foster the conditions for government deadlocks and stalemates;

A. Carl LeVan (2011) focuses his attention to a three-dimensional analysis of power-sharing:

- 1)** its *origin* – extra-constitutional or coalition pacts produced by institutions;
- 2)** its *function* – post-war scenarios or situations where the State runs less risk;
- 3)** its *time horizon* – dilemmas between long-term costs and short-term benefits.

Based on this conceptual framework, LeVan (2011) suggests that the trend of power-sharing agreements achieved as a post-election conflict-resolution instrument, or in order to avoid an even greater escalation of the conflict, could be undermining efforts for promoting democracy on the African continent in recent decades ("peace before process"). This type of agreement of an extra-constitutional origin – despite its recent popularity, has however been encouraged in academia and policy-making not only in peace promotion and conflict resolution, but also in democratic theory and promoting alternative democratic models. Indeed, Anna Jarstad (2008) states that both currents (democratic theory, on the one hand, and resolution or conflict management on the other) can advocate power-sharing for distinctly antagonistic reasons, since one of the dimensions has as its main objective the cessation of violence, and the other, the building (or deepening) of a more inclusive and proportional democracy. Both are not necessarily compatible, particularly when a power-sharing agreement is reached as an alternative to elections, which reflects, as well, the lack of cohesion and holistic analysis that the debate on the viability and sustainability of power-sharing still denotes:



*"In the conflict management discourse, power-sharing is seen as a mechanism to manage the uncertainty in the peace process – if need be, as a substitute for elections – while research based on democratic theory treats power-sharing as a mechanism to foster moderation and to improve the quality of democracy. This means that researchers of both schools advocate power-sharing for war-shattered societies, albeit for different reasons. However, the lack of integration between the two discourses means that there is limited knowledge of the long-term consequences of power-sharing in societies emerging from war. "(Jarstad 2008:111)*

Jarstad, Ian S. Spears (2005) states that power-sharing and democracy can be compatible, since one does not substitute the other. Additionally, Spears also gives clues to resistance on the part of political elites to implement power-sharing agreements in post-conflict situations. This takes into account the structural problems of many countries on the African continent – alluding to the importance of the debates that the international relations literature has provided on issues of failed or weak States and contemporary violent conflicts (often intrastate and informal in nature), the Third World security predicament – but that the literature on power-sharing has neglected:

*"Power-sharing has been repeatedly advocated as a method of post-conflict governance in Africa. In virtually all cases, however, the results have been the same: including power-sharing agreements have been resisted by local leaders or, if accepted, have rarely been fully implemented or adhered to over the long term. Given this unimpressive record, it is remarkable that power-sharing nevertheless continues to be the centrepiece of so many African peace initiatives. To expect power-sharing to work in Africa is to expect it to work under the most difficult conditions, and this, in fact, is part of the problem. For the conditions of anarchy that accompany civil war and state collapse often require solutions that are prior to, or in addition to, power-sharing – or ones that exclude power-sharing altogether." <sup>12</sup>*

Mehler (2009a) stresses, like LeVan (2011), the need to analyse power-sharing in addition to mitigation analysis of the conflict, arguing that power-sharing should be seen as a process and not as an event, citing the current example of success of Burundi<sup>13</sup>, which after 20 years of trying was considered an example of failure.

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<sup>12</sup> Spears, Ian S. "Anarchy and the Problems of Power Sharing in Africa" in Sid Noel (ed.) *From Power Sharing to Democracy*, Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005. Pp. 184-197.

<sup>13</sup> See also Vandengiste (2009).



## **Which way for the debate on power-sharing?**

Classical theories of power-sharing focused primarily on permanent designs (though not necessarily static) of institutional engineering for the political accommodation of different groups in a divided society. The recent power-sharing literature has focused mainly on power-sharing as a temporary mechanism in peace agreements in favour of a security imperative, even if it is antagonistic to the democratisation efforts of prior decades. However, little attention has been given to power-sharing as a dynamic process with advances, setbacks and transitions.

The studies of "constitutional engineering" that propose the adoption of inclusive policies for pluralistic, divided and/or in-transition societies have been developed since the late 1960s. However, this type of political science has only recently begun to be studied in relation to conflict of a third kind (Holsti, 1996), which are frequent on the African continent despite the theme of contemporary intra-State conflicts being closely linked to governance issues and the formation of States and their structural (im)balances. The study of power-sharing agreements, particularly in the context of Africa, gains increasing prominence as an instrument for analysis of the path of democratic consolidation on the continent.

Power-sharing arrangements have succeeded in Africa in recent years (Mehler, 2009; Levan, 2011). Mehler (2009) points to 17 countries of the African continent as having had "meaningful" power-sharing agreements only between 1999 and 2009, while Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) recall that, of 38 peace processes between 1945 and 1999 as a result of the negotiation to the end of civil wars, only one – the Gbadolite in 1989 – did not contain any element or norm of power-sharing. Over the years, several African countries have had a history of experience in the field of constitutional engineering to design and develop democratic institutional frameworks that have tended to be more inclusive (e.g., Nigeria, Burundi); recent popularity, on the other hand, seems to be focused mainly on the inclusion of power-sharing as a mechanism for the management and prevention of violent conflicts through the negotiation of peace agreements (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007; Mehler, 2009). The African continent, considering the amount of countries composed of multi-ethnic societies for which the theories of *power-sharing* were initially designed and developed, as well as the frequency of violent conflict and arising peace processes, it is fertile ground for the emergence of these agreements.

However, in the vast literature on power-sharing, research agendas and analytical approaches have focused almost exclusively on an institutional perspective and elites, both in its latest dimension of mitigation and conflict management as in the classical theoretical approach to power-sharing, as well as its normative political engineering proposal for a permanent institutional structure based on the accommodation of political elites. This has prevented a holistic and interdisciplinary analysis in studies on the power-sharing and its consequences, especially in Africa where it has been dominant since the end of the cold war.

It is especially surprising that, with the renewed academic interest on this topic, the influence of the nature of political parties and party systems in power-sharing situations and its dynamics and consequences are comparatively neglected to the detriment of



the dominant top-down analysis<sup>14</sup>. Even though political parties are one of the main actors in any political system because of their ability to channel, aggregate and express political wills – and stop power deadlocks for not only the management and resolution of conflicts in societies in which they are placed, but also act as privileged agent in the consolidation of democracy – power-sharing studies tend to keep their focus on small groups of elites or national institutions with no major considerations for bottom-up processes or tensions that exist among institutions, elites, political parties and segments of society. The academic literature has been profuse in evaluating the success or failure of power-sharing, but still pays little attention to the power-sharing process, its dynamics and variations. For example, the transition to a dynamic centrifuge in the first two years of power-sharing in Kenya (2008-2013) to the centripetal dynamic of 2010 onwards is seemingly absent from academic literature that, with all its conflicting conclusions, does not offer great insights to explain the mutations that have been experienced by the Unity Government in Kenya. If there is something that the proposed power-sharing theories suggest, it is that their discourse – with all its ability to empower and give visibility, selection and legitimation – is not enough to understand all the variables, dynamics and relevant actors<sup>15</sup> to determine success or failure.

Finally, the absence of more interdisciplinary analysis (even in sub-fields of Political Science and International Relations where it comes from) of power-sharing has meant that the debate on its merits and disadvantages for the promotion and consolidation of democracy and peace remain inconclusive. Perhaps, however, there is a more relevant matter that has been entirely absent from the debate: what *kind* of peace and democracy has power-sharing promoted?

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<sup>14</sup> Some exceptions must be mentioned: Reilly and Nordlund, 2008; Shah, 2009; Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; 2013 Carvalho.

<sup>15</sup> One of the few references about the important role that the Kenyan civil society played in the power-sharing agreement and the implementation of its mandate can be read in Ghai and Ghai (2010).



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## THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN THE MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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### Abstract

The end of the Cold War changed the paradigm of the role and scope of military force in the management and resolution of conflicts. With increasing intervention by the international community, the new generation of peacekeeping operations has adopted a multidimensional approach to military force to be used in coordination with other instruments of power, ensuring a proper strategic framework considering the desired end state.

This new approach and the increasing complexity of conflicts, predominantly intrastate in nature, have led on the one hand to understandings of the traditional principles of peace operations being addressed, and on the other to military forces facing diverse challenges. The most complex is related to the effective use of combat capabilities, as it seems that there is a lack of political will, after making the deployment of forces, to ensure their effective use. However, the effective use of force being the most critical element, but simultaneously more differentiating and characterising of the use of the military instrument, the management and resolution of conflicts has elevated the range of capabilities of military forces that goes beyond traditional capabilities combat, showing themselves useful in support, complement or replacement of non-military capabilities.

### Keywords

Military force; Instruments of power; Conflict resolution; Peace operations

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## **USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>**

**António Oliveira**

### **Introduction**

The international community, including the United Nations, with the support of some regional organisations such as NATO and the European Union, have increasingly intervened in the management and resolution of conflicts. Constituting a "third party", they invest their efforts in the implementation of coercive and non-coercive methods in order to defuse antagonism among opponents and to promote a lasting cessation of violence.

According to Ramos-Horta (2015: ix), the prevention of armed conflict is perhaps the greatest responsibility of the international community. But when this prevention is not possible, the so-called "peacekeepers" are often forced to intervene to help enforce and maintain a safe environment, preventing the resumption of violence and providing a safe space for the advancement of political processes.

The characteristics of the current operational environments, along with the multiple actors involved – of which the population is the most important – have increased the complexity of conflicts. Thus, operations involved in their management and resolution require the execution of an increasingly broad spectrum of tasks by the military. However, conflict resolution is also done based on non-coercive measures, which implies that the use of military should be balanced and integrated with other instruments of power. The traditional use of military forces in the context of conflict resolution seems to be undergoing rapid evolution, where its action is developed in a much more complex environment. Thus, as stated by Smith (2008: 429), "the desired result should be known before deciding whether the military has a role to play in achieving this result".

In this context, they pose a set of questions that are the basis of decision making for the use of military force in this context. What are its functions? What is the context for its use and how does it combine with other instruments of power? What conditions are necessary and what principles should be respected? Can combat capabilities in situations of military force be effectively employed?

To answer these questions, in the first topic we dwell on the framework for the use of armed force in resolving conflicts. A second part deals with the conceptualisation of

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operations based on the military approach to this subject. Finally, the text deals with the use of military means in this context, including the effective use of combat capabilities.

## **1. Military force in the context of conflict resolution**

### **1.1. The functions of military force**

The military has always played an important role in international relations. However, its priorities have been changing, adapting to the evolution of strategic contexts, successively used first as a means of coercion, then as a deterrent and more recently as a tool for the prevention and resolution of conflicts (Espírito-Santo, 2003: 235). This form of use should be regarded not as a succeeding substitution of the context of use, but as a broadening of the spectrum of use.

In this spectrum, generically, military force can accomplish five strategic functions: to destroy, coerce, deter, contain or improve (Smith, 2008: 370). These functions will be performed in isolation or in combination, according to the strategic concept that achieves the desired political result, and can be developed at different levels, individually or in a complementary manner (Garcia, 2010: 70), independent of the activities to execute.

In the context of security and defence in the XXI century, the military runs three main types of activities: (i) traditional combat operations; (ii) a wide range of "non-traditional" activities, ranging from humanitarian assistance to special operations through to the peace operations; and (iii) support activities and interaction with other instruments of power (Alberts, 2002: 39). This spectrum of usage reflects very significant changes associated with a growing appreciation of the actions developed by use of non-military vectors. This trend has become more pronounced and results in more effective diplomatic, economic and psychological strategies, as well as the problems inherent to the use of military force (Barrento, 2010: 306).

The conduct of military operations began to be the "art of the possible," implying that more and more forces adapt to non-military contexts and political, legal, socio-cultural, economic, technological and geographical constraints (Gray, 2006: 31). Thus, in addition to the means, the use of military force started to require another fundamental prerequisite: opportunity (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 171).

International organisations<sup>2</sup> supported the perspective that the use of armed force to manage international relations and maintain peace is legitimate, appropriate and often necessary (Zartman *et al.*, 2007: 422) and have progressively come to intervene to safeguard peace between States as well as within them (David, 2001: 313). The opportunity for the employment of military forces is created and, thus, they are increasingly called upon to intervene under the so-called "conflict resolution".

But this new perspective of action also brought qualitative changes in the use of military force. Objectives on a strategic and operational level are no longer related to the destruction or imposition of conditions to an enemy and now aim to shape it or change the will of the population (Smith, 2008: 42) and the warring parties.

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<sup>2</sup> Especially the United Nations, supported and complemented by other regional organisations.



Consequently, strategic functions, while retaining their ends, saw contexts change significantly as they are implemented, especially through the concept of enemy elimination, a non-applicable concept in the context of conflict resolution.


So, instead of carrying out its strategic functions in a traditional war scenario, the deployment of the military in this context can be seen as a step by the international community to resolve differences and confrontations without recourse to war, while contributing to security in collective terms (Segal and Waldman, 1998: 185).

## 1.2. The context for use - the integrated approach

In general terms, the strategic objectives defined for an operation aimed at resolving a conflict are usually related to security, governance and economic development (AJP-01 (D), 2010: 2-12).

In strictly military terms, the final state can be considered achieved when the rule of law is established, internal security mechanisms regain control and the levels of violence are within normal standards for the society in the region in question. However, achieving military objectives and creating a stable and secure environment is no guarantee of achieving a self-sustaining situation of peace (AJP-1 (C), 2007: 1-8). The implementation of an operation may help curb violence in the short term, but it is unlikely to result in a sustainable and lasting peace if it is not accompanied by programmes designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict (Capstone, 2008: 25). Thus, military success and reaching military targets should be seen as decisive aspects in order to achieve the desired overall end state, where it is essential to establish a dynamic balance with non-military objectives (Alberts, 2002: 48), using the military instrument in coordination with other instruments of power<sup>3</sup>.

**Fig. 1 - Balance of the instruments of power (adapted from the Smart Power Equaliser)**



Source:

[http://mountainrunner.us/images/SmartPowerEqualizerfindingthemix\\_FA88/smartpower\\_20thC2.gif](http://mountainrunner.us/images/SmartPowerEqualizerfindingthemix_FA88/smartpower_20thC2.gif)

<sup>3</sup> According to the relevant fields, there are several ways to effect the systematisation of instruments of power: (I) DIME (diplomatic, informational, military and economic Instruments) in the current doctrine of the Atlantic Alliance (AJP-01 (C), 2007): 2-18); (ii) DIMLIFE (diplomatic, informational, military, economic, law and order, intelligence and financial instruments) in US counter-terrorism strategy, which considers a broader range of instruments; some states do not acknowledge the informational instrument, considering it both as a component and a requirement necessary for other instruments (AJP1- (D), 2010: 1-3).



The relationship between these instruments, as regarded by Gray (2006: 15), is always contextual, conditioning their application. In the context of prevention, management and resolutions of conflict, the degree of use of each instrument is influenced by intended coercion level of the actors in the confrontation and uses the military elements that directly influence this level of coercion<sup>4</sup> (Oliveira 2011: 65).

This holistic and synergistic use is commonly called the "comprehensive approach" and is based on coordinated action between various actors - political, diplomatic, economic, military, non-governmental, civil society and business (MCDC, 2014: 115). Being linked to the strategic, operational and tactical levels, it is supported by the planning and direction of the execution (AJP-1 (D), 2010): 2-11), in which the use of different systems converge methodologically with a combination of multinational and multidisciplinary solutions (Oliveira, 2011: 65).

### **1.3. The specific framework for the employment of the military instrument**

The use of military force in the management and resolution of conflicts is conditioned by the appropriate conceptual framework that correctly interprets the operational environment through the force and its commanders (AJP-1 (D), 2010: 1-10). The confusion of conceptual and doctrinal division of operations is usually preannouncing of failure, because the degree of commitment of the military, the elements to engage with and the terms in which the mandate allows them to act (Jones, 2009: 7) are preconditions for success.

The use of the military components in this environment requires a deep understanding of three vectors that are interrelated: (I) the actors involved – supporters, opponents and neutrals in the presence of force; (ii) the operational environment, the different perspectives, and (iii) the tasks to be performed (AJP-01 (D), 2010: 2-14).

Addressing the relationship between the various vectors, Binnendijk and Johnson (2004) published some findings of a study<sup>5</sup> that examined a number of interventions in conflict situations, suggesting that success depended essentially on three controllable factors: (i) the resources allocated to resolve the conflict; (ii) the volume of military force used; and (iii) the time allocated for the process of conflict resolution. Interventions are also dependent on two uncontrollable factors: (i) internal characteristics and (ii) geopolitical interests of third parties.

These studies were designed with the military instrument as the main variable<sup>6</sup> of the cases studied, and one of the lessons learned is that there is a strong correlation between the amount of resources used and the degree of success<sup>7</sup>. With the increasing complexity and multidisciplinary of operations, this correlation has not been clear and it became one of the dilemmas of its materialisation. If, on the one hand, a large

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<sup>4</sup> The result of the balanced use of different instruments of power can be compared to the sound achieved through an equaliser, being altered by intervention in the intensity of each of them and the basic sound selection - the desired level of coercion (Oliveira 2011: 65).

<sup>5</sup> Original study by Larry K. Wentz.

<sup>6</sup> For a specific analysis of this variable, success in a military perspective is easily measured as it is related to achieving military objectives, which embody the so-called military end state (AJP-01 (C), 2007: 1-4).

<sup>7</sup> This conclusion was being called into question by other studies.



volume of forces promotes safety, on the other hand it introduces the risk of stimulating local resistance to an intrusive foreign presence in the local community. In another approach, a reduced number of forces minimises the encouragement of nationalist impulses against the presence, and can be very effective in maintaining a stable and secure environment in the territory (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 81). For this dilemma <sup>8</sup> Some UN force commanders argue that volume is not critical, being less important to the effectiveness of the force of the command unit and the removal of caveats introduced in various military contingents (Mood, 2015: 2).

The timing of an operation creates another dilemma: maintaining a presence to prevent the resumption of hostilities and/or opportunism due to the weakness of local institutions or withdrawal of forces in order to avoid the danger of local population resistance to prolonged presence (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 85). According to Binnendijk and Johnson (2004: 4:05), in this dilemma it is affirmed that the maintenance of means for a long period cannot guarantee success, though their rapid withdrawal can precipitate failure. Being variable in each case, the historical cases point to a time period of five years as the minimum time required to cultivate an enduring transition to peace.

"Peace operations are about people and perceptions" and these operations "will be developed more and more in this domain instead of on the ground" <sup>9</sup> (Mood, 2015: 1). Thus, the approach to this dilemma means we must take into account the perception that the local population has of the presence of international forces. Usually the "coexistence" between the local population and military force is divided into three periods: (i) a first, following the violent phase of the conflict, in which the population considers their presence essential, especially for the creation of security. At this stage unconditional support is guaranteed and their actions encouraged; (ii) a second period, when the situation reaches some degree of stability, where the population begins to question the need for international presence and begins to tolerate it rather than to unconditionally support and (iii) the third stage, when the perception of security and non-return of conflict starts to be installed and the population begins to see the force as an intrusive element to their interests (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 85).

Internal and intrinsic characteristics of the territory where the conflict unfolds, consequences of culture, the agendas of the various actors and the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of external actors, usually States, are uncontrollable factors for those executing an operation.

Studies conducted by Segal and Waldman (1998: 198) concluded that interventions by the international community were more successful in controlling the conflict when the actors in dispute had something to gain from the success of their own peacekeeping. On the other hand, the practice seems to show that the contributing countries' troops should be involved based on their interests in order to ensure the effectiveness of the mission (Mood, 2015: 3). It seems to apply a "win-win" relationship between local actors and multinational forces that represent their states of origin.

Given the intangibility of certain factors, evaluating the success of an intervention never reached a base that satisfies diverse actors. According to Diehl (1993: 36), the

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<sup>8</sup> For this dilemma also see (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 32).

<sup>9</sup> Force Commanders' Advice to the High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations. Washington: UN. 2015. Robert Mood.



two general criteria have to do with (i) the ability to deter or prevent the use of violence in the area of operations and (ii) how this intervention facilitates the resolution of the conflict. They are essentially intangible criteria. However, the degree of success being measured can go through the verification of tangible metrics related to the effects to be achieved at specific points in space and time. Disarmament levels, demobilisation of former combatants and their reintegration into society, as well as how local authorities guarantee security, are examples of aspects that are possible to measure along the course of the operation <sup>10</sup> (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 29).

## **2. The military approach to the management and resolution of conflicts**

### **2.1. The classical approach to peace operations**

Originally, peace operations involved almost exclusively the use of military forces. These were interposed between the parties to monitor ceasefires, facilitate the withdrawal of troops and act as a buffer between countries in very volatile situations (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 5). Thus, traditional peacekeeping operations were established when some agreement was concluded and guaranteed the necessary physical and political support to enable compliance by the parties (Zartman et al., 2007: 433).

Between 1988 and 1993, a triple transformation started involving qualitative, quantitative and regulatory changes regarding the role and scope of peace operations (Bellamy, Williams, Griffin, 2004: 92). Their field of action has widened and began to involve the combination of a wide range of tasks (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 7). In this context, the UN <sup>11</sup> and NATO<sup>12</sup>, which together represent the overwhelming majority of military personnel deployed in "peace operations" (Jones, 2009: 3), developed a specific doctrinal basis for these operations, which allow an operationalisation of concepts and a more efficient and flexible approach to them. They did so by adopting a "classical approach".

This conceptual approach and rules to peace operations are associated with the life cycle of a conflict: phase of escalation, usually non-violent, its violent phase and the subsequent return of peace which is also non-violent. The response structure is based on a sequential design and so, while not competing activities, the use of individualised mechanisms provided either by the UN <sup>13</sup> or NATO <sup>14</sup> is well typified, allowing the conceptual framing of the use of military force, based on a generic process that has been followed as a model<sup>15</sup>. This assumes, according to the situation, that a type of operation and the means and measures are to be used along with the framework. At the same time, to move from one type of operation to another, changes to this framework can be altered and the mandate and terms of reference of the mission can even be changed.

<sup>10</sup> Other less tangible effects can also be analysed, such as reconciliation between the parties and the evolution of conflict resolution (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 29).

<sup>11</sup> Through the Agenda for Peace (A / 47/277 - S / 24111 of 17 June 1992).

<sup>12</sup> Through the Doctrine of Peace Support Operations.

<sup>13</sup> The reference is still the Agenda for Peace (A / 47/277 - S / 24111 of 17 June 1992) and later the Agenda Supplement for Peace (A / 50/60 - S / 1995/1 from 3 January 1995).


<sup>14</sup> The doctrine in place for the Peace Support Operations is found in AJP - 4.3.1 July 2001 and the AJP - 4.3, March 2005, although as noted above, they are both under review.

<sup>15</sup> For a more comprehensive conceptual approach refer to the UN and NATO references above.



Generically, the organisation is based on the following operation types: conflict prevention, peace enforcement, reestablishment of peace, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

**Figure 2 - The Process of Conflict Resolution**



Source: Adapted from BRANCO, Carlos et al. <sup>16</sup>

Conflict prevention means the elimination of the causes of predictable conflict before it occurs in an open form (Zartman et al. , 2007: 13). It involves the application of external measures of a diplomatic, economic and military pressure, and even possible military intervention to support an effort to prevent a violent outbreak of conflict or stop escalation (MCDC, 2014: 70) or reigniting<sup>17</sup>. Military means normally focus on supporting political and development efforts in order to mitigate the causes of conflict. It should be based on gathering information and ensure an early warning system to watch the development of the crisis in real time and evaluate the possible answers in order to apply the fastest and most appropriate measures to each situation <sup>18</sup> (Castells, 2003: 31).

If preventive measures are successful, the crisis reduces in intensity, returning to a certain degree of stability. If they fail and the line of the outbreak of violence is broken, there is violent conflict (MCDC, 2014: 70). When this happens, the conflict has to be managed through the elimination of violence and its related means (Zartman et al., 2007: 13).

If the context establishes the objective to compel, coerce and persuade one or more factions to comply with a particular mode of action, this is a "peace enforcement" operation. This situation occurs when there is no strategic consent of the main actors (Dobbie 1994: 122). In this case, the operation involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force (Capstone, 2008: 18) at an

<sup>16</sup> Adapted from BRANCO, Carlos, GARCIA, Proença, PEREIRA, Santos (Org) *op. cit.*: 139.

<sup>17</sup> These measures are usually applied according to Cap. VI of the UN Charter. However, in the case of armed intervention, military forces may be employed to deter and coerce the parties, which requires a more robust mandate based on Cap. VII.

<sup>18</sup> Although military activities are aimed at achieving the policies and development requirements, they usually fall short in the following categories: (i) notice; (ii) monitoring; (iii) training and reform of the security sector; (iv) preventive deployment and (v) the imposition of sanctions and embargoes "(AJP-3.4.1 2007: 1-9).



operational level. Thus, supporting a mandate, military means will be employed if necessary by taking the place of one of the belligerents and remaining on the ground even against the will of the parties (Baptista, 2003: 742).

However, despite the use of force, it is essential to reiterate that the objective is not to defeat or destroy the belligerents (Pugh, 1997: 13), achieving a military victory, but to force, coerce and persuade the parties to meet certain conditions, according to a political objective (AJP-3.4.1 2007: 1-11). The purpose of these operations is a key issue, because it establishes the separation between war and peace enforcement (Branco, Garcia and Pereira, 2010: 142).

These actions are authorised in order to restore peace in situations where the UNSC considers a threat to peace, a rupture of peace or an act of aggression exist (Capstone, 2008, p.18). In the case of operations led by the UN, given that it does not have its own capabilities, other entities are authorised to use force on its behalf (Bellamy, Williams, Griffin, 2004: 148), including NATO, the EU or coalitions of goodwill organised specifically for this purpose. Given the complexity of this type of operations, forces must be organised, equipped and trained, having a coercive combat capability for the enforcement of the aspects for which it was mandated for and closely connect political and military objectives (AJP-3.4.1 2007: 1-11).

"Peacekeeping" is designed to preserve a fragile peace following the end of the violent phase of a conflict, in order to assist the implementation of agreements reached between the parties <sup>19</sup> (Capstone, 2008: 18). "Ceasefires normally follow, which by nature are volatile and precarious" (Branco, Garcia and Pereira, 2010: 139) and is, as a rule, with the strategic consent of the parties (Dobbie 1994: 122).

Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model after inter-State wars to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – that work together in order to lay the foundation for sustainable peace (Capstone, 2008: 18). The new circumstances force the establishment of more robust operations, resorting to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and ensuring "all necessary means" to address the situation (Zartman et al., 2007: 433). However, this use of force is restricted to the tactical level of operations to resolve incidents, or before specific situations of tactical non-compliance with the terms of the agreements fundamentally aimed at facilitating diplomatic action, conflict mediation and ensure basic safety conditions for a political solution (Branco, Garcia and Pereira, 2010: 141). Peacekeeping is thus supported on the assumption that the absence of fighting between the parties will allow the easing of tensions and allow negotiations to be conducted (Diehl 1994: 37).

The "restoration of peace" includes measures to address the conflict and usually involves diplomatic action to bring antagonistic parties to negotiate an agreement (Capstone, 2008: 17) and, by definition, does not include the use of military forces. However, the use of force or its threatened use has been a practice in reinforcing these efforts <sup>20</sup> (Zartman et al., 2007: 435).

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<sup>19</sup> Experts in conflict resolution argue that the presence of military forces after the signing of an agreement is essential. If their presence does not materialise effectively within six to twelve weeks after the signing, the agreement may lose effectiveness (Durch, 2006: 589).

<sup>20</sup> The concept proposed by NATO is very similar to the UN, although it is more robust (Branco, Garcia and Pereira, 2010: 135), because it does not exclude military support for diplomatic action through the direct



When the management of the conflict is successfully executed, the enforcement level of external force lessens as the situation stabilises, allowing the withdrawal of military force and the beginning of the peace-building process (MCDC, 2014: 71). The "consolidation of peace"<sup>21</sup>, when the conflict has overcome the violent phase, involves a range of targeted measures to reduce the risk of reignition, strengthening national capacities at all levels. In this scenario, the military performs its tasks after obtaining a political solution and includes collaboration with local authorities, guaranteeing security conditions for the work of civilian components and providing the necessary support to civilian agencies to resolve the deep structural causes of the conflict (Zartman et al., 2007: 436).

Military activities should have high visibility and impact, demonstrating the immediate benefits of their action. Comprehensive use must, however, be considered to ensure that short-term gains are not counter-productive for long-term development strategies and face the danger of coming to create dependency on this support. As we saw earlier, a stronger or weaker presence with local authorities is a dilemma to take into consideration in conducting this operation type (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2009: 32).

## **2.2. The new millennium and the increasing complexity of interventions**

Following the end of the Cold War and after a general decline in the incidence of armed conflict, intra-State conflicts constitute the vast majority of today's wars (Capstone, 2008: 21). These conflicts can take many forms, of which inter-ethnic conflicts, secessionist and autonomic conflict and war for power are highlighted, which usually take the form of civil war (Wallensteen 2004: 74).

This resulted in a profound change in the approach to process management and the resolution of conflicts, with the UN Security Council beginning to work more actively to promote restraint and the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the number of military, police and civilian personnel involved in United Nations peace operations reached unprecedented levels and, in addition to growth in size, they have become increasingly complex (Capstone, 2008: 6). They face significant challenges as they are often implemented in insecure environments, often not having the resources to implement mandates (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 1). This reality began to be identified in the Brahimi Report<sup>22</sup> (2000, § 12), which stated that peace operations have changed rapidly from the traditional "military operations of observation of ceasefires and separation of factions after an inter-state conflict"<sup>23</sup> to incorporate a complex model with many military and civilian elements working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars."

The transformation of the international environment thus gave rise to a new generation of "multidimensional" operations, employing a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities (Capstone, 2008: 22). These began to interact and work in the

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or indirect use of military means (AJP-3.4, 2005: 3-4), support planning and general staff. Examples of this use include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cyprus and Mozambique.

<sup>21</sup> The expression "construction of peace" is also used.

<sup>22</sup> Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A / 55/305-s / 2000/809, 21 August 2000.

<sup>23</sup> The first mission of peacekeeping operation was authorised in 1948 and implemented by UNTSO to supervise the cease-fire agreements between Israel and Arab neighbours (Zartman et al., 2007: 436).



same theatre, often overlapping each other. Thus, the range of actors involved has become broad, with different objectives, understandings, skills and motivations. These actors can divide, connect, ally or change their patterns and objectives with great frequency (Durch, 2006: 576). Each of them, according to their own agenda, may support, be neutral or oppose the peace operation itself, and these positions may vary with time or within organisations in a given context (AJP-01 (C), 2007: 1-4).

The complexity increases even more when we started to see an increasing number of operations where there is no political agreement or where efforts to establish or re-establish peace have wavered. The forces often operate in remote and austere environments, facing permanent hostilities by actors who are not willing to negotiate, and who might be interested in harming the international forces, adding restrictions to their ability to operate effectively (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 5). This fact was presented as a challenge and is referred to in the Capstone Report (2008: 20): "in the application of conflict prevention, imposing, restoring and maintaining peace rarely occurs in a linear or sequential way. Indeed, experience shows that these must be noticed in order to complement and reinforce each other. The fragmented or isolated use of each prevents the integrated approach required to address the causes of conflict that thereby reduce the risk of the conflict rekindling."

This situation started to have a strong influence on the approach to the management and resolution of conflicts because, unlike in the past in which Chapter VI<sup>24</sup> served as the basis for most operations (Capstone, 2008: 13), with the new millennium, the vast majority of military and police operations began to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter<sup>25</sup> (Durch and England, 2009: 12). According to Howard (2008: 325), the implementation supported in Chapter VII reflects the UNSC's readiness to ensure that agreements are implemented, if necessary, by force. Thus, and as shown in the doctrinal evolution of NATO and some states<sup>26</sup>, it seems that the old walls that previously segregated the operations of peace from combat operations have begun to crumble, and this has changed the paradigm of traditional "peace operations" (Durch and England, 2009: 15). The actions of peacekeeping forces began to point to the concurrent execution of a set of conflict prevention activities and conflict intervention, as well as regeneration and support after the conflict in order to reach the final military state desired (JP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5). This concurrence of actions depends on the situation, especially the ebb and flow of the process, and may be represented with the graph that is presented below.

Prevention requires actions to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and action to prevent the occurrence, escalation and resumption of hostilities, where military instruments should be used for deterrence, establishing a powerful presence to deter spoilers of peace (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5). Following the sequence of "format, intimidate, coerce and intervene", military force becomes more explicit as the situation worsens (MCDC, 2014: 71)<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup> However, according to the Capstone Report (2008: 13), the UN Security Council does not need to refer to a specific chapter to adopt a resolution authorising the use of peacekeeping operations and does not even need to invoke Chapter VI.


<sup>25</sup> In 2008, deployed forces accounted for about 80%.

<sup>26</sup> Cases, for example US, UK, France or India.

<sup>27</sup> "Format" means to influence the environment in which the actors operate, "detering" means offering an implicit threat of action if the conflict escalates, "coerce" means making the threat explicit and "Intervening" means taking military action (MCDC, 2014: 71).



Fig. 3 - Concurrent activities in peace operations



Source: Adapted from JP-3.4.1 (A) (2007), *op. cit.*: 1-7)

Intervention means taking explicit military action and should involve actions coordinated with political, economic and humanitarian activities (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5). This can be implemented as a preventive action before the crisis line is transgressed, or after in order to prevent the continuation of fighting by parties (MCDC, 2014: 71).

Regeneration should be started as soon as possible, starting with the security sector and the needs that require immediate attention. The primary task of the military is the organisation, training and equipping of the "new" local security forces until they are self-sufficient in implementing the mission (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5).

Support is the set of activities to support local organisations to maintain or improve the final state defined in the mandate. It occurs when the structures, forces and local institutions begin to assume responsibilities in a sustained and stable manner over the territory and population (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 1-5).

Lasting peace is not achieved or sustained by military and technical commitments, but through political solutions (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 11). Thus, despite the increased complexity of interventions, military force continues to be used to establish a stable and secure environment to allow the actions of other actors. These are usually better able to exploit the success of tactical actions of military forces, which have a value that must be integrated in a comprehensive plan (Smith, 2008: 428).

### 3. The use of military force

#### 3.1. The principles of the use of force

The use of military forces in operations for the management and resolution of conflicts is distinguished from other types of operations because it applies a set of principles. We



highlight three that are interconnected and mutually reinforcing (Capstone, 2008: 31): consent, impartiality and the restrictions on the use of force.

The consent of the main parties in the conflict provides the necessary freedom for strategic, political and physical action, so that the deployed means carry out their functions. However, the consent of the main actors does not mean or necessarily guarantee that there will be an agreement at a local level, particularly if they are internally divided or have fragile command and control systems. As a rule, the level of acceptance of the actors involved in the conflict will be different and will vary in time and space<sup>28</sup>. A general consent situation becomes even less likely in volatile settings, characterised by the presence of armed groups not controlled by a party, or by the presence of other spoilers of peace (Capstone, 2008: 32). When this happens and there is no common line of action between leaders and local groups, this inconsistency of positions could result in the non-compliance of some of these groups, and they may try to restrict the freedom of action of the peacekeeping force or even act against them (Oliveira 2011: 98). In the absence of consent, the main risk lies in the possibility of peacekeepers becoming part of the conflict (Dobbie 1994: 130).

Consent may thus constitute a very complex relationship between peacekeepers and the various actors, which can be at the strategic level or, more fragile still, at the tactical level (Oliveira 2011: 98). This level of consent may establish the framework that separates a peacekeeping operation from a peace enforcement operation (Dobbie 1994: 145). On the other hand, the lack of consent or passive consent may be transformed into active support through the credibility and legitimacy of the action of the forces (AJP-1 (D), 2010: 1-9). According to Durch and England (2009: 15), the best generator of consent is operational performance based on a firm but fair implementation of measures to restore living conditions and a safe environment.

Contemporary conflicts tend to be internal and the legitimacy of international intervention is sometimes questionable (Zartman et al., 2007: 8), influencing consent. Thus, "normally peace operations work best when – in addition to being internationally authorised – the forces are also invited to participate in the operation under the agreements among the parties, offering through it international and local legitimacy" (Durch and England, 2009: 13). In situations where there is no agreement between the parties, the use of effective force may be required as a last resort (Capstone, 2008: 33). Military force will thus have to rely on the terms of the mandate and be structured in adequate strength and form, and may have to adopt a position of temporary combat in order to defeat the opposition of an actor (Durch and England, 2009: 13).

Since consent is never absolute, strength can thus be used to deter or compel; however, this use has to be done with impartiality (Pugh, 1997: 14). This will be guarded by the principles of the UN Charter and the mandate, which should itself be based on the same principles, although allowing some initiative to peacekeepers in the most dangerous environments (Durch and England, 2009: 12). This initiative is the big difference between impartiality and neutrality. Unlike the latter, impartiality requires judgment with respect to a set of principles and mandate terms (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 3-6). This conduct of peacekeeping forces is very complex, because some acts will be

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<sup>28</sup> In time, from the perspective of permanence or fragility of consent and space "horizontally across all elements of the population and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties in relation to the conflict" (AJP-1 (D), 2010): 1-9).



viewed differently by different parties, which tend to evaluate them according to their own agenda. This implies that the effective use of threat or use of force against one of the parties shall be undertaken only when they do not meet the agreed terms through action or inaction (Capstone, 2008: 33).

By the very nature of these operations, the restriction on the use of force is always present and the level of coercion used must be proportionate and appropriate in relation to the specific objective pursued. The means, the manner and circumstances should be used as they are usually defined and detailed in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the operation (AJP-3.4.1 (A), 2007: 3-8). These are considered essential and are designed to ensure, within the extent possible, the effective use of force by the military component in accordance with the legal framework and set policy.

Given the new strategic and operational framework in the UN commander operations report (Mood, 2015: 2), "the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force must remain a guiding basis for peace operations, but the complexity of the context has meant that the traditional understanding of these principles should be worked out". Thus, consent should not be required when the mandate, mission or civilians are threatened. Unlike the implementation of the mandate and the protection of civilians, impartiality is not an end in itself. The principle of the non-use of force is traditionally applied with two exceptions: the use of force in self-defence and the use of force in defence of the mandate. However, these exceptions are becoming increasingly important in contemporary peace operations. The use of force in self-defence is used regardless of the type of operation, and is not controversial; however, the availability and resources for such use have become a major concern. The use of force to defend the implementation of the mandate and civilians involves much more controversy. Howard (2008: 13) argues that even peace enforcement operations, mandated under Chapter VII, in which the UN can use force in conflicts of intrastate nature, may often create incompatibilities with impartiality and consent.

The increasing complexity and "toughness" of implementation has led to peace operations being addressed as "military operations" in the broadest sense, assuming that they can be driven and shaped by principles previously reserved for conventional combat operations. With this new paradigm, the tactical approach to all military operations began to be performed based on the application of a set of common principles<sup>29</sup> (AJP-01 (C), 2007: 2-23). The particular situation will dictate the emphasis given to each of them (AJP-1 (D), 2010: 1-6).

### **3.2. The challenges for the use of military force**

Current peace operations are implemented to perform a wide range of activities. They intend to take an active role in conflict management in violent situations (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 29), whilst simultaneously facilitating the political process by promoting national and reconciliation dialogue, protecting civilians, assisting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants as well as support the organisation of elections, protect and promote human rights and help restore the rule of law (Capstone, 2008:

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<sup>29</sup> Another set of principles such as security, credibility, transparency, mutual respect and cultural integration, legitimacy, proactive action and freedom of action should also be present in the use of military forces in peacekeeping operations (AJP- 3.4.1 (A), (2007), *op. cit.* : 3-9).



6). The framework introduces a set of factors that influence the use of military force, through the imbalance and tensions between the various internal and external actors, which are assumed as a major challenge to the provision, projection and use of military means.

The first factor, external order, follows the launching process of the operation and generation of the forces itself. However, the decision to launch or support peace operations lies in international organisations<sup>30</sup> or coalitions of good will, since they do not have their own military forces, the mission will be fulfilled with the resources offered by Member or participating States (MCDC, 2014: 72). Therefore, it is ultimately these that impose a number of conditions and political constraints on implementation.

Humanitarian issues or international security – unlike wars in which soldiers defend their fellow citizens or their country – are more difficult for leaders to accept and justify the use of military forces if public opinion is low (Walzer, 2004: 34). Thus, the calculations of each State regarding the risk to its troops, the support costs and internal support for participation in the operation, have a major impact on the availability of forces and coherence of the mission (Durch and England, 2009: 16). This is reflected in the decisive organisational process and generation of the force, with the resulting problems for launching<sup>31</sup> and supporting the<sup>32</sup> mission (MCDC, 2014: 85).

Each state has its own interests or safeguards that it wants to protect when it intervenes in the process of resolving a conflict. This environment makes relatively fragile peace operations in terms of units of command and above all unity of action (Durch and England, 2009: 13). This is the second factor of external order that influences the use of military forces. Despite the desired integrated approach, actors rarely accept the establishment of command relationships where they can act freely, opting for a cooperative solution, changing the command relationship for coordinating different actions. It is a solution that presents difficulties because, as defended by Mood (2015: 1),

*"integrated missions in complex environments require a single chain of command. A Command Unit (...) is essential for the implementation of the mandate. One concept, one mandate, one mission."*

In terms of internal factors, current multidimensional operations deployed following an internal conflict have a wide range of challenges. The ability of local authorities to provide security for its people and maintain public order is often weak and violence

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<sup>30</sup> UN, EU or NATO.

<sup>31</sup> In this regard are included: (I) delays in the generation and employment of forces, leading to difficulties in mission implementation; (ii) poor quality troops, because they are inadequately trained and equipped; (iii) conflicts between troops and equipment (MCDC, 2014: 85).

<sup>32</sup> In the summary are the following problems that occur with the sustention of operations: (i) combat forces are of insufficient strength – simply because there are not enough troops for the mission, according to planning, poor interoperability between different contingents – the troops often come from a number of different countries, and do not even speak the same language and usually operate within different military cultures; there can also be tensions between different contingencies; (iii) poor coordination with civilian actors, for example, non-governmental organisations or government officials; (iv) troops and UN commanders lack specific training; (v) general difficulty of achieving a united effort, within the mission and, more broadly, with other actors locally and internationally (MCDC, 2014: 85).



may still be present in various parts of the territory. The country may be divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines, and serious human rights violations may have been committed during the conflict (Capstone, 2008: 22). The difficulties increase exponentially when there is little or no peace to keep, in the absence of a viable peace process or because the peace process has effectively broken (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 29).

All these aspects shape the operating environment, which creates the challenge for the military to develop the appropriate capabilities to make a credible contribution. To be effective, the military commanders must be involved in the political process, in order to translate political objectives into military action, which allows the greater understanding of the complementary objectives and collective responsibility of the whole operation. It is understood that in a specific operating environment, the military component should be structured "to the extent" of the specific operation, according to the conditions set out in the mandate, the situation and the ground (Mood, 2015: 5). This application of "extent" itself creates the challenge for the military component, which needs to be prepared to develop and implement a wide range of tasks that complement or are complemented by the action of other actors. According to MDCD<sup>33</sup> (2014: 116), these tasks can be conceptually organised into the following four areas: (I) the focal tasks – those that fall in areas where the military component is already engaged in relevant activities; (ii) the standard tasks – those that fall under the military purview, but can be performed by others if the prevailing circumstances were not considered; (iii) the improvement tasks – tasks in areas where, in this context, it is necessary to develop capacity to contribute effectively to the collective effort; and (iv) new tasks – those that arise from military forces framed in this context.

Despite all of these challenges, the most serious are the implicit lack of willingness and capacity provided to exercise authority for the effective employment of necessary forces (Mood, 2015: 2). As stated by Smith (2008: 288), "the lack of political will to use force rather than simply *deploy* forces" is one of the problems that has characterised recent interventions, especially in high risk situations. This use seems to always consider the exemption of risks and operations, appearing to rely mainly on its deterrent presence and the non-lethal use of weapons (Marten, 2004: 125). One of the ways that countries materialise this lack of political will is through the introduction of caveats<sup>34</sup>. These have long been criticised by commanders on the ground for concern that caveats reduce efficiency and increase risks, being that there should even be zero tolerance for hidden caveats (Mood, 2015: 4).

### **3.3. The effective use of force**

In the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, the use of military forces may be justified: (i) the risk – where the security situation presents a challenge to those who do not have the ability to protect themselves and the use of military might be necessary to provide protection to persons or property; (ii) promptness – when military means are the only ones able to respond to a need in the required time; (iii) the range – when only the military has the ability to deploy an operation at a distance to support adequate logistics; (iv) the availability of forces – in situations where forces

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<sup>33</sup> Multinational Capability Development Campaign.

<sup>34</sup> Are explicit restrictions on the operational use of force. The expression is already part of the normal lexicon of those that deal with these issues.



are the only available option to affect an intervention immediately; (V) for "niche" issues – when they have specialists and capabilities that may be required and that are not available in other organisations (MCDC, 2014: 117). A high range of capabilities that exceed the traditional combat capabilities are therefore highly relevant. However, the effective use of force, where combat capabilities are used, requires a more restrictive framework and the effective use of armed force under international law, which is pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter – one of the rare situations where this use is considered legitimate (Zartman et al., 2007: 423).

This context has presented some difficulties in the implementation of missions. As mentioned in Capstone (2008 report: 14), to relate to a peace operation with a specific chapter of the Charter can be misleading for the purposes of operational planning, training and the implementation of a mandate, and the UN Security Council, aware of this, has guaranteed "robust" mandates, authorising peace forces "to use all necessary means". However, although on the ground they can sometimes seem similar, a robust peacekeeping operation must not be confused with the imposition of peace, as seen in the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. Maintaining robust peace involves the use of force at a tactical level with the authorisation of the UN Security Council as well as the consent of the host nation and/or main parties in the conflict. Peace enforcement may involve the use of military force on an operational level, requiring the consent of the parties (Capstone, 2008: 34).

In execution, as advocated by David (2001: 305), the obstacles apparently became more serious and complicated – especially the tactical level, where the difficulties of limiting the effective use of force have increased exponentially (Capstone, 2008: 19). Thus, according to Ramos-Horta <sup>35</sup> (2015: 9), new operating environments require much greater clarity on when and how the various contingents may use force, under what conditions and with what principles. Clarity and specificity are key aspects of a mandate (Diehl 1994: 72) and the question is thus placed on the need to clarify the effective use of force, especially in the application of the principle of self-defence and in defence of the mandate.

In general, the effective use of force is acceptable within the principle of self-defence, including through preventive and pre-emptive postures, either in self-defence or to protect civilians (Ramos-Horta, 2015: 31). The question of the mandate of defence is more complex. In addition to the situations specified therein, Zartman (2007: 423) argues that the effective use of armed force is recognised and accepted when viewed in three perspectives: (I) it is the last resort to maintain law and order; (II) it is a major way to establish clear limits for unacceptable behaviour; and (iii) to destroy or eliminate a pernicious "devil" <sup>36</sup>. The posture and the effective use of military force will depend on each situation and specific threat, and debate is a fact of whether there is a direct relationship between the use of more or less force and the corresponding effect on the objectives of the mission (Mood, 2015: 2). The aim is to create conditions that contribute to the resolution of the conflict, and the effective use of force must be "the last and not the first resort to use" (Durch and England, 2009: 14).

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<sup>35</sup> Referring to missions led by the UN.

<sup>36</sup> Despite this last perspective, the ultimate goal of the effective use of force will never be the pursuit of military defeat of an actor, but to influence and deter actors who act against the process and the terms of the mandate.



According to Ramos-Horta (2015: 33) the different threats should be addressed with the appropriate use of force, ranging from deterrence to containment, through intimidation and coercion to direct confrontation. Military force should be used accurately, proportionately and appropriately within the principle of minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while at the same sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. However, the effective use of force in a peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often lead to unforeseen circumstances (Capstone, 2008: 35); here, as well, the perception of the local population is a key element. Defends Mood (2015: 7) that the actions and actual achievements of the forces should be at the core of creating perceptions among audiences, where actions speak louder than words. The experiences of the past 15 years have shown that, to be successful, an operation should be perceived as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population (Capstone, 2008: 36). Soldiers and capable units, perceived in these terms by all local groups, are a deterrent to violence. However, deterrence must be produced by the action and not just by simple presence, because, according to Mood (2015: 3), no amount of good intentions can substitute the fundamental ability to (when necessary) use the military proactively and thus achieve a credible deterrence and prevention of violence.

When it comes to a very fluid operating environment, the military force needs to move from a reactive approach to the effective use of force to a proactive one, in order to reduce the risks of carrying out a mandate and minimise casualties (Mood, 2015: 4). This implies that the effective response capability to threats must be obtained and maintained throughout the operation, and that the forces hold the initiative needed to adapt and react faster than any threats, taking necessary measures to maintain consistency in performance and ensure greater operational flexibility (Marten, 2004: 152). But to be proactive and stop the initiative, military force must have the necessary means. Well-equipped and trained troops will be an important element to deter potential offenders and reduce the level of violence, as weak and passive military components invite aggression and manipulation, leading to increased risks of unnecessary losses of life. The capabilities to deploy should therefore reflect the requirements for the most difficult tasks and consider the duration of the entire mission, which includes resources to overcome the challenges caused by local actors, the terrain and the weather (Mood, 2015: 4).

### **Final considerations**

The end of the Cold War brought about a profound change in the approach to conflict resolution. A set of qualitative, quantitative and normative transformations changed the paradigm of the role and scope of the application of military instruments. It was an opportunity to see their use in the context of international relations, and are considered legitimate, appropriate, and above all, necessary. This use is materialised by the simultaneous or individualised execution of its five strategic functions that can be applied in an integrated manner for different levels of intervention. Their field of action has widened and their doctrinal basis established, allowing an operationalisation of concepts and a more efficient and flexible approach to implementation.

The increasing complexity of today's conflicts has ceased to allow a linear approach to management and resolution, demanding a more differentiated and specific approach.



This new generation of peacekeeping operations has adopted a multidimensional approach, going beyond the traditional intervention to ensure military security. Without security the essential tasks of political, social and economic plans cannot be realised. Military force must therefore be used in coordination with other instruments of power, ensuring a proper strategic framework that properly defines its role, given the desired end state.

Despite alternations and challenges created by the current strategic and operational contexts, the guiding basis for peace operations should remain anchored in the application of a set of principles, with particular emphasis on the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force. However, the growing complexity of the context has meant that traditional understandings of these principles have been addressed. Faced with the threat to civilians, for the terms of the mandate and normal conduct of the mission, consent should not be required and impartiality should not be an end in itself. The use of force in self-defence does not raise controversy. However, its use for the implementation of the mandate and the protection of civilians is much more controversial; even this use of force in intrastate conflicts can create incompatibilities with impartiality and consent.

The recent operational experience and practical framework of operations have caused a toughening in their approach and execution, and it is assumed that they can be planned and implemented based on principles previously reserved to the conduct of traditional combat operations. Thus, the force should be organised "to the extent" of the specific operation, according to the conditions set out in the mandate, the situation, terrain and the application and intensity of the various principles.

This new approach to situations where military forces are employed in conflict resolution continues to face several challenges. The most complex is related to the effective use of force with respect to their combat capabilities; especially in high risk situations, it seems to lack the political will to – after making the deployment – ensure their effective use when needed. The introduction of caveats is one way that States materialise this lack of political will and has created several constraints to the normal development of operations.

When the operation is characterised by a very fluid operational environment, to minimise casualties and reduce the risks related to the implementation of the mandate, it is essential that the military component of the operation can adopt a proactive approach to the effective use of force. This component must therefore guarantee external and internal conditions, enabling the effective employment of combat capabilities in order to be qualified as a genuinely useful instrument in this context. Externally, these conditions have been based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, guaranteeing the formal legitimacy and the will of the State contributors of military forces in deploying the appropriate means, framework and command arrangements that permit its effective operational use. But for the military component to be proactive and stop the initiative, it must also ensure a set of internal conditions, such internal organisational coherence, availability and interoperability of the necessary means and equipment, as well as having appropriate training. These conditions allow – throughout the operation – the ability to adapt and react faster, enabling the force to respond effectively to threats and keep the initiative necessary for consistency in performance as well as to ensure operational flexibility.



The decision for the effective use of military force depends essentially on the framework of the specific operation; however, when power is used effectively, it should be only in the necessary duration and intensity, employing levels of violence that are as low and as brief as possible, as well as favour the use of non-violent means of persuasion. Thus, the military instrument is important to reduce the level of violence and deter or control potential aggressors.

The effective use of force being the most critical element, but simultaneously more differentiating and characterising of the use of the military instrument, experience shows that military force has surpassed its traditional role of controlling levels of violence. A wide range of capabilities that goes beyond traditional combat capabilities are shown to be of great benefit to the entire spectrum of conflict resolution, particularly in the support, the complement or replacement of non-military capabilities.

Thus, in the context of conflict resolution, the use of military forces is useful and justified in situations directly related to the creation and maintenance of a secure environment, performing tasks in this area and allowing an integrated approach to prevention, management and effective resolution. But, increasingly, executing other tasks in situations where readiness, scope, availability of forces, experts or capabilities are not available, other organisations are required and show themselves to be more appropriate and effective.

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**THINK POSITIVE PEACE IN PRACTICE:  
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE**

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**Abstract**

The insistence of the return of violence in countries where the UN has intervened to promote peace has fuelled a debate about the effectiveness of international instruments for conflict resolution. This article reflects on the progress that these instruments were having in response to the recurrence of violence in light of what has been an approach to the concept of positive peace of Johan Galtung. From two case studies (Guatemala and Haiti) marked by changes in the discourse and practice of the United Nations that this approach inspired, it is argued that the UN instruments for peace would be so much more effective when they respect the author's proposal, not only with regard to results they intend to achieve, but also in the way positive peace is operationalised on the ground. Analyses – as difficulties in implementing more comprehensive, local and inclusive processes that would affect the promotion of more sustainable peace – also contaminate the mechanisms used to assess their effectiveness.

**Keywords**

Peacebuilding; Positive peace; Evaluation of effectiveness; Guatemala; Haiti

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**THINK POSITIVE PEACE IN PRACTICE:  
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE<sup>1</sup>**

**Madalena Moita**

**Introduction**

Conflict resolution practices conducted by the United Nations have evolved significantly in recent decades, trying to respond more effectively to the recurring return of violence in post-conflict situations by searching for instruments that aim at more sustainable solutions. Especially from the 1990s, this effort has been made to a large extent, and there has been conformity to these instruments for a concept of peace that surpassed its minimum size of non-war and the resolution of conflicts by the containment of violence.

This conceptual expansion of peace, evident in the evolution of the United Nations discourse in recent decades, appears to be an appropriation of the concept of positive peace proposed by Johan Galtung, which has been realised in the evolution of peacekeeping for instruments of a much broader spectrum already associated with the concept of peacebuilding. This materialisation has come to assume more resources – both human and financial – as well as a much greater coordination of various actors from security to humanitarian spheres, which include liaisons with all development and state strengthening actors with a more long-term perspective that addresses the structural causes of conflict.

This new configuration of the United Nations conflict resolution architecture has not always presented effective results.

In this paper, we argue that this theoretical approach brings with it a propitious approach for more sustainable peace solutions. With respect to the proposal of Galtung, this would be much more effective for the results desired as well as the processes to achieve them.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of the UN in promoting peace is still mainly focused on results rather than evaluating procedures. The United Nations may have a difficulty in its implementation, considering that problems extend beyond intentions or objectives. We therefore suggest a review focused more on processes, providing more significant contributions to the debate about its impact on the ground.

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There has been a transition of the United Nations narrative to that of positive peace (consecrated as well on the ground) through greater attention and involvement of the organization in political processes for the resolution of armed conflict, in particular, by integrating UN mediation teams. How this involvement takes place may be a more effective conditioning factor on the ground, a dynamic that we have tried to verify through comparing two case studies.

### **Positive peace in the discourse of the UN**

In 1964 in the first issue of the *Journal of Peace Research*, Johan Galtung, regarded as one of the founding fathers of studies for peace, alluded to an alternative concept of peace that would mark a rapture in the way of conceptualising and making peace. Its reflection had been generated by concerns about the vicious cycle of violence that returned to previously interventions (Galtung, 1964).

Contrary to the dominant tendency to see peace from the point of view of the study of war, which deeply conditions conflict resolution practices on the ground, Galtung proposed an autonomisation of the debate on peace.

He called this perception of peace "positive" (in front of its minimum negative version associated with the absence of war) and suggested a more comprehensive itinerary of social construction that could provide a creative transformation of political, economic, cultural, religious conflicts as well as other forms of social renewal and proximity that come out of the variants of violent opposition. Galtung conceived a process of collective construction that sought balance and social justice, denying violent structures that were the basis of more visible violence that assumes, in its limited shape, the contours of war.

The most significant validity of its proposal, beyond offering a new analytical category to understand the phenomenon of peace, is its new understanding about violence, which moves towards a more direct observation of it as well as the structure from which it originates.

The concept of *structural violence* that Galtung associates with economic exploitation, political repression, social injustice and inequality, suggested that to reply to direct violence (of a more episodic character) it is essential to resolve the deeper causes of conflict in view of invisible violence that exists in a continuous form in whole social structures (Galtung, 1969)<sup>2</sup>.

More than suggesting a goal of a fairer, more-balanced society, Galtung proposed a guide a response to conflicts that achieves a profound transformation in the structural causes of violence, which uses in-depth knowledge of its context, actors, dynamics and incompatibilities. This guide suggest that, instead of a *dissociative* approach to resolution of conflict that breaks relationships among parties, the containment of violence, A *associative* approach that advocates the bringing together of parties in a collective and integrative effort to construct peace.

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<sup>2</sup> Galtung works later on a third concept of violence called cultural violence, which is inherent in the previously stated dimensions. This involves the symbolic aspects of everyday life that are manifested in the systems of norms, religion, ideology and language, which legitimise direct and structural violence (Galtung, 1990).



The holistic view of positive peace is not only associated with the end of direct violence, but also the transformation of structural causes of violence that come to have considerable impact on the discourse and international practices for the resolution of conflicts after the cold war.

In the 1990s we watched the exponential multiplication of interventions for peace led by the United Nations in intra-State conflicts. These new interventions are the combination of new approaches to peace that articulated peace-keeping through military intervention to contain violence, which is more centered on peace-making. This is related to political reconciliation and peace-building, which integrates measures of social reconstruction and development (Woodhouse; Ramsbotham, 2000). The United Nations has taken a leading role as a mediator in several internal conflicts, and has coordinated this function with new peace missions that have mandates far broader than their predecessors.

### **The implementation of discourse in the practice of building peace**

Transition in the dominant discourse of the United Nations, as shown in particular by the inclusion of a version of peace in key documents such as the *Agenda for Peace*<sup>3</sup> of 1992 and its addendum in 1995, came to transform practices on the ground. However, this functionality does not necessarily demonstrate greater effectiveness in resolving violent conflict, and there has still often been returns to violence in situations that had already experienced interventions.

This inefficiency is reflected in the history of peace-keeping operations, the United Nation's mechanism of excellence in this area.

There are 17 ongoing peacekeeping missions of the United Nations<sup>4</sup>. A closer observation enables us to divide them into two main subgroups. The first would correspond to missions with long durations (in some cases for the last 40 years, e.g., UNTSO<sup>5</sup>, the first UN peacekeeping operation in the Middle East), being almost all first generation operations prior to the transition that here we treat as the 1990s. More than half of all current peace-keeping operations are deployed in countries that have experienced previous missions, a second subgroup that corresponds to replica missions.

The characterisation of each subgroup itself calls into question the effectiveness of these instruments in achieving sustainable peace, whether imposing an international presence over time or whether military forces return to previous situations.

Of the 54 peace missions already completed<sup>6</sup>, a vast majority have the same objective as previous or current missions, or centred in neighbouring areas that still present large regions of instability (as would be the case of the missions in the Great Lakes or in the Middle East, which saw violence move to surrounding areas). From these completed missions, we can highlight a small set that is treated in the literature as successful

<sup>3</sup> Full text available at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277), accessed on 11 February 2016.

<sup>4</sup> See data provided by the Department of UN Peacekeepers at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>, accessed on 11 February 2016.

<sup>5</sup> The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso>

<sup>6</sup> See data provided by the Department of UN Peacekeepers at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>, accessed on 11 February 2016.



resolutions to conflicts such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, East Timor and Cambodia, which share a common theme of strong involvement of the UN in the conflicts' political resolution.

The apparent sustainability of peace processes in these cases, and therefore the notion of the UN being more effective in solving these armed confrontations, suggests the need for an evaluation framework. This would therefore make it possible to understand the implemented procedures that have made certain peace models more successful.

Reflections on the effectiveness of international mechanisms of conflict resolution are the preoccupation not just of study centres, but also the decision-making spheres of the UN, which have developed a debate on new concerns about indicators and successful results.

The evaluation of multi-dimensional and complex processes of peace are not without difficulties. Because of this, the UN itself has experimented with different routes to success. Internally, the organisation has formed structures able to stimulate this reflection through the creation of working groups that set clearer objectives, and an institutional framework able to retrieve lessons learned from various stages of action.

An example of this is the creation in 2005 of the Peace Building Commission, which is an inter-governmental advisory body that coordinates between the General Assembly and the Security Council the instruments of peace keeping and peace building. The Commission has a specific working group to compile lessons learned and evaluate processes of the projects that their Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has financed. The evaluation of the UN's performance focuses on the analysis of results, which is more of a micro-project than an assessment of a set of the instruments that the organisation uses on the ground.

Although the PBF looks to fundamentally overcome the separation between efforts for the promotion of political peace of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the functioning of the two departments have separate mechanisms of evaluation.

The UN Peacemaker was created under the DPA in 2006 and included a Mediation Support Unit. It aims to facilitate the work of UN, supporting political transitions and trying to achieve peace agreements. This tool compiles information on previous cases, integrates documents with lessons learned and guides texts for dealing with situations on the ground.

Within the framework of the DPKO's peacekeeping operations, and given its evolution in recent decades, its assessments have become increasingly more complex. For example the 2008 Capstone Doctrine<sup>7</sup>, the fundamental doctrinal document of peace operations, contains principles and guidelines for actions on the ground, as well as a framework for broader indicators of success (see table).

In 2010, the United Nations also published a guide to monitoring the consolidation of peace (United Nations, 2010). Demonstrating an increasing concern with the claimed needs of national actors in the definition of criteria and monitoring indicators, it continues to be by nature a general guide that offers a standardised framework for

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<sup>7</sup> Available in English at [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone\\_eng.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf), consulted on 11 February 2016.



following ongoing processes. However, it serves to provide information to the UN in order to better update its strategy rather than critically and effectively analysing the impact of the UN on the ground (Stave, 2011).

Benchmarks suggested by the Capstone Doctrine for new peace operation mandates, including:

- The absence of violent conflict and human rights abuses on a large scale and respect for the rights of women and minorities
- Compliance with the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants (men, women and children) and progress in the restoration of institutions of State security
- Capacity of national armed forces and the national police to ensure security and maintenance of public order under civil observation and respect for human rights
- Progress in establishing an independent and effective legal system
- Restoration of state authority and the working of public services throughout the country
- Return or resettlement of internally displaced people generating disturbance or conflict in resettlement areas
- Successful formation of legitimate political institutions after free and fair elections, where women and men have equal rights to vote and political office

This picture shows how the United Nations itself has chosen to extend the indicators of success to more extensive factors in a clear move towards the materialisation of the concept of comprehensive peace. This effort has, however, replicated the dispersion of instruments of conflict resolution within the framework of the United Nations without having a centralisation of the analysis on the ground. It does not, therefore, assess, in a given context, how all the instruments available to the organisation (in its full spectrum) have been effective in the consolidation of peace as a whole.

But more significant still is the fact that these mechanisms favour, above all, an analysis of the effectiveness of UN action in the light of indicators established by the organisation itself, without favouring peace indicators that conform to a peace model locally, and neglect accountability led by recipient countries.

Each of these mechanisms allows a more complete reading of the UN's action than about an intervention as such. Mechanisms to broaden the UN's knowledge – and particularly for its employees – on the contexts in which they act are needed as they lack critical assessment of what the UN is doing right and wrong on the ground. In some way, the uniform action of the organisation for promoting peace is accepted, because based on a framework of universal values and on external and technical projects of State construction, it can overcome political and local versions of the model of peace that it wants to advance.

In this context, rarely local players enjoy oversight mechanisms of international action in accordance with their own needs and often go beyond essential steps of national



political dialogues, because it is accepted as a single procedure to achieve a stable peace, a prescriptive UN-driven model.

### **Evaluating peace beyond results**

Considering that several cases of relative success of UN intervention in promoting a stable peace may have coincided with a greater attention to political reconciliation, we wanted to investigate the potential of this factor as a more effective generator to prevent a return to armed political violence.

Assuming that the legitimising narrative of the UN's interventions in the framework of the promotion of peace has moved towards the concept of broad peace, we look at evaluation mechanisms that allow the consideration of the effectiveness of the UN with regard to their conformity with the proposal of positive peace, both in goals as in the guide.

We emphasise the missions that were linked to political reconciliation processes through mediation. Mediation is an instrument of conflict management that is particularly relevant, since it facilitates and influences the design of procedures that shape dialogue on the one hand, and the agenda of the negotiations on the other. Without impinging with the central actors of a peace process, the mediator has the power to shape a series of variables that, taken together, are the model of peace that comes out of a negotiating process, and have a significant impact in post-conflict situations.

We rely on a recent investigation<sup>8</sup> which tried to design an evaluation framework that is as near as possible to Galtung's concept of positive peace. This, as we mentioned initially, offers a goal to reach as well as a process to reach this objective.

We decided to test this evaluation framework by reviewing two case studies that were consistent with new framework of action post-1990s. One case coincidences with new framework of values and principles that the United Nations has absorbed, and the other with reconciliation arising from a more political intervention (although with a military in nature), with a peace operation mobilized to support the implementation of their peace agreements.

The comparison served to contrast a concluded UN intervention, which integrates the framework of past missions with the subgroup that is associated with relative success (as no return to political violence in post-conflict was observed), with another less successful intervention where the violence and military presence did return and still remains on the ground.

The two cases chosen – Guatemala and Haiti - demonstrate two types of intervention that have a similar genesis but differ dramatically in their implementation, which translates into profoundly different results.

An attempt was made, in this comparison, to associate an evaluation of the results of each intervention to the very process of reaching a positive peace, a process that should be broad, transformative, integratory and primarily local.

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<sup>8</sup> Moita, Magdalene (2015) *La ONU y la Construcción de la Paz en Haití y Guatemala*, Tesis doctoral, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.



First we tried to lay out a framework of indicators with information and data available in the two countries that correspond faithfully to the idea of peace and national perspectives collected by interviews in accordance with the expectations generated nationally by peace agreements<sup>9</sup>. This presupposes an extension of indicators of success beyond the minimum framework for elections, a ceasefire and minimal stability.

Scope	Indicator/criteria
Policy framework: democracy and inclusion policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government stability</li> <li>• Democracy index (including electoral process, functioning of government, political participation and political culture)</li> <li>• Deterioration of public services</li> </ul>
Socio-economic development: inclusion and equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GDP</li> <li>• Poverty and economic deterioration</li> <li>• Uneven development</li> <li>• Social indicators, including spending on education, years of schooling, literacy rate, life expectancy and infant mortality</li> <li>• Human development index</li> </ul>
Sustainability of peace process: the absence of direct/indirect violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violent deaths</li> <li>• Scale of political terror</li> <li>• Respect for civil liberties</li> <li>• Number of years passed until the return to armed conflict</li> <li>• Degree of State autonomy: official development assistance</li> <li>• State fragility index</li> </ul>

A local perspective was favoured, enriching the international vision of the peace process and complementing more cross-sectional indicators that respond to national expectations.

In the combination of results and process, we looked to also open an analysis about the coherence among various instruments of conflict resolution used by the UN, particularly the links between policy instruments such as mediation with additional instruments that included military and peace operations established in another country.

An evaluation framework of the OECD was used that focuses on mediation. We considered this to be particularly useful for being, on the one hand, the primordial point of UN intervention in each study stage, and on the other, for having marked the evolution that each peace process made in each of the countries. Lanz, Wählisch, Kirchhoff and Siegfried (2008) tried to adapt the OECD evaluation framework associated with projects that develop conflict resolution processes, which is presented in the following table.

The combination of complementary evaluation frameworks of a more quantitative character with qualitative indicators that use a mediation framework reached conclusions that are relevant to the effectiveness of UN instruments in the promotion of lasting peace and sustainable.

<sup>9</sup> The comparative table below also added some specific indicators for each country with particular issues related to the peace process, such as sample data to investigate the greater presence of indigenous people and women in the Guatemalan political framework, given these are very relevant themes within the mediation process.



From the quantitative comparison, all indicators showed that Haiti was in a more fragile situation than Guatemala, in relation to the successful implementation of a comprehensive peace model.

Politically, government instability in Haiti was manifested in several political crises, from a coup in 2004 to several long periods without an executive branch of government, contrasting with party rotation in the Guatemalan government, with various presidencies complying with full terms.

<b>Relevance</b>	How did the mediation process relate to the context of the wider conflict?
<b>Effectiveness and impact</b>	What were the direct/indirect, intentional/unintentional and positive/negative effects of the mediation process?
<b>Sustainability</b>	To what extent have the benefits of the mediation process continued after its ending?
<b>Efficiency</b>	How do the costs of the mediation process relate to its benefits?
<b>Coherence, coordination and linkages</b>	What were the relationships between the process of mediation and other conflict management activities?
<b>Coverage</b>	How were the actors' mediation process, issues and more relevant regions included/excluded?
<b>Consistency with values</b>	Was the mediation process consistent with the values of the mediators and the international community, for example, with regard to confidentiality, human rights and the impartiality of the mediator(s)?


Data from the components of the Democracy Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit<sup>10</sup> (including, for example, the functioning of government or the electoral process) as well as detailed data of the State Fragility Index<sup>11</sup> (that includes figures on the deterioration of public services) were analysed. All these data show a significant difference between the performance of Guatemala in relation to Haiti, especially when considering the years of exponential increase of international financial and technical support for state-building in Haiti. Also in terms of economic development, the two countries showed disparities in post-intervention years, which are very evident on the charts that follow.

<sup>10</sup> Available at [www.eiu.com/democracyindex](http://www.eiu.com/democracyindex), accessed on 11 February 2016.

<sup>11</sup> Available at <http://global.fundforpeace.org>, accessed on 11 February 2016.




**Figure 1 – gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (current US \$) 1985-2010**



Source: World Bank data<sup>12</sup>.

**Figure 2 – Poverty and economic deterioration (2005-2014)**




Source: data of the components of the state fragility index<sup>13</sup> (scale from 0 to 10).

<sup>12</sup> Data available at <http://data.worldbank.org/>, accessed on 11 February 2016.

<sup>13</sup> Data available at <http://global.fundforpeace.org>, accessed on 11 February 2016.



**Figure 3 – evolution of uneven economic development (2005-2014)**



Source: data of the components of the state fragility index<sup>14</sup> (scale from 0 to 10).

Also the comparison of social indicators such as literacy rate, average life expectancy and infant mortality, which coincided with some of the main concerns expressed by the populations, always favoured Guatemala.

Finally, the third field analysed by indicators – the peace process sustainability with regard to the absence of direct violence – shows a distancing of Guatemala from Haiti again. In this context, it is necessary to highlight that there are probably higher incidence in Guatemala of direct violence of a criminal nature, with clear links to drug trafficking. This phenomenon has origins in the weaknesses of the peace process in both countries, the fragility of the security and of institutions of justice; however, it is important to note that there is more evidence of this effecting the political sphere in the case of Guatemala. Criminal violence in Haiti has been linked to political interests as well as political violence – albeit on a smaller scale – which continues to be an instrument of contestation.

In February 2016, we watched the delays of Haitian elections because of episodes of violence that were jeopardising the security of citizens, leading to the appointment of an interim president. In contrast, in 2015, we saw Guatemalan society rally against a corrupt president, removing him from power through widespread street protests. In the frameworks, the use of violence is distinct.


Indeed, the participation of the UN in Guatemala finished an armed conflict that found its roots in a political and economic regime marked by exclusion. Power spaces opened up to the population, and the Guatemalans have complaint mechanisms of accountability and non-violent channels, meaning that a return to violence with a profile similar to the one that had existed during the armed conflict unlikely.

<sup>14</sup> Data available at <http://global.fundforpeace.org>, accessed on 11 February 2016.



In contrast, for Haiti, UN intervention did not overcome fully the reality that existed, and perpetuated power structures that continue to marginalise a large majority of the population, with episodes of political violence continuing to emerge. The clearest indicator of the lack of sustainability of the peace process in Haiti is the attempted coup of 2004 that urged the establishment of the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission, which remains in place today and ignores a transformative solution to the structure of violence.

**Figure 4 – evolution of Guatemala and Haiti in their world classification of State fragility (2005-2011)**



Source: adapted from data on the index of State fragility.<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, all other indicators from this field shows Haiti negative evolution, especially when compared with Guatemala.

Specifically, the Haitian State is more dependent on international aid, is more poor and unequal, less able to provide citizens with public services, is living in a shadow of government instability, lacks protection of human rights on various levels (political, economic and social) and lives with violence as a way to resolve the friction that this has generated.

Considering the disparity in results, we then analysed the process – through the framework mentioned by the OECD – to see if political reconciliation after intervention had respected the desired guide moving forwards.

The case of the UN's mediation in Guatemala was rather unusual, possibly being the case that the guide for positive peace was more faithfully observed. Measures included a strict adaptation of mediation processes in order to remediate the causes of conflictual and relational dynamics that the conflict kept between the parties.

The UN led a group of complementary mediators (national and international) that facilitated the integration of the roots of the violence on the peace agenda, allowing a broad dialogue on structural issues of Guatemalan society. The negotiations led to the signing of peace accords on far more complex topics than just operational issues linked

<sup>15</sup> Data available at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates>, accessed on 11 February 2016.



to the end of the conflict (such as the cease-fire or the demobilisation of combatants), and focused on so-called substantive issues, such as indigenous rights, land reform and women's rights.

In terms of content, as well as procedures, this mediation process was unprecedented. A broad agenda combined the integration of civil society in discussions through the creation of a parallel advisory board in the Assembly of the Civil Society. This arrangement allowed negotiations to extend and reflect political and social frameworks to fringes of Guatemalan society after the civil war, transforming the peace process into a project of national renewal.

The dialogue included political, economic, structural and cultural specificities that comprise the social fabric of Guatemala, which had one given rise to armed conflict. This allowed the opening of spaces which were previously closed to the great majority of Guatemalans. This deep and comprehensive national dialogue permitted the creation of necessary mechanisms so that issues could be treated through non-violent institutional means, an essential step to initiate the construction of a more lasting peace.

This corresponds to a large extent with the proposed guide to peace positive (of an integrative character and its associative approach) by encouraging a national consensus on the peace model which raised negotiations that gave it far greater legitimacy and durability.

The UN also coordinated its various instruments well and used additional mechanisms in line with the objectives of their efforts as leading mediators. This is what happened with the appropriately timed implementation of the MINUGUA peace mission, which had an extensive mandate and signed agreements that served in tense moments as a deterrent against violence. The same occurred with diplomatic instruments, which positively influenced parties at critical moments. As a whole, the UN's intervention responded positively to the criteria suggested by the evaluation framework:

- relevant to the context in which it acted on the integration of the causes of conflict;
- effective in the more immediate resolution of the conflict and had a high impact on the transformation of the Guatemalan political framework, enabling a broader opening to spheres of the population;
- sustainable not just because it avoided a return to political violence as an instrument of dispute, but also because it allowed the signing of agreements with some level of specificity, which today serve in public policy agendas;
- efficient, because the costs of the intervention, including the peace mission, had been balanced with the benefits brought;
- consistent and guided by good coordination among complementary instruments of conflict resolution (i.e. diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and later peace-building);
- a significant level of coverage, integrating broader factions of Guatemalan society and included traditionally excluded groups, such as indigenous peoples and women;
- and a significant consistency with the values and positive peace proposals of the United Nations.



In contrast, the mediation process initiated by the United Nations in conjunction with the Organization of American States in Haiti showed huge weaknesses in matching these criteria.

Initially, the UN joined a mediation team that was unable to reach a satisfactory consensus among the parties, which led to a different strategy that used the threat of use of force to persuade parties to reach agreement. This mediation was focused exclusively on the elites who vied for power and aimed to restore the simplified political framework prior to the 1991 coup d'état that had overthrown Jean Bertrand Aristide.

The UN authorised a military intervention led by the United States after the imposition of economic sanctions that, although weakening the elites, drastically affected the living conditions of Haitians.

This allowed a very fragile democratic order to return that, years later, led to armed violence – the privileged tool for parties wanting to seize power. Ten years after the deployment of an international military mission in Haiti, a new coup broke this fictitious stability.

The UN response to this second coup d'état was to deploy a new peace-keeping mission (MINUSTAH) with the same scope as before, underscoring what today is called an integrated mission. MINUSTAH still exists today to ensure security in the country through predominantly military force, leading national institutions into a series of reforms to strengthen the State, particularly in the areas of security and justice reform.

Permanent instability continues to justify a very considerable military presence, but no clear exit strategy exists; it has been considered before, but dropped several times in recent years. Moreover, little progress has been made on deeper political dialogue and the underlying causes of the conflict.

When looking at the criteria proposed in the evaluation, we concluded that the process of moving toward positive peace was largely sterile:

- In terms of relevance, mediation focused exclusively on operational issues relating to the ceasefire and the return to the previous democratic framework, avoiding a more comprehensive reading of the political conflict that was behind the violence. In interviews, many actors from the UN insist that there is a pending political conflict and even violence, which continues to legitimise a robust military force.
- The UN was unable to reach an agreement satisfactory to both parties, having authorised the use of force as a means of persuasion and subsequently deciding to establish the first peacekeeping mission (UNMIH) without a real peace to maintain.
- The lack of sustainability of these options was later revealed by the return to the use of force with a new coup in 2004.
- As for the cost-benefit analysis, the intervention in Haiti turned out to be much longer than that of Guatemala and started from a fragile mediation process. There were instruments used that had high costs for the population (such as ineffective economic sanctions) and for the UN, with the multiplication of missions, including the far-reaching MINUSTAH that had a large annual budget (around 500 million US dollars).



- The different instruments for conflict resolution used in Haiti had not benefited from adequate coordination, being often counterproductive to achieving a lasting peaceful situation. This included the use of economic sanctions and the threat of the use of force.
- The scope was also limited since it did not include broader sectors of the population in addition to the two warring parties, and so excluded the vast majority of civil society and Haitian citizens from the process. The UN was limited to facilitating dialogue between the elites who vied for power, without favouring inclusion and greater national support for the peace process.
- Finally, in terms of consistency with values, if it was a discourse based on respect for human rights and democracy that sparked the intervention in Haiti, these were integrated into the debate and the implementation of superficial peace, without the origin of its disrespect being considered effectively. The mediation team was also greatly affected by the interference of the United States, which at critical moments reduced trust among the parties.

The above context shows serious doubts about the effectiveness of the role played today by MINUSTAH. In the absence of a national army (which was dissolved by Aristide in the 1990s) and within the great debility of the security forces, MINUSTAH today assumes responsibility for maintaining order and security in the country. With this central objective, a transformation of existing structures which generate violence was neglected. Although using increasingly large instruments far beyond military resources, including instruments of governance and institutions, the mission still focuses mainly on containment of the conflict as opposed to its effective and lasting resolution.

This allows the maintenance of Haiti in a hybrid situation of pre-war/post-war, without salvaging a national resolution strategy that addresses the causes of conflict. The political process, like several other areas, has been stalled and lives in a situation of permanent instability (Duffield, 2007), perpetuating the need for an armed international presence though not resolving the problems that fuel it.

The concern with the primacy of political issues that we stress here were recently mentioned in the report of experts led by Dr José Ramos-Horta, which was commissioned by the Secretary-General to assessment the effectiveness of<sup>16</sup>peacekeeping operations.

The report states:

*"The number of peace operations today are deployed in an environment where there is little or no peace to keep."*

In this context, the same document recommends:

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<sup>16</sup> Full text available at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/95](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/95), accessed on 11 February 2016.



*"Lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions. Political solutions should always guide the design and deployment of United Nations peace operations. When the momentum behind peace falters, the United Nations, and particularly Member States, must help to mobilise renewed political efforts to keep peace processes on track."*

This recommendation seems to have relevance for situations of instability like the Haitian case, where a concordant intention that led to intervention in Guatemala saw its implementation deviate from the guide suggested by the concept of positive peace, skirting the indispensability of a political solution.

The comparison brought here has allowed not only the verification of disparate results, but above all, the identification of what stages and procedures of the UN intervention may be at the root of a less sustainable peace process. Alert to the possibility of external intervention itself has negatively influenced a longer-lasting reconciliation.

The mechanisms for evaluating the activities of the UN focus mainly on results established in mandates it designed, have blocked a critical observation of the procedures employed to achieve them. On the contrary, evaluations contemplate the process itself, in order to appreciate how peace projects are materialised in practice (as was tested in comparison here) and can offer more concrete answers to the mechanisms for the sustainability of peace.

## **Conclusions**

The evolution of the UN's discourse, particularly in their guidance documents, from the mentioned agenda for peace of the Brahimi Report in 2000 to the 2008 Capstone Doctrine of 2008, was done by broadening the concept of peace to move closer to Galtung's perspective of positive peace; however, its implementation on the ground continues to see serious weaknesses in the guide that this same conceptualisation has suggested.

In terms of evaluation of the effectiveness of these mechanisms, within a framework of patent difficulties on the ground to promote more sustainable peace, the UN continues to focus mainly on the verification of results established internally, more than critically assessing the procedures put in place to achieve them. Without dramatically altering this implementation, it would hardly be able to overcome the obstacles which have repeatedly been found.

The recent Ramos-Horta report mentions some relevant concerns in terms of procedures, such as the need to expand the spectrum of UN partners and overcome the current exclusivity assigned to elites, the urgency of essential political issues and focus on reconciliation processes based on extended mediation frameworks as well as the obligation to intervene with more flexibility in accordance with contexts and local priorities.

Promoting evaluation mechanisms that also address whether such procedures are being complied with, instead of one observation restricted to results, would facilitate a more



critical view of performance on the ground, enabling an analysis of what aspects of international intervention may be affecting the implementation of a plan for lasting peace.

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## **GREED, GRIEVANCE, LEADERSHIP AND EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE INITIATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA**

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### **Abstract**

Understanding the initiation of conflict is fundamental for the success of efforts in conflict prevention. The validity of the mechanisms of the "Greed and Grievance" model, alongside leadership and external interventions are tested in four periods of initiation and intensification of the conflict in Angola. All mechanisms are present but their relative relevance varies throughout the conflict. Among the mechanisms identified in each period the most relevant in the Cold War period are the international and regional interventions in 1961 and 1975 and in the post-Cold War period, the "greed" factors in 1992 (oil and diamonds, poverty and war capital) and the UNITA leadership of Jonas Savimbi in 1998. The case study provides evidence that "greed" and "grievance" can be interlinked (such as in 1992) and confirms the relevance of leadership and external interventions mechanisms.

### **Keywords**

Africa, Angola, Conflict, Greed, Grievance, Leadership, External interventions

### **How to cite this article**

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## **GREED, GRIEVANCE, LEADERSHIP AND EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE INITIATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA<sup>1</sup>**

**Ricardo Real P. Sousa**

### **Introduction**

Several approaches have been developed to explain the initiation of Civil War. The “Greed and Grievance” model popularized by Paul Collier attracted intense scrutiny from researchers.

The model is based on a rational choice approach and contrasts the economic opportunities in which people are able to organize and finance a rebellion (“greed”), i.e. rebellion as a criminal enterprise, with social and political motives making people want to rebel (“grievances”), i.e. socio-economic injustices felt by a social group. The model is operationalized through a series of proxy variables. The opportunities of would be rebels are: a1) the funding possibilities available, which can be revenues from natural resources, remittances from diasporas or support from hostile governments; a2) the recruitment costs of rebels, determined by alternative income levels; 3) the accumulated war capital; a4) the capacity of the government to control the territory measured in terms of how the terrain is appropriate for rebels (forest and mountains) or how disperse the populations are, and; a5) the social cohesion in society and how ethnic and religious factors facilitate the establishment and maintenance of conflict groups. The grievances of would be rebels are: b1) religious and ethnic hatred between groups; b2) the level of political repression; b3) the political exclusion of groups, and; b4) the income inequality in the country (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

The application of this model to the Civil Wars between 1960 and 1999 concludes that the main mechanism in Civil War initiation is “greed”, in the desire to acquire economic benefits and therefore the perceived capacity to organise and maintain a rebellion. The main “greed” factors are the existence of natural resources (specifically oil), remittances from the diaspora, the low recruitment costs of fighters, military advantage in terms of dispersed populations, and the war capital existing in the country (in time since the last conflict) (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The only significant grievance factor is political exclusion through ethnic dominance, at the same time that ethnic and religious diversity decreases chances of conflict if ethnic dominance is avoided. Finally, the size of the population is positively associated with conflict onset<sup>2</sup> (these results are summarized in the column “results” in table 1). Fearon and Laitin (2003) reached similar results regarding the relevance of “greed” factors in explaining the initiation of Civil Wars. But they consider that the low income variable is a proxy of lower state capacity to repress rebellion and consequently lower costs for the rebels to sustain a rebellion rather than a proxy of lower recruitment costs of fighters, as considered by Collier and Hoeffler (2004). For Fearon (2005), if oil predicts Civil Wars, it is not so much by being an entrepreneurial mechanism (as a tempting “prize” for those who control the state) but mostly because oil producers have low state capacities to repress

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<sup>2</sup> This is interpreted more as a greed factor by increasing the likelihood of having secession-seeking population sub-groups.



rebellion relative to their levels of income per capita. Oil rich countries have less incentive to develop the state apparatus required for revenue collection.

Following similar rationalist-positivist approaches, the validity of the model was tested with quantitative and qualitative assessment. Quantitative analysis by Hegre and Sambanis (2006) confirmed several of the model's results, including the entrepreneurial (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) and state repression claims (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

The model was later reviewed to consider that it is the financial and military feasibility of conflict that increases the likelihood of Civil War initiation. Feasibility is mainly measured in terms of: the country being a former French colony and therefore under the security umbrella of France, making rebellion less likely to succeed; the proportion of young male in the country who are potential fighters, and; a mountainous terrain that makes rebel military action feasible (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009). Therefore, the issue is not so much if there is a "grievance" motive, or if there is a "greed" opportunity, instead if insurrection is feasible.

We test in this paper the original "greed" and "grievance" model for three reasons. One is that the feasibility factors are difficult to test within a single case study, as they don't vary significantly across time. A second reason is that the results of the feasibility model reconfirm the results of the original model in the sense that "greed" factors are still significant and "grievance" are not (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009). A third reason is that there is no agreement on the "greed" and "grievance" debate and this debate has not been replaced by a "feasibility" debate.

The current "greed" and "grievance" debate focuses on which of the mechanisms explains the initiation of Civil Wars, the epistemological foundations of the studies and the policy implications of the results.

The "grievance" argument can be traced back to the "relative deprivation" theory that proposed that psychological mechanisms associated with a frustration of not meeting material expectations are at the root of conflict initiation (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). Tilly (1978) contested this argument considering that grievance factors are widespread in society and conflict is not present in all societies. Instead, it is the capacity to mount a rebellion, determined by access to material and organisational resources, that differentiates societies where Civil War is initiated or not. With Gurr's work (1970, 2000) on ethnic conflict, group level grievances gain another capacity to explain the initiation of conflict.

In the tradition of the "grievance" argument, it has been suggested that rebellion occurs in cases of multidimensional horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2002). Horizontal inequalities occur when social exclusion and poverty and identity or regional boundaries take place simultaneously. Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014) used horizontal inequalities as a proxy for inequality, instead of the GINI coefficient used by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), which reflects vertical inequalities - inequality among values of a frequency distribution of income, economic interpersonal inequality. They found that horizontal inequalities are an important factor in rebellions and a better predictor of rebellion than vertical inequalities.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Similar results were found by Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) and Østby (2008).



The qualitative analysis of the model through a series of case studies (Collier and Sambanis, 2005) confirms its main results. Nevertheless, it also identifies a series of limitations and reflections, some of which this case study on Angola is particularly suited to investigate.

One limitation of the model is the absence of leadership as a factor. This is mainly due to the fact that leadership is hard to quantify. There are two theories on the role of leadership in mobilizing ethnic groups. One, from rationalist and constructivist accounts, suggest that there is a social construction of identity by political elites in order to mobilize and manipulate ethnic groups into fighting (Gurr 2000). These differ from the primordial perspectives, which consider that there is an innate conflict propensity in ethnic identity (Brubaker 1995).

Another limitation is the absence of an account of the role of external interventions. The Collier and Hoeffler (2004) theory uses a Cold War dummy variable to proxy for this effect, finding no statistically significant relationship<sup>4</sup>. But this variable does not capture the nuanced effect of exogenous variables on Civil War. The Cold War had different periods of intensity, between the post-Second World War and 1991, when it ended with different levels of involvement of external actors. Also, it had different expressions at international and regional level. At the regional level, there can be diffusion and contagion effects. Diffusion occurs through demonstration, where political events in one country inspire political action in another. Contagion occurs through: common ethnic groups across borders; accumulation of war capital (for instances small arms) in specific regions; refugee movements, or external interventions (Sambanis, 2005). The effect of external interventions on Civil War is one of the understudied relationships in the literature (Sambanis, 2002). External interventions support the fighting parties, affecting their propensity to fight. Military interventions increase directly the military capacity to fight, and economic interventions decrease the coordinating costs of sustaining a rebellion by increasing the likelihood of success (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000). Diplomatic interventions are normally intended to find a non-violent solution to the conflict and through information sharing they can increase the chances of reaching a political solution. Generally speaking, evidence has been found of the escalatory effect of military interventions and de-escalatory effect of economic and diplomatic interventions in Civil Wars (Regan and Meachum 2014, Sousa, 2015).

These limitations can be contextualized in broader epistemological considerations. It has been argued that the rational choice approach and methodological individualism of these studies fail to take into account social, relational and historical aspects (Cramer, 2002). Furthermore, statistical inference is distinct from causality and positivism can fall into tautological explanations of the phenomenon, based on datasets detached from the meanings that events have on the ground (Korf, 2006).

A main reflection of Sambanis (2005) is that one should be looking at "greed" and "grievance" as alternative shades of the same phenomena, and not as competing explanations. A few mechanisms can be considered to illustrate this hypothesis. For instance, functional political institutions may decrease political grievances but at the same time good economic performance can promote the stability of institutions and, in

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<sup>4</sup> The other exogenous variable used is remittances from the diaspora, but, for data reasons, this is limited to remittances from the USA.



this way, affect grievances. Also state failure or government illegitimacy leads to domestic anarchy, in which case "greed" can be considered the pursuit of survival by groups in society.

Finally, the relevance of this debate can be apprehended on its policy implications on how to prevent Civil War. The "greed" explanation puts a focus on: economic growth and diversification; control and management of natural resources, and; state strength and external interventions to improve its capacity. "Grievance" explanations highlight: the indivisibility of some issues, such as identity, ethnicity or religion; the need for ethnic inclusion and fairer distribution of wealth in the country; mediated solutions among parties, and external interventions in order to secure the commitment to peace agreements.

Inspired on the qualitative work of Collier and Sambanis (2005), the main contribution of this paper is two-folded. One is to test the "greed" and "grievance" hypotheses as alternative but also complementary explanations of Civil War alongside the normally omitted variables of leadership and exogenous effects at international and regional level, in the form of external interventions (or processes of diffusion). Another is to apply the model to an historical case study on Angola, which has not been done before. The Angolan Civil War spanned from the war of independence through the Cold War and up to the post-Cold War era. It had more than 500,000 deaths, tens of thousands of persons mutilated by anti-personnel mines and the displacement of approximately 4.1 million people.

This study follows the definition of Civil War advanced by Gleditsch et al (2002), whereby it consists of a contested incompatibility regarding a government and/or territory with the use of force by parties, and where at least one of them is the state or government, resulting in at least 25 deaths in battle<sup>5</sup>.

The conceptualization of variables, in this case the dependent variable of Civil War, is one of the challenges in quantitative studies (Sambanis, 2004). Broadly speaking, in the case of Angola there were two types of war: the war of colonial independence initiated in 1961, also called extra-systemic war, and an internationalized Civil War since independence, between 1975 and 2002. The war of colonial independence has particularities that differentiate it from the subsequent war (the issues and parties involved) which could merit a separate analysis. But because the original analysis of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) includes these types of war, it will also be considered. The Civil War initiated after independence is internationalized because it had military involvement of external actors. The question here is to consider if relapses into conflict after periods of peace following a peace agreement should be considered a new Civil War or not. In Angola the relapses had the same conflict parties fighting over the same issue and therefore it does not fit completely into a classification of a new Civil War.

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<sup>5</sup> All the classifications used in the paper and dates of initiation/intensification of conflict are from this source, unless otherwise identified. The periods and sub-periods used in this paper significantly match those of Sambanis (2004) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) with small differences of one year due to the level of violence considered: Sambanis (2004) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) consider the second period to end in May 1991, the year of the Bicesse peace accords, even if technically both 1991 and 1992 are considered as conflict years in Gleditsch et al (2002); Sambanis (2004) considers the third period to end in 1994, and 1995 to be a year with very low violence not reaching the threshold to be considered in conflict, while for Collier and Hoeffler (2004) the conflict that started in 1992 only ends in 2002; Sambanis (2004) considers the fourth period to start in 1997, due to the escalation of violence in that year.



Also the model of the “initiation” of Civil Wars aims to identify the key mechanisms associated with a qualitative change on the political processes in a country, where actors decide to move from non-violent conflict to violent conflict. The mechanisms present in these cases are not necessarily the same as in situations of relapse. In relapses, the fighting group and war capital already exist and this can have a decisive effect on what factors explain Civil War initiation. This path-dependence is difficult to analyse and is also present in the transition from the war of independence to internationalized Civil War, where one can find some of the same fighting parties even if fighting against a different party (different dyads). For these reason the analysis will consider two initiations, the war of independence and the internationalized Civil War, and, in the latter war, two intensifications of the conflict

Four periods are identified in the Civil War in Angola between 1961 and 2002<sup>6</sup>. The first period begins in February 1961 with the initiation of the war of independence against Portugal and extends up to July 1974, when a ceasefire is signed between Portugal and the nationalist movements. The second period begins in November 1975, when the internationalized Civil War initiates and ends with the Bicesse accords in May 1991. The third period starts with the intensification of conflict after the September 1992 elections and ends in 1995 when the conflict intensity decreases significantly. The final period ranges from March 1998, when the conflict restarts, to April 2002, when it ends<sup>7</sup>.

Table 1 resumes the values of the proxy variables of the Collier and Hoeffler (2004) model for the years closest to conflict initiation in the period between 1960 and 1995. It compares the values for Angola with the averages for all countries, countries where a Civil War did not start and countries where a Civil War started. In Angola, the main “greed” indicators are propitious to conflict initiation: for funding, natural resources are above the average and the recruitment costs are below the average<sup>8</sup> of the values for countries where a Civil War started; at the same time, the possibilities for state control are diminished as both geographical dispersion and population are higher than the average in countries where a Civil War started, and; the grievance indicators are less favourable to conflict initiation as the social fractionalization is high throughout but without ethnic dominance.

The historical analysis in this paper identifies both “greed” and “grievance” factors in moments of the initiation or intensification of Civil War in Angola<sup>9</sup>. It suggests that exogenous variables for international and regional dimensions and the endogenous variable of leadership improve the model’s explanatory power. The article follows a chronological order of the four moments of initiation or intensification of Civil War, with a description and analysis of the “greed”, “grievance” and exogenous dynamics. It then proceeds to analyse the leadership dynamics, which is better understood across periods.

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<sup>6</sup> This article does not analyse the Cabinda conflict, which occurs at the same time with similar but in many cases particular dynamics.

<sup>7</sup> Collier and Hoeffler (2004) consider the Civil War in Angola to have started in 1961, 1975 and 1992 and ongoing in 1999, the last year of the dataset. Because 1996 and 1997 are years not classified in conflict by Gleditsch et al (2002), 1998 is added here as another intensification of the conflict.

<sup>8</sup> Except for higher economic growth in 1965 (not shown in table) and 1998.

<sup>9</sup> Because for Angola there is no data on GINI and the horizontal inequalities indicators are non-variant in the period, the evidence of the grievance is based on case studies.

**Table 1: Greed and Grievance model factors 1960, 1975, 1990 and 1995**

Factor	Proxy (*3)	Results	1960 (Initiation independence war 1961)				1975 (Initiation civil war 1975)				1990 (Intensification civil war 1992)				1995 (Intensification civil war 1998)			
			Angola	All	NoCW St	CW St	Angola	All	NoCW St	CW St	Angola	All	NoCW St	CW St	Angola	All	NoCW St	CW St
a1) Natural resources	Ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP	+ SIG	0,202	0,138	0,162	0,127	0,360	0,183	0,190	0,189	0,476	0,146	0,134	0,136	0,411	0,142	0,141	0,231
	Ratio of oil exports to GDP	+ SIG	0,202	0,033	0,033	0,017	0,360	0,051	0,055	0,042	0,476	0,023	0,024	0,029	0,411	0,020	0,019	0,085
a1) Remittances from diasporas	Emigrants living in the US over time since last conflict *1000	+ SIG		0,083	0,083			0,046	0,043	0,090	0,013	0,144	0,103	0,322		0,088	0,084	0,183
a1) Support from hostile government	Start of Civil War in Cold War or post-Cold War (dummy)	NS	1,000	0,070			1,000	0,070			1,000	0,110			0,030			
a2) Atypical low cost of recruitment	Mean income pc (lnGDPpc)	- SIG	6,836	7,324	7,338	6,882	6,394	7,730	7,810	7,464	6,448	7,962	8,083	7,296	6,628	7,974	8,039	8,434
	Male secondary school enrollment;	- SIG	3,000	22,992	24,212	9,336	10,000	39,871	42,343	23,600	12,000	33,939	36,217	43,613		61,362	62,398	60,300
	Economic growth in n-1	- SIG					-9,321	2,423	2,392	0,327	-2,336	0,816	1,032	-1,108	3,383	0,371	0,317	-7,119
a3) War capital	Months since last conflict	- SIG	172	137	160	118	1	301	311	168	16	433	467	339		469	481	134
	Previous war (dummy)	NS	0,00	0,14	0,12	0,43	1,00	0,22	0,19	0,70	1,00	0,24	0,22	0,44		0,30	0,28	0,80
a4) Mountains	Mountains index	+ p=.164	9,7	17,2	15,8	20,1	9,7	17,2	14,8	29,2	9,7	17,2	14,1	37,3	9,7	17,2	15,7	6,7
a4) Dispersed populations	Gini coefficient population dispersion	- SIG	0,648	0,373	0,368	0,393	0,648	0,373	0,368	0,628	0,648	0,373	0,363	0,621	0,664	0,379	0,369	0,769
	Population (ln)	+ SIG	13,39	0,16	0,16	0,13	13,63	0,18	0,19	0,19	16,04	0,13	0,13	0,14	16,19	0,14	0,14	0,23
a5) Social cohesion	Social fractionalization (ethnic and religious)	- SIG (*1)	4446	1778	1690	2682	4134	1783	1792	1394	3822	1788	1718	2608	3822	1788	1718	4447
b1) Religious and ethnic hatred	Ethno-linguistic fractionalization	+ SIG	78	40	39	32	78	40	39	33	78	40	39	37	78	40	39	73
	Religious fractionalization	NS	36	36	33	44	32	36	37	28	48	36	36	38	48	36	37	38
	Polarization measure	NS (*2)	0,070	0,051	0,049	0,074	0,070	0,069	0,069	0,123	0,070	0,053	0,055	0,073	0,070	0,051	0,048	0,168
b2) Political repression	Democracy/autocracy (10-0)	- SIG (*1)		3,8	4,0	0,7	0,0	3,0	3,3	0,7	0,0	4,8	3,4	1,7	1,0	3,3	3,6	2,1
b3) Political exclusion	% largest ethnic group – ethnic dominance	+ SIG (*1)	0,000	0,473	0,474	0,343	0,000	0,473	0,446	0,300	0,000	0,473	0,467	0,364	0,000	0,473	0,473	0,400
b4) Income disparities between groups	Gini coefficient	NS		41,178	41,339	38,733		40,841	40,483	44,613		40,789	40,390	33,300		41,094	41,023	31,080
	Gini coefficient of land ownership	NS		0,643	0,646	0,624		0,636	0,639	0,720		0,639	0,642	0,389		0,639	0,641	0,392

**Notes:** Data is from Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and follows the 5-year interval of the dataset. Years reported are the closest to the initiation or intensification of conflict in 1961, 1975, 1991 and 1998. Empty cells are missing data and the column "Results" identifies if the proxy is statistically significant (SIG) (at either 1%, 5% or 10% level) and the direction of the effect: increasing (+) or decreasing (-) the likelihood of Civil War initiation. NS means No Significance and in one case the p value is reported. Definition of the variables can be found in the original paper. The main objective of the table is to compare Angola and other countries and not the individual values. For instance, population is reported as natural log as used in the original paper, the emigrant variable is here multiplied by 1000 in order to have a more readable value. "No CW St" means countries where no Civil War started in the period (five years subsequent to the year identified) and "CW St" means countries where a Civil War starts in the period. \*1 - Results of most models tested, but not all; \*2 - Significant in one combined model; and \*3 - Variables identified are the ones reported in the independent models. Some model's variables were not reported in Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) tables due to lack of significance, these are: a4) proportion of forests, population density and population in urban areas; b2) political openness, and; b4) ratio of top-to-bottom quintiles of income.



## The beginning of the independence war in 1961

In the early sixties, the socio-economic structure of Angola was typically colonial with industrial output representing only a low proportion of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). There was a small white minority living mainly in the capital which controlled the local political sphere but dependent on the metropolis<sup>10</sup>. Another minority were the *creoles* and assimilated blacks with citizenship rights, who worked mostly in the public and trade sectors<sup>11</sup>. The remaining population of four million and seven hundred thousand were all of Bantu origin and belonged mostly to one of the three dominant ethno-linguistic groups, the Mbundu, the Ovimbundu and Bakongo.

The Mbundu, predominantly from the centre and north region<sup>12</sup> would, together with the urban *creoles*, become the main support base of the MPLA – the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The group is associated with the Methodist religion and the urban economy of state employment. The Ovimbundu, mainly from the central plateau<sup>13</sup>, are associated with the UNITA – the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola – and are mainly of the Congregational church, linked to the trade associated with the rail road. Finally, the Bakongo<sup>14</sup> from the northern region are also present in the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The group is associated with the FNLA – the National Front for the Liberation of Angola –, belongs mainly to the Baptist church and is connected to the coffee production (Birmingham, 2006). The main and sometimes sole common political denominator of these three groups was Angola's independence.

Although there had been rebellions in the history of Angola, no new social and economic grievances or economic opportunities developed in this period that could explain the initiation of conflict. Instead, what is specific to this period are changes occurring in the international context of the Cold War, mainly: the early pro-nationalism of the Kennedy administration in the United States of America (USA)<sup>15</sup>, and, in the regional environment, the year of African independence in 1960, in particular the independence of the Congo (later called the DRC)<sup>16</sup>.

In this propitious international and regional environment, in the beginning of 1961 a sequence of events led to the initiation of the conflict. The first event in January occurred when the Mbundu attacked mainly the representatives and buildings of the cotton industry, capitalizing on the complains over forced labour and the cotton production policies, which involved forced production of cotton, state control of the market and appropriation of land (Birmingham, 2006)<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> 173.000 in 1960.

<sup>11</sup> About 54,000 in 1960 and 30,000 in 1950 respectively.

<sup>12</sup> About 24 percent of population.

<sup>13</sup> About 32 percent of population.

<sup>14</sup> About 32 percent of the population.

<sup>15</sup> Up to 1962 when the pro-European thesis wins over an Africanist position in the White House (Rodrigues, 2004)

<sup>16</sup> Some of the contemporary events are: Egypt's independence in 1951, Bandung conference for self-determination and autonomous government of colonized people in 1955, the All-Africa Peoples Conference with delegates from the independence movements held in Accra in 1958 and in Tunis in 1960, but significantly the independence of 17 countries in Africa in 1960.

<sup>17</sup> These complaints had already been associated with revolts in 1915 and 1945, although at the time the Portuguese regime had the capacity to control them. The only other period with revolts occurred in the



In the following month of February, in the capital of Luanda, a group failed an attempt to free nationalist political prisoners, where some of the group's members would belong to the MPLA in the future. In its aftermath there was severe repression in the city by police and armed civilians. This revolt can be linked to the grievances of *creoles* and mixed race urban population, especially regarding the discriminatory public sector policies implemented since the 1950s due to the increased influx of Portuguese settlers<sup>18</sup> (Hodges, 2001, Birmingham, 2006).

The third event occurred in March 1961 in the coffee areas of Bakongo North (Uige), from where the rebellion would spread violently. In this case, not only were white farmers and their families attacked but also *mestiços* and migrant black workers - Ovimbundu originating from the south (Spikes, 1993). These were seen both as collaborating with the colonizers (Birmingham, 1999) and the reason for the low wages prevailing in the region (Cramer, 2006), where significant frustration existed over the expropriation of northern Angolan coffee farmers (Cramer, 2002). Holden Roberto, leader of the then UPA – the Union of the People of Angola<sup>19</sup>, claimed responsibility for the rural insurrection, which occurred at the same time he was travelling to New York to discuss the self-determination of Angola at the United Nations (Spikes, 1993).

In contrast both to the Belgians (the colonisers of the neighbouring country from where the insurgents of UPA came and which had its own independence just months before) and to the political landscape of the time, the Portuguese administration did not negotiate and, despite the dictatorship facing one of its most challenging periods, the regime reinforced its colonial policy and increased its repressive capacities in the colony. At the same time, a policy was started to “win the hearts” of the peoples governed and internationally the Lajes “card” (strategic important military bases for the USA located in the Azores islands) was played in order to ease international pressure for decolonization.

### **The model and the initiation of conflict in 1961**

Most of the economic opportunity factors were not present in 1961 when the war of independence started. Unprocessed resources were significant in the volume of exports, although oil was not the main resource. Coffee was the main export with 36 percent, which, together with other unprocessed agricultural goods, amounted to 56 percent of the total export value in 1961, while oil exports represented 20 percent of exports (Ferreira, 2006). In any of the four periods under analysis, there is no data on diaspora in the USA. Nevertheless, the qualitative literature rarely refers to the role of the Angola's diaspora in funding the rebellion, making single references to the political exiles in Lisbon, Brazzaville and Conakry in the 1960s. At the same time, Angola had no war capital and there was not a large ethnic group dominating the country. Instead, there was a minority of settlers' dominance, therefore a case of political grievance of the Bantu population.

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beginning of the century in the period of Portuguese consolidation of control over the territory and were associated with the Ovimbundu (1902 and 1904) and Bakongo (1913 and 1916) kingdoms' resistance. (Spikes, 1993).

<sup>18</sup> From 80.000 in 1950, the settler population increased to 170.000 in 1960 and about 300.000 at independence in 1975 (Pereira, 1994).

<sup>19</sup> Which would later become the FNLA.



The first attempt of insurrection in Luanda was not successful, mainly due to the state's capacity in controlling an area with high concentration of population, resulting in the insurgents' refuge in the dense Dembo forest in the Northeast of Luanda (George, 2005). The conflict was mainly initiated in a rural setting of a vast region with a dispersed population by a group who share the Bakongo identity. Also, the insurgents had similar economic grievances regarding agricultural and labour policies in the coffee sector, which translated into low income per capita and low male secondary school enrolment. Due to the economic structure, the prize associated with taking over the state was small because it was directly dependent on the same low wages in the agriculture sector, compared to a situation where income would come mainly from offshore oil. Therefore, the financial incentive for rebellion can be found abroad.

The fact that the leadership of UPA was based in Leopoldville and that the DRC had recently become independent, significantly contributes to a diffusion and contagion thesis. Diffusion related to the demonstration effect of DRC independence. Contagion related to the origins of the insurgents and agitators, most likely Bakongo living in the North of Angola as well as in the neighbouring country. The nationalist political awareness of an emigrated elite was supported by the regional and international landscape, favourable to independence movements with both the DRC and the USA supporting the UPA.<sup>20</sup>

In sum, the colonial context with political grievances of the population, ethnic-based grievances over economic inequalities, dispersed population making it more difficult for the state to control insurgencies, and the cohesion of insurgent groups, which decreased the coordination costs of a rebellion, were all important factors to explain conflict initiation. But these factors had been present for some time and therefore are not capable of explaining events in 1961. Instead, the favourable Cold War period and regional context with the independence of the DRC could have been the deciding factors that led to the initiation of the conflict in 1961.

### **The initiation of the international Civil War in 1975**

Despite the economic uplifting of the local population in the 1960s<sup>21</sup> and political grievances being answered through the independence of Angola, the Cold War setting did not allow an independent peaceful solution to be found. Also war capital (in the form of fighting groups and military equipment) resulting from the previous war of independence were a disincentive for the national groups to find a political compromise. This Civil War that started in 1975 would last until April 2002, with a brief pause in the conflict in 1991/1992 and in 1996/1997.

Two processes are important to understand the initiation of the Civil War: the socio-economic configuration in Angola before independence, and; the process of transition to independence, in particular the period from the Portuguese revolution on 25<sup>th</sup> of April 1974, up to the first trimester of 1976.

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<sup>20</sup> Since 1961 the US National Security Council (NSC) officially supported UPA (Wright, 2001).

<sup>21</sup> Between 1962 and 1973 the average real GDP growth is 5% (Ferreira, 2006).



In the pre-independence period, economic growth and colonial policies met the grievances of the local populations, at the same time that a series of military tactics proved paramount in successfully controlling the rebellion. A certain degree of industrialization and the emergence of oil as the main export product were the most significant socio-economic developments in the period (Ferreira, 2006).

The three main nationalist movements developed differently, each with specific international support. The FNLA was led by Holden Roberto with the support of Mobutu Sese Seko and was part of the anti-Soviet groups, supported by the USA, the DRC and the People's Republic of China. Nevertheless, the support provided was symbolic and never sufficient for the FNLA to mount an independent process capable of decisively challenging the colonial government. The MPLA was at this stage plagued by fragmentation, with the "Eastern Revolt" led by Daniel Chipenda and the "Active Revolt" headed by the Andrade brothers challenging the leadership. Agostinho Neto would eventually secure his position during 1974 alongside Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA. In UNITA, the leadership of Jonas Savimbi was secure and the movement's presence was mainly in the southern regions. UNITA was the movement with least foreign support at this stage. Apparently, all the independence movements were taken by surprise when on 25<sup>th</sup> April 1974 there was a military coup in Portugal overthrowing the "Estado Novo" and with a key objective of ending the colonial wars.

During this period, the internationalized Civil War begins to display two main characteristics: on the one hand, the apparent inevitability that each nationalist movement seeks to acquire exclusive power in Angola and, on the other hand, not only the lack of cooperation and coordination of each external actor in containing the conflictual impetus but also the gradual increment of their involvement in a competitive process.

Initially, Portugal took on a leading role in the decolonization process, managing to secure a ceasefire agreement and the signature of the Alvor Accords by the three movements in January 1975. The accord stipulated a transition plan with a date for the independence on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1975. In practice, Portugal did not have the capacity or availability to manage the process and from August 1975 onwards handed over the transition process to the fortunes of parties on the ground.

Initially, all three movements received limited support from their Cold War external supporters. But in the months leading up to independence day both the MPLA in Luanda as well as the FNLA in the North of Angola (supported by the DRC) progressively stepped up the intensity of the conflict. This would take on a decisive international dimension in October/November when South Africa decided to launch an invasion force in support of UNITA, and Cuba increased its support for the MPLA (Operations Savana and Carlota respectively).

Holden Roberto attempted to conquer Luanda with a final showdown in the decisive Quifangondo battle, which ended on 10<sup>th</sup> November 1975. This battle opposed the MPLA supported by the Cubans to the FNLA supported by DRC. The South African troops were not involved as they were stopped in Lobito (a town in the south of Angola) on their way to the capital. By winning this battle and holding the capital, the MPLA declared the independence of Angola on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1975 and claimed the right to govern its sovereignty.



This date marks the initiation of the internationalized Civil War in Angola, opposing the MPLA to the UNITA and FNLA. After the Angolan independence, the American Congress decided, through the Clark amendment, to end direct American involvement in Angola, which would contribute, a few months later, to the withdrawal of the South African military forces from southern Angola. The Clark amendment was in effect between 1976 and 1985, significantly limiting American support to the FNLA and UNITA.

### **The model and the initiation of conflict in 1975**

The initiation of the Civil War was the result of the building up of opportunities. The MPLA and the FNLA intended to claim the government by holding the capital, Luanda, on the day of independence and UNITA intended to dominate the South, with all groups respecting the territorial integrity of the Angolan state.

The opportunities of the payback from conflict are related to the natural resources and international support. Oil had become the main export, constituting an important “award” for the group controlling the government<sup>22</sup>. At the same time, although the economic conditions had improved since 1961, the recruitment costs of potential rebels continued to be low compared to other countries<sup>23</sup>.

The specific period of the Cold War was relevant in determining the superpowers’ lack of interest – or incapacity – to agree on a low intensity solution for the conflict. The specific phase of the Cold War, after the Israel/Arab war, where the Soviets had lost ground in the Middle East and Americans were losing in Vietnam, was conducive to the Soviets testing American determination in the case of Angola. This decision was facilitated by the availability and “idealism” of the Cubans, who provided the most complicated resource to secure - troops. Also relevant was the availability of South Africa to play a counterweight regional role, controlling the African nationalist fervour and its Soviet tendencies, in line with its own need to maintain the apartheid system.

Additionally, the war capital<sup>24</sup> gave the groups the organizational capability to wage war but also the international recognition consubstantiated in the three groups being a party to the Alvor Accords. In this case, the war capital was not linked to the accumulation of hatreds between the groups because the main common enemy had been the Portuguese<sup>25</sup>.

Another factor was the power vacuum in national governance. At symbolic level, none of the challenging parties managed to win over the colonial power. Rather, it was the established power that proclaimed its own extinction. There was no legitimate force to hold onto power and hence requiring a transition process prone to competition. At the same time, as Portugal was unable to secure the role of mediator throughout the transition process, the monopoly of power was in practice abandoned to the players that jockeyed for position, with some advantage to the MPLA as it was based in Luanda.

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<sup>22</sup> It represented 36 percent of GDP by 1975.

<sup>23</sup> Income per capita and secondary school enrolment is lower than in the average of countries where Civil War started between 1975 and 1980.

<sup>24</sup> Resulting from the 14 years of insurrection.

<sup>25</sup> Even if the three groups were rarely involved in joint operations.



Finally and inversely to the model's prediction<sup>26</sup>, the high social fractionalization in the country<sup>27</sup> and the lack of ethnic domination may have contributed to conflict initiation. In Angola there were three political parties formed along ethnic-lines with similar importance and none had a hegemonic presence. Alongside other factors, it may have been precisely the lack of hegemony of any of the three groups that led to the political conditions explaining the groups' hegemonic ambitions to power in a process of regime transition.

In sum, the potential oil revenues from controlling the state (and low recruitment costs of fighters) were important in this period, together with the war capital, but need to be analysed in conjunction with the international and regional Cold War dynamics that contributed to the escalation of the conflict. International and regional external interventions explain significantly the escalatory process of the conflict. At the same time, the social fractionalization without hegemony was the condition that led to a conflictive competitive bid to occupy the power vacuum left by the Portuguese, who were not defeated but withdrew from the conflict.

### **The failure of the 1992 elections**

The signature of the New York Accords in 1988 marked the end of the Cold War dimension of the Civil War in Angola. The accords implemented the United Nations Security Council's resolution 435 granting independence to Namibia, agreeing on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and, indirectly, the end of South African incursions in the south of Angola. Three years after, in May 1991, the Bicesse accords were signed between the MPLA and UNITA with a plan to hold elections. The Bicesse accords brought a period of relative peace in Angola up to the elections in September 1992, when the conflict resumed after the announcement of the elections' results.

The failure to secure peace in this process was partly related to the specific organizational, economic and political characteristics of the two contending parties.

The MPLA party went through a significant reorganization after the presidency of Agostinho Neto was challenged from within the party in a failed *coup d'état* by Nito Alves in 1977<sup>28</sup>. With the death of Agostinho Neto in 1979, José Eduardo dos Santos assumed the presidency of the party and the state. The MPLA is a Marxist-Leninist inspired state project for most of the later 1970s and 1980s. But reforms had to be initiated in the 1990s as a result of a series of structural constraints, namely: the over dependence of the economy on oil makes it susceptible to oil price fluctuations; an economic system discredited and in debt; the end of support from its resourceful strategic partners<sup>29</sup>; the collapse of state services in terms of education, health, water, sewerage, garbage, electricity and transport (Pereira, 1994), and; a military dead-lock in the conflict<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> According to the model, when there is a higher social fractionalization and hegemony is avoided, the likelihood of conflict initiation decreases significantly.

<sup>27</sup> Almost double the levels identified for countries when Civil Wars started.

<sup>28</sup> According to Hodges (2001, p.46), the initiatives taken in the post-coup attempt period resulted in a culture characterized by "fear, conformism, state dependence, lack of initiative and submission" in a process he refers to as the "loss of innocence" in Angola (ibid, p.161).

<sup>29</sup> Politically and economically the Soviet Union, and militarily Cuba.

<sup>30</sup> Incapable of defeating the UNITA militarily even after the end of direct South African support.



In this context, the MPLA party initiated a process of political-economic reforms: opened the state to the multi-party system; further opened the economy; promoted civil society participation, and; introduced freedom of the press. These changes were inspired on models proposed by the international community and were in line with the demands of UNITA (Hodges, 2001). Economically, the reform was partial, in the impossible mission of merging market mechanisms regulated by a plan in a centralized and planned economy (Ferreira, 2002). Politically, the constitution underwent modification in 1991 and 1992 with a series of laws passed within the spirit of the Bicesse accords. The failure to implement decentralization and local government provisions of the constitution, together with the reinforcement of a presidential system meant the establishment of a formal pyramid system under the president. It also meant an “all or nothing” setting for the elections.

The ideology of UNITA, the other main party, was a mixture of Maoism with Ovimbundu nationalism<sup>31</sup> and regionalism<sup>32</sup>. Throughout the 1970s, UNITA transformed itself into a structured, hierarchical organization within the requirements of a nationalist movement, exercising a monopoly of violence within controlled areas and operating an administrative apparatus, which included the provision of social services (Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2005). During the 1980s, UNITA broadened territorial control<sup>33</sup>, developed a diamond economy and improved the governance structure<sup>34</sup>. UNITA’s internal organisational cohesion was the merit of its leadership and of an effective patrimonial system, even if dependent on funding from the CIA and on military support from South Africa (Stuvøy, 2002).

In contrast to the MPLA, UNITA was intimately linked to the local traditional power structures. At the end of the 1980s, an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 people lived under UNITA rule in Jamba, about 80,000 to 100,000 in its surroundings and it had around 30,000 troops in 1984 (George, 2005). UNITA considered that an electoral solution would give them a victory over its main competitor of the time, the MPLA, and was united around the leadership of Jonas Savimbi.

Regarding the overall well-being of the population, from 1987 onwards Angola was classified as in a state of calamity and in 1991 it received 6 million USD for assistance, part of a 40 million USD package for humanitarian assistance channelled to Non-Governmental Organizations. Additionally, the United Nations (UN) provided 165 million USD for refugees and droughts.

Angolans had to choose one of these two parties and their leaders on the 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> of September 1992 first free and fair elections in Angola. A total of 4,8 million Angolans voted, with a participation rate of 92 per cent of registered voters<sup>35</sup> (Pereira, 1994). The result for the presidency did not grant the required majority to any of the contestants, but José Eduardo dos Santos, with 49,7 per cent, had achieved more votes than Jonas Savimbi with 40 per cent. The second round of elections would never take place as the conflict resumed<sup>36</sup>.

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<sup>31</sup> Different from FNLA or MPLA nationalism.

<sup>32</sup> In opposition to the then prevailing Marxist, Pan-Africanism and socialist perspectives.

<sup>33</sup> The territory controlled by UNITA was the central plateau, its main stronghold.

<sup>34</sup> Some analysts considered it a quasi-state.

<sup>35</sup> 90 per cent of adult population was registered.

<sup>36</sup> The parliament was won by the MPLA with 54 per cent of votes against the 34 per cent of UNITA, with other small parties winning 12 per cent of the votes.



The electoral defeat of UNITA reflected the ethnic character of the party. Of the four provinces it won<sup>37</sup>, only in one the Ovimbundu were not in a majority – in Kuando Kubango, where UNITA had operated since the 1970s. In contrast, the MPLA was able to attract groups beyond the Mbundu (Hodges, 2001). This electoral pattern reflects what Pereira (1994) identifies as the clashing vision of the parties: besides being both patriotic and state-centric, the MPLA ascribed to an inclusive nationalism while the UNITA had a particularistic ethnic nationalist vision. Although the observers considered the elections to be fair, UNITA did not accept the results announced on the 17<sup>th</sup> of October 1992 and intensified the conflict. This time the conflict took place not only in the countryside but also in the cities, including Luanda (Wright, 2001), and targeted the state system itself. In December 1992, the Angolan government launched a military counter-offensive (Wright, 2001) and the Civil War resumed.

### **The model and the intensification of the Civil War in 1992**

Although the 1990s began with a series of factors favourable to peace, like the end of the Cold War with international and regional commitment to peace and the population's eagerness for peace (as attested by voter turn-out), the re-initiation of conflict in 1992 was related mainly to the country's economic opportunities regarding resources (diamonds and oil) combined with the political grievances generated by a governance model where the "winner takes all".

The opportunities for funding through oil for the MPLA and diamonds for UNITA<sup>38</sup> substantially determined the predisposition for conflict, mainly on the part of UNITA but also indirectly for the MPLA. For UNITA, this predisposition was more direct in the sense that it had lost the elections and therefore was about to lose control over both its territory<sup>39</sup> and source of revenue (diamonds). For the MPLA, there is no counterfactual for its possible reaction in case it had lost the elections. Nevertheless, the fact that there was an "all or nothing" presidential model makes it reasonable to assume the MPLA did not intend to share or abandon the state executive power which controlled oil revenues. Natural resources was a key factor at this stage and the best comparison for its role is the case of Mozambique, which had a similar Civil War history but, without natural resources, was able to reach peace in 1992.

In combination with the natural resources, the governance system in place at the time of the elections, a non-decentralized presidential model, contributed towards an essential factor: grievance by political exclusion of a group<sup>40</sup>, at both central and local levels of governance. This grievance would be unacceptable to a war-hardened authoritarian UNITA, which, together with the historical low level of national unity and limitations of the Bicesse accords, contributed decisively to the peace plan failure<sup>41</sup> (Pereira, 1994). Generally speaking, the responsibility of the leadership in the conflict can be attributed to both parties (Anstee, 1996), even if at this stage particularly the

<sup>37</sup> Benguela, Bié, Huambo and Kuando Kubango.

<sup>38</sup> The ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP was 47% in 1990.

<sup>39</sup> Because the decentralization legislation had not been passed.

<sup>40</sup> Considering the resource base of the economy, one could argue that political exclusion also meant economic exclusion.

<sup>41</sup> The limitation of the Bicesse accords were the limited resources of the UN for the mandate, the short time span of the process, the execution of the elections without full compliance of the stipulations in the accord (mainly regarding the military component), and the inexistence of a power sharing solution (Hodges, 2001).



UNITA and president Jonas Savimbi had been identified as a “greedy spoiler” in the peace process (Stedman, 1997).

In addition to the above key dynamics, a series of other factors both contributed to the conflict or were favourable to peace. On the one hand, contributing to conflict were opportunity factors such as: the atypical low costs of recruitment, with thousands of people who knew of no other work apart from fighting or living in a war economy; the destruction of the economy and generalized poverty, which did not provide great income alternatives for unemployed youths or demobilized soldiers, and; the accumulation of war equipment from where one can extract quick and easy returns. On the other hand, contributing to peace were: the international and regional dynamics with active support through the UN and a decision by the superpowers to ban military support to the conflicting parties; the concentration of the population in urban areas as a result of the war, and; the national legitimization of government by holding elections.

### **The intensification of Civil War in 1998**

After the relapse into Civil War in 1992, the conflict would de-escalate in 1996 and 1997, two years of almost peace in the country. But the Civil War broke out again in 1998 and lasted until 2002.

Between 1992 and 1998, significant advancements were made in the implementation of a multi-party model with a more inclusive governance system, at the same time that the Angolan government acquired legitimacy with the 1992 elections and USA recognition in 1993. UNITA returned to the negotiation table in 1993 as a result of territorial losses to the MPLA<sup>42</sup> and of the 1993 United Nations sanctions targeting its leadership. In the following year, on 20<sup>th</sup> November 1994, Jonas Savimbi signed the Lusaka protocol.

The protocol was based on the Bicesse one, but had significant provisions for additional executive power sharing between the parties and the delay of elections until the end of military activities. It further stipulated UNITA’s respect for national law, the assumption of seats in parliament by the elected representatives of UNITA, the return of all belongings to UNITA members and the granting of lodging to UNITA leaders (Wright, 2001). The responsibility to monitor the agreement was granted to the UN and a significant peace force was deployed in February 1995.

Economically, the 1990s were characterised by the government’s incapacity to implement a coherent economic programme. For Ferreira (2006), the war certainly conditioned the Angolan economy but the main obstacles were the inappropriate policies and the political system that promoted a rentier elite. As Oliveira (2007) points out, it is the oil revenue in petro-states that allows an unsustainable system to last long beyond its normal life span and, together with it, the elite that manages it.

For UNITA, this decade was marked by the unsuccessful process of being transformed from a guerrilla force into a political party with both parliamentary representation and executive responsibilities. A double process of disintegration occurs: one of the established “social system” of the “quasi-state”, and; another of the party leadership

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<sup>42</sup> In 1992, UNITA controlled about 60 to 70 per cent of the territory, while in 1994 it controlled 40 per cent, and in November 1994 it lost the key areas of Huambo and Uige.



with the emergence of breakaway factions<sup>43</sup>. The difficulties in making UNITA comply with the Lusaka protocol led the international community to continue a sanctions policy. In 1997 and 1998, the United Nations sanctions targeted the UNITA leadership, UNITA party and in particular the diamond business. It is estimated that UNITA diamond revenues were somewhere in the region of 2 to 3,5 million USD from 1992 to 1998 (Cramer, 2006).

Due to the incapacity to make UNITA implement the Lusaka protocols, in December 1998, at the fourth MPLA Congress, President José Eduardo dos Santos declared that the only route to peace was war. He requested both an end to the Lusaka peace process and for the UN mission to leave<sup>44</sup> (Hodges, 2001). In January 1999, José Eduardo dos Santos convened a war cabinet to achieve total victory (James, 2004) and in July of that year the Angola government, through its Department of Criminal Research, issued a warrant in the name of Jonas Malheiro Sidónio Savimbi for crimes of "armed rebellion, sabotage and slaughter" (James, 2004, p.xxxv). The war had re-initiated and this time it would only finish after the death in combat of Jonas Savimbi on 12<sup>th</sup> March 2002.

### **The model and the intensification of conflict in 1998**

The context of a continued lack of compliance with the accords' stipulations by the UNITA led the MPLA to decide for a belligerent solution to the conflict, within a specific social-economic context.

On one hand, UNITA seemed to never accept any peace solution. The failure to attract a full cooperation from UNITA by broadening the power-sharing formula of peace led to more pressure of the international community, which intensified the ongoing party disintegration. Although some UNITA members assumed parliamentary and executive functions, Jonas Savimbi's faction did not accept the process, continuing to defy the constitutionality of the state.

On the other hand, the MPLA was pressured internationally and domestically. It could not close economic reform deals at a stage when the economy was extremely debilitated. Although oil revenues were critical and sufficient for the maintenance of the patrimonial system surrounding the president, successive initiatives of populist inspiration and restrictions on civil liberties revealed concerns over the economic crisis and popular grievances (MRP, 2005)<sup>45</sup>. At a time when the MPLA could be more accountable for its governance record, the international community had spent the 1990s criticising and pressuring the MPLA for increased transparency, more respect for human rights and justice. The MPLA military involvement in the conflicts on the Republic of Congo in 1997 and in the DRC in 1998 allowed it to close down the foreign bases of UNITA.

In this way and specifically for the MPLA, the factors identified for conflict initiation in 1992 continue to hold. In particular, the opportunities for funding from oil, the low level of alternative sources of income for would be soldiers, the high level of accumulated

<sup>43</sup> Among them UNITA Renovada in 1998.

<sup>44</sup> Which left in February 1999.

<sup>45</sup> The grievances were also a result of the war strategy of "social implosion" adopted by UNITA from 1992 onwards, with attacks in urban areas, to the administrative systems and forcing the exodus of the population to the cities, along with committing human atrocities.



war capital together with a certain Ovimbundu targeted hatred that had developed (of which the post-election ethnic violence is an example). Nevertheless, in this phase there may also have been other factors contributing to Civil War initiation related to the political survival of the MPLA elite and a perspective that the debility of UNITA<sup>46</sup>, together with the international backing for the MPLA, might permit a military victory by the MPLA.

UNITA, in turn, tried to maintain the state within the state up to the last moment, with its own specific economic and social characteristics. The fact that UNITA was funded by diamonds and the MPLA by oil from an enclave was important to the extent that it progressively increased the resources available to the MPLA (with a safe source) and diminished those of UNITA (with an uncertain source) with possible repercussions on military capabilities. Consequently, the maintenance of resource areas and their revenues were important to military capacity but they do not seem to have been the main motivation. Instead, they enabled the conflict to drag on and then re-start, reinforcing the perspective that resources are a means as well as an end in the conflict. For instance, it is highly probable that in this phase of the conflict the UNITA leadership would have more to gain financially in moving to Luanda and integrate the state neo-patrimonial system rather than to keep on fighting. This is corroborated by the fragmentation and emergence of *UNITA-Renovada*.

Finally, this UNITA belligerence, which splits apart to continue fighting, reinforces the importance of leadership, in this case Jonas Savimbi, and the role that this plays in the achievement or not of political solutions. In the 1998 re-initiation of the conflict, it began to become obvious that the conflict was dependant on the military capacity and leadership of Jonas Savimbi.

## Leadership

Several elements contribute to a rationalist and constructivist explanation of the role of leadership in Angola, instead of primordial perspectives.

In the description set out above, the leaderships are presented as individualized but in fact the four main leaders are the top of a structure of political, economic and military power, in these cases, mostly autocratic and centralized but dependent on an elite and power network. Agostinho Neto needed to redefine the party as a means of consolidating his leadership of the MPLA; José Eduardo dos Santos fostered an economic-military *nomenklatura* based on oil; Jonas Savimbi based his structure on the traditional leaders, patrimonial system of diamonds along with a military wing; and Holden Roberto related significantly to the elite of Mobutu Sese Seko.

Already with recognized leadership capabilities when a FNLA member and having negotiated with the MPLA in the 1960s, it would seem it was a messianic determination or ambition that led Jonas Savimbi to opt to start a process from scratch and create UNITA without significant international support during the 1960s. With only a small, unrepresentative nationalist group in 1975, it was after independence that Jonas Savimbi managed to mount a "quasi-state" socio-economic structure in the south. These origins and developments of UNITA as a coherent ethnic group were the product

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<sup>46</sup> Both politically as well as militarily as a result of the choking off of revenue sources.



of a social construction by the political elite and less the result of primordial factors. After the end of the Cold War and the 1992 elections, its survival outside the state was due mainly to UNITA's existing capacity. Also at this time, it was an inability to accept a secondary role in the state structure that drove Jonas Savimbi to re-engage in conflict. Even periods of peace, or of almost peace, resemble more phases of reorganization and management of the status quo, as Jonas Savimbi never took up his place in the capital – Luanda. The disintegration of UNITA in this period also attests against a primordial account, wherein some elements of the UNITA leadership were able to become incorporated into the MPLA system.

We can identify the importance of Jonas Savimbi given the fact that the conflict only ended after his death in 2002. Having the benefit of hindsight, it seems the only moment when a deal might have been possible with Jonas Savimbi would have been in 1975, if a federalist solution had been established before UNITA set up the “quasi-state”, and eventually in 1992, if a decentralized solution had been implemented, although at that time it seemed virtually impossible to position Jonas Savimbi under some other authority.

The other leader, Holden Roberto, depicts an external factor, representative of the first nationalist impetus on the continent, connected after 1970 to Mobutu Sese Seko. Since the beginning of the DRC independence process, the liberation of the Bakongo people had been on the agenda of nationalist leaders and Holden Roberto arose as the leader of a movement that quickly changed its regionalist focus to a nationalist and Pan-Africanist focus, in accordance with the prevailing political orientations. Closely associated with the political movements emerging out of Leopoldville, Holden Roberto lacked the determination, capacity or possibility of having an independent movement and this might have led to his earlier appropriation by Mobutu Sese Seko, who ended up ordering him out of the country in 1987 (Spikes, 1993). The lack of funding would not have been the main factor in this gradual process of disappearance of the FNLA, as the US only switched from supporting the FNLA to backing the UNITA after independence.

Also in the FNLA case, it was the leadership construction of identity with external support that fuelled the rebellion. The fact that the FNLA and its leadership virtually disappeared in the post-independence period while the conflict between the MPLA and UNITA endured attests to a rejection of primordial perspectives.

Finally, in the MPLA case, the initial leadership of Agostinho Neto was critical in the sense that it transformed a heterogeneous party into a cohesive political group, leaving a clear path for José Eduardo dos Santos. Part of the escalation of the conflict in Luanda in 1975 can be attributed to Agostinho Neto as the leader of the MPLA (possibly aided by the Portuguese), even if there was an inevitability of the FNLA attempting to take the city. José Eduardo dos Santos took over an homogeneous party in 1980 but has the merit of maintaining it and governing the party without violent open challenges to his leadership.

Formed by *mestiços* and Mbundu, the MPLA had a more inclusive and multi-ethnic platform, which in its origins was more ideologically grounded. Even if there is no evidence of constructivist accounts, it points to a rejection of the primordial perspective. Significant examples of it was the adoption of Portuguese as the national



language or running the campaign to the 1992 election on an inclusive multi-ethnic discourse, in contrast to UNITA, which explicitly had an exclusivist ethnic agenda.

## Conclusion

The case study validates the importance of leadership and external interventions as explanatory variables in the initiation or intensification of Civil War. Overall, all factors - "greed", "grievance", leadership and external interventions - were operative in Angola. The challenge is to distinguish among the mechanisms (factors) present in each initiation or intensification of the conflict the one(s) that most decisively contributed to that outcome, even if limited by the difficulty to isolate the path dependence processes.

The 1961 initiation of the independence war is the least well explained by the "greed" versus "grievance" model. It was based on the combination of economic and political grievances along ethnic lines that the conflict against the colonial domination emerged. But this decolonization motive would not have found form and expression without external influence. Regional and international diffusion of the idea of independence alongside political and (limited) military support were the required mechanisms for the conflict to start.

The initiation of conflict in 1975 is mainly explained by the Cold War and economic "greed" factors. An initial setting was the power vacuum resulting from independence which, combined with a fractionalization without hegemony, led to an intense competition with no party able to claim legitimacy for the government. The economic aspects emerge mainly through the existence of resources, which were an important award to the winners, but these "greed" factors become operative mainly through the external support operating within the geo-political context of the Cold War. The support provided internationally and regionally to the parties in the conflict was an essential mechanism for the conflict to start.

In the intensification of the conflict in 1992, one can find "greed" factors in the importance of resources (oil and diamonds), in the poverty and in the years of conflict, and "grievance" factors in the governance system that gave hegemonic power to the winner of the elections and political grievances to the loser. But at this stage, natural resources had become the means and ends of the conflict for both MPLA and UNITA, explaining the "winner takes all" constitutional solution adopted in the elections. Therefore, "greed" economic factors seem to be the essential mechanism for the conflict intensification in this phase. It is important to highlight that at this stage there was an international and regional context conducive to a peaceful solution. From this phase onwards, the leadership of Jonas Savimbi assumes an important role in the impossibility to end the conflict.

Finally, in the intensification of the conflict in 1998, one can find the same economic "greed" factors as in 1992. The political grievance in the governance system existing in 1992 had been dealt with through increased power sharing solutions capable of attracting some UNITA members. The leadership of Jonas Savimbi constitutes the essential mechanism to explain the intensification of conflict in this phase. The end of the conflict after Jonas Savimbi's death highlights the importance of eliminating "grievance" factors in order to prevent conflict.



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## ***Notes and Reflections***

### **AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN FRANCISCO I AND KIRILL I: A SMALL STEP IN AN APPROACH FULL OF UNCERTAINTIES<sup>1</sup>**

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The first meeting between the Pope and the Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia held in Havana on 12 February was a historic event, a fact unanimously recognised by all. However, great illusions should not be created as Francisco and Kirill made only small steps in the rapprochement between the two largest Christian churches in an atmosphere of ancient distrust. Using a common allegory found in Russian nature, the head of the Catholic Church and the head of the Orthodox Church began to abruptly tread on a very thin layer of ice covering the lake.

#### **Preparation of the meeting**

The preparation of the meeting in Havana was held in the greatest secrecy (a level similar to that of hidden diplomacy), and the event's announcement was made only a few days from its date.

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In June last year, Ilarion Metropolitan, who heads the Section of Patriarchal Relations of Moscow, admitted that this possibility of "an approximation of perspective", but stressed that the meeting should be "carefully prepared" and "take place on neutral grounds" (Ilarion, 2015).

However, such promises had been made before but without any positive result. With much struggled in the normalisation of relations between Orthodox Russians and Catholics, the head of the Roman Catholic Church Pope John Paul II marked a meeting with Alexy II the Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia in Austria, which subsequently did not occur (Lima, 2016). It took hard work and 20 difficult years of talks so that the dignitaries of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican could meet.

Moscow accused the Catholic Church of developing missionaries (proselytism) in its "canonical territory", i.e. Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as well as the Greek-Catholic or Uniate Ukrainian Christians, who follow the Eastern rite but recognise the primacy of the Pope in the Christian world, occupied temples belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church.

The second of these problems has not yet found a solution within the Russian Orthodox Church, as a strong opposition to rapprochement with the "heretics" has always existed. Because of this, the meeting was announced only on 5 February, looking to catch his opponents off guard.

The city of Havana was also not chosen by chance. It was hard to find a more neutral place than Cuba. On the one hand, in the Russian geopolitical point of view, this country is still part of its zone of influence and, on the other hand it is part of the Catholic world.

The meeting would not take place in Moscow, because presently it is hard to imagine a visit by a Pope of Rome to Russia. Considering a popular, humble and charismatic figure like Francisco I, it would be a pretext for criticism of the Orthodox clergy and laity, who continue to see the Bishop of Rome as a "heretic".

The meeting also could not be held in the Vatican, because Kirill's trip would certainly be interpreted by the same conservative circles and Russian nationalist as a sign of recognition of the Pope by the Moscow Patriarch as head of the Universal Christian Church.

At the request of the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, the meeting also did not take place in Europe, as it symbolises the division of Christians. It was therefore decided that the meeting should be held in Latin American countries, where Christianity is still an alive and well and is still a key player.

*"From the beginning, the Holy Patriarch Kirill did not want the meeting in Europe, precisely because Europe is linked to a heavy history of division and conflict between Christians"*

He recognised the Ilarion Metropolitan, Head of International Relations at the Russian Orthodox Church. (Ilarion, 2016)



Further proof that everything was carefully prepared is seen in the Joint Declaration adopted in Havana, where the signature was not of the Pope but the Bishop of Rome. This was extremely important to show that they gathered as two equal parts. (Declaração Conjunta, 2016).

### **Political motives**

The meeting of the Pope and the Russian Patriarch was also of paramount importance to the latter because it was a way for him to affirm the Orthodox world before the Council of the Orthodox Churches, scheduled for June 2016 in Greece to face its main competitor: Bartholomew, Patriarch of Constantinople. The Patriarchate of Moscow was concerned that the latter be received under its Orthodox Church jurisdiction, which included the Russian independents such as Ukraine, Estonia and Finland.

Iegor Kholmogorov, one of the ideologists of Russian nationalism wrote on the subject:

*"As for the influence of this meeting on relations within the Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill returned from Cuba as the unconditional leader of the Orthodox world, in fact, its informal leader"* (Kholmogorov, 2016).

From the Russian side, it is clear that this meeting was also intended to help reduce the isolation that the Kremlin was facing from Western countries and to improve the image of President Putin, which had suffered due to aggressive foreign policy. The support of such a popular Pope in the Christian world and was of utmost importance in a period of international relations as troubled as the current. In view of the strong dependence of the Russian Orthodox Church on secular power, it is hard to imagine that this meeting took place without the "blessing" of President Putin.

In fact, the preparation of the meeting in Havana was accelerated after the meeting of Francisco with Vladimir Putin, held on 13 June the year before. Three days after the hearing of the Russian leader at the Vatican, the Pope proposed that the Catholic and Orthodox churches begin to celebrate Easter on the same day. Subsequently, there was an increase in contact between representatives of both churches, which flowed to Havana.

It must be noted that the almost all submission of religious power to political power is not a current feature, but has deep historical roots.

The Kievan Rus was baptised in 980 by Prince Vladimir the Great. From that date, the Russian Orthodox Church was headed by metropolitans who were subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople. During the process of political centralisation, the Russian tsars considered the creation of the post of Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church with only formal dependence on Constantinople to be necessary. This policy was based on the ideology of "Moscow - The Third Rome", i.e the idea of Moscow as a Byzantium successor. In 1472, Ivan the Great (reigning between 1462 and 1505), married the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor. The Grand Prince of Moscow Ivan the Terrible give



himself the titles of "autocrat" and "tsar" and started to use the double-headed eagle of Byzantium.

Ideologically, this first universal claim to Moscow was justified by the monk Philotheus Pskov in some letters to the Tsar Vasily III in 1510:

*"We say a few words about the current glorious reign of our brighter and most powerful Lord, who on all Earth it is the only Tsar of the Christians and the ruler of all the Divine thrones, of the holy universal apostolic church that was born in the place of Rome and Constantinople and that exists in the city for God saves Moscow, the holy church and the glorious Assumption of the Virgin Mother of God, where she alone in the universe shines with greater beauty than the sun. Blessed by God and Christ, all Christian kingdoms arrived and joined in one kingdom of our Lord, according to the books of the prophets, the Roman kingdom: two Romes have fallen, the third stands and the fourth will not come"* (Milhazes, 2016).

The election of the first Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church called Job was driven by Tsar Fyodor, son of Ivan the Terrible in 1589. In fact, Fyodor was completely controlled by the boyar Boris Godunov, who came to succeed the Russian throne. (Ulojionnaia Gramota, 1589).

However, with the advent of absolutism, the Russian imperial power came to completely control the Russian Orthodox Church. Peter the Great decided in 1700 to settle the post of Patriarch and Russian Orthodoxes under the preview of the Holy Synod, a kind of ministry headed by a laity appointed by the tsar himself.

This situation continued until 1917, but when the Russian Orthodox Church elected Patriarch Tikhon, the country was already run by a communist regime that aimed to put an end to religion as a social phenomenon (Gubonin, 1994). Until the end of the USSR in 1991, this church, or more precisely, what was left of it after numerous anti-religious campaigns, entirely depended on the State Committee for Religious Affairs.

After the fall of Communism in the USSR, there was an "invasion" of religions and sects that tried to fill the vacuum left by atheism. Not prepared to face competition, the Russian Orthodox Church demanded that they and their "canonical territory" were recognised by political power, not only in Russia but also in neighboring countries such as Belarus and Ukraine.

Political power, especially during the presidency of Vladimir Putin (which started in 2000), met the requirements of the Russian Orthodox Church, and in return he received support for his domestic and foreign policies. In the field of diplomacy, the Moscow Patriarchate supported the sending of Russian troops to South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia's breakaway regions) in 2008; the invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014-2015; and the Russia's aviation participation in the war in Syria.



## **Platform of understanding**

The Joint Declaration adopted at the Havana Summit contained the issues and concerns that could cement the beginning of joint work between the two Christian churches internationally.

In paragraphs 8-13, the Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill launched a dramatic appeal in defence of persecuted and killed Christians in the Middle East and North Africa that had dipped into cruel civil wars.

Paragraph 14 welcomes increased religiosity in countries once oppressed by communist regimes, notably Russia (Declaração Conjunta, 2016). A study by the Levada Centre in November 2012 on the Russian Federation shows that 74% of respondents claimed to be Orthodox. However, it should be noted that only a minority regularly attend temples or meet religious duties. According to the same poll, 24% of respondents "never attend a temple", 29% only go there for "christenings, weddings and funerals" and only 7% for confession and communion (Levada Center, 2012). Basically, most consider themselves Orthodox based on national consciousness.

In the Joint Declaration, Francisco and Kirill also draw attention to the danger that are contained in processes taking place in the modern world, for example, secularisation and relativism, defence of abortion and euthanasia and attacks on the Christian concept of family. In this situation, they called for Europe to remember its Christian roots (Declaração Conjunta, 2016).

This is undoubtedly one of the fields where cooperation between the two Christian Churches may develop with greater intensity, as they were facing the same challenges, but in some cases in a different form. For example, if on abortion the Catholic Church fights against legalisation, the Orthodox Church is fighting for its ban. This is because in the USSR and later in Russia, abortion was almost always legal and, due to the almost non-existence of anti-contraceptives, particularly in the Soviet Union, numbers were high. In particular in 1980, 4,506,000 legal abortions were recorded (Rossiiskii Statisticheskii ejegodnik, 2007). The number has seen a significant reduction (1,186,100 in 2007 or 66.6 abortions per 100 births) (Federalnaia Slujba gossudarstvennoi statistiki, 2011), but the Patriarchate of Moscow still considered it an authentic "killing of innocents" and has been engaged in campaigns to outlaw abortion in the country.

## **War between Christians**

The leaders of the two Christian churches could not fail to address the military conflict in Ukraine. First, because it is home to the second largest Orthodox community after Russia, and second because in the Western part of the country most people are Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Christians, who follow the Orthodox liturgical rite but recognise the supremacy of the Pope of Rome.

When Ukraine became an independent country after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Ukrainian political elite also needed to create a "national church" in



order to demarcate Moscow. In 1992, part of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy separated from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) and created the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP), currently headed by Filaret, Patriarch of Kiev and all of Ukraine, with around 3,000 parishes in the country. The Moscow Patriarch cut relations with the new Ukrainian Church, considering it "cissionista".

Despite all the efforts of the Ukrainian leadership to restore dialogue, the two Orthodox communities continued to "turn their backs" and the relations between them soured after Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014 and militarily occupied part of Eastern Ukraine, which continues until the present.

There is also the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPC), which was established abroad by large Ukrainian diaspora. In 1989, this church settled in Ukraine but in the following year, the clergy and the faithful went to UOC-MP and joined UOC-KP. Currently with about 550 parishes, the UAPC keeps irregular contact with the other two orthodox churches.

In turn, the Catholic world is represented in the country by two churches: the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) and the Ukrainian Roman Catholic Church (URCC). Having a very significant weight in Ukrainian society (with about 800 parishes), the UGCC is the second most numerous ecclesial community in the country, with more than 3,000 parishes and 10 million followers.

The UGCC was created in 1596 thanks to the Union of Brest, the Vatican's attempt to unite Orthodox and Catholic Christians (hence the name Uniate) in one church under the direction of the Pope of Rome. In accordance with its other name (Greek Catholic), the Uniates conserved their rites and traditional liturgical language, but they recognised the authority of the Pope and Catholic dogma.

The Catholicism of an Eastern rite was the target of several prohibition attempts. In 1839, the Russian tsar Nicholas I, whose empire included Ukraine, dissolved the Synod of the Greek Catholic Church, ordering the faithful to choose between the Russian Orthodox Church or the Catholic Church. However, most of the Uniates did not obey this order.

In 1945 under the pretext of the Uniate hierarchs having collaborated with Nazi Germany, the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin dissolved the UGCC. In 1946, the communist authorities organised the "Council of Lviv of the Greek-Catholic Ukrainian Church", which voted for passage of the faithful followers to the Russian Orthodox Church.

However, the Uniates did not comply with the decision and went underground. No Uniate bishop participated in Lviv Council, with the Greek-Catholic pastors preferring concentration camps or emigration to collaboration with the Communist regime.

By the end of the Soviet dictatorship, millions of Ukrainian Uniates were forced to organise clandestine worship ceremonies in private homes or attend the few Catholics and Russian Orthodox churches that remained open.

In 1990, the Committee for Religious Affairs together with the Ukrainian Council of Ministers legalised the Uniates, who demanded that the Russian Orthodox Church return the numerous temples that had been confiscated and handed over to the



Russian Orthodox Church by Joseph Stalin. In 1945, the UGCC had more than 4,000 temples and chapels, seminaries and an academy of theology.

A commission was set up, consisting of representatives of the Vatican, the Uniate Church, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, in order to control the return of confiscated churches to the Uniates and avoid conflicts. However, due to the lengthy process, the followers of the Greek-Catholic Ukrainian Church began to occupy the buildings of worship that had been taken in 1945.

The Patriarchate of Moscow reacted sharply, accusing the Vatican of being behind the actions of the Uniate believers and interpreted it as an offensive against UOC-MP. This is one of the major friction between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Vatican, but it is not only the one with regard to the situation created around the UGCC. (Milhazes, 2005).

### **Contesting voices**

As was expected, this meeting provoked negative reactions within the fundamentalist and nationalist wings of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Archpriest Vladislav Emilianov, parish priest in one of the regions of Siberia, considered the meeting in Havana to be "treason":

*"The sad and well-known events lead me to raise my voice in support of the clergy and Orthodox laity, who fight for the defence of dogma and canons of the Orthodox Church ... The meeting of Patriarch Kirill with Pope provoked a feeling of betrayal"* (Emilianov, 2016).

Alexei Morozov, parish priest of the Novgorod region, member of the Union of Writers of Russia and President of the Orthodox Intellectuality Assembly, even threatens to cause a schism within the Russian Orthodox Church:

*"Today, our church is on the verge of a schism. After the known religious events of early February 2016, many followers are afraid to enter their temples for confession and communion. Hundreds of thousands of people drive themselves to their spiritual guides and ask what to do if the head of the Church, despite the canons and the Orthodox tradition, enters into open contact with the Latinos and their boss [the Pope of Rome] and preaches the ecumenism of heresy as an integral part of the church's life"* (Alexei, 2016).

Some Greek-Catholic Christians were also unhappy with the very occurrence of the meeting. Bishop Sviatoslav, head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Uniate Church, commented:



*"Drawing on our centuries of experience, I can affirm: when the Vatican and Moscow organise meetings or sign common texts, it is not worth expecting anything good to come from them".*

Commenting specifically on paragraph 25 of the Joint Declaration:

*"We hope that our meeting can also contribute to reconciliation where there are tensions between Greek Catholics and Orthodox peoples. Today, it is clear that the method of "Uniatism" of the past, understood as the union of a community to another separate church, is not a way to restore unity. However, the ecclesial communities that arose in these historical circumstances have the right to exist and to undertake all that is necessary to meet the spiritual needs of the faithful, while seeking to live in peace with its neighbours. Orthodox and Greek Catholics need to reconcile and find mutually acceptable ways of living together",*

he stressed:

*"There is no doubt that this text has caused an overall disillusionment among many believers of our Church and among many committed citizens of Ukraine. Today, many addressed to me the way and told me that they feel betrayed by the Vatican, being disillusioned with the half-truth of this document"*  
(Sviatoslav, 2016)

The Uniates consider that the Russian Orthodox Church fully supported the invasion of Crimea by Russian troops in 2014 and the military actions of Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine.

Therefore, it is very difficult to predict how the dialogue between Rome and Moscow will develop, but there is no doubt that the two Christian churches will have to overcome enormous obstacles to start talking about a union in the distant future. For example, in the medium or long term, a visit from the Pope of Rome to Russia is not foreseeable. The same can be said of a visit of the Patriarch of Moscow to the Vatican. Much will also depend on the evolution of Russian foreign policy and its objectives.

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