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ECOLOGY VERSUS PROPERTY RIGHTS: LAND IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD-ECONOMY¹

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Abstract

Access, ownership, and land use for agricultural and living purposes have undergone major changes over time, particularly with the emergence of the capitalist World-Economy.

The present text offers a reflection on the propositions of property rights, as well as on the forms of gaining that right, ranging from land seizure, conquest, or "land development". In the context of the capitalist World-Economy, the process of legitimization by means of right to legal ownership is a fundamental process. However, the emergence of social, libertarian, and resistance movements opposing restrictive property rights has had significant cultural, political, and economic impacts, in addition to major ecological consequences.

This article offers several examples of the above, with special mention to the important social movements that have arisen in countries of the global south, and to the natural resources where impact is mostly felt.

Keyword

Land; Capitalist World-Economy; Property Rights; Ecology

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The land was there before the existence of a capitalist world-economy. And people lived on the land and off the land. The relationship different peoples had to the land they used in one way or another varied considerably. There were different customary rules about rights to utilize the land. The crucial point was that these rules very seldom existed in written form.

Some peoples were essentially nomadic, which meant they physically moved over time from place to place, although the range of places may have been constrained by customary agreements. Other peoples engaged in settled agriculture, which usually implied some right to land usage, and some possibility of inheritance of these rights. In many situations, there were persons who did not use the land themselves for production but claimed the right to receive transfers of the usufruct in one form or another from the direct users. Generically, we may call them overlords, who often repaid these transfers by offering some kind of protection to the direct producers. It was seldom the case that individuals, either direct users or overlords, had the kind of title to the land that legitimated the sale of their rights to others.

The coming into existence of the capitalist world-economy changed all this in fundamental ways, creating new constraints on utilizing the land for productive purposes. It is these constraints that I wish to explore in this paper, which raises more questions than it offers a series of analytic propositions about land rights in the world-system.

1. Title to the Land

The single most important change imposed by the modern world-system is that it established a systematic legal basis for what is called title to the land. That is to say, rules were created by which an individual or a corporate entity could "own" land outright. Owning land - that is, property rights - meant that one could use the land in any way one wanted, subject only to specific limitations established by the laws of the sovereign state within which this unit of land was located. Land to which one had title was land that one could bequeath to heirs or sell to other persons or corporate entities.



How did one acquire title to land that previously had no title in this specific legal sense? The answer by and large was that one seized such land and simply proclaimed oneself owner of the land. Sometimes this occurred by legal authorization from a superoverlord (like a king). And sometimes it occurred in situations of conquest of a region by a state, which then authorized such seizures. Usually the conquering state initially authorized such seizures to participants in the conquest. And then later, this authorization might have been extended to anyone the conquering state in question wished to permit to seize the land.

Generally, this was considered "development" of the land - or in that wonderful French expression "mise en valeur." Let us dwell for a moment on the French expression - in wide use until at least 1945. Literally, the word "valeur" means "value." So if one put something (*mise*) into value, one means that it then acquired value within a capitalist economic system. Presumably, before the "mise en valeur," it did not have such value; and afterwards, it did.

Of course, in almost every case, this land previously had been "used" for some purpose by someone. However, once title was granted to a seizer, the person or group that previously "used" the land lost whatever customary rights they had had, or thought they had had, to the land. Quite often, they were literally evicted from the land. Or else, they were allowed to remain on the land in some subordinate capacity, as defined by the person who now held title to the land. Such seizure of previously untitled land has been going on for the past five centuries. It is still going on today in whatever units of land still remain somehow outside the domain of land to which there is legal title.

Seized land may, under certain political conditions, be resealed by persons who do not have legal title. This is largely done by what we call "squatting" on the land. There are today organized social movements which proclaim the moral and political right to squat, particularly if the land in question is not being used actively, or if the person who has title is a distant landlord. In many cases, the squatters are actual cultivators of the land who however do not have legal title. For example, the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra* (MST) is a powerful social movement in Brazil that specifically works to permit reseizure of the land. They seek further, so far without much success, to get the Brazilian government to legitimate such reseizure. Squatting also occurs in urban zones in unoccupied buildings.

Of course, the government itself can reseize land, by a legal process called eminent domain. This has often occurred in various parts of the world. Normally to invoke eminent domain the government must proclaim some social interest of the state in preempting usage of the land. They may seize the land of small landowners in order to give it to larger landowners, in order that the latter "develop" it in some way that is deemed more productive. But the government may also do it as a political gesture, to take land from persons considered outside/foreign settlers and "restore" it to persons considered somehow indigenous to the state.

Both government seizure for "development" and squatting can, and do, occur not only in rural areas, where the land is used for some agrarian purpose but in urban areas where the land is used first of all for housing. Government seizures on behalf of corporate housing developers occur with some frequency. But seizure by squatting is also commonplace. These days, large urban areas, particularly in the Global South, have extensive zones of settlement (such as *bidonvilles*, *favelas*, etc.) in which there is



such squatting - sometimes tolerated de facto by the legal authorities, sometimes repressed, provided the state has sufficient means to suppress it.

The basic point is that title to the land is fundamentally a political question masked by a legal veneer. Title to the land may or may not be enforced by legal authorities, who are thereby making a political decision. In this regard, Proudhon's famous slogan, property is theft, is no doubt the most apt description of land title.

The main ongoing legal and political issue is what happens after the initial seizure. If a piece of property is acquired by theft, and is passed down to descendants for multiple generations thereafter, or sold to others, does de facto continuity of legal ownership confer either moral or legal rights to the land? This is the issue raised today by movements of so-called indigenous peoples that are laying claim either to recovery of land (full ownership) or at least to financial compensation for land that had been seized - in many cases, centuries earlier.

Virtually the entire land area of so-called lands of settlement was originally seized in this manner. This applies notably to areas of overseas European settlement - North America, Australasia, the southern cone of Latin America, southern Africa, and Israel. It applies however as well to the areas of purely land-based European expansion, as Russia into Siberia and the Caucasus. Actually, of course, the same process is to be found in the expansion in those areas wherein stronger non-European groups move into adjoining areas that are weaker politically. This is what has happened historically in China, in India, and in the many parts of Africa that were not White settler areas.

The main point is that the process of legitimating ownership by legal title is a fundamental process of the capitalist world-economy. And its origin almost always lay in seizure by force. But since it has been a virtually universal practice, undoing this process is akin to leveling the Himalayas or the Alps. I suppose it might be technically possible but it is politically impossible. This does not mean that adjustments cannot be made as a result of pressure by social movements. But any adjustments would necessarily constitute unsatisfactory compromises of mutually incompatible assertions of moral and legal rights.

Why do people seize land? The obvious primary answer is that it is economically profitable in some way to do so. It may be profitable because the land offers good possibilities for production for the market. But it may also be indirectly profitable because it pushes some people off the land, and such persons may then have to seek remunerative employment elsewhere, and thereby serve the need of capitalist producers elsewhere.

Of course, some of the land seized may not in itself offer much opportunity for profitable production. It may be seized for "strategic" reasons - to defend the collectivity of owners from counterpressures or countermovements; to guarantee the possibilities for long-range transportation of merchandise; or simply to deny the use of the land to other states or their citizens.

2. Space

The amount of land that is governed by title is, even today, not 100% of the global land surface. But it has grown as a percentage of the total global land surface



throughout the history of the modern world-system. Some people have always fought back, resisting the demand to create title on the land they have customarily used. And some people have escaped the consequences of their land having been seized by fleeing to other land areas that are more remote from the persons engaged in doing the seizing. This is what James Scott has called "the art of not being governed." It accounts for the emergence and creation of zones in, for example, high mountainous areas, which are considered both "traditional" and "primitive" by the holders of titled land rights. These same zones however are considered zones of libertarian resistance by those who have thus escaped. These zones are as doubtfully "traditional" (that is, pre-modern) as most other phenomena we like to brand negatively as traditional.

The basic pressure on those who have sought to escape the process of the assertion of restrictive land rights has been population growth. We know that the population of the world has been growing steadily for the past 500 years. With only marginal exceptions - the results of landfills - the area of the globe on which people can live has remained the same. So, there are continuously more people per square mile globally.

Population growth has led to two forms of expansion. There is extensive growth, the bringing of more and more land areas into the system of titled land. But there is also intensive growth, the ever greater concentration of the population of the world into close-contact areas. We call this urbanization. This is a process no one doubts and which, in the last fifty years, has accelerated at a breathtaking rate, such that we have moved into a world of multiple megalopolises, with the prospect of still more and still larger ones in the decades to come.

The two processes together - extensive and intensive occupation of land areas governed by the legal processes of the world-system - have created a whole range of additional constraints on the ways in which the capitalist world-economy operates. It seems elementary to observe that the situation of more people on the same amount of land creates a pressure on every conceivable kind of resource that humans need to survive. It also seems elementary to observe that if humans appropriate more land, they inevitably have to eliminate competing users of the land - mostly fauna but also flora.

While these processes have been in operation throughout the history of the capitalist world-economy, they have become a cultural and political issue particularly in the last fifty years, as the ecological effects of the modern world-system have become more and more obvious and the negative aspects more and more blatant.

The first problem is water. Water is essential to life processes. The amount of usable water in the world is not unlimited. One of the controversial features of land title is the degree to which it involves total control of water resources that are accessible on the titled land in question. The water conflicts between settled farmers and ranchers are so central to the modern world that much modern fiction is devoted to discussing it. The conflict between rural users and urban consumers is equally notorious.

What happens as a consequence? Governments make decisions about allocations, which they then implement by various alterations of the land surface in order to ensure certain kinds of flows of water that give preferential access to water to particular groups. The construction of dams is one tried and true technique of doing this. When dams change the flow of water and access to the water, they of course affect most



immediately the land rights of owners and users in or near the trajectory of the rivers that are being dammed.

There is however an additional more long-term effect. The process of altering flows and access leads over time to more extensive usage of the available water and eventually to desertification. This thereby reduces the available water supply at the very same time as the numbers of persons seeking water worldwide has increased.

Furthermore, this is more than a question of the use of water that is located in rivers and lakes and in the water table underneath the land areas. The demand for food resources leads to more and more intensive usage of the ocean areas as sources of food supply. Title to ocean areas has been increasingly asserted by the states. The historic claim that a three-mile zone at the edge of land frontiers falls under a state's sovereignty has escalated in recent decades into claims for a 200-mile zone. And tomorrow still wider zones will almost surely be claimed.

The commodification of water - by individuals, by enterprises, and by states - has expanded enormously, as the reality of worldwide water shortages has become more evident. Of course, commodification of a vital resource means that there results increasingly unequal allocation of the resource. Water struggles have thus become a central focus worldwide of the class struggle.

What is true of water is equally true of food and energy resources. If there are more people in the world, it means that more total food resources are needed. Since land is increasingly appropriated for human use, there is less room for animals that roam. The world has turned therefore to farming animal resources - that is, concentrating their location in small, enclosed areas, controlled by ever larger corporate enterprises. This not only polarizes distribution but has important negative health consequences both for the humans and the animals.

The interstate conflicts over access to energy have become the everyday story of the media. What is also much discussed these days is the ecological dangers resulting from the kinds of energy utilized, and its impact on world climatic conditions. This is in turn leading to one of the last but not least commodifications, that of the air we breathe. Title to land meant initially title to what was on the land surface. But quite quickly, it was extended to mean what lies beneath the land surface, and more recently to what is in the oceans. Now it has begun to be asserted to the air rights above the land surface.

As more and more goods are produced on less and less land area per person in the world, the issue of the disposal of toxic waste has loomed heavily. Who has title to toxic waste, and where can it be deposited in a system in which there is title to land? We know what is happening. As the dangers of toxic waste to human survival have become more well-known, it has become less and less legitimate to dispose of it in the public domain. This is not to say that such disposal has ceased - far from it - but it has become less legitimate and therefore the disposers act more secretly.

The alternative to disposal in the public domain is disposal by purchased access to land (or water) zones to which others have title. Where this can be done is of course in direct correlation with the relative strength of zones within the world-system. In wealthier zones, political resistance to purchased waste disposal sites is strong and relatively effective. This is the so-called NIMBY phenomenon. The purchase of rights



tends therefore to mean increasingly purchases in the Global South, which further increases the polarization of the world-system.

Once again, this affects the land rights of those closest to the disposal areas. But it also affects the long-term class struggle - in this case not over access but over non-access.

The basic issue can be readily summed up. More people equal more resource needs. To the extent that resources are allocated within a system of title to land rights, the result is fewer resources per person, more commodification, more ecological damage, and more acute class struggle worldwide.

3. People and Peoples

After 500 years of the operation of a capitalist world-economy, where are we today, in terms of both people and peoples? That is, what has been the impact on the lives of individuals? And what has been the impact on the lives of groups? And perhaps most importantly, what can either individuals or groups do about this impact? And what are they doing about it?

If we start with people as individuals or quite small groups like families, it is quite clear that their options and their freedom of action is constrained in very important ways as the result of creating a system in which the use of land is governed by so-called title, that is, by property relations.

It is reasonably important to look carefully at the concept of freedom of action. At a superficial level, acquiring title to land seems to enhance individual rights. The owner can dispose of this property as the owner wishes, subject to a small number of legal limitations. The owner, it is argued, benefits directly from the owner's work input, in that the owner can retain the benefits of improving the property.

This is no doubt more or less accurate. However, it leaves out of the equation the unequal strength of different property-owners, and therefore of the ability of larger, stronger owners to outcompete smaller ones and in effect force a transfer of ownership. This is what we call concentration of capital.

An obvious simple example can illustrate this. Take two instances of where collective property without individual rights to title existed and then was transformed into individual rights to a small portion of the collective property. One would be a rural zone in the Global South previously outside the system of titled land rights. A second would be collective property in the ex-Communist states in the period following 1989. In both cases, mandated privatization of the property created multiple small owners who however were unable to maintain the property in a market situation. They thereupon sold their rights to some larger entrepreneur. At the end of this process, they had lost all rights within the erstwhile collective property, and economically were likely to be worse off than before.

As we have seen, this is only a small part of the story. If we look at the demographic and ecological consequences of the system over 500 years, we observe a considerable and growing polarization of the world-system which, at an individual level, has translated into a vast growing population who live below what is considered the "poverty level." This is often masked by the considerably improved situation for perhaps 15-20% of the world's population.



What has happened to individual people is perhaps less dramatic than what has happened to peoples. Groups of people - peoples - all like to assert their eternal existence and their eternal moral right to exist and persist. This is of course mythology. Groups come into and out of existence all the time, and always have.

Is there something different about this process within the framework of the modern world-system? Well, yes and no. The answer is no if one emphasizes the fact that groups have lives, that they are constantly changing in structure and design, in values and boundaries, in size and importance.

But the answer is yes if we look at how groups come into and out of existence in the modern world-system, as contrasted with how they did so previously. It has very much to do with land rights. The modern world-system has made possible, via technological improvements, larger and more rapid movements of peoples. We lump all these movements under the vague cover label of migration. But this greater technological facility of movement has occurred at the same time that there has been created an historical system that is composed of so-called sovereign states within an interstate system. These states have boundaries (albeit changing ones). And by systemic definition, there are no zones outside this carving up of the world into sovereign states (except marginally, and perhaps not for very much longer, the once totally-unoccupied Antarctic).

Sovereign states, as part of their mechanism of survival as institutions, have by and large all sought to become so-called nation-states. That is, they have all (or almost all) practiced an underlying Jacobin ideology of integration. They have wanted to insist that the multiple peoples located within their borders become part of the one people that is being asserted as the legitimate expression of membership in the community of the state.

In addition, in-migrants to the state have been regularly asked to surrender previous cultural identities and submit to the dominant one of the putative nation-state. Once again, however, this is essentially a political question. And in the past half-century, there have been important movements of resistance to this process. The resistance first of all has been the work of groups that consider themselves somehow more indigenous to the region than others - for example, within the settler states. Or they have been the resistance of groups who have been conquered by more powerful neighbors and are seeking to "revive" their language or their autonomous institutions. Today centrifugal forces are coming to be at least the equal of centripetal forces within the political-cultural lives of the world's states. The virtues of being a pluri-national state or a multi-cultural state are now being proclaimed in some countries.

The hard, cold fact is that there is no real possibility of creating truly multi-national states with different policies in different zones concerning land rights, except possibly when the so-called indigenous populations are an absolute majority of the population, as in Bolivia. The clearest instance of this impossibility is occurring right now in Ecuador.

Ecuador is considered by world standards a state governed by left forces, one of the most radical politically in Latin America. The current president, Rafael Correa, was elected with the strong support of the federation of indigenous movements in Ecuador, *CONAIE*. He is today in deep conflict with *CONAIE*. What happened?



The policies that give Correa the image of a political radical in today's world is first of all that he takes much geopolitical distance from the United States, and secondly his stance in regard to the foreign mining companies that have held various kinds of concessions in mineral-rich Ecuador. He moved to revoke many of these concessions in order to force the mining companies to renegotiate the terms of their arrangements. He did this in order to obtain far greater revenues for the Ecuadorian government in order to "develop" in various ways the country. Such attempts to reduce the advantages of foreign corporations in favor of higher revenues for the states in which these corporations operate have been a standard element in world politics for at least half a century and have been generally considered to be a mark of a left position in world politics.

CONAIE is not opposed to reducing the power and advantages of foreign mining corporations. But they represent those parts of the population who are still largely living on land that is not titled. The groups they represent also are disproportionately located in the regions in which mining has been or will be undertaken. They therefore are the most immediately subject to the negative ecological consequences of such operations as well as to the land displacement consequences that have occurred or may occur in the future.

The position of *CONAIE* is that Ecuador should change its constitution to proclaim itself a pluri-national state. Furthermore, they demand the right of the indigenous communities to give prior consent before extractive projects occur in their region. In part, they intend to deny such rights, although it is possible they will also in part simply demand control over the income that may come from consent, control that would otherwise fall to the Ecuadorian state. Correa and *CONAIE* have also come into conflict over water. In this matter too, the government wished to control access to water resources, including the possibility of privatizing it. *CONAIE* insisted on absolute public and community control over water resources.

Finally, there was a dispute over the prospection for oil in a national park area called Yasuni. Correa took the position that the government might renounce such prospection if countries in the North compensated it for the loss of revenue, a proposal that did not go very far. He has reserved the right to proceed with prospection, with the strong support of the national oil corporation, *Petroecuador*.

This account of recent events in Ecuador illustrates the fundamental dilemma of the world left. On the one hand, the world left, especially in the Global South, has stood for measures that would reduce the enormous real gap with the Global North. Correa is simply pursuing this objective. On the other hand, the world left (or at least a growing portion of it) is standing against further commodification of land rights and further ecological degradation of the world. *CONAIE* is simply pursuing this objective.

The two strategies are contradictory and incompatible one with the other. Land rights stand as the crucial deciding point. It is not at all clear today which way the world left, as social movement, intends to go. At the moment, collectively it seems to be trying to go in both directions at the same time. This is difficult, indeed probably impossible. The conflicts within the world left about their fundamental strategy of global change risks canceling all possibility of a successful outcome in the continuing struggle over the successor system to a capitalist world-economy that is in structural crisis.

PARADIPLMACY, KNOWLEDGE REGIONS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF "SOFT POWER"

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Resumo

The paper analyses the nature and features of the Knowledge Regions and their emergence in the international system as strategic players in the process of globalization, strongly anchored in the creation of dense knowledge networks and the development of an active paradiplomacy which enables the regions to project externally their specific interests and to reinforce their influence in the process of multilevel governance functioning as strategic brokers between the global and the local. In this context the paper discusses the implications of the paradiplomacy of sub-national governments to the foreign policies of central governments and argues that not only paradiplomacy does not present a risk to the coherence of foreign policy but constitutes a major factor for the consolidation of the soft power of states.

Keywords

Knowledge regions, Paradiplomacy; Globalisation; Knowledge networks; "Soft Power"

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PARADIPLMACY, KNOWLEDGE REGIONS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOFT POWER

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Introduction

The increasing complexity of the international system is particularly illustrated by the heterogeneity of players and the growing influence of non-state actors as well as by the existence of a system of multilayered and diffused governance, where there is coexistence and interplay between supranational, regional, national and sub-national levels, not the monopoly of the global level, leading to a considerable ambiguity in the international system, namely about the exact location of authority, its fragmentation and the management of overlapping jurisdictions and rules.

The major structural changes societies and the international system are experiencing are determined not only by globalization but also by two other distinct processes which are intertwined with it: the emergence of the "knowledge-based society" and the "network society". The processes of globalization and of building the knowledge society originated two different phenomena which are apparently contradictory. Globalization is behind the development of macro-regionalism insofar as macro-regions enable the exploration of scale economies, the rationalization of production systems and transaction costs and the development of transparent competition rules. In contrast the knowledge-based society has worked in a different direction introducing the dimension of "localization" and stimulating the development of micro-regionalism. There is sufficient evidence to support the argument that the evolution of the world economy is not simply characterised by globalization but by "glocalization", a more complex process involving simultaneously globalization and localization.

Knowledge regions, strongly anchored in multi-actor knowledge networks and a proactive paradiplomatic international action, have emerged as relevant players in the international system and the real competitors in the global economy. The paper is structured in three parts. The first part discusses the main factors behind the emergence of the micro knowledge regions in the context of the process of glocalisation. The second part analyses the features and dynamics of knowledge regions both the old ones in advanced countries but also the new ones in the emerging economic powers, China, Brazil and India. The third part addresses the phenomenon of paradiplomacy and its strong linkages with knowledge regions and discusses the



implications of the new knowledge society paradigm in terms of changes in the philosophy and practice of foreign policy.

Globalisation, knowledge society and the emergence of knowledge regions

The international system has been experiencing not only a process of globalisation but more precisely a dual process of "globalisation cum localisation" which some authors have named glocalization or fragmegration¹. The joint effect of this globalisation-localisation process, with their points of complementarity and their contradictions, is inducing a major paradigm shift in societal structures, in the way the economy and markets function and states operate and how citizens relate to each other and to the state

Globalisation has been a widely discussed topic but still remains a rather ambiguous concept with at least four different meanings to it². The first perspective sees globalisation as internationalisation, stressing the intensification of interaction and increasing interdependence between countries/states. A second view equates globalization with liberalization, implying the elimination of barriers to the free flow of goods, capital and people, the reduction of state restrictions and deregulation. Thirdly, globalization has also been regarded as universalisation, implying the creation of global norms and values (by states) and gradual reduction of cultural differences. Finally, globalisation can also be seen as deterritorialisation, reflecting the fact the territory, a fundamental basis of organisation of *westphalian* sovereign states, lost relevance as transnational networks and new forms of social organisation that transcend territorial borders emerged and non-state actors became increasingly influential at the international level. Unlike the others, the last meaning implies a qualitative change and distances itself from the state-centric approach insofar it underlines the new role and influence of non-state actors.

Localisation is associated with the emergence of knowledge-based economies and societies which are those where knowledge became the determinant factor of innovative production (new products, production processes and organizational methods), and innovation the key ingredient behind competitiveness. The most valuable aspect in the production of knowledge is the investment not in physical capital but above all in intangible assets: human capital, knowledge capital and social capital. In the knowledge society social activities are particularly geared towards the production, the distribution and effective use of knowledge which allows for the capacity to create and innovate new ideas, thoughts, processes and products and to translate them into economic value and wealth. On the other hand, the knowledge society is also a learning society where there is a strong priority attached to learning and "learning how to learn" which conditions the sustainability of the process.

In stressing the centrality of the process of knowledge creation and diffusion it is important to point out not only that there are different types of knowledge but also that

¹ See James Rosenau (2002). "Governance in a new Global Order". In David Held and McGrew (eds.) *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance*, Cambridge Polity Press: 70-86.

² Dominique Moisi, IFRI (2001). "The Knowledge-based society – beyond IT revolution", paper presented at the Annual EU-Japan Journalists Conference: Reacting to the knowledge-based society: European and Japanese views, Dublin, 7-9 March.



some have a higher strategic value than others. An important distinction to be made between two fundamental types of knowledge: (i) Coded knowledge (know-what and know-why) which can be equated with information and easily accessed through databases, books or lectures; (ii) Tacit knowledge (know-how and know-who) which is more difficult to have access to insofar it presupposes practical experience and social practice, in particular the know-who which is socially embedded knowledge that can not easily be transferred through formal channels.

"Tacit Knowledge" is the most decisive and strategic kind of knowledge because it is crucial to interpret, select and integrate coded knowledge, as well as to learn new skills and forget old ones. Moreover, with the advances in information technologies the increasingly cheap and easy access to vast information makes tacit knowledge even more relevant because it is scarcer and selection and interpretation of coded knowledge becomes paramount.

The creation and diffusion of tacit knowledge, unlike coded knowledge, requires a social context, face-to-face interaction and trust and it is unlikely to be transferred on an anonymous base. This is where the "network society" factor has to be accounted for, in the sense that the social networks that involve a diversity of actors and contribute to the upgrading of the level of social capital³ – i.e. the capacity members of a society have to develop mutual trust and cooperate to achieve common goals – is a fundamental condition for the creation of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is considered to be only transferable among actors who share norms and values and possess a high level of social capital.

The transition to the knowledge society/economy has become a key issue in the strategic thinking of many societies and states and is gradually becoming a priority in the political agenda of governments. Thus far, this trend involves mainly "strong states," developed countries or emerging new powers, which already have a strong position in the global economy. The analysis of the EU Lisbon Strategy and the updated "Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth"; Japan's "Innovation 25" strategy, the US "American Competitiveness Initiative"; Brazil's *Programa "Três Tempos"*; China's "Harmonious Socialist Strategy" already made operational in the 11th Five-Year Plan and updated in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) currently in its final process of approval; or India's 11th Five-Year Plan, shows that, since the late 1990s, these actors have engaged in the formulation and implementation of strategies to facilitate a transition to a knowledge society/economy⁴.

The relationship between the two processes of globalization and knowledge-society is rather complex. Globalization is at the same time undermining localisation, insofar instantaneous transfer of information regardless of location undercut traditional competitive factors such as proximity to inputs and markets, and reinforcing localisation as this ability to source from anywhere becomes open to everyone and therefore ceases to be an advantage. In this context the "location paradox" emerges in the sense that "*...the most enduring competitive advantages in a global economy seem*

³ In the sense of the concept developed by Putnam, see *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993.

⁴ Neves, Miguel (2007). "National Experiences in Managing the transitions towards a knowledge Society/Economy - Same Dreams, Different Beds". In *Estratégia*, nº 22-23, IEEI.



to be local" as argued by Porter⁵. Moreover, the environmental costs of globalisation are now increasingly at stake. The pressing standards of corporate environmental responsibility and the concerns over climate change and the reduction of CO2 emissions, questions the sustainability of the fragmentation of globalized production processes pressing for location near the consumer markets in order to minimise emissions thus providing new advantages to localisation.

Michael Enright⁶ argues that this is only an apparent paradox as this twin process tends to be essentially complementary insofar the process of localisation of competitive advantages of firms is a necessary condition to compete in the global market. In other words, firms have first to consolidate their knowledge creation and innovation capabilities in their local/regional clusters and networks, as innovation is today the main driving force behind competitiveness, in order to meet the new challenges of globalisation.

However, I would argue that there is not only complementarity and convergence; there is also divergence, tension and contradictory effects between the two at different levels.

Firstly, while globalisation reduces the relevance of the territory in the old way, the knowledge society grants a new strategic significance to the territory. Given the centrality of tacit knowledge and the fact its creation requires direct social interaction on a territorial base, we can then understand how the knowledge society and the network society processes have contributed for the territory to regain importance but in a new perspective: not because it is controlled by the state or is the basis for the exercise of sovereignty, but because of the social activity that takes place there and the density of the knowledge networks. Knowledge creation became a territorialized phenomenon, insofar it enables national/regional actors to develop trust, form networks, produce common norms and values, develop partnerships and engage in mutual learning.

From this perspective, the knowledge society and economy contradicts the opposite trend of deterritorialisation set in motion by globalisation. As a consequence the local and regional levels gained a new strategic value, because it is the optimal dimension for the creation and operation of the knowledge networks that produce and diffuse tacit knowledge.

Secondly, globalisation generates a concentration of economic power, setting in motion a complex process of mergers and acquisitions which have been taking place in many sectors, while the knowledge society tends to generate greater dispersion of power and assets and to stimulate co-operation. This concentration of economic power and the formation of major conglomerates in the financial sector is clearly one of the structural causes behind the current financial and economic crisis insofar it created the syndrome of "too big to fail" and weakened the capacity of states to carry out effective regulation and moderate market abuses and anti-social behaviour of conglomerates. At the same time this same process weakened the globalisation process insofar global banks bought or pushed out of the market smaller regional/local banks with closer ties with the local

⁵ Michael Porter (2000). "Location, Competition and Economic Development: Local Clusters in a Global Economy". In *Economic Development Quarterly*, 14: 15-34.

⁶ Enright, OECD (2001). *Enhancing SME competitiveness*. The OECD Bologna Ministerial Conference, Paris, Background paper for workshop 2.



economy and institutions: as a consequence credit became less accessible to SMEs clusters and knowledge networks ⁷.

Thirdly, in terms of policy responses, globalisation requires from the point of view of regulation the fight against monopolies / dominant positions and strict enforcement of competition rules while the knowledge society/economy implies a logic of greater cooperation between firms, universities, research centres, local governments, NGOs and other partners that integrate the knowledge networks and greater tolerance with regard to practices that from a formal perspective could be seen as violating competition rules. In other words, the new paradigm of the knowledge society has far reaching institutional and regulatory implications insofar it requires a flexibilisation of rules in several areas notably in competition and intellectual property rights in order to remove major obstacles to knowledge diffusion.

Fourthly, globalisation is behind the development of macro-regionalism and regional integration while the knowledge society is favouring an opposite trend of micro-regionalism, thus facilitating the development of two different kinds of regionalism with two different logics.

The development of this new micro-regionalism is anchored on, and driven by the emergence of the knowledge regions, a new actor both in terms of knowledge creation and innovation and of governance whose strategic relevance derives from the very nature of tacit knowledge production and dissemination as will be discussed below.

The new strategic relevance of the knowledge regions is associated with different factors.

To begin with, the necessity to introduce new forms of Governance within states that induced decentralisation and devolution of powers to sub-national governments. The systemic effects of globalisation caused the weakening of the Westphalian state, although with considerable differences between strong and weak states, as a result of the incapacity of central bureaucracies to deal effectively with a whole new range of complex issues, the growing power of non-state actors and the emergence of new sources of loyalty and identity that compete with nationality.

Secondly, the knowledge regions emerged as the systemic mediators between the local and the global managing contradictions and addressing the new multi-level governance challenges. To a large extent they are the real competitors in the global economy and acquired a deep understanding about its logic and dynamics. One can argue that it is regions rather than countries that are competing in the global economy. Conversely at the local level they function both as the catalysts of the organisation of local actors' strategies and actions to pursue their interests in the global economy and as the safety net to cushion negative effects of globalisation, thus contributing to social stability.

Thirdly, the relevance of the knowledge regions derives also from their strategic role in strengthening Global Governance insofar they operate already on the basis of multi-actor knowledge networks whose expertise is required to respond to the complex regulation of very technical issues. This puts knowledge regions in a privileged position to provide inputs to global rule-making. Similarly, they have a crucial role to play as far as rule-implementation and adaptation to local conditions and specificities are

⁷ See Stiglitz, Joseph (2006). *Making Globalization Work*, Penguin Books.



concerned, thus being a strategic player in ensuring both the voluntary compliance to and enforcement of global rules.

Knowledge regions: features and dynamics

The concept of Knowledge Regions is relatively recent and there is not yet a consensus about its precise contents. However, it is clear that the concept refers to micro-regions, territorial units which are parts of a State, that operate as regional innovation systems according to the new logic of the knowledge economy and society. Although the focus has been more on national knowledge regions I would argue that transborder regions involving parts of different states cutting across political boundaries can also constitute knowledge regions (transborder). In spite of the fluidity of the concept, I would argue that a comparative analysis suggests that knowledge regions display some fundamental common features which go far beyond economic aspects to include sociological, governance and political dimensions. The most fundamental features include the following aspects:

- (i) High level of human capital as a result of a consistent level of investment, especially in education and training, with important consequences not only in terms of productivity but also in terms of acquisition of new skills, innovation capacity and learning capabilities.
- (ii) High investment in R&D, public and private, and efficiency of the system translated in good performance as far as outputs are concerned, particularly patents.
- (iii) Possession of a core group of knowledge-intensive industries and/or knowledge services which play a strategic role in securing innovation and competitiveness: IT and computer manufacturing (computer and office equipment, electronic components, communication equipment); Biotechnology and chemical sectors (pharmaceuticals, drugs, chemical products); Automotive and high-technology mechanical engineering (motor vehicles and transport equipment, machine tools and equipment); Instrumentation and electrical machinery (precision and optical equipment, electrical transmission equipment, lighting and wiring equipment); High-technology services (software and computer related services, telecommunications, research, consultancy, development and testing service).
- (iv) High level of social capital, implying good levels of cooperation and trust between members of the community, which favours the development of dense regional networks between regional knowledge actors, enhancing the capacity to produce and diffuse tacit knowledge.
- (v) Communities characterised by a strong multicultural trait, associated with the presence of a significant foreign community from a variety of countries and cultures, also because as dynamic innovation poles they attract talents from other countries and regions, which facilitates a better knowledge about other cultures and visions of the world.
- (vi) New forms of governance, less hierarchical and more participatory, which put great emphasis on active public-private partnerships, devolution of powers to local governments and new forms of articulation between different levels of



government and policies aimed at facilitating entrepreneurship in both public and private sectors.

- (vii) High international profile in many cases associated with a reasonable level of international participation based on a proactive paradiplomacy in areas of *low politics* carried out by sub-national governments in close co-ordination with the private sector and civil society organisations.

This illustrates the complex, multidimensional and far-reaching structural changes that underpin the emergence of knowledge regions. It should be noted that these traits are tendencies and therefore they are combined in very different proportions in different regions, some might even be absent or not fully consolidated in specific regions. Moreover, despite the commonalities mentioned above there is not a homogeneous model of knowledge region; there are obviously many points of divergence and different degrees of maturity between different experiences.

Comparative analysis of Knowledge Regions has been carried out by Robert Huggins⁸ who has been producing the World Knowledge Competitiveness Index. This Index is an overall benchmark of the knowledge capacity, capability and sustainability of the best performing and most dynamic regions in the global economy.

The World Knowledge Competitiveness Index 2008 provides the most recent analysis of the performance of the leading knowledge regions in the world. It compares 145 regions - 63 from North America (USA and Canada), 54 from Europe and 28 from Asia and Oceania - and is headed by the San José region in the US followed by other US regions. In the top 10 there are two non-US regions Stockholm (6th) the best performing European region and Tokyo (9th) the best performing Asian region. The top 50 rank is dominated by US regions but includes 13 European regions and 9 Asian regions. At the bottom of the ranking we find the Chinese and Indian regions as well as regions from Eastern Europe. It is interesting to note that all the most developed Chinese coastal regions are now integrated in the group.

Comparing the 2008 results with the 2005 Index it is possible to conclude that while the leading knowledge centres are still in the US, the American predominance is less overwhelming insofar there is a clear improvement in the performance of the knowledge centres outside the US, namely in the EU and Japan which place 13 regions (7 in 2005) and 7 regions (1 in 2005) respectively in the top 50 knowledge regions. Moreover, there are few US regions that have improved their position since 2005 which suggests that the considerable gap between US regions and European and Asian regions is narrowing.

In developed countries the most competitive knowledge regions have consolidated their competitive advantages and lead the process of innovation. They are clearly the engines of their respective economies and the key competitors in the global market. In the US the San José-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara region, which includes Silicon Valley, is for some time the leading region supported in very high rates of investment in education and R&D (such as NASA) with a strong basis in knowledge-intensive sectors in particular the IT, high-tech services and instrumentation and electrical machinery sectors. The top US knowledge regions group include also Boston-Cambridge endowed

⁸ Robert Huggins, Hiro Izushi, Will Davies and Luo Shougui (2008). *World Knowledge Competitiveness Index 2008*, Centre for International Competitiveness, Cardiff School of Management, University of Wales Institute, UK.



with a high quality tertiary education sector with 8 strong research universities in particular Harvard and the MIT; San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont; Hartford and Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue.

In Europe the strongest knowledge region is Stockholm (Sweden) which ranks 6 in the ranking of the world knowledge competitiveness index. It has a highly educated population - 39% has tertiary education and 45% secondary education - and a diversified economic structure although with a particular specialisation in knowledge-intensive services and in some high-tech industrial activity: Information Technologies/Electronics; Software/Internet; Health and Biotechnology; Transport and Logistics.

Other leading knowledge regions in Europe include West, South and Ostra Mellansverige in Sweden; West, East, North and South regions in the Netherlands; Pohjois-Suomi, Etela-Suomi and Lansi-Suomi in Finland; Ile de France (Paris region) and Centre-Est in France; Luxembourg; Denmark; Norway; Baden-Wurtemberg, Bayern, Hamburg and Bremen in Germany; Eastern, South East and South West in the UK; North West and Lombardia in Italy; Noroeste/Catalunya and Madrid in Spain.

In Japan knowledge regions have also improved their performance in recent years. Tokyo is the leading Japanese region (ranks 9 in the 2008 WKCI), possessing a strong high-tech services sector and high rates of patents, followed by Shiga, strong in specific knowledge sectors instrumentation and electric engineering and IT and computer manufacturing, Kanagawa, Toyama, Osaka and Tochigi regions.

While the role of these knowledge regions in securing the leadership of advanced economies in the innovation process is well known, the role new knowledge regions have been playing in developing economies that have emerged recently as economic powers is often overlooked and less known. The main argument is that one of the key factors behind the success of the new emerging economic powers, in particular China, Brazil and India, is the gradual consolidation of knowledge regions inside these countries which have performed the roles of the main engines of economic growth, centres of innovation and the fundamental bridges to the global economy. The other side of the coin has been the asymmetric nature of their development processes.

In China, there are three crucial knowledge regions with different profiles: the "Bohai Rim region" (Beijing, Tianjin, parts of Shandong and Liaoning); the "Yangtze River Delta" with the leading centre in Shanghai and involving also 7 cities in Zhejiang and 8 cities in Jiangsu provinces; the "Pearl River Delta", involving Guangdong province and the ties with Hong Kong and Macao. The 9 coastal provinces involved in these 3 leading poles of the Chinese economy account for nearly 2/3 of China's GDP (62%) and GDP per capita is 1.7 times higher than the national average; more than 75% of China exports. It is important to note that each region has its own development model and its specific strong points⁹.

The Bohai Rim region has been characterized as a government driven model with the most intensive R&D facilities (42 of the 91 institutes of the Chinese Academy of Science

⁹ See Robert Huggins, Hiro Izushi, Will Davies and Luo Shougui, *World Knowledge Competitiveness Index 2008*, Centre for International Competitiveness, Cardiff School of Management, University of Wales Institute, UK: 34-46; On PRD and YRD comparative analysis see Chen Xiangming (2006). *Regionalizing the Global - local Economic Nexus: a tale of two regions in China*. Great Cities Institute, Working Paper, University of Illinois Chicago, March.



are located here) as well as the top universities (Tsinghua University and Peking University) and nearly 25% of university students and 30% of R&D researchers are located in the region which accounts for 34% of national R&D expenditure. This is mainly explained by intensive investment by the Chinese government in the last two decades.

In contrast the Yangtze River Delta is labelled as a city-network driven model by which the new knowledge and technology absorbed by Shanghai from its own industrial dynamism and strong presence of foreign multinationals is then diffused from Shanghai to smaller cities around it, in particular Nanjing, Suzhou and Hangzhou where specific clusters are maturing. It has strong knowledge intensive sectors in particular the automobile industry, the IT sector and chemicals and machinery as well as more dense knowledge networks in particular strong ties between firms and universities and high levels of technological commercialization.

Finally, the Pearl River Delta region is qualified as a FDI driven model as it has been an important recipient of foreign investment accounting for 20% of FDI stock in China, especially from and through Hong Kong, and the main basis of China exports as the region is the origin of nearly 1/3 of Chinese exports although the share has declined in recent years. Although the science and technology basis, the education indicators and the density of knowledge workers are not strong points, the region benefits from the intensive presence of foreign investors which are associated with some knowledge transfer through workers and managers, the formation of local SMEs clusters and the proximity of an international centre like Hong Kong with knowledge-intensive services.

In India three main knowledge regions are behind the emergence of India as a global economic power : (i) Mumbai, capital of the state of Maharashtra, is the financial capital of India and a region with strong knowledge intensive sectors - IT, Health sector and audiovisual namely the film industry of Bollywood – responsible for 40% of India exports; (ii) Hyderabad, capital of the state of Andhra Pradesh with a series of relevant sectors IT, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and high-tech services sectors, is a main exporter of software products ; (iii) Bangalore, capital of the state of Karnataka, is known as the Indian Silicon Valley reflecting the fact it is the leading IT sector producer and exporter in India accounting for 34% of India total exports¹⁰ of IT products, and is also an important biotechnology centre.

In Brazil the leading knowledge region is the state of São Paulo which has set up several knowledge networks associated with the programme "Arranjos Produtivos Locais" which involves SMEs, universities, research centres, local governments aimed at building strong ties between the different players and fostering innovation¹¹. The state is already the powerhouse of the Brazilian economy accounting for 34% of total GDP in 2007¹² (down from 37% in 1995) and for 43% of Brazil's industrial output and possesses a group of knowledge-intensive sectors namely chemical industry, machinery, medical instruments, auto industry, biotechnology, pharmaceutical, IT and nanotechnology sectors.

¹⁰ See Invest in India "17 billion software exports for India's IT state, <http://investmoneyinindia.com> (2.08.10)

¹¹ Secretaria do Desenvolvimento, Governo de São Paulo, www.desenvolvimento.sp.gov.br/drt/apls (2.08.2010)

¹² Fundação Sistema Estadual Análise de Dados e IBGE, www.seade.gov.br (2.08.2010)



One of the important characteristics of knowledge regions is their increasing direct participation in the international system and their ability to act more or less autonomously in the international stage and develop paradiplomacy actions that can be parallel or complementary to actions developed by national governments.

Paradiplomacy and foreign policy in the knowledge era

A crucial issue in terms of prospective analysis is the implications of the new knowledge society paradigm for structural changes in foreign policy taking the emergence of knowledge regions into account. There are interesting developments which suggest potential fundamental changes to the goals, nature and instruments of foreign policy in a global knowledge society.

The first development is the new relevance of paradiplomacy developed by sub-national governments, in particular by the governments of knowledge regions. These are increasingly active in the international arena, mainly in areas of low politics (trade, investment, science and technology, culture, and education), trying to project their specific interests according to a dual logic: on the one hand, a process "from the inside out" reflecting the fact that local governments go out to promote local interests and reduce the risks of international threats; on the other, a process "from the outside in" whereby non-central governments become the focus of attention and suffer pressures from both foreign governments and non-state actors as they realise that influence at the central level is no longer sufficient to pursue their aims. This is a potential area of conflict with the traditional diplomacy of central governments¹³.

The development of paradiplomacy is a growing trend in the international system clearly illustrated by the old and more developed knowledge regions as well as by the new ones in the emerging countries. Paradiplomacy first entered the international system through the British Dominions (Canada, South Africa, Australia) in the context of the British Empire in the 1920s. For the first time the international activity of non-sovereign governments, although seen as a deviant behaviour, was tolerated by the international community and the Dominions gained autonomy in negotiating international trade agreements and other economic matters. This set a precedent. Hong Kong was later on one of the pioneers of modern paradiplomacy as a result of a structural conflict of interests between the colonial power, Britain, and the colony on trade matters leading London to informally accept since the late 1950s Hong Kong's autonomy and capacity to negotiate directly trade agreements with foreign states. The Hong Kong SAR still has an active paradiplomacy based on the action of the network of HK Trade Offices (Geneva, Brussels, Washington, San Francisco, New York, Toronto, Tokyo, Sydney, Singapore, London) at the bilateral level and HK's participation in multilateral organisations, particularly in WTO. The Canadian Province of Quebec was another case in point since the early 60s when it developed close ties and signed bilateral agreements directly with France on cultural matters which generated conflicts with the Federal government.

¹³ Brian Hocking (1993). *Localizing foreign policy – non-central governments and multilayered diplomacy*, London, St. Martin's Press.
Michelmann in Hans Michelmann, and Soldatos (ed) *Federalism and international relations – the role of subnational units*, Clarendon Press, 1990. Duchacek, uses the word paradiplomacy in "Perforated sovereignties: towards a typology of new actors in international relations" in Michelmann (ed.) *Federalism and International Relations*: 1-33.



Since the late 1980s, also facilitated by the strategic decompression after the end of the Cold War, the expansion of the paradiplomacy of sub-national governments has been a silent but fundamental change in the international system and the way in which states act internationally. The most developed regions became proactive in the international stage, mainly motivated by economic reasons, as illustrated by various cases. The German Lander such as Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria developed a certain degree of external autonomy, establishing networks of external representation offices in several countries in all continents. Bavaria for example has built since the mid-1990s a network of external representations in 22 countries in Asia (China, India, Japan, Vietnam), Africa (South Africa), America (Brazil, Mexico, Canada, USA New York and USA San Francisco) and in several European countries. Interesting enough some of these offices are located in other knowledge regions such as Guangdong the Pearl River Delta and Shandong in China, Bangalore in India, São Paulo in Brazil and Tokyo in Japan¹⁴.

In the context of the US states, California, the powerhouse of US knowledge economy, has been one of the most proactive through the activity of Governors and of the California Technology, Trade and Commerce Agency and its network of trade offices abroad (Tokyo, London, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Mexico City, Shanghai, Taipei, Johannesburg, Seoul, Singapore) until 2003 when the agency was dismantled. But many other States such as Florida, New York, Nebraska, North Dakota, Kentucky or Colorado have followed the same path and are also active internationally, under the leadership of their Governors who perform the role of economic ambassadors seeking to promote the competitiveness of their States in the global economy and to boost their own political profile¹⁵.

Another interesting example is Catalunya which enjoys a high degree of autonomy in domestic affairs and has developed since the late 1980s a very active paradiplomacy that promotes its specific economic and cultural interests in the international arena through the activities of the network of external offices managed by COPCA (Consorti de Promoció Comercial de Catalunya) participated by the Catalunya Government, Chambers of Commerce, industry sectoral associations and export associations. These entities jointly created and manage the network of 35 external trade offices located in 31 countries and covering 70 countries around the world¹⁶, including China (Beijing, Shanghai), India (New Dehli), Hong Kong, Singapore, Brazil (São Paulo) or the USA (Washington, New York, Los Angeles) at the same time it directly supports firms at home through training and assistance for the development of their international/export departments. Moreover, bilateral relations with States and other Non-Central Governments are one of the priorities leading to the signature of international agreements in a variety of areas ranging from trade, investment, education, culture, science and technology or health.

¹⁴ See Invest in Bavaria, State Agency (<http://www.invest-in-bavaria.de/en/bavarias-foreign-representations/>)

¹⁵ A good example of this "profile-boosting strategy" has been California's Governor Schwarzenegger signature of an agreement on climate change with British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2006. On US states' paradiplomacy see McMillan, Samuel Lucas (2008). "Subnational Foreign Policy Actors: How and Why Governors participate in US Foreign Policy" in *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 4, 227-253. For example, California's Governor Gray Davis created a secretary of foreign affairs and hosted political leaders from China, Japan and Singapore. In 2001 alone California hosted foreign dignitaries from 67 countries.

¹⁶ See Generalitat Catalunya, COPCA (<http://www.acc10.cat/ACC10/cat>) acceded 3.08.2010



In the case of China the development of the paradiplomacy of the leading Chinese provinces since the mid-1990s although discrete and with little visibility, has been a major factor to explain China's integration in the global economy and her impressive emergence as a global economic power. Indeed one of the key institutional ingredients of China's economic success has been the high level of decentralisation of economic decision-making from central government to provincial governments and even to local governments, including in foreign trade and attraction of FDI, since the early stage of reforms. The paradiplomacy of the most developed coastal Chinese provinces, an extension of this internal autonomy, was further developed as a consequence of the implementation of the "Go Global" strategy implemented since 2000 and has gradually been blessed by the Central Government, encouraged by the positive experience with Hong Kong's external autonomy since 1997. Beijing saw this paradiplomacy as useful and complementary insofar it could function as a mechanism to explore more informal channels with economic partners and nurture special relationships; mobilize the overseas Chinese business communities; and even as a solution to manage economic relations with countries which have no diplomatic relations with the PRC.

Guangdong Province has been probably the pioneer and developed since the mid-1990s, under the coordination of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Guangdong Provincial Government, special relations with some "sister provinces" in various continents. As far as Europe is concerned Guangdong developed paradiplomacy relations with 7 European Provinces/Regions: Utrecht (2002), with initiatives in the areas of environmental protection, agriculture, and trade; Skane (Sweden) 1997, especially exchanges in education, environment and medicare; Alpes Cote d'Azur (2000); Catalonia (2003); Fyn Region (Denmark) 2004; State of Bavaria (2004). This special relationship involved the organisation of trade missions, the creation of permanent trade and investment offices such as the offices opened by Catalonia and Utrecht (jointly set up with Dutch Chamber of Commerce the Holland House in Guangzhou), the organisation of investment promotion seminars, participation in trade fairs etc.

There are also more recent but interesting examples of other provinces belonging to the other growth pole of the Chinese economy, the Yangtze River Delta which have invested in building preferential ties with specific European regions. In the case of Jiangsu, the Provincial Government opened 5 Economic and Trade Offices in Europe with the headquarters located in Dusseldorf in 1996 followed by the offices in Paris, Chelmsford - Essex County and East England (UK), Tilburg - Province of Noord-Brabant (Netherlands) and Stockholm (Sweden)¹⁷. Specific European regions have also established their own trade offices in Nanjing, capital of Jiangsu, like Essex County, the German Landers of Nordrhein Westfalen and Baden-Wurttemberg, through Baden-Wurttemberg International¹⁸, or the Paris Department of Haute Seine. For obvious reasons Shanghai is an important location of trade and investment offices from the paradiplomacy of EU regions having developed special relations with Barcelona, Milan, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Liverpool, Marseille, Antwerp.

¹⁷ The intensity of paradiplomacy initiatives is rapidly increasing. For example the Jiangsu Provincial Department of Trade and Economic Cooperation organized several investment seminars in France, Italy, Germany, Belgium and Britain between 21-31 May 2007, involving more than 100 entrepreneurs from Jiangsu. This initiative alone led to the signature of investment contracts worth US\$ 1.3 billion and import and export contracts of more than US\$ 100 million (see <http://www.china-jiangsu.org/news.htm>).

¹⁸ Illustrating this increasingly closer relationship between the two regions, Baden-Wurttemberg and Shanghai created a joint portal in the Internet (<http://www.bw.shanghai.de/portal.jsp>).



Another case in point is the special relationship between the Lander of Bavaria and Shandong Province which developed special ties in terms of mutual investment promotion, but also cultural exchanges and even swap and training of civil servants. Bavaria has created the State of Bavaria Shandong Office in 1997 and in September 2006 the Shandong Provincial Government opened in Munich the Business Representative Office of Shandong with the blessing of China's Central Government. However, it should be stressed that this paradiplomacy does not concern exclusively the Provincial level, there are also paradiplomacy initiatives at the municipal and county levels contributing to a much more complex picture, especially because a minimum level of coordination that exists between Central and Provincial Governments is much more difficult to ensure in relation to lower levels of government.

In the case of Brazil the paradiplomacy of the Brazilian States, called "federated diplomacy", is a recent phenomenon pioneered by the States of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul in the late 1980s followed by São Paulo, Paraná, Baía or even other states involved mainly in transborder paradiplomacy with neighbouring states – Roraima, Acre, Amazonas e Amapá¹⁹. The Federal State has recognised and to some extent favoured the increasing international proactivity of sub-national governments and tried to set up a coordination mechanism in 1997, the "Assessoria de Relações Federativas" between the Itamaraty and the state and municipal governments in order to ensure there was no major contradictions between national foreign policy and paradiplomacy initiatives²⁰. In addition the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created 8 representation offices in various states and regions to operationalise the process which constitutes an innovative solution. This can be seen as an act of legitimisation of paradiplomacy by the central government. The most recent trend has been the intensification of paradiplomacy relations, anchored in bilateral agreement, between Brazilian States and Chinese Provinces: São Paulo-Shanghai, Baía-Shandong, Pará-Sichuan, Paraná-Hainan, Mato Grosso-Jiangxi.

Looking at these different experiences it is possible to point out some conclusions concerning the nature, dynamics and impact of paradiplomacy at present.

First, it should be stressed that paradiplomacy is not an homogeneous phenomenon on the contrary has a heterogeneous nature. On the one hand this is the result of the coexistence of different types of paradiplomacy as argued by Duchacek identifying three different types of paradiplomacy according to its contents and regional scope: (i) *transborder regional diplomacy* (or micro-regional), referring to transborder relations between geographically contiguous NCGs which was initially the dominant form (ii) *transregional paradiplomacy* (or macro-regional) between NCGs which are not contiguous and (iii) *global paradiplomacy*, involving distant players, including sovereign states and touching all issues in the international system, including security, international trade etc²¹. I would argue that another type of paradiplomacy should be

¹⁹ See Francisco Gomes Filho and Alcides Costa Vaz (2008). "Paradiplomacia no contexto da Amazonia brasileira – estratégias de desenvolvimento regional do Estado de Roraima". In *Ci & Desenvolvimento*, Belém, vol. 4, nº 7, jul-dez 2008: 155-165.

²⁰ See Decree 2.246/1997 República Federativa do Brazil; On Brazil's paradiplomacy see Gilberto Rodrigues (2006), "Política Externa Federativa. Análise de Ações Internacionais de Estados e Municípios Brasileiros". *CEBRI Tese*, Rio de Janeiro, CEBRI.

²¹ See Michelmann in Hans Michelmann, and Soldatos (1990) (ed), *Federalism and international relations – the role of subnational units*, Clarendon Press: 299-312 and Duchacek, "Perforated sovereignties: towards a typology of new actors in international relations" in Michelmann (ed.) *Federalism and International Relations*: 1-33.



identified "multilateral paradiplomacy" that refers to the participation of some sub-national governments in multilateral organisations and the production of multilateral rules being the best example Hong Kong. These different types of paradiplomacy have different impacts both on the international system and national foreign policy. Whereas transborder regional paradiplomacy does not raise much controversy and is accepted and even promoted by central governments, transregional and, above all, global paradiplomacy is more likely to raise tensions and tend to be regarded with suspicion by central governments. In addition the more we move towards complex and demanding global paradiplomacy or multilateral paradiplomacy more robust institutional and financial capacity is required.

On the other hand, I would argue that a major distinction must be drawn between a permanent and structured modality of paradiplomacy, mainly developed by the richest knowledge regions, developed according to a long term strategy, and sporadic and non-structured paradiplomacy activities involving the use of specific instruments for short-term purposes. There is an important qualitative difference between these two modalities which has to be acknowledged with clear implications for the density of the international status of sub-national governments.

Second, concerning the conditions of success, in spite of the diffusion and explosion of paradiplomacy, the practice of a robust, effective and consistent paradiplomacy is still strongly associated with, and somehow restricted to rich and powerful knowledge regions operating within States, federal or unitary, possessing a considerable level of decentralisation. These are the sub-national governments that have the financial means, the human resources, institutional capabilities and the level of domestic autonomy to engage in complex international relations. In this context it should be stressed that domestic autonomy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. The degree and dynamics of substantive external autonomy is fundamentally determined by the complex interplay between three different factors: SNG own institutional capacity and strategy to act internationally; the pattern of relations with the Central Government and the mechanisms and level of control exerted by the former; the attitude and recognition of external players and willingness to interact on the international stage. In short, there are different conditions of success that interact which include not only institutional conditions related to level of decentralisation and economic conditions concerning the resources and strengths of regions, but also political conditions, related to the attitude of central governments, and regional leadership conditions²².

Third, the concerns over the dysfunctional nature of paradiplomacy and the risks of conflicts between central governments and sub-national governments expressed in the 1990s by authors like Soldatos, are no longer justified. This "chaos scenario," heavily influenced by the state-centric view, considered paradiplomacy to be a dangerous derogation of state power and a clear threat to the coherence and unity of foreign policy: sub-national actors were regarded as trespassers and their behaviour as deviant. A major shift in perception has occurred. In fact as a result of accumulated experience, and leaving aside the few exceptions where sub-national governments had separatist agendas, paradiplomacy is by and large seen as beneficial and a positive

²² These factors have been highlighted by Keating, M. (2000). *Paradiplomacy and Regional Networking*, paper presented at the Forum of Federations: an International Federalism (<http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs>).



contribution to strengthen the overall international position of states, strongly illustrated by the Chinese, Brazilian and Spanish cases, and less and less perceived as a deviant behaviour. In other words it can be argued that paradiplomacy is no longer seen as an anomaly but on the contrary as a normal and increasingly diffused practice which central governments have even encouraged and ought to incorporate in their foreign policy planning²³.

Fourth, traditional analysis tend to see paradiplomacy as a consequence of globalization and the need local/regional communities have to respond to new challenges and increasing uncertainty in order to pursue their specific economic interests in the global market, to project their cultural identity and to overcome the limitations and rigidities of traditional central bureaucracies that are slow to adjust to new conditions. However, it seems more accurate to consider that paradiplomacy is simultaneously a consequence of glocalisation and a cause, a catalyst of glocalisation. Knowledge networks are behind the development of paradiplomacy through regional governments. Building on the fact they are leading poles of innovation, networks aim at enhancing their competitive position in the global market but also to link up and cooperate with other knowledge networks abroad. This means that paradiplomacy is not a passive and defensive response to globalization, on the contrary it is indeed part and parcel of the process of globalization, it contributes to greater integration in the global market and is the expression of the multi-level governance paradigm.

Fifth, paradiplomacy is a fundamental source of innovation in foreign policy insofar it incorporates and anticipates some of the changes in the conception and rationale of States' foreign policy that will be brought about by the new knowledge society/economy paradigm. To start with the abolition of the boundaries between the domestic and the external levels, there is clearly a continuum, external action is just the extension of domestic network activity and should involve the same players. This also implies a more holistic approach and greater coherence and coordination between domestic policies and foreign policy as well as greater transparency and citizen participation. Moreover, it shows that external action will be more and more a multi-actor, multidimensional process where public, private and third sector actors have to engage and combine their different skills in the context of long term partnerships. Knowledge networks involving coordination and cooperation between governments, business, NGOs, academia, trade unions becomes paramount for effective external action not only in terms of implementation but also in terms of policy conception.

Furthermore, paradiplomacy highlights the growing importance of informal channels and procedures and the role of Soft Law in the regulation of the international system which ensures flexibility and adaptability to adjust to uncertainty and rapid change. Finally, new global issues involve increasingly technical and complex issues requiring expertise which governments lack therefore requiring the active involvement and contribution of private firms, universities, research institutions. In this respect it is relevant to highlight the new role of global transnational networks in international rule-

²³ In the same line Michael Keating (2000). *Paradiplomacy and Regional Networking*, paper presented at the Forum of Federations: an International Federalism (<http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs>). Andrew Petter referring to the Canadian experience clearly states that "...Canadian Governments have facilitated and encouraged paradiplomacy over the years as a means of accommodating nationalist sentiments, regional interests and economic pressures" - see *Canadian Paradiplomacy in practice: confessions of a paradiplomat*, paper presented to the Conference The International Relations of the Regions: sub-national actors, para-diplomacy and multi-level Governance, Zaragoza, 2006 (mimeo).



creation, and renewed concern with global rule-implementation, which presupposes the active involvement of sub-national actors and knowledge regions insofar as they can adapt global rules to local specificities.

Sixth, paradiplomacy is a strategic channel for the creation and consolidation of the "soft power"²⁴ of States not only because of the informal channels and instruments it uses but also because of the fundamental relevance of the issue-areas addressed by paradiplomacy, namely trade, investment and economic cooperation; education and human capital; migrations; science and technology; culture and identity. All of these are crucial dimensions of "soft power" and this is the main reason behind the open-minded and tolerant attitude of China's Central Government with regard to some Chinese Provinces' paradiplomacy the more so as this was combined with the Chinese Diaspora strategy, another crucial instrument of China's soft power. Dense and robust knowledge regions, internationally proactive are the main builders of soft power in the context of globalisation.

However, despite internationally proactive knowledge regions are a fundamental tool to sustain systemic competitiveness in the global economy and consolidate soft power, this is a phenomenon that involves a limited number of states. Still, the majority of states are excluded from this trend as they have been slow to adapt to the new paradigm, both in terms of changes in governance models and policies, and failed to create the necessary conditions to facilitate the emergence of knowledge regions. On the contrary, they tend to hold on to very centralized systems believing that only a strong centre can respond to the new threats and face the challenges of globalisation.

A good example is the case of Portugal where a historical centralist tradition has been somehow reinforced by the dynamics of the EU integration process. As a result Portugal is today one of the most centralised states in Europe a major factor preventing the emergence of dynamic regions.

Portugal went through a vivid debate on regionalisation and decentralisation in the late 1990s as a consequence of the process of referendum on regionalisation held in 1998 which culminated in the rejection of the proposal to create 8 administrative regions along the lines foreseen in the law²⁵. The creation of administrative regions was a binding principle already enshrined in the 1976 Constitution but never implemented. In spite of possessing since 1976 two autonomous regions, Madeira and Azores, the continental part of the Portuguese territory has been managed under a fairly centralised system making Portugal one of the most centralised states in Europe²⁶.

The terms of the debate in 1998 analysed in more detail elsewhere²⁷ and the arguments put forward revolved around the implications of regionalisation for the reform of public administration, national cohesion and the impact on development

²⁴ In the sense used by Joseph Nye (2004). *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*, Public Affairs.

²⁵ Law 19/98 which defined 8 regions: Entre Douro e Minho; Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro; Beira Litoral; Beira Interior; Estremadura e Ribatejo; Lisboa e Setúbal; Alentejo; Algarve.

²⁶ See Hahan J.P. and Loo, M.V. (1999). *A Seminar Game to Analyze Regional Governance in Portugal, Lisboa*, FLAD e Rand Corporation. The level of centralisation can be measured by the share of tax revenue controlled by the Central Government which reached 93% in Portugal (Central government+social security) which means that the share of local governments in total tax revenue was 6.2% in 2005, the same as in 1998 see OECD *Revenue Statistics 1965-2006*, 2007, Paris ; OECD *Tax and the Economy - comparative assessment of OECD countries 2001*

²⁷ See André Freire and Michael Baum (2001). "O referendo Português sobre a Regionalização numa perspectiva comparada" in *Penélope*, nº 24: 147-178.



asymmetries between regions, the organisation and coordination between municipal governments and the risks of corruption, nepotism and intensification of political clientelism. In short, regionalisation was then seen strictly as a domestic issue and analysed in the same logic prevailing in the 1970s when the issue was first raised, as if the world had not changed, and taking no account of the experiences and results of other EU countries. Surprisingly there was no reflection on the dynamics and challenges of the knowledge society/economy and its implications for governance.

In the last decade the debate on regionalisation has been frozen and no real advances were made in terms of promoting decentralisation. The opportunity costs of no-regionalisation have been considerable if we look at Portugal's fragile capacity to respond to the challenges of globalization and the transition to the knowledge society. Regionalisation should not be approached from a restrictive and outdated domestic perspective but from a wider perspective as part and parcel of Portugal's strategy to deal with globalization and enhance its competitiveness in the global economy. It should be stressed that competitiveness is a systemic process and so the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy can not be confused with the competitiveness of a few Portuguese large firms. As long as the core nucleus of the Portuguese productive system, the SMEs, is not involved the sustained competitiveness of the Portuguese economy is at risk.

The inexistence of knowledge regions in Portugal is the main cost of no-regionalisation and a major impediment for Portugal's capacity to foster the process of innovation and compete in the global market. As argued earlier, the regional level is the optimal level for the creation of knowledge networks that produce and diffuse tacit knowledge. Although regionalisation is not a sufficient condition, it is certainly a necessary institutional and political condition for the emergence of knowledge regions. In addition, it provides interesting opportunities for the development of paradiplomacy in Portugal, an important tool to complement traditional foreign policy and to explore new channels and opportunities in an increasingly complex international system. The potential contributions of the paradiplomacy of future regions are varied but I would stress the capacity to: facilitate the redefinition of relations with the Spanish Autonomous Communities and support a more proactive strategy towards them; explore new ties with other European regions; respond positively to the paradiplomacy initiatives developed by Chinese Provinces or Brazilian and Indian States; link up with the Portuguese diaspora and integrate it as strategic players and a major asset in the globalized world.

Conclusions

Knowledge regions are strategic leading players in the process of transition to the knowledge society/economy and the main competitors in the global economy. If it is true that they allowed advanced economies to retain control over the innovation process and therefore preserve the leadership in the world economy, it is also true that knowledge regions are a key factor behind the rise of the new emerging economic powers, namely China, Brazil and India, which challenge the dominance of the US, EU and Japan. Knowledge regions became also new actors in the international system, still with an informal and fluid status, as their governments are increasingly active internationally through organized and permanent paradiplomacy actions and structures.



This external dimension of knowledge regions, in general overlooked, is a fundamental ingredient of their success and capacity to pursue their specific economic, political, scientific or cultural interests and project their identity.

Paradiplomacy practised on a permanent and structured basis by sub-national governments of the most advanced knowledge regions, or on sporadic and non-structured basis by other regions, is mainly focused on low politics areas, ranging from trade and investment, to science and technology, education, culture issues and involves the use of both formal instruments, such as international agreements or trade offices, and informal instruments. Far from being marginal areas, these are on the contrary crucial issues for the building of knowledge society and for strengthening the soft power of states. One of the key arguments put forward is that paradiplomacy is a strategic channel for the creation and consolidation of soft power, the capacity to influence others and shape their behaviour by persuasion and attraction rather than coercion.

The knowledge society and the logic of knowledge networks have important consequences in terms of changes in foreign policy and the way in which states interact with each other and with non-state actors. In this respect it is argued paradiplomacy is an important source of innovation and somehow anticipates some of the inevitable changes to come in central governments' external action, namely the abolition of boundaries between the domestic and the international levels, requiring an integrated approach and greater coherence and coordination between domestic policies and foreign policy; the implementation of a multi-actor process highly participated both in terms of formulation and implementation which is the effective way to respond to the increasing complexity of both the issues-areas and the international community; the increasing relevance of informal channels and the role of Soft Law and transnational networks in international regulation.

Contrary to concerns expressed over the risks of conflicts between central and sub-national governments and threats to the unity of state foreign policy, experience demonstrates that paradiplomacy is a positive factor and contributes to strengthen, not weaken, the international position of states and overcome some of its vulnerabilities, in particular to expand the soft power of states. As a consequence paradiplomacy ceased to be seen as unorthodox and marginal and tends to be gradually perceived as a normal activity with a fundamental strategic importance insofar knowledge regions are clearly the best positioned brokers between the global and the local, with a crucial role to play in the improvement of Global Governance, both in rule-setting and rule-implementation, and the operation of the multi-level governance system.

SECURITY AND SECURITY COMPLEX: OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

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Abstract

Security is one of the most ambiguous, contested, and debated ideas in the conceptual framework of international relations. The "traditional" perspective has been severely contested as new approaches develop, and the concept of security has been reworked in all its fundamental components and dimensions, from object and reference to range and security instruments. Likewise, the discussion over the definition and characterization of international security systems, namely regarding competitive security, common security, cooperative security, collective security, and security community, continues to be very lively. Starting from these debates, and in the light of the current international situation, we propose operational concepts of security and of security complex.

Keywords

Security; Security Complex; International Relations; Theory; Concepts

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SECURITY AND SECURITY COMPLEX: OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

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Security continues to be a top concern, a major issue of debate in national, regional, and global agendas. Likewise, it continues to require major resources and the sacrifice of many lives. However, as societies and international relations change, the approach to security also evolves. For that reason, security continues to be the focus of discussion, and to be redesigned in all its components and major dimensions, from its reference to international security systems. Starting from these debates, and in the light of the current international situation, what we propose in this paper are operational concepts of security and of security complex.

1. From "traditional security" to "new approaches"

A significant part of debates over security concerns the object it refers to and the range it covers: What is the object of security and what entity must be protected (*whose security*)? What are the nature and type of threats, risks, and challenges (*security in face of whom, or what*)? What is the agent of security (*security by whom*) and with what means (*security instruments*)? The respective concepts of security depend on how one answers these questions.

In the realist perspective,¹ according to which the international system is anarchical and in a permanent state of competition and conflict, the State is not only the major agent, but also the almost exclusive reference of security. In other words, it means *security by the State and for the State*. In this light, the concepts of security focused, for quite some time, around topics that James Wirtz (2007: 338) describes as *high politics*: war and peace, diplomatic summits, nuclear dissuasion, weapons control, military alliances, defence of "national interests" or, in other words, "national security" and "international security" always perceived from the exclusive stance of the State. In contrast, the topics of *low politics* (environment, energy, migratory flows, overpopulation, health, underdevelopment, etc.), despite being regarded as sources of problems, were seldom perceived as risks or threats to national or international security.

¹ Whenever, in this paper, we make reference to concept/approach/school/paradigm/ perspective/"realist" vision, we consider its essence or fundamental and defining traits, without tending to the great diversity and wealth of analysis it entails.



On the other hand, security was always associated with the military dimension, often to the exclusion of all others. There are even some authors who, like Richard Ullman, have reversed their position, after initially advocating a more inclusive perspective. He, who early on stated that *"defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality [which] is doubly misleading and therefore doubly dangerous"* (Ullman, 1983: 129), later defended that *"if national security encompasses all serious and urgent threats to a nation-state and its citizens, we will eventually find ourselves using a different term when we wish to make clear that our subject is the threats that might be posed by the military force of other states. The "war problem" is conceptually distinct from, say, problems like environmental degradation or urban violence, which are better characterized as threats to well-being (...) Labeling a set of circumstances as a problem of national security when it has no likelihood of involving as part of the solution a state's organs of violence accomplishes nothing except obfuscation»* (Ullman, 1995: 3-12). In fact, for a certain school of thought, the relationship between security and the non-military dimensions is only relevant when such elements are at the root of international conflict or have an impact on war.

The traditional approach to security highly centred on the State, on the topics of *high politics* and on the military instrument, has been severely contested. From the start, the incapacity of the State in face of pressures it encounters "from above", "from below", and "from within" (Tomé, 2003; 2004), becomes an issue. Other opinions, which João Gomes Cravinho (2006: 256) portrays as "hyperglobalistic", suggest that the State is about to become irrelevant as a deciding entity or, simply, that it no longer is an adequate structure to deal with the challenges facing Humanity.

Similarly, many believe that it is inadequate to apply conventional logic of "state security" to non-consolidated state entities, or in cases when the "State" itself is perceived as the main source of insecurity for its people. In fact, in many instances, the internal environment is far more unstable, or Hobbesian, than the international one, reducing some States to the condition of "non-States": the notions of "Failed State", "Fragile State" and "State in Collapse" describe that type of situation.

This implies, naturally, a substantive alteration of the reference of security: *«When human rights and the environment are protected, the lives and identities of people tend to be safe; when they are not protected, people are not safe, independently of the military capability of the State where they live»* (Klare & Thomas 1994: 3-4). Thus, the State is no longer viewed as the only or even the major reference of security, and the security of individuals and communities gain relevance. Ken Booth (1991) - who calls himself an ex-realist, anti-realist, and post-realist and advocates an "utopian realism" - admits the possibility of a redesign of security around a global civil society and a community of global communities, with both local and universal issues: that is, "populations", more so than States, must be the reference of security. Variations of this perspective point to human collectivities (Buzan, 1991), society (Waeber, 1997), the community (Alagappa, 1998), individuals (Alkire, 2003) or Humanity (Commission on Human Security) as the reference of security.

Furthermore, the traditional differentiation between "internal" and "external" security dimensions is clearly diluted. Even authors of the "realist school", like B. Buzan (1991: 363), wisely recognize the limits of that traditional dichotomy: *«Though the term 'national security' suggests an occurrence at State level, the connection between that*



level and the individual, regional, and systemic levels are too numerous and powerful to be denied...the concept of security so strictly connects those levels and sectors that it demands to be treated through an integrated perspective». In fact, it seems evident that «security threats are not confined to national borders, they are interrelated and must be dealt with at the national, intra-State, regional, and international levels» (Tomé, 2007: 18).

On the other hand, it became clear that security, economic development, and human freedom are inseparable. Along this line, Dietrich Fisher (1993), for example, distinguishes between *object of danger* (survival, health, economic well-being, liveable environment, and political rights), *geographic source of dangers* (internal, external, and global), and *human sources or natural sources of dangers* (intentional threat, non-intentional dangers of human nature, natural risks) to arrive at the conclusion that the main non-military dangers are environmental decline, underdevelopment, overpopulation, violation of political rights, and ideological nationalism. Likewise, B. Buzan (1991: 19-20) highlights five domains that are intricately related: military security, political security, economic security, societal security, and environmental security.

Economic security was the first of those non-military domains to deserve the attention of researchers, strategists, and politicians, in particular, following the 1973 oil crisis. In spite of that, it was not until the end of the Cold War that the idea that the *highest stakes* were moving to the economic arena gained momentum and became generalized: in face of the increase in economic interdependence and the need to guarantee conditions for economic development and access to supply and outflow markets and their routes, economic and energy security became crucial dimensions of security.

More recently, the *environment* has equally become associated with security. «*The process of environmental degradation*», Al Gore (1990: 60) stated two decades ago, «*threatens not only the quality of life, but life itself. The global environment became, then, a matter of national security*». A sign of the times, Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change of the UN were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace, in 2007.

There are many other aspects that have been included in the security agenda, albeit with different degrees of controversy and/or acceptance. For instance, while the inclusion of human rights, natural disasters, and infectious diseases is relatively controversial, terrorism is mentioned in virtually all contemporary literature on security, as do maritime piracy, transnational organized crime, cyber attacks, and biologic, bacteriologic, and radiological issues. No wonder, then, that Simon Dalby (2006) made more reference to the "geopolitics of global dangers" than to the competition among superpowers or territorial disputes, while Hartmann et al. (2005) highlighted a new agenda for security in the "era of terror" and "bio-anxiety."

The fact is that, ever more frequently, we come across proposals that invert the hierarchy of *high* and *low politics* and place non-conventional issues at the top of the security agenda. This gives rise to the additional problem of *militarization of non-military dimensions of security*: in other words, the securitization of certain issues traditionally associated with low politics (that is, the discursive assumption that certain problems threaten "national and/or international security", elevating and giving them a



relevance never before achieved) could fuel a tendency to address and resolve them through traditional means of high politics, giving priority to military intervention and raising (in)security at other levels (Dannreuther, 2007: 42-44). In the same way, the *non-securitization* of some "traditional" threats (discounting or downplaying their significance) may lead to a breach between reality and the magnitude of the threat, by underestimating it.

The enlargement of the security agenda and the multiplication of "new dimensions" give rise to a much greater assortment in terms of security instruments, well beyond those of military nature, ranging from help to development to new judicial and financial regimens, from diplomacy to the advancement of human rights or the strengthening of the Rule of Law. Besides, other than States, there are clearly many more players involved who may either be threats (terrorist groups or criminal associations) or promoters of security (from international organizations to NGOs).

All this means that the realistic vision and the "traditional" approach to security have been questioned in their fundamental aspects: the State as exclusive actor and single security reference; threats, primarily external, intentional, and military; almost exclusive military instruments; the clear distinction between internal and external aspects (Brandão, 1999: 173). As a result, the debate around the *broadening* and *deepening* of the concept of security has intensified and we have witnessed its "expansion" in four fundamental directions, as stressed by Emma Rothchild (1995:55): "downward extension", that is, from the security of the States to that of groups and individuals; "upward extension", from national security to security at much broader levels, such as the environment/biosphere or Humanity; "horizontal extension", switching from military security to political, economic, social, environmental or human security; and "multi-directional security", from the States to the international institutions, local and regional governments, non-governmental organizations, as well as public opinion, the media, and abstract forces of nature or markets.

This has resulted in broader security concepts and measures, of which comprehensive security, world/global security, and human security stand out.

The concept of *comprehensive security* appeared in the late 70s and early 80s, initially developed by Japan - as part of the redesign of the "Yoshida Doctrine" and the concept of economic security. Later, other countries and organizations, such as Canada, the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and even the United Nations, adopted it. "Comprehensive security" underlines the multi-dimensional and multi-instrumental character of security, and shifts the focus from political-military disputes to a myriad of economic, social, and environmental concerns. At the same time, it concentrates on non-military instruments, such as development assistance, economic cooperation, or international institutions. Besides, according to promoters of "comprehensive security", the recognition of multiple dimensions and the cooperative development of multiple instruments may contribute to minimize tensions between traditional antagonists and to increase the security of all. G. Evans (1993), however, contends the greatest weakness in this concept is that it is so inclusive and ambiguous that it loses much of its descriptive capacity and, on the other hand, it becomes hostage of the overestimation of international cooperation.

Other concepts that are currently gaining support include *global security* and *world security*, both of which mean more or less the same. In its report "Our Global



Neighbourhood" the *Commission on Global Governance* expressly prefers the term "global security: «*Global security must be broadened from its traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people and the planet*» (1995, Chapt. III, Promoting Security). Similarly, Gwyn Prins (1994: 7) supports the urgency of a "global security" because Humanity is connected through a new "community of vulnerabilities". Along the same lines, Seymon Brown (1994) invokes the concept of "world interests" to reconcile national, international, and sub-national interests.

The most controversial approach, however, is that of *human security*. This concept often appears associated with the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, though its ground-concept was developed much earlier: In June of 1945, in reference to the results of the San Francisco conference, the USA Secretary of State already reported that «*The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace...*» (cit in UNDP, 1994: 3). Therefore, the presumption of human security is to free all Humanity from fear and violence (freedom from fear) and poverty, and deprivation (freedom from want). Accordingly, «*Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity*» (ibid: 22).

This concept has been recurrently used, albeit with different characteristics and definitions.² Its own proponents differ regarding what *threats*, or *fundamental threats*, individuals must be protected against: the more strict concept focuses on internal violence exercised by governments or politically organized groups against communities or individuals; a more inclusive concept, however, considers that hunger, disease, and natural disasters must also be included. In turn, its critics point to an excessively vague nature, its ambiguity and incoherence, and even its arbitrary nature and inadequacy. Roland Paris (2001: 93-96) is particularly fierce in his criticism: «*if human security means almost everything, then, in effect, it means nothing (...) the ambiguity of the term serves one particular purpose: it unites a diverse, and often divided, coalition of States and organizations which "seek an opportunity to achieve some more substantial political interest and greater financial means" (...) Human security does not appear to offer a particularly useful analytical framework, either in academic or in political terms*».

Independently of this controversy, countries like Canada, Norway, or Japan incorporated this approach in their security and foreign policies, in an attempt to implement it. Likewise, international institutions such as the World Bank, the OECD, the ASEAN, and the UN also adopted it as a reference to their activities. In reality, the idea that the first goal of security is the protection of individuals and communities is enough to cause reasonable changes: indeed, the traditional framework which explains and tries to avoid war, or promote peace, among States is clearly insufficient and irrelevant to deal with the new dangers and transnational concerns, violent conflicts within States, or to protect individuals or groups from certain attacks or tragedies (Tomé, 2007: 18). Therefore, human security is associated with controversial principles that emerged in

² One of the most influential is that of the Commission on Human Security (2003: 4): «*Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity*».



the international security panorama over the last years, such as "humanitarian intervention" or the "Responsibility to Protect", the latter formally adopted at the UN World Summit, in September 2005, as part of that Organization's reform.

Another perspective that has gained recognition in theoretical-conceptual debates and political thought is the so-called *critical security*, which shares and impacts the vision of human security with an anti-State and anti-realist theory. This approach is also particularly sceptical regarding the impact of international liberalism in the security agenda, going as far as to call it "subversive" or "subservient". Karlos Pérez de Armiño (2009: 8), for instance, states that *«it has been noticed a certain co-optation and distortion of the concept of human security by western countries, with the purpose of placing it at the service of their foreign policies»*. Additionally, José Manuel Pureza (2009), stresses *«the ambition to bring the fight against fear and deprivation into security priorities did not result in substantial changes in international power relations, and has served fundamentally as a point of support (one more) to the discipline of the turbulent periphery by the restless centre»*. The roots of neo-Marxist tradition in the critical theory of security are clear, but the fact is that, like all other main areas, the field of Critical Security Studies is wide and heterogeneous, and encompasses diverse tendencies, from Feminism, to Marxism-Leninism, and to Anarchism. The uniting factor in such originally distinct theories is their vision and common commitment to a *«"critical" rather than a "problem-solving" approach to IR»* (Danneuther, 2007: 49). In other words, the "critical vision" seeks to differ in the way it identifies the root of security problems, and how it proposes to substantially alter the situation it condemns. It attempts to "undo" conventional discourses and, in some cases, "invalidate" them to re(focus) attention on human condition and its emancipation. It employs an approach that relegates the interests of States, of the "centre" and the "powerful", to second place, in favor of individuals, "peripheries", and the "underprivileged".

2. An operational concept of Security

Clearly, Security is one of the most ambiguous, debated, and contested ideas in the overall conceptual framework of international relations. Concepts evolve with time and change according to circumstances, which, in effect, make it imperative to redefine the concept of security. The effort to conceptualise security and to accommodate the great complexity and diversity of its fundamental elements with impartiality, while preserving its analytical and operational usefulness, is a complex and delicate exercise. Nevertheless, we attempt to do it, based on six major premises:

- 1) Communities are the references of security;
- 2) Well being and political survival, considered from a relatively broad but discerning perspective, are the fundamental interests and values of security;
- 3) Threats and concerns relative to the security of communities do not come only from other States. They may also originate within the States and non-state actors;
- 4) Competition, cooperation, and the building of communities are equally relevant and may coexist concurrently;
- 5) The emphasis or priority granted to each dimension/concern/threat, and to each instrument of security, may vary from community to community;



- 6) The generic concept of security must be abstract, inclusive, and cautious to reconcile complexity, diversity, and change and to allow different levels.

Thus, security means the protection and promotion of values and interests considered as vital for the political survival and well being of the community. The closer the community is to the absence of concerns of political, economic, and military nature, the more safeguarded its security is.

Having the *community* as reference means that the object of security may be a State, an ethnic group, a transnational group or an international association, while accommodating the problematic nature of States and the existence of other security references "within" the States and/or "above" the States. At the same time, assuming *political survival* and *well being* as vital values and interests, allows the broadening and deepening of security beyond traditional dimensions, in a sufficiently inclusive and flexible manner, in terms of its content, threats/risks, and instruments.

Concerns over political survival or well being may, independently or simultaneously, be the fundamental interests communities can ensure, though not necessarily with the same priority, in the same manner, at the same level, or in face of the same concerns: North Korea, Kurds, Palestinians, Iceland, Angola, or the EU, will certainly consider both their survival and their well being in vary different ways. Again, if the State is for some the greatest reference of security, for others it constitutes the major source of insecurity, while for others the major reference is not the State, but rather their ethnic or religious group, or the political elite.

Moreover, if there is a crucial problematic of political survival or of well being, it may not simply result from the conflict of material interests (such as territory, resources, etc.) but arise, primarily or equally, from considerations and perceptions of identity, either of ideological nature or historical and cultural heritage. Such problems and perceptions occur also in very distinct contexts of rivalry, conflict, involvement, and cooperation, which are dynamic and evolving.

Similarly, the safeguard and/or promotion of political survival and well being may imply the orchestration of military panoply but, complementary or independently, may favour internal or international normative/legal frameworks, diplomacy, politics, commerce and economy, or social-cultural aspects and others. Again, it depends on the specific community and circumstances. Accordingly, in the concept we propose, at the same time that political survival and well being limit the spectrum of security (in order to pose a security problem, a concern must, somehow, question values and interests considered to be vital) they are also sufficiently inclusive and flexible to allow a great variety of potential real situations. In similar fashion, the idea of community that emerges in our concept of security not only allows encompassing several levels (infra-state, state, and multinational), but also selecting those communities which may be more relevant and pertinent in terms of the security agenda and of the system, or security complex, under analysis. The same may be said regarding military, political, and economic concerns, since they can only be included in the operational concept of security depending on their relevance to the protection and promotion of interests and values considered vital to the political survival and well-being of the communities in question: of course, there are security concerns that do not threaten basic levels of security of populations, States, or regions; otherwise, we would be inviting a



tremendous array of potential communities and concerns that, in fact, are not of equal relevance.

3. Systems of International Security

A distinct, although related, debate concerns the characterization of "systems of international security". There are also very different perspectives and proposals on this topic. For instance, while Muthiah Alagappa (1998: 54-56) described three types of security systems he considers "pure" - *competitive security, collective security, and security community* -, Raymo Vayren (1999) listed three different "perspectives" on international security: *common, cooperative, and collective*. Patrick Morgan (1997), however, identifies five "ideal types" of systems, or multilateral forms of conflict management: *power restraining power; alignment agreement of major powers; collective security, pluralist community of security, and integration*. In turn, Brian Job (1997) goes further to subdivide the first into balance of power and collective defence, while Gareth Evans (1993) maintains that common security, collective security, and comprehensive security are different forms of cooperative security. Particular relevance is, then, placed on concepts centred on competitive security, common security, cooperative security, collective security, and security community.

In the traditional perspective, clearly inspired by realism, the *international security system is competitive* by nature, rooted in self-defence/security of States in an environment of conflict. In the perceived anarchical international structure, without any superior authority to guarantee survival and mistrusting and fearing the ambition of others, each State faces its own security as its main concern and assumes responsibility for self-defence and self-security, in a traditional *Hobbesian* challenge of order and competitive security. Even so, there are differences between the so-called "offensive realism" and "defensive realism". John Mearsheimer, one of the most distinguished authors of the "offensive" position, argues that «*States are always prepared to think offensively toward other States*» (2001: 34). Kenneth Waltz (2001) stresses a different viewpoint: States are not simply driven by "maximization of power", but also by maintaining their positions in the system and consolidating the balance of power which, in the logic of "relative gains", may be a source of international stability.

The competitive nature of the system, however, does not erase the possibility of cooperation among States on security and defence, or even the feasibility of a relative "international order". It is within this framework that realism finds comfort in the theories of *collective defence* (several States, confronted with a common threat from another State or coalition, unite to consolidate their respective capabilities and better defend themselves as a group, dissuade, or defeat the enemy/adversary), of *balance of power* (stressing the permanent play of weight, counter-weight, and/or compensation, primarily among the great powers), and of *hegemony* (stressing not only the ambitions and attitudes of the great powers constantly seeking maximization of power, but also the capabilities and potentialities/vulnerabilities of hegemonic power, which may be the determining factor in achieving greater or lesser stability in the inherent system of competitive security).

The *common security* approach gained some emphasis following the report "Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament" by the Palme Commission (Independent



Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues), in 1982, amidst the tense Cold War context. Emphasizing the risks of escalation and the risks and limitations of unilateral initiatives, the Commission called for a common compromise for survival and security that would accommodate the legitimate interests of "others" as well as "ours". The argument is that security must be reached with others, not against them: hence such recommendations, like the creation of nuclear weapon free zones, mutual control of strategic defence of space, disarmament of superpowers and their respective 'blocks' of collective defence, and the strengthening of the United Nations and regional organizations. For Gareth Evans (1993), the positive aspect of this idea, as defined by the Palme Commission, is that it emphasizes common survival through security with "the other side". However, he points out that a great deal of the debates over common security has focused on aspects of military security and that is only one of many fronts in a more inclusive cooperative security.

The *cooperative security* became very popular in Europe as a result of the 1975 Helsinki Accords and, primarily, since the end of the Cold War. Cooperative security, however, has been defined and applied in different ways, although always based on the premise that, in order to be respected, security cannot be imposed or reached by one group on another and must be based on common institutions and norms. As a rule, cooperative security is perceived as a regimen which prevents and manages conflicts in a certain established framework of norms and procedures which imply accommodating rival (or potentially rival) interests and politics to maintain a stable international order under the leadership of the great powers (Vayryen, 1999: 57-58).

Muthiah Alagappa (1998: 53-54) further ascertains that relational identity in cooperative security is not a negative thing or, if it is, it is only to a very small degree and may, actually, be positive: States may be sceptic and distrustful of one another, but there is not a perception of immediate threat. Gareth Evans (1993) presents a rather broad concept of cooperative security that includes several forms of common security, collective security, and comprehensive security. In this author's view, the main virtue of cooperative security is that it provides a broad range of responses to questions of security: the essence of cooperative security is based on the fact it emphasizes cooperation over competition³. David Dewitt (1994) shares an equally broad concept of cooperative security, and includes in it the idea of comprehensive security, competitive security, as well as the balance of powers and alliances.

Regarding *collective security*, G. Evans defines it as being inherently focused on military issues, incorporating the idea that all members renounce the use of force among them and agree to promptly assist any other member that may come under attack. Collective security is, in this light, the corollary of common security, «*the last guarantee that the process will not stray from the course as the result of individual aggressive behaviour by any State - or that if it does, the reaction will alter it*» (Evans, 1993: 15-16). Likewise, in Vayryen's view, the purpose of collective security is to

³ G. Evans (1993) describes cooperative security as: 1) multidimensional in amplitude and gradual in temper; 2) more inclusive than exclusive; 3) places more emphasis on the assurance of security than on dissuasion; 4) it is not restrictive in terms of *membership*; 5) favors a multilateral approach over a bilateral one; 6) does not favor military solutions over non-military ones; 7) It assumes that all States are primary players in the security system while accepting that non-state players may have an important role; 8) Does not request the creation of formal security institutions, though, naturally, it does not reject them; 9) and, above all, it stresses the value of creating "dialogue habits" based on a multilateral approach.



create a virtual international coalition that will deter potential aggressors and, if necessary, punish them through the use of force, but without prior definition of the aggressor or the victim. It is anchored, primarily, on the premise of maintaining the *status quo* by representing and mobilizing the international society, and calling for a vast legitimate and representative measure of collective action. Therefore, a system of this type requires «*an established framework of institutions, norms, and procedures that are helpful in mobilizing international response when necessary*» (Vayryen, 1999: 59).

Brian Job, on the other hand, stresses the difference between *collective security* and *pluralist security society*. The former refers to a compromise of the type "all-for-one" among members in order to act, automatically and in synchrony, to assist a member State under threat or attack by another State. According to this author, collective security mechanisms, unlike collective defence, are not motivated by the need to plan or act against a perceived external threat, that is, a State excluded from the group. In this context the dilemma of security among members is attenuated, as there is not an immediate, or clearly identified, threat. Thus, collective security frameworks have a tendency to have a large range of participants, as they are designed to accommodate a large common denominator in terms of attitudes and compromises. Their success depends a lot on the degree of involvement and commitment of the most powerful members of the group (Job, 1997: 172-173).

In Job's perspective, a higher level of cooperation is that of the *pluralistic community of security*, where there is a deeper, and qualitatively higher, level of multilateralism and institutionalism and where membership is more restrictive and very regulated. This happens because the pluralist community of security presupposes the mutual identification and identity development among participants, which is necessary to materialize and sustain the principle of diffuse reciprocity on a long-term basis. More importantly, the distinctive character of the security community is «*the cognitive transition that occurs among States, and which, in principle, does not encourage or fear force as a means of interaction among themselves*» (Job, 1997: 174-175). In M. Alagappa's view, also, the "community of security" is deeper than cooperative security, since it is more demanding in its premises and has a greater potential for preventing the emergence of new disputes: «*In a community security system, national identity and national interest become fused with those of a larger community of states*» (1998: 55). Therefore, there is no exception to the use of force among members of the community and it becomes illegitimate as an instrument of politics among the States that form it: in this perspective, security is collective by definition.

4. The notion of Security Complex

It is important to ascertain whether any, and if so which, of the aforementioned systems characterizes, on its own, the world reality, or that of specific macro-regions, in an exclusive logic: in our view, not one but several of those systems may be identified and overlap in the same international or regional framework, which justifies the reference to a security complex. On the other hand, independently of the favoured concept to characterize a certain framework, in a specific space and time, a security system is only one of several in existence; it interacts with other systems and other



units in a dynamic network of direct and indirect effects on the framework of relationships reflected in the security environment.

Thus, the *security complex* may be understood as a *system of security systems*. More specifically, the *security complex is a network of linear and non-linear relationships among multiple components and of interactions among several systems of security at different levels, and of different dimensions, from which result certain patterns in connections, structures, and behaviours that, in turn, interact with the internal and external environments of that security network*.

The concept of security complex is associated with the study and theories of *complex systems*. It is a scientific field that permeates all areas of knowledge and which, in short, focuses on «*how parts of a system produce collective behaviours of the system and how the system interacts with its environment*» (New England Complex Systems Institute - NECSI). There are five main ideas that are fundamental to the understanding of the concept of systems complex and, therefore, of security complex: system, pattern, network, scale, and linearity.

Naturally, the most important is the concept of system, inasmuch as we started by defining "complex" as a "system of systems". According to Yaneer Bar-Yam (s/d) "*a system is the outlined portion of the universe which is separated from the rest by an imaginary border... the key concept of 'system' is that, once it is identified, it describes: the system's properties, the properties of the universe beyond the system which affect the system, the interactions/relationships among the parts of the system, and between these components and the universe.*" The system is not isolated from the environment; rather, it interacts with the environment. In some cases, it may be useful to isolate the system. In other cases, one first focuses on the interactions/relationships. Often, the identification of a certain security system stems from delimiting a certain geographic space and focusing on the characteristics of interactions and/or how they change. However, it is also possible to identify systems in a way that does not correspond to spatial division: for instance, we may consider an economic system in face of other systems (cultural, political, institutional, etc.) and downplay spatial aspects.

Pattern corresponds, in short, to the idea of repetition - of structures, ideas, behaviours, or, in ultimately, of systems within a broader collection of systems. One simple way to understand a pattern is to detect repetition of behaviours or relationships. But we may also think of the pattern in terms of quantity and quality of repetitions: the more often and coincidental those repetitions are the more solid or clear a particular pattern is. Therefore, identifying patterns of security, understanding how they interrelate, and observing their effects upon the group of systems, help us determine the character of a certain security complex.

The *network* is the sum of connections that allow interactions and influences among the parts (units and sub-systems) of the system complex. Sometimes, the designation of network expresses, in itself, a system in its whole, considering the effects of these connections. There are, obviously, many types of networks, but a fundamental aspect to understand is that the parts are directly or indirectly connected among themselves; subsequently, each network connection can be characterized by vectors such as force, influence, substance, motivation, capacity, etc...Potentially, all networks have influence over the interconnected components, other networks, and the network complex as a



whole. The study and explanation of a security complex in a given region or in the world involves, then, setting up networks amidst networks and players which implies not only identifying the different networks and units, but also observing their effects and establishing which behaviours and influences are common or different in the multiple connections.

Scale refers both to the size of the complex under study and the scope of the impact of units, networks, patterns, and systems, as well as the influence of the complex of systems itself. In both instances - size and range of influence - a security complex interconnects security of different scales, from intra-State levels to global security. Scale is important both for purposes of definition and delimitation of the security complex itself, and for measuring mutual impact at different levels. For that reason, all other scales must be considered.

Finally, *linearity* is a recurring aspect in relationships of cause-and-effect. The concept of linear relationship suggests that «*two quantities are proportional between themselves: if you double one, you must also double the other*» (Bar-Yam, s/d). Linear relationships are, in many cases, the first approach used to describe international relations, despite the fact that there is not a single way to define what a linear relationship is in terms of "content": for example, a linear relationship of historical association and identity elements between the Popular Republic of China and Taiwan is necessarily different from a linear relationship in an economic or political and diplomatic perspective between the same countries. The problem is that, even taking into account a great variety of linear relations, it is still very far from characterizing a system, and even further from characterizing a complex system. Therefore, it is necessary to consider, equally, the *non-linear relationships*, which are understood, simply, as those which are not linear and greatly amplify the potential scope of causalities and dependencies. Often, problems are very difficult to understand and resolve because the relationships between causes and effects are not easy to establish: alterations in a system "here" have frequent consequences in a system "there", since the parts and systems are interdependent. In other words, returning to the prior example, the relationship between the PR China and Taiwan results from many sorts of relations between the two, but at the same time, it also reflects and helps to stipulate relationships, at different levels, between either country and the USA and other players in Asia-Pacific and around the world. This means that the security complex is made up of, and to some extent results from, the sum and convergence of linear and non-linear relations with repercussions in the domain of security.

Conclusions

The concept of security proposed in this paper - meaning *the protection and promotion of values and interests considered to be vital to the well-being and political survival of the community, and considering that the closer the community is to the absence of concerns of political, economic, and military nature, the more safeguarded its security is may, admittedly, be the focus of criticisms and objections*: open to abuses; subjective and ambiguous; problematic in terms of "theoretical placement" and identity of research agenda. However, any concept of security slightly more inclusive is virtually exposed to criticism, and we cannot allow that to dissuade us from introducing what we consider to be an operational concept. On the other hand, restricting a concept for the



sake of great simplification would risk making it less adequate to reality, as we would be forced, *a priori*, to consider exclusions independently of specific situations. Consequently, and in the face of the need to make an option, we decided to pursue a more open, inclusive, and flexible approach, in order to consider all the possibilities of the highly complex and contested concept of security.

Moreover, the purpose of defining a concept is to indicate its essence and its fundamental limits, and it must be measured according to its applicability to *problem solving*. In our view, the approach we propose expands and deepens the concept of security without making it excessively inclusive, as it establishes important parameters in terms of reference (community) and core values (political survival and well-being); it does not restrict, *a priori*, the range of possibilities of interconnections and the multiplicity of its vital parts; it permits to involve/ characterize different types of concepts, divided in function of the reference and nature of threats, of instruments and concerns; and it simplifies comparative analysis among different theoretical-conceptual hypotheses, and between the latter the specific reality of security. At the same time, it permits evaluating the most significant aspects and, if necessary, establishes new interconnections.

Regarding the concept of "security complex" - *defined as a system of systems and a network of linear relationships among multiple parts, a system of interactions among several systems of security, at different scales and dimensions, which result in several patterns in connections, structures, and behaviours that, in turn, interact with the internal and external environments of that security network* - they clearly overlap the multiple characterizations of the systems of security. In a specific space/dimension where many and different units and systems interact, the impact is not only a certain international/regional "order", but also a certain security complex, which eventually comprises, simultaneously, elements of competitive security, collective security, cooperative security, and security community. And, in fact, taking into account the current international reality as a whole, there is not a system, but rather a complex of systems of security.

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USING THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CHANGING PARADIGM

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Abstract

The characteristics of current armed conflicts have grown in complexity, and the operations carried out to solve them are often performed without the agreement of all of those involved. Accordingly, the traditional use of military forces in the resolution of conflicts seems to be undergoing a rapid evolution. In face of this mounting complexity, peace operations began to be considered as broader "military operations" guided by principles that in the past were limited to the execution of combat operations, materialized by the implementation and application of a complex set of techniques and activities. In this new paradigm, the same "peace" operation may comprise a wide range of activities, ranging from conflict prevention to medium and high intensity fighting operations, and including also parallel humanitarian support activities. For this reason, and in accordance with the concept of employment and the functions to be carried out, the performance of the military forces in current peacekeeping operations is based on the simultaneous completion of a set of tasks that are required to attain the required final military goal. In the presence of the wide range of tasks that need to be performed, a military force should have the resources and be organized based on multiple capacities and characteristics. Areas that in the past used to support the actual force have now assumed increased relevance and are perceived as being crucial, given that the main role of military forces is that of creating and maintaining a safe and stable atmosphere that enables the remaining sectors participating in the process to act. In an integrated approach system to conflict, the aim is that military forces attain and ensure safety conditions, and guarantee the necessary support so that other agents can come up with the most appropriate solutions to address the causes of conflict.

Palavras-chave

Strategic context; Armed Forces; Military Instrument; Peacekeeping Operations; Conflict Resolution

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USING THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CHANGING PARADIGM

António Oliveira

Introduction

The international community, namely the United Nations with the support of some regional organizations,¹ has increasingly intervened in the resolution of conflicts. This became not only an opportunity but, rather, one of the priorities for the use of the military instrument by States.

Conflict resolution is defined by Fetherston² (1994) as "the non-coercive application of negotiation and mediation measures by third parties, with the goal to disarm hostilities among adversaries and to support a lasting end to violence among them." From this definition, we evoke the main characteristic of conflict resolution: third parties, who are not involved in the conflict but use their means to resolve it.³ Their role is essential to identify and give assistance to the parties in conflict and to attain possible peace in more complex processes, in a credible and transparent manner. (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall, 2006: 12). This characteristic is also found in the definition of "peace operations" mentioned in the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (2009: ix), which describes them as operations "authorized by a multilateral body, multinational in their make-up, with a substantial military component, and launched primarily with the goal of supporting a peace process or managing a conflict."

The characteristics of current armed conflicts involving several participants, of whom populations have been the most important, have amplified their complexity, and often the operations launched to solve them fail to have the support of all parties engaged. Thus, the traditional use of military forces in the resolution of conflicts seems to be undergoing a rapid evolution, which calls for a revision of its role in this context.

With the present text, we aim to analyse the role of the military instrument in the resolution of conflicts within the present strategic circumstances, namely in reference to the use of military force and the necessary characteristics to act in that context, considering the change of the paradigm which circumscribes its use.

¹ With particular emphasis on NATO

² Quoted by David (2001: 284).

³ According to Jones, this definition (2009: 7) is the fundamental factor, since an inadequate understanding, confusing, for instance, conflict resolution with combat operations against terrorism, usually leads to failed operations.



To that end, we have organised our research into three parts: the first part opens with the conceptualisation of the resolution of conflicts and the analysis of the reference models, primarily centred on the use of the military instrument; in the second part we address the challenges the current nature of conflicts presents to those models and their impact on the use of military force; thirdly, after approaching this issue, we examine the characteristics and capabilities military forces must possess to act in this new context.

1. Traditional approach to peace missions.

Through its Charter, the United Nations (UN) defined various measures anticipated and accepted by its members for the resolution of conflicts, either peacefully, as addressed in Chapter VI, or through the use of force, as described in Chapter VII.

The international situation in the post-Cold War era presented the UN with the challenge of re-evaluating its domains of intervention in the area of international security. Therefore, in 1992, Secretary-general Boutros-Ghali announced the Agenda for Peace⁴, in which the Organization officially commits, for the first time, in a conceptual context, to the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts that would become known as "peace operations."

Based on lessons learned, in January of 1995, the UN published the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. This document rearticulates the instruments for controlling and solving conflicts among States and intra-States, in the following manner: (i) preventive diplomacy⁵, and peacemaking⁶, (ii) peacekeeping⁷, (iii) post conflict peace building⁸. (iv) disarmament, (v) sanctions, and (vi) enforcement actions;⁹ (UN 1995: paragr. 23).

The UN does not claim the exclusive use of these instruments and anticipates their use by regional organizations, *ad hoc* coalitions, and States in an individually manner (UN 1995: paragraph 24). This way, NATO, while considered as a regional organization, approved doctrine in this matter, designating the use of these instruments as Peace Support Operations¹⁰ (PSO).¹¹The operations carried out by the Atlantic Alliance follow

⁴ A/47/277 - S/24111. *An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. New York.

⁵ It consists of "actions by third parties with the goal to avoid conflict escalation and the outburst of violence, to avoid the spreading of existing conflicts to neighbouring areas, and to avoid the rekindling of conflicts under control" (Branco, Garcia e Pereira (org), 2008: 121).

⁶ "Action aimed at reconciling hostile parties, essentially through such peaceful means as those identified in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, at least during an initial phase, without excluding, at later times, the use of measures of coercive nature". *Peacemaking* is devoid of activities that involve the use of force, and is limited to the use of diplomacy. Sanctions and enforcements that were part of peacemaking are treated as independent, outside that umbrella" (Branco, Garcia e Pereira (org), 2008: 126).

⁷ It consists of the projection of a UN presence in a given territory, up until this point with the agreement of all parties involved, and usually involving the presence of military forces and or/police forces, often civilians (idem: 121).

⁸ "Group of actions destined to support the structures used to solidify peace in order to avoid the reoccurrence of hostilities" (Ibidem: 121).

⁹ These are of a coercive nature and applied without the consent of the factions involved in a conflict, or when that consent is no longer a certainty.

¹⁰ The doctrine followed by NATO is outlined in one of its joint publications, AJP 3.4, and identifies five major instruments: (i) conflict prevention: (ii) peacemaking; (iii) peace building; (iv) peace-imposition: (V) and peace consolidation. NATO considers PSOs as multifunctional operations that encompass a large range of political, military, and civil activities, executed in accordance with international law (including international human rights), that contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflicts and crisis management.



the same line of action as the UN, both in terminology and in anticipated instruments. However, its concept is more "muscle-up", as it considers military force as its primary means of action.

The role of military force in the application of the various instruments, and through the use of individualized mechanisms identified by the UN and by the current doctrine of the Atlantic Alliance, is relatively well typified.

Thus, the prevention of conflicts depends primarily on the availability of credible information that will ensure the availability of a quick warning system to anticipate the development of crisis situations in real time, and evaluate possible responses, so that the most adequate and quick response in each case can be applied in each particular situation (Castells, 2003: 31). Military means usually focus on support to political and development efforts to mitigate the causes of conflict.¹²

"Though the military actions must be directed toward meeting political and development demands, usually they fall into the following categories: (i) forewarning; (ii) surveillance; (iii) training and reform of the security sector; (iv) preventive planning; and (v) imposition of sanctions and embargoes" (IESM, 2007: 22). The goal of peace imposition is to compel, subdue, and persuade the factions to carry out a certain type of action. Despite being a compulsive mandate, a force of peace imposition seeks to implement an agreement among the parties, when "due to unexpected procedures or other circumstances, one or more parties want to renege on their obligations in face of the accord, or reject the presence of the force. The force may ignore such opposition or even utilize its coercive means in order to impose the peace agreed upon" (Baptista, 2003: 743). Backed by the mandate, the force will be used to ensure that the peace objectives are met. "If necessary, it will take the side of one of the rivals and stay on the field against the will of one of the parties that violated the terms of the agreement or does not accept that it be forcefully executed against its side" (Baptista, 2003: 742).

The objective of peacemaking is to re-establish a cease-fire or a quick and peaceful appeasement, focusing on the diplomatic activities carried out following the outbreak of the conflict, not excluding military support for diplomatic activity through the direct or indirect use of military means.

Peacekeeping seeks to keep a cease-fire and prevent hostilities from reoccurring. These operations are used to monitor and facilitate the execution of a peace agreement (Branco, Garcia and Pereira (org), 2008: 134). It is under these terms that military force is employed, with the primary goal of facilitating diplomatic action, conflict mediation, and ensuring basic security conditions to reach a political solution (Branco, Garcia and Pereira (org), 2008: 143).

In peace building scenarios, military forces operate primarily after political solutions to conflicts have been attained. In general, their role centres on creating a safe and stable

¹¹ The Atlantic Alliance expressed its doctrinal basis for the execution of NA5CRO in AJP – 3.4 (Non-Article 5 – Crisis Response Operations) dated March 2005. The principles and typology of such operations are defined in this publication. This doctrinal publication is undergoing a reformulation process based on NATO's new doctrinal position.

¹² In this context, military activities are usually carried out according to chapter VI of the UN charter, but military forces may also be used to dissuade or subdue the parties involved, which may require a mandate based on Chapter VII. This reinforcement by mandate stems from the need to give credibility to the necessity of the use of force.



environment that allows civilian agencies to focus their efforts on reconciliation and the process of peace building (IESM, 2007: 28). Conflict resolution experts defend that the presence of military forces after the signing of a peace agreement is fundamental, and if their presence does not occur in an effective manner within six to twelve weeks following the signing, the agreement may lose its effectiveness (Durch, 2006: 589). The previously described approach to operations is based on a sequential conceptualization, based on the idea developed by Fisas (2004: 33) that when a conflict crosses the threshold of armed violence and enters the "reactive" phase of its resolution, the objective of the first phase is to reach an end to violent hostilities, and then enter into the phases of peacekeeping and peace building, until reaching a stable peace.

Thus, under their current doctrine, both organizations (UN or NATO)¹³ recognize different activities related to the resolution of conflicts as non-concurrent activities. That is, politically, they ascertain they are confronted with a certain type of operation, and that the means and measures to be used, as well as circumstances for the use of force, are in tune with it. At the same time, whenever there is a transition to a different type of operation, this context changes, namely regarding the military instrument.

In the current context, particularly shaped by the prevalence of intra-state conflicts, the conceptual break-down of a conflict into phases in order to apply one of the particular instruments mentioned above, becomes extremely difficult and complex. This was first identified in 2000, in the Brahimi Report,¹⁴ according to which the current peace support operations distance themselves from the "military matrix operations of surveillance, cease-fire, and separation of rival forces that follow an intra-state conflict, to incorporate a complex model with many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace, in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars" (Brahimi, 2000: paragr. 12).

Peace Support Operations¹⁵ now involve a wide range of players with different objectives, agendas, understandings, capabilities, and motivations. At this level, the dynamic relationship among the three groups who are key players in the whole process should be stressed: "(i) *peace forces*, seeking stabilization; (ii) territorial elites, who want to hold on to power; and (iii) the sub-elites who seek autonomy from the State and want to maintain their power in certain regions of the territory. The ability of each player to reach individual goals depends on the strategies and behaviours of the other two. (Barnett e Zurcher, 2009: 24)".

These players act together with others, namely local populations, International Organizations (IO), organs of third countries, police and law enforcement agencies, military agencies and private security firms, and NGOs. They all work and participate in the same scenario of operations, almost always without spatial limitations among them and they may support, be neutral, or oppose¹⁶ the peace mission. Furthermore, these positions may shift with time or be affected by changes within the respective organizations. We are in face of what Brahimi (2000: paragraph 13-18) called "complex peace operations" which represent a junction of activities ranging from peace keeping

¹³ Together these two organizations represent 88% of the military personnel employed in "Peace Support Operations" (Jones, 2009: 3).

¹⁴ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-s/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

¹⁵ We keep the designation used by NATO.

¹⁶ Support or opposition may be active or passive.



to peace building. Complexity increases even more when, in the current conflicts, we witness situations in which certain areas are only partly pacified, or when the parties involved resist the terms of the agreement to safeguard their interests and, directly or indirectly, incite their supporters to resume violence (Durch and England, 2009: 13).

All this alters the paradigm of traditional "peace support operations." These cease to be seen as the application of a series of specific tasks and techniques in face of the instrument adopted, in accordance with the systematisation of the UN or NATO, to be viewed as "military operations" in a broad sense, and may become shaped and guided by principles previously reserved for traditional combat operations.

2. Challenges of complex peace support operations

The "peace support operations" of the current generation¹⁷ started to be viewed as a group of activities of variable intensity executed across the wide spectrum of action of military forces. However, and despite the growing risks associated with it, the "peace support operations continue to focus on temporary security presence or on the role of supporting agent for the disarmament of belligerent factions and the reorganization of local security forces in trust building activities between the parties involved (Durch and England, 2009: 15). This supports Edelstein' statement (2009:81) "Without security, the essential task of the political, social, and economic sectors can not be carried out." This way, and in generic terms, the military force continues to be used to create a stable and secure environment. What is changing are the challenges its activity faces.

For a long time, the biggest challenge international forces faced when they intervened in support of the resolution of an intra-State conflict lie, essentially, in the operational environment resulting from the stage of operations. Special relevance was given to the security of the ethnic groups in conflict, particularly as related to ethnic-based revenge (Binnendijk and Johnson, 2004: 8). In the meantime, a group of factors, some internal and others external to the conflict, presented the military forces with a new series of ever more complex challenges.

From an external perspective, the first factor results from the process of launching the operation and propagation of force. Its use, under the conditions we have been analysing, usually results from the International Community's decision to intervene in a certain conflict. These operations are planned considering an environment with a series of non-controllable¹⁸ factors on the part of the force projected, as they result from the management of individual interests of existing relationships among several participants, internal and external, in which some States or multilateral organizations attempt to bring the parties closer based on common objectives. The lack of an organizational coherence specific to these operations is reflected in its essentially practical basis, shaped by historic instances and the almost unilateral political-military commitment of some States,¹⁹ instead of an organizational system based on the international organizations that sponsor these operations. Although decisions to launch or support

¹⁷ Considered the third phase since 1994 (David, 2001: 318).

¹⁸ As are, for example, the internal characteristics of the conflict proper or the external environment, stressing the geopolitical interests of third parties. This matter will be addressed in more detail later in this article.

¹⁹ Despite being organized under the aegis of an international organization - usually the UN - each State has its own agenda in face of intervention in specific conflicts.



peace operations rest with the organizations (UN, EU, NATO), ultimately the States impose a series of conditions and political restrictions for their execution, as they contribute with human resources - police and military. As operations become riskier and more complex, estimates by each individual State regarding maintenance costs, risk assessment for its troops, and internal support for participation in the mission, will have an increasing impact on the availability of forces and mission coherence (Durch and England, 2009: 16).

Another problem that has characterized recent interventions of the International Community using military forces, particularly in situations of greater risk, "is the lack of political will to employ force instead of simply *deploying* forces - which reflects a *near zero will*" (Smith, 2008: 288) to assume risks against the forces projected. For participation in the resolution of conflict to be effective, it requires, simultaneously, not only forces with much greater preparation and capabilities, but also the willingness to assume other risks, primarily political, in face of potential increase in casualties.

Current operations, on the one hand, require that soldiers act together with a diverse range of civilian and non-governmental entities (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 54). This environment renders peace operations relatively fragile in terms of unity of command and, above all, unity of action (Durch and England, 2009: 13), making their execution even more complex, due to the large number of players and their particular interests and agendas. This implies that military strategy must be an integral part of a deliberation focused on the goals to achieve, as military objectives are subject to an ever more complex system of constraints and, as such, need to find a dynamic balance with non-military objectives (Alberts, 2002: 48).

Challenges in the resolution of intra-State conflicts are, apparently, more serious than those encountered in inter-State conflicts (David 2001: 305). Military forces have had mandates to execute missions of peacemaking, peace-imposition, or peace building in high-risk conditions, often when neither party subscribes to such operations. Accordingly, the intervention of "peace forces" may, in some cases, lead to the execution of a range of activities with an even broader reach, which, simultaneously, shape maintenance characteristics, peace-imposition and peace building, as well traditional combat.²⁰ Thus, in some instances, contrary to the definition of conflict resolution, the military force ceases to be seen by some of the contenders as a third party to the conflict.

This is where the concept of "war on three blocks" defended by Krulak (1999) seems to apply, according to which, in confining physical spaces,²¹ in close moments in time, a small military force may have to: (i) provide food and clothing to displaced populations or refugees, give humanitarian assistance to a group that needs support; (ii) separate hostile factions, carry out peace-imposition or peace building tasks; (iii) fight, using lethal force against a threat to its own presence. Thus, as exemplified by the doctrine evolution of NATO and that of some States considered powerful, the segregation of peace and combat operations is collapsing.

²⁰ Nowadays, this situation starts to show serious consequences since, contrary to the past, 80% of military and police forces deployed in operations under UN leadership act under protection of Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Durch and England, 2009: 12).

²¹ Which Krulak defines them as "blocks".



However, despite the increasing range of options and activities, as well as a "toughening" in the execution of missions, three interrelated principles continue to distinguish the use of military forces in peace operations from other types of operations: consent of the parties in conflict, impartiality, and restrictions imposed on the use of force. The great change is that, despite their being the core and better defined principles of these operations, when military forces are used in the resolution of conflicts, besides respecting the specific principles of peace operations, they must also take into consideration the general principles of military operations, many of which were previously limited to combat operations.

Thus, the use of military force in the resolution of conflicts depends on the strategic context in which they are carried out, but is usually based on the implementation of a series of operations of complex and concurrent nature. Consequently, the success of the force intervention seems to be related to the non-sequential, concurrent²² execution of a series of activities to prevent conflict,²³ as well as intervention in the conflict,²⁴ regeneration,²⁵ and maintenance²⁶ following the conflict to attain the final military goals desired.

However, since military force is only one of the components used, success depends essentially on the political decision to intervene in the conflict, which defines the end to which the force will be used (Smith, 2008: 42). This end, (final military state) is primarily a facilitator in attaining the final political state defined in the mandate, and it is based on the latter that the final military state is assessed.

Success in the resolution of conflicts is, usually, connected to the achievement of a group of strategic objectives of different dimensions, and which shape the final political scenario desired.²⁷ This (and the extent to which it is achieved) becomes the defining agent of the criterion for total success of the operation, including that of the military mission. In this context, it is fundamental that the use of the military instrument be articulated in a holistic use of all instruments of power, so that all are empowered, and the success of military intervention, may be exploited at each moment.

²² This concurrency of actions depends on the situation, primarily on progress and set-backs in the process.

²³ Prevention requires actions to monitor and identify causes of conflict and activity to prevent occurrence, escalation, and rekindling of hostilities. This activity is primarily of diplomatic and economic nature, but the military instrument must be used as a dissuasive element, establishing an advanced presence to dissuade *spoilers*.

²⁴ Intervention in the conflict requires actions to implement or maintain an agreement or cease-fire, or even to impose the terms of the mandate. It must involve the coordinated execution of political, economic, military and humanitarian measures. The military instrument is usually employed to establish an environment of security conducive to the execution of all others measures in order to attain the global objectives of the operation.

²⁵ Regeneration requires a group of actions geared to the execution of the conditions identified in the mandate. It must begin as early as possible, starting with the security sector and needs that require immediate intervention; it must, then, shift priorities to the regeneration and development of infrastructures, institutions, and specific components of the mandate. The primary task of military forces will be the organization, training, and outfitting of the "new" local security forces.

²⁶ Maintenance refers to the group of activities of support to local organizations to keep or improve the final state defined in the mandate. It occurs when local structures, forces, and institutions start to assume responsibility for the populations and territory in a sustained manner.

²⁷ As part of a global strategy, it is fundamental to introduce measures and actions of diplomatic and economic nature and empower them through social networks, in a system of *rapprochement* integrated in the conflict (Rasmussen, 1997: 45). This way, the introduction of rules of law that allow for a decrease in human rights violations, the development of structures that increase governability and reduce arbitrary behaviours, the creation of a market economy that allows for a decrease in corruption and parallel economy, are mechanisms that contribute to the dissipation of conflict causes and toward the restoration of a state of peace.



In face of this new paradigm and the challenges it presents, we face questions of how to use military force in this context, and what characteristics and basic capacities must be considered in its organization and preparation.

3. What military force should be used in the resolution of conflicts?

Larry Waltz carried out a series of studies²⁸ with the military instrument as the cornerstone of resolution in the conflicts studied. When you isolate that instrument, the success of operations is easier to ponder, as success in the military perspective, related to the achievement of previously identified military goals, is easily measured. In this context, and according to Smith (2008: 208), military objectives at strategic and operational level have to do with shaping or changing the will of the people, and not that of an enemy, and are usually related to establishing a safe and self-sustaining environment for the local population, the territory, and region where it is located, marked by a gradual decrease of the projected military forces. The analysis of the progress of these objectives, based on measures of effectiveness, permits to monitor the level of success of the intervention.

According to Binnendijk and Johnson (2004: 7), the success of military interventions in the context of resolution of conflict relies, essentially, on three controllable factors: (i) resources allocated to resolve the conflict; (ii) strength of military force used by peace contingency; (iii) time attributed to the process of resolution of conflict; and two non-controllable factors: (i) internal characteristics and (ii) geopolitical interests of third parties.

One of the lessons learned from the different cases studied is that there is a close correlation between the volume of resources employed and the degree of success. That volume is closely related to the resources allocated, but also to the internal success of contributing countries. Since internal success is intrinsically related to the number of casualties from participation in missions,²⁹ the strength of the force allows for increasing measures of protection to the force, thus minimizing risks. This is, however, one of the dilemmas of executing any operation - a high number of forces helps security but introduces the risk of stimulating local resistance to foreign presence. On the other hand, a reduced number of forces minimizes the impact of nationalist impulses against its presence, but may not be very effective in developing and keeping a stable and safe environment in the territory (Edelstein, 2009: 81).

Another controllable factor is the amount of time the international community allows for the success of the operation. Studies suggest that the maintenance of resources for a long period does not guarantee success, but a quick withdrawal contributes to failure (Binnendijk and Johnson 2004: 4 e 5). This creates the dilemma of maintaining a presence³⁰ to avoid the restart of hostilities and opportunism in face of weakened

²⁸ Larry K. Wentz analysed a series of conflict cases such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo and his conclusions were published by Binnendijk and Johnson.

²⁹ Studies also show that when the size of the force is higher, the number of casualties is lower.

³⁰ Usually the presence of an international force is divided into three periods: (i) the period during which the population considers its presence fundamental to the resolution of conflict, mainly to the creation of security conditions; (ii) a second period when the population starts to question the need for the international force and tolerates it, rather than lending it its unconditional support; and (iii) the phase in which the population starts to view the force as an obstacle, or an intrusive element, to its interests (Edelstein, 2009: 83).



local institutions, or withdrawing forces to avoid the period of resistance by local populations to its drawn-out presence (Edelstein, 2009: 82). Historical examples point to a time period of five years as the minimum necessary to foster a long-lasting transition to peace (Binnendijk e Johnson 2004: 5). Combining the above-mentioned factors, Wentz, in a study of RAND,³¹ states that a high number of forces for an extended period of time promote success, citing as examples the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, where there are notorious indications of success in the resolution of the respective conflicts (Binnendijk and Johnson 2004: 6).

On the part of those engaged in the resolution of conflicts, the non-controllable factors consist, on the one hand, of internal characteristics and intrinsic aspects of the territory where the conflict takes or took place, the result of the culture and agendas of different players; on the other hand, those factors stem from the geopolitical interests of external players, usually the States.

Considering these circumstantial factors, the military force must be organized and prepared taking into account a series of characteristics and capabilities that will allow it to carry out effective action in face of the operational environment in which it will be used. In the implementation of current peace operations, where it is not the only player on the field,³² the military force is required to accomplish an ever-growing multitude of tasks. These may include: help local populations by assisting with the return and placement of refugees and displaced persons, ensure the security and protection of ethnic minorities, help with reconstruction, provide medical assistance, execute combat missions to impose certain conditions, help remove landmines, protect cultural and religious landmarks, provide safety and public order, ensure border security and protection, support the setting-up of civilian institutions, law and order, guarantee the functioning of the judicial and penal system, the electoral process, and other aspects of the political, economic, and social life of the territory. This wide panoply of activities shows that a force must have the means to be organized with multiple capabilities. It stresses the increasing importance of areas that in traditional combat operations had primarily the role of support to the force proper, and now have become fundamental to work in an operational environment where the primary objective is to conquer the will of the populations.

Considering the paradigm currently used, the traditional military capacities that allow the force to execute combat tasks will be the basic matrix from which it should be prepared and organized to be used in this context, as they are what ensures protection and versatility to adapt to the wide spectrum of missions.

However, given the growing number of players the military force interacts with and the fluid nature of the operational environment in which it operates, it must be agile in several areas besides those traditionally associated with combat, namely in the cognitive and social fields (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 68). To this end, its operational elements must be recruited, trained, and prepared to that end (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 68) since, as David (2001: 193) states, "(...) the training and development of troops still make the difference between an effective and an ineffective force, more so than the presence or absence of emergent technologies." In this area, and in specific terms, there are several characteristics and capabilities that must be focal points of

³¹ Rand Corporation - available at <http://www.rand.org/>.

³² Probably it is not the most important, either.



development, with particular attention to flexibility and interoperability, subversion and counter-subversion, intelligence, cooperation with civilian players, and media relations.

In face of the multinational configuration that surrounds their use,³³ the forces to be employed in this environment must possess two characteristics which are interrelated and transcend any mission or operation: flexibility and interoperability (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 8). In this context, the military force must have "great mobility and rapid projection, versatility and flexibility of architecture of equipments and weapon systems, modularity, speed and unit adaptability, interoperability³⁴, and increasing coordination among all forces" (Espírito-Santo, 2002: 94).

One of the trends that characterise the operational environment of intra-State conflicts is the ever more frequent engagement by some of the players in subversive techniques, knowing that this will draw out time to resolve the conflict (Smith, 2008, 339). Experience tells us that conflicts of a subversive nature are not won through military action, but are lost by military inaction (Garcia and Saraiva, 2004:111). So, the force must also be organized, equipped, and trained to act and use techniques beyond those of conventional activity.

Information collection is another core element in this type of operations (Smith, 2008:373). One of the difficult tasks and, at the same time, one of the most important ones for the execution of the operation, is that of outfitting the peace force with an effective system for collecting, producing, and communicating information. It plays an important role in protecting and use of the actual own force, as well as in supporting the other players.

These new operations have also created new possibilities and opportunities in terms of relationships among States, UN agencies, NGOs, military forces, and private agencies (Duffield, 2007:77). So, in terms of the force, civilian-military cooperation and coordination³⁵ is ever more important. There is, simultaneously, a need for military forces to have at their disposal the means to develop the capacity to act in this context. This should be accomplished by creating and training teams to carry out these tasks (Smith, 2008: 442).

On the other hand, considering that nowadays the media is a useful and essential element in reaching the desired goals, particularly that of conquering the will of the population (Smith, 2008: 333), with its consent and cooperation, according to Espírito-Santo (2002: 94), the military force must know how to fight "the information battle" and how to counter media manoeuvres, and align them to political and diplomatic decisions and actions.

The basic idea to manage a force to be employed in the resolution of conflicts is to build that contingent upon a group of capabilities that allow for the execution of multiple tasks, in which the most delicate and complex consists of confronting the threats it encounters. Thus, forces must have, at least, four basic competencies: (i) make a correct assessment of the situation; (ii) work or operate in a coalition environment, including non-military sectors; (iii) possess adequate means to respond to specific

³³ The rule of the States in study is to employ military troops along with other States, forming a "combined force."

³⁴ Interoperability means the necessary measures for successful cooperation among the different organizations and national resources (Smith 2008:366).

³⁵ Usually designated CIMIC (acronym for Civil Military Coordination).



situations it encounters; and (iv) manage the means to respond in opportune and adequate time (Albert and Hayes, 2003: 54). With such competencies, it will be possible for the military instrument to respond in an adequate manner, combined with the other instruments, to attain the political situation desired and identified at the beginning of each intervention.

Conclusions

The United Nations defined the different actions anticipated and accepted by States to execute its activity to resolve conflicts. NATO, as a regional defense organization, and one of the most supportive of the UN, also approved doctrine in this matter. Its concept is more "muscle-up" than the UN's, foreseeing the possibility of using military means to dissuade and coerce the parties in conflict, proposing the possibility of a combat posture to fulfil a mandate, under the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. Despite differences in approach, both organizations base their doctrines in the employment of certain instruments depending on the specific stage of the conflict.

In face of the increase in complexity, peace operations began not to be considered not with a specificity restricted to the application of one of the instruments, adopted according to the systematisation of the UN and NATO, but rather as broader range "military operations", guided by principles previously reserved for the execution of conventional operations and carried out through the execution of a complex series of activities and techniques. This type of operations became known as complex peace operations that represent the merging of traditional activities of typified instruments to resolve conflicts.

From this new paradigm, one may conclude that a wide range of activities, from conflict prevention, to humanitarian support, and combat operations of medium and high intensity, may develop concurrently in the same "peace support operation". Accordingly, depending on the concept of application and the functions to be executed, the activity of the military force in current peace operations is based on the simultaneous execution of a series of activities. These include activities of conflict prevention, conflict intervention, and regeneration and maintenance following the conflict, to achieve the desired final military state.

Influenced by this context, the concept of success in resolution of conflict, and the way to attain it, has also undergone some changes. Success is thus related to reaching objectives in the political, economic, military, and social domains which, when integrated, provide conditions for reaching the desired final political state. This state, and the extent to which it is reached, is the primary defining factor of criteria for the success of the whole operation.

In face of the vast panoply of activities, a military force must have the means and be organized based on multiple capabilities and characteristics, stressing the increasing importance of areas that were, previously, areas of support of the force proper, and now become crucial to act in an environment where the objective is to conquer the will of the populations.

In this context, the fundamental role of military forces is that of creating and preserving a safe and stable environment that allows the execution of activities by other intervening partners. The expectation is that, in a system of integrated



rapprochement to the conflict, military forces reach and ensure security conditions, and ensure the necessary support, so that other agents may find the most adequate solutions to the causes of the conflict.

Keeping in mind the current strategic context, the military instrument continues to play a relevant role and its use is currently considerably more valuable due to its broader range. It is the fundamental support and credibility instrument for other instruments of power.

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THE BIG INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION GROUPS IN THE WORLD

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Abstract

The present article addresses the form major world information and communication groups operate, based on strategies of verticalisation of activities that encompass the distinct media segments – newspapers and magazines, television and radio – and stretch to the new technologies, namely telecommunications and Internet access services. Operating through a vertical system, these groups work as a network system by establishing association or merger agreements, protocols to strengthen their commercial relations, and through interpersonal connections. Their corresponding capitals tend to disperse and their ownership is constantly changing, particularly thanks to the involvement of pension funds, which do not disregard the opportunity of alienating property whenever the profit obtained justifies it.

Both directly, thanks to the strength of their own products – “global products” that inundate the world market, and indirectly, through the influence they have on others around them, the leading information and communication groups are a decisive factor in the speeding up of the processes of naturalization, the fixing of stereotypes, and in putting on the agenda the topics that will cross through public space.

It is undeniable that the advent and massive spread of the new technologies pose a serious threat to the homogenization and the media standardization carried out by the major groups. However, there are still issues that call for moderation when analyzing this issue. Firstly, the power public authorities still detain, especially in non-democratic countries, to interrupt the circulation of contents. Secondly, the attack launched by the large information and communication groups in order to occupy online space themselves. Thirdly, the excess of information flow and the difficulty associated with the need to select and verify.

Keywords

Network; Transnationalisation; Naturalisation; Standardisation; Digitalisation

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THE BIG INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION GROUPS IN THE WORLD

José Rebelo

The economic, financial, and political globalisation that marked the turn of the century had a double impact, which was felt both in terms of consumption and in terms of the functioning of the production system. At the consumption level, it standardized and homogenized lifestyles and desires, from the big city to the tiny village. At the production level, it displaced factory units: anything could be produced and commercialised anywhere on the globe.

In order to ensure the effective functioning of the system, it was necessary to overcome restraints associated with the existence of a Nation-State. On the other hand, it was essential to shift a new entrepreneurial structure based on the concentration of decision hierarchies and on the geographic dispersion of antennas, or subsidiaries, of that concentrated structure. Gradually, we witnessed the shifting of power and decision making to localities increasingly farther from those where the effect of such decisions was felt" (Klein, 2002: 492).

The media became decisive factors in the imposition/acceptance of this new order. To be able to do so, they had to adapt themselves to the new environment. They adapted through logic of concentration that followed well differentiated stages. Firstly, they created primarily national multimedia groups. That was followed by the transnationalization of invested capital. As a result, borders were dissolved.

This led to a separation between work places and decision-making places, and, finally, to the trans-sectorisation of trans-nationalized capital. Partnerships looking to pursue the most diverse interests cropped up along with the multimedia groups, or rather, in a symbiotic relationship with them: from tourism to real estate speculation; from the sale of food products to the arms industry; from the commercialisation of data to financial management (Rebelo, 2002: 162). In that virtually dematerialised mesh, it was the media's job to contribute to an increase in demand¹. But it was also their role to contribute to the development of public opinion trends that would generate new

¹ "The role of TF1 is to help Coca-Cola to sell its product" admitted Patrick Le Lay, former president of that French television channel, quoted by the news agency *France Presse*, in a newscast dated 9 July 2004. The same leader added: "However, for a message to be apprehended, it is necessary that the brain of the viewer is available. Our broadcasts aim to make it available, by amusing him, and making it feel rested. What we sell *Coca Cola* is the human brain's available time".



business opportunities. And, furthermore, it was their responsibility to act as currency when the strategy of companies depended on political decisions.

STRATEGIES

1. Vertical Management

Currently, the great media groups are in vertical management and, frequently, are in a predominant position in the most diverse sectors connected to information and communication. The French group *Bouygues*, for example, holds the majority of stock in *TF1*, the French largest generalist television channel, in terms of audience. In 1989, it started a news channel, *LCI*. Six years later, it purchased an important company that produced television entertainment programs, *Glen*. In 1996, it launched *TMC*, which was geared to the acquisition and development of broadcasting rights for audiovisual programs. Four years later, along with *Miramax*, a *Disney* subsidiary, it formed a group of economic interests that allowed it to break into the business of distribution of cinematographic products. In 2003, it made an agreement with Warner, thus reinforcing its position in this latter sector. The *Bertelsmann* group, primarily with German capital, leads the European communications market. Through the increase in subsidiaries, it ensures important positions in the areas of printing (*Gruner & Jahr*), book publishing (*Random House*), graphic industry (*Arvato*), and discography (Gabszewicz and Sonnac, 2006: 57-61).

2. Network organization

The practice of a vertical economy, capable of ensuring the group's omnipresence in the media arena, implies a network organization carried out through capital holdings in other media companies, the development of joint enterprises, the strengthening of commercial relations, and connecting people. This explains why competition, in its traditional sense, is further and further away from what, in effect, we notice in this domain. Besides, there is the increasing cost of visibility inherent to the development of a new magazine or newspaper, of a new radio station, or of a new TV station, which is an insurmountable expense for an independent initiative. When the *Bertelsmann* group launched the *Télé Deux Semaines* magazine in France, one third of the advertising associated with its launching was done on the *M6* Channel, which the group owns. The other two thirds of advertising were done on *TF-1*, property of the *Bouygues* group, with which the *Bertelsmann* group has partnerships.

Therefore, a sort of a functional agreement prevails among big players.

The groups *Bouygues*, *Berlusconi* and *Murdoch* formed a partnership to create a TV channel, *Breizh* TV, which broadcasts in the region of Brittany. *Dassault* and *Lagardère* associated as part of a company that publishes free newspapers (*Marseille Plus*, *Lyon Plus*, *Lille Plus*). *Lagardère* and *Socpresse* (a branch of *Dassault*) jointly publish *Version Femina*, a magazine with a circulation of over three million copies. These same companies created a group of economic interests with the goal of jointly acquiring all the paper needed for their publications, thus lowering their costs. They also formed a partnership to start a company geared to raise and place out advertising at a local level. *Bouygues* and *Bertelsmann* are the owners of the large majority of the social



capital of *TPS*, a digital TV company with over 200 channels and one million and six hundred thousand subscribers.

A political analysis programme, very popular in France and called «Le Grand Jury», is mediated by three journalists: one from the daily newspaper *Le Figaro*, which is owned by the *Dassault* group; one from *LCI*, a TV channel that belongs to the *Bouygues* group; and a third one from *RTL*, a chain of radio stations that are property of the *Bertelsmann* group. That program is broadcast live on *RTL* and *LCI*, and the main points are published the following day in *Le Figaro*.

About connecting people. Bernard Arnault, "the richest man in France", as society magazines proclaim, is the CEO of the *LVMH* group, which combines the initials of the three large companies that formed a partnership to create a giant group in the luxury item sector: *Louis Vitton*, *Moët and Hennessy*. Their showcase includes famous brands of beverages, clothing, and beauty products, such as *Moët & Chandon*, *Veuve Cliquot*, *Dom Pérignon*, *Louis Vuitton*, *Givenchy*, *Kenzo*, *Christian Dior*, and *Guerlain*. However, the *LVMH* group also owns the daily economics newspaper *Les Echos* and a vast array of periodicals, ranging from economy to culture: *La Tribune*, *Investir*, *Défis*, *Connaissance des Arts* and *Le Monde de la Musique*. Actually, Bernard Arnault is a member of the Financial Council of the *Lagardère* group, while Arnaud Lagardère is a member of the Management Board of *LVMH*.

3. Transnationalization

At the global level, we witness a true division of influence zones, where each of the main multimedia groups enjoys a predominant position.

Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, the leader in daily newspapers in English language, distributes its products in the United Kingdom and the United States of America, as well as in the Asian and Australian continents. The *Vivendi* group, sole proprietor of *Canal Plus*, a French paid channel with over twelve million subscribers, holds 53% of the social capital of the main Moroccan telecommunications company, *Maroc Telecom*. Through this company, it controls the capital of similar companies in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mauritania, and Mali.

From the association of the North American trust *AOL* and the Brazilian bank *Itaú* with the Venezuelan group *Cisneros*, one of the most important in all of Latin America, founded in 1999, emerged *AOL Latin America*, from which *AOL Brazil*, *AOL Mexico*, *AOL Argentina*, and *AOL Puerto Rico* are part. This initiative, however, did not match the anticipated goals and, a few years later, *Cisneros* and its associates put an end to that venture and sold their assets for a nominal value. In 2008, *AOL Latin America* carried out a new implementation attempt in South America, this time in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela, offering a series of services associated with the Internet. However, *Cisneros'* efforts in the information and communications sectors did not stop here. In association with *General Motors*, it created *DIRECTV Latin America*, which includes 150 TV chains located in 28 countries, with a range of services that span from radio, to electronic sales, and data transmission (Rebelo, 2009: 181).

RTL, property of the *Bertelsmann* group, has holdings, almost always a majority, in the social capital of 23 generalist and thematic TV channels in Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Hungary. It also holds capital interests in 24 radio stations in nine



different European countries. The *Lagardère* group, through its subsidiary *Hachette Filipacchi Médias*, is the first worldwide editor of news magazines, with 263 magazines in 39 different countries. As it happens, more than half of the 113,000 of the employees of the *Bouygues* communications group work outside of France.

4. Trans-sectorization

A fluid and diffuse mesh of overlapping interests, where multimedia companies intertwine and merge, openly or implicitly, with companies with a different business, led philosopher Michel Serres to state, in a text published in 1988: " I recognize the existence of a power unlike any ever seen in any other society [...]. But as that power is not of a typically material nature, I cannot imagine what force may rise against it " (in Lefebvre, 1989).

And there are many other examples. The *Lagardère* group holds 33% of the capital of *Aérospatiale-Matra*, the fifth largest world power in the aeronautical and military industry. The *Bouygues* group invests in the construction and public works industries, as well as in the reception and distribution networks of drinking water. The Management Board of *Rupert Murdoch News Corporation* includes representatives from *Boeing*, *Nike*, *Apple*, and *British Airways*.

The *Cisneros* group is an interested partner in companies such as *Procafé* (coffee roasting industry), *Pizza Hut* (restaurant business), *Spalding* (sports equipment), and *Pananco* (alcoholic beverages), and is one of the founders of *Gengold*, the second largest gold mining company in the world. One of Russia's main TV channels, *NTV*, belongs to *Gazprom*, a company that owns farms, food processing factories, health centres, luxury hotels, private clubs, and banks. Particularly active in the mining and medicinal water industries, *Gazprom* controls about one fifth of the world reserves of natural gas and produces one fourth of the world supply. *Sílvio Berlusconi's Fininvest*, has connections to companies with Italian, British, and Saudi Arabian capital. The professional careers of some of the major stockholders of the Bertelsmann group, such as *Albert Frère*, include positions of great prominence in the banking and oil sectors (Rebelo, 2009: 180). A visit to *Vivendi's* web page will show that the group's social capital include, alongside French financial institutions like *Crédit Agricole*, *Banque Nationale de Paris/Paribas*, and *Société Générale*, underwriters from other countries and regions: *Emirates International Investment Company*, *Abu Dhabi Investment Authority*, *Bank of America*, *Crédit Suisse*, *Caisse de Dépôts et de Gestion* of Morocco.

In *Manufacturing Consent. The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman analyze the make-up of management boards of the ten major communication groups in the United States: *Dow Jones*, *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Time*, *CBS*, *Times-Mirror*, *Capital Cities*, *General Electric*, *Gannett*, and *Knight-Ridder*. They concluded that: 41.1% of the administrators were executive directors of multinationals; 8.4% were bankers; 13.7% were retired capitalists and former industrialists. 8.4% were lawyers; 4.2% were private consultants. The end of the millennium has confirmed, and arguably emphasized, this preponderance.



5. Capital Dispersion

Large media groups are usually identified by the name of their founders or main stockholders. That is why we refer to the *Dassault* group, *Lagardère* group, *Bouygues* group, *Murdoch* group, *Bertelsmann* group, *Berlusconi* group, etc. Such designations, however, must not obscure a main aspect: that a good portion of the capital of those groups is dispersed, which means we do not know exactly who it belongs to. First of all, it is dispersed through the development of the trans-sectorization strategies referred to above. In second place, it is dispersed as a result of the growing importance that investment funds, like *Cinven*, *Carlyle*, and *Apax*-partners, have acquired in the capital pool of the groups mentioned. According to a study published on 1 March 2005 in the French paper *Les Echos*, investment funds control 22% of *Bouygues*' capital, 37% of *Lagardère*'s capital, and 45% of *Vivendi Universal*'s capital.

The goal of those funds consists in quickly reselling acquired capital with substantial profits in each transaction. Therefore, capital moves incessantly and almost imperceptibly. It is also because, and here is the third reason that explains the dispersion of the capital of global dimension multimedia groups, they are listed in the stock market. It is expected that a company listed in the stock market will show gains and profitability that are at least compatible with those of companies in other business areas. If that does not happen, the investment funds and other capital holders will instantly dump their stock causing an immediate drop in value and, as a consequence, capital losses for those companies. All of these factors combine to account for the fact that the media are seen as a mere commodity, subject to the ups and downs that result from commercial interests, beyond other much more obscure.

CONTENT STANDARDIZATION/ NATURALISATION OF REALITY

Our everyday routine is made up of an endless zigzag between problems. Unemployment. Health. Housing. Problems which are and are not our problems. They are *our problems* to the extent that they affect us directly and we are their victims. *They are not our problems* in the sense that their genesis is external to us. They are problems that underwent a naturalization process. It is precisely that naturalization process that makes us lose the sense of external that renders us unable to be fully conscious of the building of an itinerary that, if it is not imposed upon us, it is intimated. It is that process that helps to establish a relationship of complicity between the dominant and the dominated. Through this relationship, the dominated, who disregards his condition as dominated, or perhaps is not even aware of it, recognizes, and in recognizing legitimises, the statute of the dominant. Or, to quote Bourdieu, it makes it so that the dominated "forgets and ignores himself, submitting [to the dominant] in the same way he contributed, through his recognition, to making him legitimate" (1982: 119). It is a naturalization process that leads to loyalty and to agreements. These are not the "common agreements" of Kantian inspiration, but agreements that hide strategies that Grasmci called "hegemonic".

The major media groups have, from the beginning, worked as driving forces of those naturalization processes. They placed themselves, from early on, in a "social space", in the meaning Pierre Bourdieu conferred to that concept (1979), which is the place where what distinguishes us is, the place where contradictions and social struggles are played out. Diving into that "social space" where they find people and objects they propose to



"*mediatize*", the media act as carriers/accelerators of hierarchies or norms which are the vary same hierarchies or norms of this or another social group, and corresponding interests. To achieve that, they use three techniques: the technique of institutionalisation; the technique of explanation; and the technique of repetition.

In terms of institutionalisation, they resort to operations of classification, standardization, and typification of experiences, which, as a result, lose their originality and individuality to become diluted inside paradigms that are external to them.

The technique of explanation entails a dimension of rationality and a dimension of rationalization. As a rational effort of interpretation, Esquezani stresses (2002: 78) that explanation advances arguments liable to be exposed and, therefore, refutable. As a rationalizing attempt, it is connected to a specific lifestyle and represents a normative perspective, an imposition attempt by a specific social order.

The technique of repetition is used because, as events are insatiably repeated in the media, "in a sort of enchanting ritual, exorcist practice, journalistic litany, rhetoric refrain" (Derrida, 2004: 134), they become imposed on us. They become part of ordinary discourse. They become part of our arsenal of *preconceptions* (Gadamer, 1995: 110). "Through repetition", Moscovici points out, "the idea is dissociated from its author: it is transformed into evidence, independently of time, place, or person; it ceases to be the expression of the one who speaks to become the expression of the thing of which we speak" (1981: 198-199). For that reason, evoking September 11, is instantly associated with the terrorist act against the twin towers in New York. But it was also on 11 September that Salvador Allende falls victim to the bullets of assassins. The New York September 11 was the object of a datation process, whereas the September 11 in Santiago, Chile, was not.

Strategically organized according to a vertical management model; organized into networks through alliances, collaboration protocols, and social exchanges; delineating areas of action at a global level; integrating themselves into increasingly larger and complex groups of companies or groups with more diversified commercial, economic, and financial goals; keeping the sources of their capital anonymous: In this manner, the multimedia groups contribute to the acceleration of naturalization processes, to the development of stereotypes, and to the decision of what themes will navigate the public space.

They contribute through what they say or write. They contribute through what they do not say or do not write. "The media instinctively keeps certain types of facts out of the public space and selects others to which they confer increased visibility", observes Jean-Pierre Ezquenazi. "A coherent critique of the media", he adds, "can not be satisfied with analyzing the media discourse actually delivered. It must also take into account the media "non-discourse". To determine which facts are not, or are never, object of the media is one way to learn about the selections that are made" (2002:70). And this is done directly and indirectly.

They do it directly through the decisive force of their own products: the so-called "global products", such as the TV game "The Wheel of Fortune", which became part of television programming worldwide. Or they do it by benefiting of quasi monopoly regimes in vast regions of the world. In 2004, magazines of the *Lagardère* group, such as *Elle* and *Paris Match* sold over one thousand million copies. Vivendi Universal and the *Bertelsmann* group, the latter in association with *Sony BMG*, are responsible for the



production of half of the records in the world. This is the same Vivendi that, according to *IDATE* (a research and consulting firm based in Montpellier), is the proprietor of a catalog with over 10,000 movies and more than 40,000 hours of television programmes. And what can we say about the importance on the circulation of information of newspapers such as *The Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Le Figaro*, and *Libération*, all of which belong to major groups?

Even *Le Monde* which, since its founding in 1945, was the only example of press controlled by its own workers - journalists, employees, and managers - ended up in the hands of three important French business men who, in 2010, offered to pay its debt in excess of 150 million euros. They are: Pierre Bergé, an industrialist in luxury items sector and close to couturier *Yves Saint Laurent*; *Mattieu Pigasse*, Vice CEO of the bank *Lazard*; and *Xavier Niel*, CEO of the French telecommunications group *Iliad*. By taking control of such a prestigious newspaper as *Le Monde*, they crowned their project of entrance into the field of information and communication. In fact, at the time they invested in *Le Monde*, Pierre Bergé was already the proprietor of the magazine *Têtu*, and *Mattieu Pigasse* owned *Les Inrockuptibles*, a magazine that stands out on account of the irreverence with which it approaches issues linked to the world of music, film, literature, and television. *Xavier Niel*, on the other hand, had created *Foundation Free*, officially geared to set up all French homes with a free telephone line, free access to the Internet, and an antenna service that would grant access to all non-paid channels of digital terrestrial television.

Indirectly, they do it through the social imaginary model they build and which will be repeated on the editorial options of other media. It is the "mimetic effect", developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1997). It is *Baudrillard's* theory of "the smallest marginal difference" (1983), which bases the identity of a newspaper in a double premise: to offer something the others do not, as well as everything the others do.

It is, in short, the effect of standardization of themes and approaches that overflows from the large groups to contaminate the whole field of media.

The reactions provoked by the attempt to build a mosque in Lodi, a village located some thirty kilometers from Milan, clearly illustrate that. The initiative by a group of Arab immigrants provoked an immediate reaction by representatives of the Catholic Church and right wing groups. A cardinal, the archbishop of Bologna, appealed to the redefinition of Italian immigration policy to favor Catholic immigrants over Muslims, the latter considered incompatible with a country historically devoted to Christ. He insisted upon the application of the principle of "reciprocity" - "we must receive Muslims the same way they receive us Christians" - and alerted against the Muslim "invasion" that posed a threat to the "Italian identity". The Northern League, openly xenophobic, based its public interventions on the natural/artificial dichotomy. "Natural" behaviour would be "healthy": the traditional family, the religion of the majority, and the good traditions "which characterize us". The behaviour of those the Northern League readily classified as "communists" and "terrorists" would be "artificial". One of Berlusconi's ministers took a strong stand, always related to the building of the mosque, against the "enemies" who previously posed an external threat and now grouped themselves inside Italy's borders. Negligently, the governor of the Bank of Italy made a reference to those who are nothing more than "a work force", therefore incapable of being a source of diversity and cultural renewal.



This is the frame of reference that served as a starting point for all media coverage. They were diverse to the extent that they were propagated through different channels of information, but quite similar in their presuppositions and arguments.

According to an investigation carried out by the national television network, *RAI*, their own television coverage had supported the locals and muffled the reasons invoked by the Arab immigrants. Likewise, an analysis of the news content and commentaries published at the time by two newspapers of different political tendencies, the right wing *Corriere de la Sera* and the moderate left *Repubblica*, revealed that, in the sequence of demonstrations against the building of the mosque, in the early days of October 2000, the *Corriere* wrote in major headlines: "Mass against the Mosque", "Tension in Lodi". Its articles insisted upon the paradigm of the "Italian family" and the "danger of Islam". The *Repubblica*, in turn, and despite publishing the views of leaders like Romano Prodi, who defended the laity of the state and peaceful coexistence, also defended positions in line with those defended by the archbishop of Bologna.

Drawing conclusions from the media handling of this event and its public repercussions, Fábio Perocco, who used this theme as a launching point for a chapter he wrote for a book on the role of religion in the development of European identities, stressed the confusion established between Islam as a religion and the Muslim world in its whole. Such confusion is food for simplistic interpretations, and validates stereotypes built upon constantly evoked episodes (the Rushdie case, the wearing of the *tchador* and the condition of women, rituals involving animal sacrifices, etc.). In his opinion, Islam, presented as a threat, functioned like a mirror where all the unresolved questions of Italian history and politics, namely the issue of national unity are reflected (Perocco, 208:153). Joseph Maila advanced a similar idea in the eve of the debate over the European Constitution, stating in an article in the magazine *Esprit*: "the Non-Europe exposed Europe"

THE CHALLENGE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

It is true that the Internet and the cell phone revolutionized the world of information and communications. It is true that each one of us may, through the new media, send and receive information. It is true that the screens of computers and cell phones are filled with petitions, summons, and messages. In *La Culture-monde, réponse à une société désorientée*, Gilles Lipovetsky and Jean Serroy assert that: Starting from a new global language - digital language - a new technology develops, whose unbelievable and inevitable progression the 21st century discovers, year after year, month after month. Nowadays, screens are everywhere: from pocket screens to giant screens, from *GPS* to the *Blackberry*, from the console of home games to the atmospheric screen, from the security screen to the medical screen, from the digital picture frame to the cell phone, which becomes a multipurpose screen that not only allows internet access or viewing movies, but also displays *GPS* or a digital agenda book. A world of screens transformed into Web- world [...] nothing can be done, from the most complex to the simplest of tasks, without the use of a computer. *Homo sapiens* has become *Homo ecranis*" (2008: 82, 83)

However, it is also true that the big groups include telecommunication companies and services of Internet access in their business. It is also true that, ever more, they fill the screens of cell phones with their own programmes - sports, fiction, etc. - and that the



online editions of their newspapers and magazines are all over the Internet. And it is also true that, by political decision, the flux of messages may be stopped. Let us consider what happened in China and, more recently, during the popular demonstrations that rocked the capital of Mozambique.

We are faced with a double challenge. On the one hand, it is a political problem and, at this level, it is a struggle in which the parties involved do not have access to the same weapons, at least not for the moment. On the other hand, it is a problem associated with the excess, selection, and verification of information. Going back to Lipovetsky and Serroy: "in the West, freedom is not threatened by deficit, censorship or restrictions, but rather by the over information, the overdose, the chaos. We do not lack information: we have plenty of it; what we lack is a method so that each one of us may navigate safely through that undifferentiated overabundance, and may reach an analytical and critical distance, a fundamental condition for the development of awareness" (2008: 87).

The issue of digital terrestrial television persists. This is a technology that must be generalized in Portugal by the year 2012. Will it allow the influx of new operators and the production of innovative content? France's example does not constitute a good prognostic. As Janine Brémond points out (2005: 48, 49), over two thirds of digital terrestrial channels were distributed to dominant groups: five to the Vivendi group (canal Plus); six to the *Bouygues* group (*TF1*); five to the *Bertelsmann* group (*M6*); three to the *Lagardère* group.

Of the six channels distributed to newcomers to the market, three went to the AB group (an acronym created from the initials of the surnames of its founders, Jean-Luc Azoulay and Claude Berda). Self proclaimed "independent", the AB group is closely connected to *TF1* and the securing of publicity channelled through its products is in the hands of the *Lagardère* group. With few salaried employees, including journalists, AB is already known as the expression of televised fast food. It follows a low-cost approach based on the broadcast of canned programs.

And nothing keeps this model from multiplying.

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INTERNET GOVERNANCE

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Abstract

It has now become quite obvious that the Internet has brought significant changes to our society and a break on how we lived before its emergence. It is still too early to assess the impact on society of the new services at our disposal, such as the capacity to communicate faster and cheaper on a global scale, access information and, perhaps more importantly, to produce and disseminate information in a way that is accessible to all.

It is clear that the advent of the Information Society implies changes in our society that constitute a point of no return. However, contrary to what happened when we entered the Industrial Age about three centuries ago, when the changing process was slow and led by older individuals, these days the entrance into the Information Society is taking place rapidly and the decisive players are younger people.

The global nature of the Internet, the possibility of producing and distributing any type of content in digital form at almost zero cost, as well as the vast number of people who use the web, have highlighted the need for new forms of intervention in a sector where there are many types of players. It is in this context that the problem of Internet Governance becomes a very current issue, inasmuch as one feels the need to guarantee a diversity of rights and duties, which may appear difficult to reconcile.

This paper presents a brief overview of the main players and initiatives which, in the field of Internet governance, have tried to contribute to turning this network into a factor for social development and democraticity on a global scale.

Keywords

Governance; Internet; Security; Information Society; Privacy

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INTERNET GOVERNANCE

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1. Introduction

Internet governance can be defined as the development and application, by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet¹.

When referring to Internet governance, one cannot ignore the vital role played by a group of organisations², on a national and world scale, which deal with the issues and problems that stem from it.

Of particular mention are the *Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)*, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Internet Society (ISOC), the European Commission, and, at national level, the entities responsible for the management of the *country code top-level domain (ccTLD)*³.

However, it is not possible to understand Internet governance, or the principle on which the Internet should be governed, without first explaining how it came about and developed up to the present, and what is so good about it, which, in our opinion, outweighs its less positive aspects.

Then, we shall attempt to explain that Internet governance is not underpinned by mandatory and imposing actions and policies. Quite the opposite, from the very beginning it has resorted to a participatory model where all players have a say. The balance point is, thus, the compromise that is paramount to the safety and privacy of each individual, and, equally, to a free, open Internet.

¹ Original definition given by the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, in: <http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.pdf>

² [UMIC - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento, IP](#) (Agency for the Knowledge Society) ensures, through its President, Portugal's representation at [GAC - Governmental Advisory Committee](#) of [ICANN - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers](#), at [IGF - Internet Government Forum](#) of The United Nations, as well as , in the European Union, [HLIG - High Level Group on Internet Governance](#).

³ In Portugal, ccTLD.pt is managed by FCCN, within the context of IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (RFC 1032/3/4 e 159).



2. The technical invention of the Internet

The ideas leading to the origin of the Internet resulted from an applied research project, which began in the 1960s and aimed to connect several computers in the USA armed forces, to ensure the network had high tolerance to flaws. This requirement was brought about by the Cold War political environment and it had the purpose of guaranteeing that, even in case of potential war destroying many of this network's means of communication and computers, the remaining systems would continue to communicate and support military logistic operations, albeit with some limitation of its functions.

Given the poor communication capacity of telecommunication networks at the time, the technology to be developed was expected to work well at low speed connections (compared to now) and use a variety of means of telecommunication, land circuits, and satellite connections.

These objectives were the decisive factors in conceiving this technology, which became the core solution for connecting the main information systems, as well as the communication technology that stands at the basis of the information society at the beginning of the 21st century.

Nevertheless, it was, undoubtedly, the invention of the World Wide Web that gave the Internet the capacity to present information in such a way that it contributed to its expansion to the masses.

It enabled global access to information, which became increasingly presented in digital format, and forced a change in the way individuals and economic agents interact among themselves and with public administration.

3. The year of 1995 and the Internet for the public at large

The year of 1995 marked the beginning of the Internet for the general public. This growth did not take place in a uniform manner in all countries. It first started in the USA and the North of Europe and, subsequently, extended to other world regions.

Right from the outset, there was a perception that the Internet could be very important as a tool for development, which went hand in hand with concerns regarding "who controls the Internet?" There were two types of resources, in particular, that became the focus of concern: domain names and IP addresses (numbers) used by Internet computers.

With regard to domain names (i.e. <http://www.parlamento.pt> or <http://www.cnn.com>), a peculiar situation arose. Whereas domains ending in two letters were the responsibility of each country, corresponding to countries' ISO codes, global domains (.com, .org, .net, .edu) were managed and commercialised, in a monopoly system granted by contract, to an American company, NSI – Network Solutions International. The way domains and other technical aspects of the Internet were managed posed several problems, of which the better known were: i) the need for global and generic domains, called *gTLDs* (Generic Top-Level Domains); ii) cybersquatting, which was the abusive appropriation of domains and the huge difficulty in managing this type of abuse on a global scale; iii) lack of *competitiveness* in the commercialisation of existing *gTLDs* on a world scale; iv) the fact the Internet was dominated by the English language, a



technical reminiscence of the 7 bits *ASCII* code, which did not allow the representation of all the characters in the Portuguese language, but was even much more serious in the case of non-Latin languages; v) the stable system of Internet protocol addresses distribution (IP and other protocol addresses); vi) the technical stability and the safety of the resolution of names and domains support infrastructure.

The European Union was aware of the economic and social importance of the Internet, and started contacts and negotiations with the USA government, which, during the Clinton administration, triggered off a series of political moves aiming to create a new era in the way the Internet was managed. The initial concerns, predominantly of a technical nature, were followed by a series of measures we shall now analyse.

4. The setting up of the ICANN

The *ICANN*⁴ (*Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers*) was set up following a few failed attempts to create procedures appropriate to the expansion of the Internet, supported by mechanisms ensuring its geographic and cultural diversity, democraticity, technical stability, and independence from economic interests.

On 25 November 1998, the Department of Commerce of the USA, on behalf of the American Government, signed a *Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)* with the recently founded *ICANN*. Basically, this *MoU* had a fundamental objective: to carry out the transfer of the management of the Domain Names System (DNS) to the private sector, that is, a not-for profit corporation, thus freeing it from alleged ties to the USA government.

After a series of addenda to this *MoU*, the *Joint Project Agreement (JPA)* was only signed in 2006. In practice, it reaffirmed *ICANN*'s responsibilities regarding a set of goals established in the beginning, the most important being the effort to establish competition in the services registering domain names for *gTLDs (Generic Top Level Domain System)*, including the implementation of new *TLDs (Top Level Domains)*, the development of a policy to resolve dispute and conflict in the registration of *TLDs (Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy)*, the establishment of formal agreements with entities responsible for the management of distinct *TLDs*, the implementation of a financial strategy capable of ensuring the sustainability of the actual organization and, particularly, the technical management of the *DNS*, where *ICANN* operated together with *IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority)*.

On 5 June 2008, Viviane Reding, then European Commissioner for the Information Society and the Media, contended that: "The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers is reaching an historical milestone in its development. Will it become a fully independent and responsible organisation for the Internet's world community? This is what the European expects and this is what we shall defend. I invite the United States to work with the European Union to attain this goal".

Eleven years after the process started, the Affirmation of Commitments (AoC) was signed on 30 September 2009, a date considered historical in Internet governance. Several principles were agreed: the management of the Internet shall be carry out by a not-forprofit private organisation, in a bottom-up manner, and the multi-stakeholder

⁴ <http://www.icann.org/>



structure will be open, transparent, and independent. This set of prerogatives was explicitly and unquestionably conferred to *ICANN*.

Nowadays, *ICANN* stands as an institution turned to the future and able to take on the challenges formalised by the *AoC*. It represents public and private organisations, governments and governmental agencies, companies, the Internet technical community, Internet services suppliers, registrars, registries, registrants, and the civil society itself.

ICANN, thus, relies on a governance model that is networked, global, and open, and aims to balance the various interests involved in the management of the several technical aspects connected to Internet management.

ICANN is based on the group of entities that form it, of which the most important are: the Board and its president, several supporting organizations (SO), and a *CEO* responsible for its operational structure. The members of the Board are elected according to geographical regions for one, two, or three-year mandates, with the aim of ensuring widespread representation and diversity. The geographic regions are: Africa, North America, Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, and Europe.

Although it is acknowledged that many Internet-related issues are of public interest, *ICANN* deals with the role of governments in a particular and innovative manner, with all the controversy associated to it. There is an advisory body called *Government Advisory Committee (GAC)* that prepared the guidelines and opinions that are taken into consideration by the Board in its decision-making process. These reports are written by own initiative or at the request of the of *ICANN's* president. The role of *GAC* was amply strengthened in the *AoC* in terms of decision-making processes of a political and strategic nature, and also in the actual technical coordination of DNS.

There are several supporting organisations: *ccNSO (Country Code Name Supporting Organisation)*, *GNSO (Global Names Supporting Organisation)*, *ASO (Address Supporting Organisation)* and *At-Large*. *At-Large* is the name given to those who aim to represent Internet individual users worldwide and wish to contribute to *ICANN's* political orientations.

ICANN's agenda, the result of contributions by its several supporting organizations, is currently focused on Internet safety and stability – *DNSSEC* and *eCrime* –, on the launching of new *gTLDs*; on *IDNs* for *ccTLDs* and *gTLDs*; on the transition from *IPv4* to *IPv6*, and on issues regarding the *WHOIS* system.

ICANN has been acting on several fronts but has pursued a set of stronger measures, of which the following stand out: internationalisation of the management and technical operations of the Internet, representation equity of all geographic areas, and the safety and stability of the Internet's core infrastructure.

5. Global challenges

The years between 1995 and 2000 confirmed the importance of the Internet as a tool for development. There was also a perception that, besides the global technical aspects that *ICANN* had started to address, there were many others that needed to be debated, in a world that was becoming increasingly global.



WSIS – World Summit on the Information Society - is a United Nations initiative organised around two conferences that took place in 2003 (Geneva), and in 2005 (Tunis). The conferences aimed to overcome the digital divide between rich and poor countries and discuss how the information society can be a core tool for development, improved life standards, and sustained development.

The *Declaration of the Principles of Geneva* and the *Action Plan* (ITU website) were the first documents that identified the major guidelines the world community saw as being of relevance. The documents approved in Tunis – *The Tunis Compromise* – and, particularly, the *Tunis Agenda for the Information Society*, defined a series of objectives and ways to attain them. It is not possible, in the present paper, to describe the diversity and scope of the identified objectives, given the cultural nature and diversity of the communities involved. Some of them ended up as statements of good will, rather than concrete measures that can be followed up on a global scale.

However, we would like to stress that there is a general awareness that we have entered the age of the Information Society, and that this fact brings huge opportunities, particularly for developing countries. It also brings to the foreground a series of older challenges that need to be overcome, especially those related to communication infrastructures and the training of individuals to fight the digital divide. Particular emphasis is being given to the effort that needs to be made to include traditionally excluded groups whenever there are paradigm breaks, such as women, the elderly, migrants, the disabled, particularly because there is a perception that these groups may benefit the most from the Information Society.

Among the *Key Principles of the Tunis Agenda*, the following stand out: investment in a multi-stakeholder model for the development of the Information Society; acknowledgement of the major role played by the private sector in making infrastructures available and of the role of the media in a knowledge-based society; raising awareness of the need for increased cooperation between public and private bodies to address the fact that safety issues are global and critical to ensure users trust the use of the Internet and information technologies.

This multi-stakeholder model relies on the collaboration, involvement, and sharing of responsibility among governments, the private sector in its distinct forms, the civil society where NGOs play a decisive role, and citizens.

Some of the numerous examples stipulated in the *Tunis Agenda* as factors in development include access to information and knowledge, enabling people to benefit from the information society, creation of safe and trustworthy environments, protection of intellectual property rights, the need to invest in research and development, the possibility of using *ICT* in new sectors such as health, even at a distance, maintaining the Internet's multicultural facet and using it to preserve cultural heritage.

After 2005, the *Tunis Agenda* has been followed up on a yearly basis by annual meetings of the *Internet Governance Forum - IGF*⁵. So far meetings have taken place in Athens (2006), Rio de Janeiro (2007), Hyderabad (2008), Sharm-el-Sheik (2009), and Vilnius (2010). Although *IGF's* mandate comes to an end this year, it may continue its agenda up to 2015, a decision the UN will make at the end of the year. However, the work and reflections already carried out in, for instance, cybercrime, privacy, freedom

⁵ <http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/>



of speech, and the most critical resources in the Internet must be underlined. Another vital issue for many regions in the globe is access to the Information Society. Either due to cost or lack of infrastructures, there are still millions of individuals worldwide who are deprived from access to it. Accordingly, one of the areas where a lot of effort has been made, but which is also one of the most difficult to resolve, is that involving access to communication structures, which is closely connected to the next steps: access to equipments (computers or similar) and digital world literacy.

On a European level, increased attention is being paid to the problems regarding Internet governance. Europe is probably the region in the world where we find more structured thoughts on the topic. *EuroDIG*⁶ (*European Dialogue on Internet Governance*), which is a forum for debating these issues, was created to discuss the current and future challenges the Internet is bringing into the agenda of the European society.

6. Legal issues of the global network

Awareness of the power and growth of the Internet led to the alleged need for its governance. When talking about governance, the law is the first ruling instrument, followed by crime police bodies and, in the last instance, the courts. On this issue, there are two opposing views. One that defends that Internet governance is a safety imperative, and that safety can only be guaranteed if there is regulation and sanctions' control. The other position defends that governance is anti-natural and that, in its most radical stance, it represents a tool for Internet censorship.

Among us, the prevailing view is for minimum governance combining individual freedom with the necessary privacy, safety, and respect for rights, liberties, and guarantees of each individual and people in general.

The protection of personal data, the defence of intellectual property and associated rights, the fight against cybercrime, the protection of minors, who are considered to be particularly vulnerable in their daily use of Web resources, particularly social networks, the rights of consumers in general, the potential constraints in commercial access to Internet services and corresponding regulation by the competent authorities in each country, constitute a few of the touchstones when referring about the legal aspects of the Internet.

Within the Internet, the borders become blurred or simply disappear, and international law not always has the answers to the issues that arise. In addition, at a national level, there is either no specific law or, when it exists; there may be doubts as to its enforcement.

With regard to protection of personal data⁷, the National Committee for Data Protection, as the national entity for control of personal information, has launched several awareness-raising campaigns to draw people's attention to the dangers of circulation of personal data on the Internet. The applicable legal system restrains the

⁶ <http://www.eurodig.org>

⁷ Law no 67/98 of 26 October – the Law for the Protection of Personal Data defines personal data as follows: any type of information, regardless of its nature and form it is presented, including sound and image, pertaining to an identified or identifiable person («data holder»); anyone who can be directly or indirectly identified, namely through reference to an identification number or one or more specific aspects of his physical, physiological, psychic, economic, cultural or social features is considered to be identifiable;



possibility of data processing to two specific situations: those resulting from the law, and those stemming from the express free and informed consent of each individual. Apart from these two situations, we have a muddy field that deserves and awaits legal regulation. This is where vagueness arises, when, for instance, the applicable legal system is that of a country where simply there may not be a law regulating personal data protection. This is the case in the USA, for example, where the accountability model prevails, in detriment of personal data protection, which we have in countries like Portugal or Germany.

In 1991, the *Computer Crime Law (LCI)* was approved as per Law no. 109/91 of 17 August. This law followed the Recommendation 89/9 of the European Council and adopted the non-compulsory list of crimes listed in the Recommendation, such as: computer fraud; damage regarding data or computer programmes; computer sabotage; illegal access; illegal interception and reproduction of protected programmes. The penalties for basic crimes ranged from imprisonment up to 3 years, except in the case of qualified crimes, when sentences could be up to 10 years imprisonment (in the case of informatics sabotage). The Computer Crime Law also foresaw the criminal responsibility of companies practising this type of crime (as well as several accessory crimes), with managers and the actual companies being considered responsible. The national legal system went even further, and the *Criminal Code* established the legal system regarding computer fraud where, contrary to what happens with the LCI, companies are not considered to be accountable.

Meanwhile, on 23 November 2001, Portugal joined the *Cybercrime Convention*, whose main goal was to standardise the national legal systems of member states of the European Union with regard this type of crime, as well as to make international cooperation and crime investigation easier.

On 15 September 2009, Law no. 109/2009, also known as *Cybercrime Law*, was published. This new law set out the material and procedural penal dispositions, and those on international cooperation on crime matters, regarding cybercrime and the collection of evidence in electronic format. It transposed into the Portuguese legal system the Council Framework Decision no. 2005/222/JHA on attacks on information systems, adapting internal law to the *Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe*. The *Computer Crime Law*, which had been in force for a long time, was, thus, revoked. On the same day the *Cybercrime Law* was published, the Convention on Cybercrime was also approved and ratified (eight years later), as well as the Additional Protocol to *The Convention on Cybercrime Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems*, adopted in Strasbourg on 28 January 2003. This law implemented what Portugal committed to do as part of the Cybercrime convention. It is an instrument for international cooperation as it allows over 40 countries to adopt a similar legal system regarding Cybercrime and electronic collection of evidence on matters of attack against information systems.

This new law brings a new element, in that it sets out types of new crimes that aim to deal with new Internet paradigms, such as the crime of phishing. Now, the mere propagation of computer viruses is punished. Even in the absence of computer damages, Courts may rule the handing over of objects, equipments or devices to the State, if they were used for the practice of crimes listed. This is a law applicable to computers crimes, crimes committed by electronic means, or illicit acts whose evidence is kept electronically. To further stress the points made in this paper, this law



underlines and formalises, explicitly and unequivocally, the role of international cooperation. This is set out over six articles that establish the ways and means the competent national authorities cooperate with their international counterparts. It further contemplates the preservation and quick release of computer data for purposes of criminal investigation, with rigorous deadlines for their safekeeping. On this matter, cooperation extends beyond law enforcement officers and includes providers of electronic communications services. Lastly, as part of the general law applicable, whenever it does not oppose the Cybercrime Law, crimes, procedural measures, and cooperation shall be ruled by dispositions set out in the *Criminal Code*, the *Criminal Procedural Code and Law no. 144/99*, of 31 August. The fact that treatment of personal data must be regulated by the dispositions contained in Law 67/98, of 26 October, is further strengthened.

In short, to state that the legislative body has its back turned on the Internet, is to ignore current legal legislation. However, the slow pace of law enforcement continues to be a major challenge.

As it is not possible to mention extensively the entire legal framework in this paper, we shall mention just a few dispositions of the Fundamental Law: the Portuguese Constitution. Examples include Article 35, no. 6, which states: "access to public computer networks is open to everyone (...)". Article 37 establishes freedom of expression and of information, and its wording states that everyone can freely express his/her thoughts by any means without impediments or discrimination.

Given that, in general, legal norms may not prevail over the fundamental principles of the democratic Rule of Law protected by the Constitution, the dichotomy safety/freedom is easy to understand, as well as the need to balance out these values when referring to Internet governance.

We have referred to the role of particular bodies regarding Internet governance, stressing the importance of national registries in the management of each country's ccTLDs. We shall now briefly assess what has been done in Portugal on this matter.

Between 1991 and 1996, the registration of names under the domain .pt was based exclusively on technical grounds. With the increase in the number of registrations, the first rules on registration of .pt domains came about in 1996, still quite incipient and adapted to the needs of the time, when the main concern was fighting cybersquatting.

The Resolution of the Council of Ministers no. 69/97 of 5 May clarified, within the Portuguese legal system, the spread, and the terms of the responsibility and role of FCNN, and conferred to the Ministry of Science and Technology the competences "to settle all potential divergences between FCNN and those requesting or benefiting from all Portuguese specific domains or sub-domains."

The *DNS Advisory Council of .pt* was subsequently created, as a consultative body formed by renowned entities in the areas of the Internet, intellectual and industrial property, and telecommunications, which are asked to propose and give opinions on any changes to the applicable regulations. This model is an example of what nowadays is regarded as the basis of "good" Internet governance, as it has a multi-stakeholder composition where entities such as *INPI - Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial/National Institute for Industrial Property*, *Associação Portuguesa para a Defesa do Consumidor - DECO/Portuguese Association for the Protection of*



Consumers; ANACOM – Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações/National Authority for Telecommunications, Direcção Geral do Consumidor/Consumers Directorate-General, APREGI – Associação de Prestadores de Registos de Domínios e Alojamento/Association of Domains and Accommodation Sites Providers/APREGI are represented, as well as highly reputable bodies in the field of the Internet.

When the impact of the Internet and the legal and economic value of domain names became fully acknowledged at the end of the 1990s, FCCN, as a *.pt Registry*, published a new regulation with the purpose of facilitating and accommodating *.pt* registrations according to their activity and target audience. As a result, the following classifiers were created: *.org.pt*, *.publ.pt*, *.gov.pt*, *.net.pt*, *.name.pt*, *.int.pt*, *.edu.pt*, *.com.pt* (the latter had no registration restrictions, which made access to domain name registration easier, which in fact did happen, making it the first choice in name registration, immediately after the registration *.pt*).

The rules on *.pt* domain name registration were reviewed again in 2003. The most important change was the introduction of an arbitration system for the resolution of conflict in domain names, the abolition of some prohibitions, and a reduction on the price of submitting and maintaining domains. These measures fostered an increase in the number of registrations under TLD.PT. A new alteration in 2006 consolidated a set of principles: the pursuit of a policy that aims to prevent speculative and abusive registration of *.pt* domain names, in conformity with best practice, including *World Intellectual Property Organization – WIPO* recommendations, resorting to an extra-judicial litigation solving policy – arbitration process; the possibility of registering domains/sub-domains with special characters of the Portuguese alphabet; the correct configuration and operation of the prime server of the zone DNS PT, and the priority assumption of safety in that operation, with the implementation of DNSSEC extensions. The new regulation for the registrations of *.pt* domains has been in force since 1 July 2010, characterised by increased flexibility of the sub-domains *.com.pt* and *.org.pt*, increased safety for *.pt*, and the formal adoption of the arbitration centre *ARBITRARE*⁸ for resolution of conflicts in this field.

Final Notes

The dissemination of the digital society is one of flags of the *Strategy Europe 2010*, launched in March by the European Commission, which, on 19 May 2010, published a Digital Agenda with one hundred measures and a calendar for implementation up to 2015. The Agenda is divided in seven priority areas, including the creation of a single digital market, increased interoperability, and reinforcement of trust in the Internet and its safety, and much quicker access to the Internet for all citizens.

The growing role the Internet is playing in our society has led to increasing involvement of governments in the distinct areas of this network. Whereas some governments express their concern regarding the economic and social impact of the network, and defend its use as a tool for development and democraticity, others attempt to control it to impair its use for political purposes that oppose their own interests. It is within this huge and diverse world that Internet governance moves about, aiming to follow

⁸ <http://www.arbitrare.pt>. *ARBITRARE* is an institutional arbitration centre with authority to solve conflicts on industrial property, companies and pt. domains denominations and names.



innovative approaches that ensure a growing use of the network amidst safety, stability, and universal span.

List of Acronyms

ICANN – Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

gTLD – Generic Top-Level Domain

ccTLD – Country Code Top-Level Domain

ITU – International Telecommunications Union

ISOC – Internet Society

IGF – Internet Governance Forum

EuroDIG – European Dialogue on Internet Governance

IPv4 – Internet Protocol Version 4

IPv6 – Internet Protocol Version 6

GLOBAL TELEVISIONS, A SINGLE HISTORY

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Abstract

We live in a complex and still blurred time of transition from systems of audiovisual fragmentation, specific to cable and satellite, to web environment hyper-fragmented systems. In the process, transnational televisions are experiencing some loss but for the time being, they still hold powerful distribution channels in the main strategic areas of the globe, with exception of zones where, for totalitarian or censorship reasons, they cannot always penetrate. This is a model that has several limitations both at the onset and at the point of arrival, which makes for a critical communication system whose subordination to local and/or global interests affects its narrative diversity. Finally, it is a model that is normally characterized by discursive regularities that are alien to political, cultural, and geographic pluralism, and which is closer to what we may call "single history" than to an open, pluralistic and participated system.

Keywords

Democracy; Geopolitics; Journalism; Local/Global; Transfrontier Television

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GLOBAL TELEVISIONS, A SINGLE HISTORY

Francisco Rui Cádima

«(...) Because of writers like Chinua Achebe and Camara Laye I went through a mental shift in my perception of literature. I realized that people like me, girls with skin the color of chocolate, whose kinky hair could not form ponytails, could also exist in literature. I started to write about things I recognized.»

Chimamanda Adichi

Like Chimamanda Adichi, who only started to have a vision that stood closer to her native Nigeria when she started reading African literature – namely Chinua Achebe and Camara Laye – the Muslim world only started to have a better understanding of its own television image and recent history following the launch of Qatar's broadcasting network, *Al Jazeera*. However, on this matter, one cannot say this is a diverse, plethoric and definitive experience.

Al Jazeera, which in Arabic means "the island", started broadcasting on 1 November 1996, with the aim of becoming a sort of *CNN* for the Islamic world. However, it was only after September 11 that it started to be better known in the west, hardly ever for good reasons by western standards. The new messenger reported facts in function of the "other one", which in the past was known as the "infidel", and that was all it took for the North to decide the death of that alien being. Bush and Blair agreed on this matter, as Jeremy Scahill reported in *The Nation*.¹ The *Qatar network* thus became the voice of that "other one" and of "evil".

It is equally true that Israel's own strategic communication will not cease to occupy that «demonized» space, whenever it has to. Thus, the «island» keeps living up to the metaphor, which in this case consists of a whole set of discourses entirely surrounded by message.

This message, or "massage", as Marshall McLuhan preferred to call it, is there, haughty, since the era of the fragmentation of the European and North-American audiovisual model – which is practically simultaneous and corresponds to the end of classic generalist television and to the start of the satellite and cable channels multiple

¹ Jeremy Scahill, «The War on *Al Jazeera*», *The Nation* online, December 1, 2005. Accessed on 2 May 2010: <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20051219/scahill>. This article appeared in the December 19, 2005 edition of *The Nation*.



offers. But now, at the end of the first decade of the new century, this era of fragmentation corresponds to a time of hyper-fragmentation of television systems, which in Europe translates into 10 thousand television channels, be them generalist, cable, satellite, local TV, mobile, or other. The issue here is that the diversity of the offer and quality of contents does not grow in proportion to the exponential growth of the number of channels and platforms. Quite the opposite: more channels tend to mean a constant rebroadcasting of the same contents, or of contents that are identical in everything. Above all, it means a continuing recycling of the message coming from the centre to the periphery to pacify, standardize or, at least, bring consensus around a general common plan. What will the major international channels, which were built around common objectives, internationalization strategies, and language and cultural dissemination, such as the *BBC*, *RTPi*, *CNN* and others, do to stand out to be different and diverse? And what alternative at local/global level do these new "islands", such as *Al-Jazeera* and *Al-Arabiya*, or even *BBC Arabic Television*, represent to countries in North Africa and the Middle East?

A report written by Deborah Horan², as part of *CIMA - Center for International Media Assistance* - tells us that, generally speaking, the media in the Middle East and North Africa presently enjoy more freedom than they did ten years ago.

With the outburst of channels in the first decade of this century, we saw the emergence of Arabic channels, including in the specific area of information, which are very attentive to their own reality.

Even in the field of entertainment, the new channels introduced significant changes which, for most cases, led audiences to relegate official local channels to second place in the light of the new transborder offer. Conversely, the truth is that we cannot speak of major changes in that regard, given that the strong hand of power still controls the local media system, despite all the "opening" brought about by transnational channels. It is actually channels like *Al-Jazeera* and *Al-Arabiya* that hire the best local journalists, clearly increasing the difference in the final product between satellite channels and government controlled stations. In that light, "only three Arabic countries were classified as being 'partially free' by Freedom House in its 2009 Index on Freedom of the Press, the rest staying 'non-free'. Given that the majority of Arabic countries are not democratic, even if the media coverage of a particular issue may encourage people to change, there are few or even no political options to make the change happen. Nonetheless, the higher the access to more trustworthy news, the higher the chance to advance the cause of democracy (...)"³.

Local/Global

It is a fact that there can be no globalization without the media nor, obviously, without the new media and communication networks. Given that media systems are central to the globalization process, it is equally true that a large part of theories in the area of communication sciences and of theories critical of "cultural imperialism" have

² Deborah Horan, *Shifting Sands: The Impact of Satellite TV on Media in the Arab World*. CIMA, Washington, D.C., March 29, 2010. A Report to the Center for International Media Assistance at the National Endowment for Democracy. http://cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/CIMA-Arab_Satellite_TV-Report.pdf

³ Deborah Horan, op. cit.: 4-6.



attempted to see the phenomenon as a homogenization process. However, it is also true that the issue cannot be reduced to polemics between sceptics and neo-liberals or any other supporters of globalization. As Appadurai (2004: 32) put it, "globalization does not necessarily mean, not even frequently, homogenization or Americanization". The issues are, naturally, more complex, and there are strong arguments advanced both by critical theorists and by more favourable views, such as the theses that defend cultural hybridism, audience and reception studies, cosmopolitan social democracy, diversity and relocation (Movius, 2010: 6-18), constructivism, etc.

On a different and more anthropological stance, one could talk about the ambivalences of new technologies and the topic of the digital divide, or about the multiple identities and identity fantasies described by Appadurai - our own "others" emerging within the new multicultural contexts, which also have their own roots in the new global processes - and about global cultural flows, as it is true that new "mediascapes" have become deterritorialized, disseminating information, events and images through the complex, albeit centralized, global media system: *"These images of the world involve many complicated inflections, depending on their mode (documentary or entertainment), their hardware (electronic or pre-electronic), their audience (local, national or transnational) and the interests of those who own and control them. What is most important about these mediascapes is that they provide (...) large and complex repertoires of images, narratives and 'ethnoscapes' to viewers throughout the world, in which the world of commodities and the world of 'news' and politics are profoundly mixed"* (Appadurai, 2004: 53-54).

Although we support Appadurai's view that the globalization of culture is not exactly the same thing as its homogenization, it is a fact that the global cannot be built without that negative pulsing, so to speak. This means that the main feature of today's politics at global level is *"the politics of the mutual effort of sameness and difference to cannibalize one another and thus to proclaim their successful hijacking of the twin Enlightenment ideas of the triumphantly universal and the resiliently particular"* (Appadurai, 2004: 63).

Others prefer to sustain a critical interpretation of the current model, expressing growing concern about the negative features of globalization. It is the case of Zygmunt Bauman, who says that if, on the one hand, symbol makers and manipulators are becoming increasingly more aggressive and "extraterritorial", on the other we see a weakening of sovereignties that are locally circumscribed: *"We could prophesize that if nothing refrains or dominates it, our negative globalization - and its alternative way of taking away security from those who are free, to offer security in the shape of lack of freedom - makes catastrophe inescapable"* (Bauman, 2007: 227).

The truth is that even among liberal thinkers standing on the opposite side, we find strong critical arguments, as in the case of German Max Otte, who sees a prevailing "economy of disinformation" in the current information age, a system of opacities, of pseudo-events and of media noise. He describes it as a new feudal society subjugated to predator capitalism, a hijacked democratic experience allied to a growing weakness of political authorities subordinated to economic pressure groups: *«Independent journalism has fallen into an increasingly deeper crisis. Editors are thankful to receive prefabricated opinions sent by the public relations departments of companies and ministries, and so the circle of the driving forces of the society of disinformation comes to a close (...) the media - for some time seen as the critical (!) "fourth power",*



together with the legislative, executive and judicial powers – has become, like the former, a clear multiplier of disinformation” (Otte, 2010: 39-40). Nothing new here... were not the global media the ones responsible for the dramatic escalation of the successive crises of the decade, such as the dot-com bubble, the lies about Iraq, the real estate bubble, the easy credit, toxic products and so on? Not to forget other crises, like the climate change crisis, the crisis of the paradigm of progress, the belief in the consumer and abundance society etc. But over that decisive cultural fracture and the much worn out models of deferred gratification, nowadays, in the new context of instantaneous information on a global scale and under the spectrum of that “first State”, where the impatient capital has become king, we indeed face a different crisis, one of the “triumph of superficiality at work, schools and politics”. As Richard Sennett (2006: 133) stated: “Perhaps indeed, revolt against this enfeebled culture will constitute our next fresh page”.

This superficiality affecting global information has long reached the actual cultural dimension of the television phenomenon. The ultimate example is that provided by the Iberian-American market, where the Portuguese example is depressing. The flow of fiction in the Iberian-American space does not escape from the global model of a certain cultural homogenization. According to Lorenzo Vilches, the standardization of contents appears to be the rule in the television industry, and the fact is that this type of specific production is not alien to the current globalization process, being characterized by the following aspects: «i) standardization of contents by adapting national and Iberian-American fiction formats; ii) confirmation that economics is the guiding principle in the process; iii) once the decadence or weakness of the public sector has been demonstrated (...) the market takes precedence in all the decisions regarding formats and contents and iv) confirmation of the existence of a incipient and unequal in magnitude globalizing philosophy in the whole of Iberian-American national fiction industries towards international markets.” (Lopes and Vilches, 2008: 23-24). The same study also refers that the differentiation in consumption and genres in the context of the Iberian-American market is increasingly smaller, with a high concentration of soaps and series at prime time, and there is equally little difference between public and private offer in those markets. This empirical study is not dissimilar to what is happening in Portugal (Cádima, 2009), which makes us reflect seriously about the consequences of a typically third-world model in our television, which finds no parallel in Europe: “Portugal is the country that offers premiere national fiction (soap operas) during the primetime evening schedule”⁴. On this matter, we can also say that with regard European regulations, we have a clear lack of monitoring of this type of situations (Cádima, 2007).

RTP Internacional

In the beginning of 2010, socialist MP Paulo Pisco questioned in Parliament the utility of the television’s public service, and presented a petition criticizing the programming of RTPi and RTP Africa. In the case of RTPi, he believed there was not “a journalism of and

⁴ Maria Immacolata Vassallo de Lopes and Lorenzo Vilches (Coords.), *Anuário Obitel 2008 - Mercados globais, histórias nacionais*, Rio de Janeiro: GloboUniversidade, 2008: 35-36. This «national fiction» refers mostly to soap operas, a negative sign considering that it is a study carried out mostly in Latin American countries including: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and also Spain and the USA (television broadcasted in Castilian Spanish).



for the communities, and that the promotion and recognition of the many values that exist in the communities was not perceptible". In addition, the public channel failed to attract the "interest of the new generations of Portuguese around the world", and "the fundamental civic and political dimensions for the affirmation of our communities"⁵ was missing. As for RTP Africa, he found there was still no «clear promotion of the cooperation and historical and cultural ties" between Portugal and Portuguese speaking African countries.

RTPi was launched in June 1992, aimed at Europe and broadcasting for just six hours a day. RTP África was founded in 1997. Currently, RTPi is a global network present in several digital systems, cable and other platforms, with an audience of about 20 million viewers. It is constantly criticized for forgetting the vital rhythm of the actual communities, for showing little Portuguese cultural heritage, which contradicts its concession contract, and for showing difficulty in co-existing with countries where there is a marked lack of pluralism. SIC Internacional emerged in 1998, and in 2010 the Media Regulating Authority (ERC) approved the project TVI Internacional.

Following the major waves of the Portuguese diaspora up to the 1960s, the launch of an international channel for Portuguese culture three decades later was, at the very least, blatantly overdue. This explains why it was up to local means, often organized by the Portuguese community themselves, namely in France, to take up the role that had long been postponed by the Portuguese public operator. Examples include Jorge Reis' radio broadcast in the public station Office de Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (ORTF) in 1966, the famous free radios, the programmes in Portuguese at Radio France Internationale (RFI), the broadcasting of the Mosaïques television (FR3, 1976-1987), etc. A bit closer to us stood the Portuguese Language Channel CLP TV (2006-2009), a project developed by the Portuguese community which unfortunately went bust, and also Lusopress.tv, a Web TV Project which, due to the fact it is less costly, may have its future assured in the new model of communication in a digital environment.

The work *Les Portugais de France face à leur télévision. Médias, migrations et enjeux identitaires*, by Manuel Antunes da Cunha⁶, focused on several of the topics mentioned above. This is a comprehensive study of the Portuguese diaspora and the media system encompassing it, namely in France and particularly on RTPi which, as the author writes, started by re-framing it, including from the perspective of identity within the diaspora and in terms of participation and integration within a community that lived at a distance from its origins and in that new social network: «the programme's grid, the visual environment and the nature of its objectives attracted me in a way that the Portuguese audiovisual medium failed to do (Cunha, 2009: 16).

In the end, the author describes very clearly what he believes to be the "discursive identity of RTPi: Tradition and modernity, scholarly and popular culture shape the enunciative tone of the chain of sovereignty. (...) The programmes about tourism, nature, language, gastronomy and popular culture, amongst others, present a more traditional representation of what is Portuguese. In this quest for origins, historical fiction evokes the founding archetypes and tales, whereas the programmes on football,

⁵ «Deputado socialista questiona estratégia da RTPi e RTP África», Público online/Lusa, 6 January 2010. Accessed on 25 May 2010: http://www.publico.pt/Media/deputado-socialista-questiona-estrategia-da-rtpi-e-rtp-africa_1416566

⁶ Manuel Antunes da Cunha (2009). *Les Portugais de France face à leur télévision. Médias, migrations et enjeux identitaires*, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.



fado and religion offer a more modern picture of the Portuguese way of being in the world" (Cunha, 2009: 329).

However, as MP Paulo Pisco reminded us, there are other critical issues that must be taken into account, such as the shortage of political and cultural pluralism, amongst others, particularly in the context of programmes targeted at more complex geopolitical areas, and, in our own case, especially at relations with Africa. One situation in particular must be remembered, amongst many others concerning *RTP África*, which had to close down its delegation in Bissau on 1 December 2002. The reason was a dispatch issued by Guinea's Secretary of State for Information suspending broadcasts, which led to the expulsion of journalist João Pereira da Silva, *RTP Africa's* delegate. This situation was allegedly provoked by references made to Amnesty International, which demanded an enquiry on the circumstances of the death of General Ansumane Mané on 30 November 2000.

With regard to Angola, Vicente Pinto de Andrade⁷ clearly touched a sore spot: «(...) *There is still a long way to go towards a full establishment of a democratic regime. The governmentalization and partisanship of public media constitute the most negative facet of the current political regime. It is not by chance that restrictions on widening the bandwidth of Rádio Ecclésia (Catholic Broadcaster of Angola) continue. Angola is the only country in Africa's Portuguese speaking countries where the images and sounds of RTP Africa and RDP Africa do not reach our homes "directly" (...)*».

Another researcher has also referred to this deficit in his recent PhD thesis⁸, which addresses the pulsing of diaspora communities and its almost total absence in *RTP Internacional*. His research focused on the way the media builds and expands the identity of a community of immigrants, their integration and identity ties. It analyses the influence of the media and the role of *RTP Internacional* in building that reality and identity. This poses various questions, starting with the fact that the pulsing and experiences of those communities are not generally shown on international channels – and, in the case of *RTPi*, the Portuguese cultural, patrimonial and identity heritage is equally forgotten. It is interesting to note that this work on the identity problem of that community, and on the problem of the media and its interactions, focuses particularly on the television as a medium, and on the majority of members of that community who left Portugal in the 1950s and 1960s, including some who left even prior to the first television broadcasts in Portugal.

RTPi is, thus, perceived as the privileged means to reinforce the identity link, both within the community, and in its link to its origins. The effective contribution of the media for strengthening identity is more difficult to define, although it is argued that identity is a construction, a collective conscience and a common perception. Hence the new social responsibility of the media and journalists.

Given the lack of synchronization between supply and demand in terms of global television, the question of adapting programming to specific needs of particular

⁷ Vicente Pinto de Andrade, «A futura Constituição angolana», *Correio do Patriota* online, 5/8/2008: http://www.correiodopatriota.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=339 Accessed on 25 May 2010.

⁸ Fernando Carlos Moura (2010). «A Construção da identidade de uma comunidade imigrante portuguesa na Argentina (Escobar) e a Comunicação Social». PhD Dissertation in Communication Sciences. Department of Communication Sciences - FCSH/UNL, May.



communities makes even more sense, and so does the need to listen to those same communities, and, accordingly, produce programmes locally. This would avoid the tendency to show the official discourse, somehow hegemonic and uncharacteristic, made for the “global” masses which public channels show in their international broadcasting.

To that effect, interesting approaches can be made, such as rethinking global televisions, with their somewhat ethnocentric and, to a lesser or greater extent, official local/national realities or histories (from the origin). This is precisely the opposite of what happens with local and regional media, as they tend to adopt national/global editorial strategies. However, the fact that global televisions may have, generally speaking, their single histories as a result of introverted editorial approaches becomes even more complex, since they focus on the same topics and not on different ones related to the experiences of the diaspora, and focus even less on fringe communities and corresponding voices: those are the diaspora within the diaspora, who can only find an alternative in those “virtual neighbourhoods”. Appadurai (2006) talked about, despite the fact that those fringes have earned new inclusion areas, mostly thanks to the new media rather than traditional media. The production of locality and deterritorialized cultural reproduction in the new ethnoscares cannot be made, of course, without contradictions and impasses, due to the *disjuncture between these processes and the discourse and practices that are mass-mediated by the mass media*” (Appadurai, 2004: 263).

CNN

Currently *CNN* is spread over several *CNNs*, each focusing on specific geopolitical regions of the world. An interesting way to start reflecting on the “massage” conveyed by *CNN* is to know the experience of former journalist Rebecca MacKinnon.⁹ This experience became the naked image of the system, something that CBS journalist Lara Logan described at an interview at Jon Stewart’s *Daily Show* in June 2008, when she stated that if she had to watch the news about Iraq that are published in the USA, she would “shoot herself on the head”...

Rebecca MacKinnon is currently a lecturer at the Journalism and *Media Studies Centre* of the *University of Hong Kong*, and a co-founder of *Global Voices*. She joined *CNN* in 1992, and headed the Beijing delegation in 1997. In 2001 she became chief of the *Tokyo Bureau*. In the preface of the essay we refer to later on and of which we reproduce a large excerpt given its importance, MacKinnon clearly states her intentions, and what she has to tell us is so clear cut that it leaves no room for doubt as to what the “*CNN* system” is about: «*After working for CNN in Asia for over a decade, I stopped to take stock. I asked myself: Did my job as a TV news correspondent remain consistent with the reasons I went into journalism in the first place? My answer was “no”*» (MacKinnon, 2004: 1).

In the beginning of the 1990s, when she was still in her early twenties, Rebecca had all the dreams in the world, and her idealism made her believe that there was a public-service oriented journalism awaiting her...«*I believed that a democratic nation such as*

⁹ Rebecca MacKinnon (2004). «The World-Wide Conversation - Online participatory media and international news». Shorenstein Center Working Paper Series, Spring. Accessed on 2 May 2010. <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/blogs/gems/techjournalism/WORLDWIDECONVERSATION.pdf>



the United States could only have responsible foreign policies that truly served the people's interests – and intentions – if the public received quality, objective international news. I wanted to make a difference. To say that I made no difference covering China, Japan, Korea, and other parts of Asia to viewers in the United States and around the world would be overly cynical. But by early 2004 I concluded that my ability to make a difference on issues that I felt were important was diminishing. In November 2003 I interviewed Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, focusing primarily on his decision to send Japanese non-combat forces to Iraq despite widespread public opposition. Despite being a close ally of U.S. President Bush, Koizumi said Bush should be doing more to cooperate with the international community. While this interview was broadcast repeatedly on CNN International, not a single sound-bite ran on CNN USA» (MacKinnon, 2004: 2).

Editors at the CNN headquarters in Atlanta kept telling Rebecca there had been no time to show the interview on the national broadcast. However, the truth is that it had been an excessively quiet day for CNN in America. Editors' top priority had not been Prime Minister Koizumi, but rather Michael Jackson, Jessica Lynch, an interview with the then Secretary of State Colin Powell, a legal decision on homosexual marriages, and so on. As Rebecca MacKinnon put it: *«I understood the CNN USA producers' perspective: they are not paid to serve the public policy interest. They are paid to boost the ratings of their shows, and thus make choices every day in favor of news stories they feel will keep viewers from changing the channel to competitors such as Fox News. (...) I was told that the priority of all internationally-based correspondents should be to find ways to get more stories aired on CNNUSA's prime time shows. We needed to "serve their needs" better in order to continue to justify our existence financially. I was told that the main "problem" with my recent reporting was that my depth of knowledge about Northeast Asia was "getting in the way" of doing the kind of stories that CNNUSA is likely to run. It was after this conversation that I began to wonder whether I should return to the job that was so generously being held for me. (...) I did not feel that the job remained consistent with my reasons for becoming a journalist in the first place. Nor were my concerns limited to CNN exclusively; in fact, most TV journalists I knew at other U.S. networks harbored similar sentiments. Having no debt or dependents of any kind, I was in a better position than most people to take risks. In March, I took a deep breath and resigned. I have gone from being a well-compensated foreign correspondent to being an independent writer, researcher, and blogger» (MacKinnon, 2004: 2).*

Rebecca MacKinnon's story is by all means enlightening, albeit for the opposite reason of what is going on with transnational channels that attempt to spread their message to the four corners of the world and which, in this specific case of CNN USDA, comes alight in the fact that some messages edited in some "remote place" in the world, only with difficulty could be shown internally in the USA. This is because what matters at national level is the preservation of the good image and "unblemished" politics. As Sheldon Rampton put it: *«Any serious contemplation of the process by which the United States went to war in Iraq tells us that propaganda is still a powerful force in shaping public opinion.»*¹⁰ Despite Obama and his new communication cycle, the truth is that broadcasting continues to be, still today, the main communication medium,

¹⁰ Sheldon Rampton, «Has the Internet Changed the Propaganda Model?» Center for Media and Democracy – PR Watch.org, 22/05/2007. Accessed on 24 May 2010: <http://www.prwatch.org/node/6068>.



which also means that the old propaganda strategies of the decades of the great wars remain alive in the regional wars of the beginning of the new century. This also means that not even in the long term, in the *longue durée*; will the problems of “single history” and of the new and old geopolitical ethnocentrism find a solution.

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PUTTING PORTUGAL ON THE MAP

João Ferrão

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Abstract

This paper argues the need to “put Portugal on the map” in a double sense: in a prospective way, in order to place the country on the required map(s), something which entails strategic vision and capacity for action; and in an analytical way – to enable us to understand Portugal from the map(s) it is part of, which presupposes a capacity to analyse and understand the current state of affairs. By drawing inspiration from the polymorphic vision on the spatialities of contemporary societies and economies defended by Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008), we propose the creation of a unifying reference framework to “put Portugal on the map”, using a combination of five elements: territory as a geographic location; territory as a unit of reference of the nation-state; places; geographic scales; and networks. The polymorphic nature of the spatialities that characterize, or should characterize, Portugal’s place in the world reflects several, and even contradictory, ethical values, interests, preferences, and options. Accordingly, the supported polymorphic spatialities ought to stir up controversy based on knowledge and arguments that are solid from a theoretical and empirical stance, and should make explicit the objectives and values they are based on.

Keywords

Geography; Geopolitics; Geoeconomics; Portugal; Territory; Place; Geographic Scale; Network

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PUTTING PORTUGAL ON THE MAP

João Ferrão

Putting Portugal on the map: strategic vision and analytical capacity

The idea behind putting a place, region or country on the map is generally associated with the purpose of conferring it greater visibility, importance, and recognition.

Distinct initiatives, such as joining the European Union, economic diplomacy and territorial marketing actions, the support given to the internationalisation of Portuguese companies, participation in international football tournaments cups, tourism campaigns, or encouragement to participate in science, creativity, and innovation networks, no doubt contribute to putting Portugal (or parts of it) on the map (or on specific maps). Albeit with very different results in terms of intensity and duration, all these initiatives aim to reposition Portugal on various cognitive and power maps on a European, even world, scale.

However, at the same time, Portugal is continuously being repositioned on those maps by external agents and processes with exogenous origin and led from the outside: the global financial crisis, changing international migration flows, pandemics, the relocation of investment or climate change, to name just a few examples, may contribute to a profound change of our position on maps marked by spatialities in constant transformation. So, what does “putting Portugal on the map” mean? Which Portugal and on which map(s)? And how? On our own initiative, through a proactive individual or collaborative effort involving national and external players – *putting ourselves on the map*? Or as a result of an initiative by a third party – *to be put on the map*?

The expression “to put Portugal on the map” has, in fact, a double meaning: a prospective one – *to place the country on the required map(s), which entails strategic vision and capacity for action*; and an analytical meaning – *to enable us to understand our country from the map(s) it is part of, which presupposes capacity to analyse and understand the current situation*.

Efforts with a prospective purpose have, so far, been fragmented and, generally speaking, unarticulated, as they are normally devised from a sectoral perspective to address specific conjunctures as part of one-off initiatives, programmes, or events. On the other hand, the multiplicity of used areas of reference, such as the European Union, the whole of the Portuguese communities scattered all over the world, *Portuguese Speaking Countries*, the *Mediterranean*, *Macaronesia*, the “*North Atlantic*”, or *Mercosul* countries, are almost always associated to specific topics and objectives. Prospective



exercises normally lack a comprehensive view of the whole that would ensure a more systemic strategic stance about the country's position on the world, and on the envisaged outcome. However, broader perspectives can be found in official documents (for example, in the *Programa Nacional da Política de Ordenamento do Território*, or in the *Estratégia Nacional de Desenvolvimento Sustentável – ENDS 2015*), or in the interesting works on possible scenarios for the geoeconomics insertion of Portugal and its regions, which are regularly prepared by the *Departamento de Planeamento e Prospectiva - DPP*¹.

Conversely, from an analytical perspective, we also find that fragmented stances predominate, mirroring the conventional divisions among fields of scientific knowledge. Areas as diverse as climatology, geography, political science, economics, or international relations, attempt to understand the country from the physical, cognitive, and power maps in which it is inserted, but they do so in an autonomous way, almost always ignoring external contributions. It is, thus, paramount, that we develop a broader analytical capacity that is able to scrutinize Portugal from its multiple insertions within vaster spaces and domains.

A reflective approach to the country requires that we confer a broader meaning to the expression "to put Portugal on the map": to propose new futures (strategic vision) implies understanding the present and, necessarily, the past (analytical capacity); and to understand the present, both the one we have inherited and the emerging present (analytical capacity) points to evolution dynamics which, depending on specific cases, must be fought, inflected, replaced, enhanced or completed (strategic vision). We, therefore, need a unifying reference framework to help us bring together strategic vision and analytical capacity. They are, after all, the two sides of the same coin.

Figure 1. Changing maps




Fig. 1a. Continental drift
 The Economist 24May2010

Source:
<http://www.economist.com>




Fig. 1b. Europe/Climat changes 2071

Source:
<http://www.nonformality.org>

¹ See <http://www.dpp.pt/pages/pub/estudos.php>



Fig. 1a: several countries are repositioned in the map of Europe, so that they can be closer to other countries with which they share common problems. The United Kingdom, for instance, is placed between the Azores and mainland Portugal, to be aligned with Southern European countries, due to the worrying state of public finances affecting all of them.

Fig. 2a: several cities in Northern and Central Europe are repositioned in the Iberian Peninsula (Stockholm, Oslo, London, and Paris) or even North Africa (Barcelona, Berlin), becoming closer to locations which currently have the temperatures forecasted (in a quite speculative way) for those cities in 2071, according to climate change prospective scenarios.

Portugal on the map: a polymorphic view

Contrary to spatial metaphors announcing a “borderless world” (Ohmae, 1991), the “end of geography” (O’Brien, 1992), or a “flat world” (Friedmann, 2005²), we increasingly live in a reality that Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) call polymorphic, whereby territory, place, geographic scale and network connect together in a contingent, sometimes volatile, but decisive manner for the development of contemporary societies and economies. In fact, security walls alongside borders which have either been built recently, are being built or whose construction is planned, in such different regions as North America (Mexico/USA), the Near East (Israel/Cisjordan and Israel/Egypt), or in Africa (Ceuta/Morocco; Botswana/Zimbabwe), remind us of the unrealism of the aforementioned spatial metaphors.

By drawing inspiration from the polymorphic vision of the spatialities of contemporary societies and economies defended by Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008), we propose the creation of a unifying reference framework to “put Portugal on the map”, encompassing both strategic vision and analytical capacity, and that includes the following elements:

i) Territory as a geographic location

Territory as a geographic location influences the development of countries.

The fact of being located in the southern area of the sea front of the European continent, close to the Mediterranean and in a peripheral position regarding the whole of Europe, means that Portugal’s territory is inevitably conditioned by its location. However, that limitation is dynamic and varies along time.

Old Portugal, provincial and rural, that Orlando Ribeiro (1963) described and which persists on a physical or subjective basis in so many aspects of our collective life, was characterized by its significant dependence on factors directly connected to the country’s geographic location. The growing modernization and tertiarization taking place from the 1960s have contributed to reducing the country’s dependence on those factors. However, recent changes of a very distinct nature remind us how geographic location, even now, continues to be important.

² See Carmo (2010) for a critique of this view.



As an example, let us highlight the fact that Portugal became politically and economically more “peripheral” with the expansion of the European Union to the east, or how its location makes it particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. It can be negatively affected both by the average sea level rise (location by the sea), and by the intensification of extreme conditions, particularly heat and draught (location in Southern Europe).

ii) Territory as a unit of reference of the nation-state

The territory as a unit of reference of the nation-state is also a key element that is undergoing change.

Portugal’s ancient and stable European border, allows us to clearly define its internal and external spaces (with the exception of the one-off and irrelevant episode of Olivença). Accordingly, for Portugal, its territory represents a solid and unquestionable symbol of affirmation of national sovereignty and of differentiation from other States. However, here, too, we find recent changes, of a distinct nature but, nonetheless, significant.

Over the past years, the rigid land border, whose impermeability nurtured, throughout history, well-known lively smuggling activities, has become porous and inexistent, as a result of the free movement of people, goods, and capital within the EU. This fact undermined the importance of our land border in favour of port and airport infrastructures. Furthermore, it even fostered positive interactions on the two sides of the border, which were initially encouraged by high investment, made as part of cross-border European cooperation programmes and, more recently, by the development of active reciprocated employment pools and flows of equipment and services of a cross-border nature.

At the same time, the instability of the sea border increased. This is due to the reduction of our coastal area, which, as a result of erosion and decrease in sediment deposits on our beaches, may reach, in extreme cases, 20 metres per year (MAOT, 2010). This value runs the risk of growing substantially if some of the predictions on the rise of the average sea water level caused by climate change are confirmed (Santos and Miranda (ed.), 2006).

From a “portulan chart” perspective that is to say, looking at earth from the sea, Portugal is actually shrinking...

Nevertheless, at the same time, the country may considerably expand its jurisdiction over the current 1.7 million square metres of maritime Exclusive Economic Zone.

The territory as a basic unit of the nation-state is, thus, undergoing change. In some cases this is due to the functional change of its borders, in others this is because this line is physically being redrawn.

iii) Places

People’s everyday lives, as well as those of companies and organisations, take place within the context of specific places.

However, the growing mobility stimulated by sub-urban growth enabled by mass public transport and generalized use of private transport implies that current living



spaces tend to be larger and polycentric, associated to areas of residence, employment, study, consumption and leisure, often quite apart from each other.

Locations and even cities which, until recently, had a relatively compact geography regarding their direct daily influence on population from neighbouring areas, are being replaced by functional areas. These are large spaces or constellations of places where living and proximity forms of socialization, which confer meaning to the lives of individuals and groups, develop and get consolidated. Simultaneously, other agglomerations with ageing populations, uncompetitive activities, and fragile companies become more marginal, undergoing a process of spatial disintegration that contradicts the physical geography that stubbornly keeps them in the same space.

Places where everyday life takes place continue to be based on proximity. However, that proximity increasingly presupposes the intensification and diversification of forms of mobility, underpinned by a dynamic that reconstructs centralities and peripheries, thus shaping a changing geography of winner and looser places.

iv) Geographic scales

Perhaps never so much as today geographic scales have played such a decisive role in analysing dynamics, understanding behaviours, and identifying changes. In this area too, distinct examples abound.

Let us recall, on the one hand, how local and global dynamics increasingly intertwine, even leading to the emergence of the neologism “glocalization”, made popular by Robertson (1995). Examples of this growing dialectics between global and local dynamics, observable in several domains, include: globalisation of investment and relocation of companies, fair trade of local products and world markets, climate change and local adaptation strategies, ethnic neighbourhoods, and globalisation of migrant flows.

But, equally, the forms of multi-scale governance, which are so important in the context of the European Union, require that we pay attention to the “geographic scale” component in which the various players – international, European community, national, regional, and local – organize themselves and distribute or share tasks and competences, decisions and initiatives, or use the scales, as Charnock (2010) described it, to build new and successive forms of hegemony.

Unsurprisingly, Portugal cannot escape these two trends.

Thanks to the visibility it offers, enabling us to identify the analytical scale that is more appropriate to each phenomenon through zoom-in exercises, the interactions it allows to detect through multi-scale analysis, and the forms of organization it permits, as pinpointed in the previous paragraph, the “geographic scale” dimension and the reading and hierarchy exercises it permits, constitute a powerful source of intelligibility and power with regard the present and the future of any territory.

v) Networks

We currently live in an increasingly interactive and networked world.

The globalisation of the most varied components of active life – financial world, economy, drug traffic, migration movements, terrorism, media, tourism, social



activism, etc. – presupposes an intensification of flows and mobility relying on networks with extremely variable degrees of organization and duration, which benefit enormously from the new information and communication technologies and point to plans, strategies and practices that are increasingly conceived on a global basis.

More recently, the expansion of services related to Web2.0 (blogs, wikis and social network sites) enabled the exponential development of online communities, transforming cyberspace into a huge communication platform involving many thousands of networks and many millions of people and organizations.

Physical and virtual networks complement and strengthen one another, resting on strategic connections and players who know how to take advantage of the enormous potential offered by connective proximity, which may be accompanied, or not, by the intensification of movement of people, capital and goods.


Our strategic understanding of the spatialities of today's societies and economies requires us to know how the several aforementioned components – territory, place, geographic scale and network – specifically combine in distinct contexts. This means we need to decipher the polymorphic nature of those spatialities according to existing or desired situations.

For example, the analysis and strategic management of cooperation networks involving cities scattered around the various member States of the European Union with very distinct hierarchal positioning within the European urban system mobilizes, simultaneously, the territory, place, and geographic scale and network components. The higher the capacity all the players involved have to understand and foster the polymorphic nature of this complex relations network, the more productive and powerful they will be.

“To put Portugal on the map” requires a systemic view on those various components that is able to integrate the spatialities of distinct powers – political, economic, and social. These components are currently taken into account in areas such as geography, modern and postcolonial geopolitics, and geoeconomics (Cowen and Smith, 2009). This systemic view must, nevertheless, go beyond these domains and have, as a reference, the “geographic” relational matrix advanced by Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008).

This relational matrix involving the territory, place, geographic scale, and network components has, however, a nature that is, above all, instrumental. It only makes sense in the light of integrated versions, and is desirably developed from distinct viewpoints that complement each other. Portugal, as perceived by local communities, as a national project, as part of the European Union or in the context of global decisions will mobilize, necessarily, distinct aspects and combinations of the four elements mentioned above.

The scenario exercises developed as part of ESPON – *European Spatial Planning Observation Network* on Europe's role in the world (ESPON 2007a) and on the future of Europe's territory by 2030 (ESPON 2007b) – which obviously include Portugal – illustrate how important it is that we understand territorial dynamics better, and consider territorial objectives in politics and policy agendas aiming at building visions that favour a more promising future.



Conferring intelligibility and meaning to Portugal by putting it on the map(s)

The polymorphism underlined by Jessop, Brenner and Jones (2008) does not vary in time and space only. It also changes according to the perspective and analysis adopted.

This point is particularly important, as it implies accepting that there is no such thing as a "correct polymorphism" for Portugal, or any other country or area in the world, associated to each historical and geographical context, able to be identified and deciphered with precision and objectivity. On the contrary, there are several combinations of the elements of reference referred to earlier, and these combinations inevitably mirror distinct, even contradictory, ethical values, interests, preferences, and choices, both from an analytical and a strategic stance, which means they are subject to controversy and opposition.

The actual construction of global and contrasting projects in and for Portugal is manifestly insufficient, reflecting aspects as diverse as the lack of a culture of interdisciplinarity, the scant dialogue among the scientific, political, entrepreneurial communities and civil society, and the total absence of stable and credible think-tanks.

The scientific community ought to give the first step by making available for public scrutiny a research agenda aiming at the collective construction of more integrated and prospective visions that allow putting Portugal on the map(s) which confer it intelligibility and meaning.

These responsibility and ambition are inalienable. The use of the extensive collection of the Janus Magazine and of the Observatory for External Relations that supports it can, no doubt, help attain this goal.



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Figura 1a.

http://www.economist.com/realarticleid.cfm?redirect_id=16003661



Figura 1b.

<http://www.nonformality.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/12/02-large.jpg>

Figura 2a.

<http://www.cnn.com>

Figura 2b.

<http://www.aucklandmapcentre.co.nz/assets/resized/img/sm/340/11/22-320-640-240-480.jpg>

Figura 2c.

http://www.espon.eu/export/sites/default/Documents/Publications/ESPON2006Publications/EuropeInTheWorld/EIW_light_25-3-25008.pdf (p.28)

Notes and Reflections

THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFIGURATION

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In their attempt to observe, understand, and interpret social realities, including, obviously, internationalized realities *per se* and as they undergo change, sociologists resort to more or less well-accepted conceptual tools.

One of these tools is the concept of **structure**, which is extensively used in everyday language and in scientific discourse, particularly by the large majority of authors aptly described as structuralists. The idea of structure appears to correspond to the endeavour of searching for the framework that confers consistency to the social reality, which is important to examine beyond its observable forms. This search presupposes that, in the same way the skeleton supports the group of organs in living organisms; in human societies we also have a network of relationships and a mesh of interactions that sustain the social construction.

Let us recall a few examples. In linguistics, structuralists like Saussure were the forerunners of this type of thought when they defended the concept of language as a structure, a system of signs. In anthropology, Lévi-Strauss' structuralism sees the web of kinship relations as the support of ancient societies. Indeed, in its own way, Marxism is also a form of structuralism, given that it understands social groups as lying on relations of production. Several other sciences, such as mathematics or psychology, resort to structuralist categories in their analyses. In the same fashion, structuralist theories applied to international relations are also well-known, particularly those advanced by Immanuel Wallerstein.

Generally speaking, the concept was studied in depth by Jean Piaget¹, for whom the idea of structure comprises three elements: wholeness, transformation, and self-

¹ See Piaget, Jean 1970 (1981) *Structuralism* (Portuguese translation by Fernanda Paiva Tomaz used here), Lisbon: Moraes Editores: 10-20.



regulation. Above all, a social structure is something singular which represents the whole, where all the elements that constitute it form a set. This set has properties that differ from its elements when considered individually. However, this wholeness is not static, and its dynamism generates transformation processes, develops its own potential, goes through stages of growth, consumes energy in the process, and, ultimately, tends to disintegrate. Effectively, these transformation processes end up causing inevitable disequilibria. This is due to the dissipation of energy (entropy) and subsequent exhausting of the potentialities, which require the existence of compensation devices capable of correcting disequilibria through self-regulation mechanisms. According to Piaget, those three elements are vital to our understanding of the idea of structure: the creation of a coherent whole, a capacity to adapt and transform, and the existence of tools to readjust the whole.

The concept of **system**, very much present in distinct scientific fields, and at the core of a vast number of theories, stands quite close to that of structure. In the field of international relations, systemic analyses have become widely used, as well as the expression "international system", even in non-scholarly language. Systems theory has been used in several interpretations of the internationalisation processes. As Morton Kaplan earned fame for his inventory of possible international systems², Kenneth Waltz took this theme to the sphere of "realist" classical thought by applying systemic theories to the study of international relations, which granted him the classification of "neorealist"³.

Returning to the concept of system *per se*, among other in-depth studies on the topic, one can emphasize the work of Georges Lerbet⁴. In his view, system adds the notion of interaction with the milieu to the idea of structure, which translates, basically, into the exchange of energy between the structure and the environment surrounding it. Between the dynamic wholeness in question and what surrounds it (the "surroundings"), a regular exchange of interactions occurs, a two-way flow of energies where we indeed find the idea of system that results from this new mixture of structure plus network of interactions. Systems can be closed (like those in machines) or open (such as those in living beings, either biological or social ones). In the case of the latter, the exchange of energies can take up several forms, such as, for instance, material flows or information flows. For some authors, the analysis of systemic processes can be done according to the cybernetic model of input, output and feedback, through an action and reaction complex.

The truth is that specialists almost imperceptibly slide from the concept of structure to that of system in the vocabulary they use, as if the two concepts were synonyms. Often, structure is given a predominantly static meaning, whereas system is presented as an essentially dynamic meaning. One just has to read the book that is probably the most complete work on the application of the concept of system to international relations, authored by Michael Brecher⁵. He writes that "a system contains,

² See Kaplan, Morton (1957). *System and Process in International Politics*. New York: John Wiley.

³ Waltz, Kenneth (2002). *Theory of International Politics* (translated from English into Portuguese by Maria Luísa Felgueiras Gayo), Lisbon: Gradiva.

⁴ See Lerbet, Georges (1986). *De la structure au système: essai sur l'évolution des sciences humaines*. Éditions Universitaires: 18-21. See also, by the same author, *Approche systémique et production de savoir*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993.

⁵ Brecher, Michael (1987) "Système et crise en politique internationale" in Korany, Bahgat (org) *Analyse des relations internationales*, Québec: Gaetan Morin Éditeur / Centre québécois de relations internationales.



simultaneously, static and dynamic elements. The structure refers to the manner players are placed in relation to one another. The core variables are the number of players, and the distribution of power among them. The process designates the interaction networks that exist among players in a system. The core variables of the interaction are type, identified with the continuum conflict/cooperation, and intensity, which reflects the volume of interactions during a given period of time. There is, thus, a link between structure and process: each structure has an interaction process; and a structure creates and maintains regular interactions" (83)⁶.

Now that we have referred to these two concepts of structure and system, perhaps our preference goes to a third one, developed by the German sociologist Norbert Elias: the concept of configuration: Aiming at overcoming the dilemma presented by a sociology anchored on human beings as individuals, versus a sociology that sees human beings as societies, he advanced the word "configuration" to describe the situation where the multiform relationship among individuals in a interdependence environment takes place. This brings about a set of tensions, where not only minds but people interact as a whole and where reciprocal actions and reactions occur⁷, regardless of the level of relationship.

When explaining the intellectual tool which the concept of configuration represents, Elias provides detailed examples. To demonstrate his point, he presents the situation of four men sitting at a table playing cards, precisely forming a configuration, given that among them there is an obvious relation of interdependence: each person's game depends intrinsically on the game of the others. However, Elias then adds that the word applies "both to relatively restrict groups, and to societies formed by thousands or millions of interdependent beings"⁸. In this sense, a school class, a therapeutic group, an urban conglomeration, a nation... represents configurations, thanks to the interdependence networks which form them.

Accordingly, the word configuration is appropriate to describe very distinct realities, ranging from the small group of card players to the international system.

As a side remark, one can mention that this proximity of ideas – game, internationalization – brings to mind the application of game theory to the analysis of international relations⁹, not to mention the metaphor of the "grand chessboard" Brzezinski chose as the title of his famed book¹⁰.

One of the merits of this concept developed by Norbert Elias is to remind us that large social groups, obviously collective as they are, do not cease to be human. The anonymity of multitudes must not make us forget that they are formed by individuals, and in themselves represent a whole.

⁶ See also *ibidem*, page 82: "An international system is formed by a set of players who are placed in a configuration of power (*structure*), involved in regular interaction networks (*process*), separated from other units by a domain's functional *borders* and whose behaviour is subjects to the internal (*context*) and external (*surroundings*) constraints of the system".

⁷ See Elias, Norbert (1986). *Qu'est-ce que la sociologie?* (translated from the German by Yasmin Hoffman), Paris: Éditions de l'Aube: 154-161. 'Individuals' and 'society' are not two objects living separately, as the current use given to the words may lead us to believe. In fact, they are distinct, yet inseparable, levels of the human universe" (156).

⁸ *Op. cit.*: 158.

⁹ The work Rusconi, Gian Enrico (org.) (1989), *Giochi e paradossi in politica*, Torino: Einaudi, is particularly interesting.

¹⁰ See Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1997) *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York: Basic Books.



There is a field where this viewpoint is particularly clear: international relations. We are accustomed to considering States as privileged, even exclusive, agents of those relations. As we know only too well, we are now forced to add the roles of multiple players. However, the role of individuals as global players must also be included in this new inventory, as they interact powerfully with collective players. Let us recall contemporary individuals like Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, Karol Woitila, or Nelson Mandela and the influence they imparted in the development of world events. To counteract a discourse so often exclusively centred on the game of “powers”, it is useful to complement analysis with personal decisions and individual influences. By reinforcing the importance of people as individuals, this perspective allows us to “humanise” our observation of international relations.

Furthermore, the sociology of large human groups appears, thus, committed to including the intersubjectivity dimension in its analyses. The concept of configuration comprises this complex crossing of interdependences, where individuals-in-interpersonal-relationships and societies attain consciousness.

By including multiple scales, the notion of configuration points to these manifolds platforms of communication and interaction where social events take place, and where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. In the same way a concert performed by an orchestra is not merely the superimposition of the various instruments that form it, presupposing a common denominator where each element is integrated at a higher level, in social configurations there is equally a surrounding wholeness that is delimited by the dense network of interactions and capable of adding meaning to each of its components.

In short, the concept of international configuration, perhaps even more than that of structure or system, may be particularly appropriate, as a mode of representation, to describe world reality in its various dimensions: a dynamic wholeness subject to major transformations and able to balance its critical disequilibria by resorting to correcting mechanisms; change and interaction processes expand within it, creating networks of interdependence where individuals play relevant roles.

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Notes and Reflections

THE ROLE OF PORTUGAL IN EURO-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

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The necessary “new international order” that everyone is calling for makes us reflect about the role Europe may play in the post-crisis world and the strategy that needs to be adopted to build that order.

Among the challenges that the “New Europe”¹ has to address, the crucial need to define a Global External Policy steps to the fore. As one of its objectives, this policy may consider the establishment of a strategic partnership with Latin America anchored on common values and on the sharing of common interests which, due to its non-exclusivity, may act as an alternative axis. At the *Sixth European Union-Latin American and Caribbean Summit*, which took place in Madrid this year² some steps were taken in that direction.

Together with Spain, Portugal emerges as a legitimate intermediary, as it stands at both ends. This fact implies the need to conciliate national interests with those of the European Union.

Portugal and Latin America

The relationship between Portugal and the Americas was, for a long time and almost exclusively, restricted to the United States in the north, and Brazil in the south.

The 1974 April Revolution and, later, the adhesion of Portugal to the European cooperation/integration zone, led the democratic government to review its position

¹ The Europe suggested by the *Treaty of Lisbon*.

² In Madrid, the negotiations *EU – MERCOSUL* were resumed with a view to creating a free trade zone; the creation of the Eurolat was announced, and the creation of a *Mechanism for Investment in Latin America* in the value of €125 million by 2013 was approved.



regarding Latin America. In effect, the European participation in the peace process in Central America in the 1980s, the establishing of regular European Union – Rio Group meetings and of Ibero-American summits, the joint meetings in the framework of the United Nations General Assembly, and the development of privileged economic and political relations between the EU and the *Southern Common Market* (MERCOSUL), led to the creation, in little over a decade, of a strong network of exchanges and common interests. Portugal, due to its condition as an Iberian country, its historical association with the largest regional power in South America – Brazil - and the weight of the Portuguese community in Venezuela as the second largest in Latin America, could not, for obvious reasons, stay out of this process.

On the other hand, the return to democracy of countries located mostly in the southern part of Latin America fostered important advances in the area of political agreement and regional cooperation and encouraged the region to diversify its relations with Europe, Asia and Africa.

In the first instance, as mentioned earlier, it was historical and cultural links with Brazil and Venezuela that determined the clear preferences of Portugal, mostly in economic and political terms, in the region. Later on, Portuguese interests in the region extended to other fields.

Presently, the relationship between Portugal and Latin America is going through a very dynamic stage. Accordingly, in the economic and trade sectors, Portugal's exports to Latin America amounted to around 426 million Euros in 2008, whereas imports stood at 1.460 million Euros in the same year. The main destinations of exports are Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Cuba, while the main products are machines and mechanical equipments, textiles, common metals, plastics, cork, chemical products, medications, paper pulp, vehicles and other transport equipment, wine and olive oil. As for Portugal's imports, the majority of products, mostly foodstuffs and fuels, come from Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Venezuela and Cuba.³

Still in 2008, and according to data provided by the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), Portugal channelled to Latin America around 2.5 million Euros in cooperation projects, and diversified the destination of that aid in an unprecedented manner, making it reach ten new countries. As we can see, funds ceased to be channelled exclusively to Brazil and were geographically spread over ten new receptor countries, with Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay receiving the largest share.

In the political sphere, Portugal's various governments have been following attentively, and with interest, the political reforms implemented over the last few years in the various countries in the area, in addition to using the Ibero-American summits as a means to strengthen bilateral relations with countries in the region, both in political and other terms. One example, among several, was the signing of an agreement for cooperation in the areas of tourism and air transport, including a memorandum of political agreement between Portugal and Mexico in November 1996, on occasion of the 6th Summit in Chile.

³ According to data made available by *IPDAL*, and which is kept on file.



The European Union and Latin America

Within the EU, it has positively accepted, right from the onset, that the accession of Spain and Portugal implied, and still does, the increased attention of Europe towards Latin America.

The point of departure was the Joint Declaration of Intentions (a Declaration Annexed to the Treaty of Accession of 12 June 1985), a demonstration of political will which confirmed the importance given to links with Latin American countries. The Declaration reinstated the decision to strengthen economic, commercial and cooperation relations and suggested some collaboration measures and the economic and commercial sectors where it would be possible to intensify and reshape relations. Subsequently, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Community published a document titled "European Union New Orientations for relations with Latin America". The "new orientations" established a new conceptual and juridical framework for relations between the two regions, as well as the necessary mechanisms for strengthening them.

On 18 December 1990, the Council of Ministers of the European Community approved the document titled "New orientations for cooperation with Latin America and Asia in the 1990s", which aimed to address the challenges facing relations between those two regions, in the international scenario that had, meanwhile, emerged. Besides affirming environmental issues as one of the objectives of that cooperation, the document set out the so-called "democratic clause" as a general rule, a mechanism that confers the European Community the possibility of restricting its cooperation to humanitarian issues should a particular country fail to respect accepted rules of democracy or the principles stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Gomes, 1999: 175).

Afterwards, as part of the 1994 strategy for Latin America of the Council of the European Union, and the subsequent 1995 statement of the Commission, the idea that it was necessary to build a relationship of "association" with Latin America was brought forward, as a means to improve the quality of that relationship. These papers underlined the political vision of the EU regarding the various challenges posed by Latin America at the time, such as international economic insertion, impulse to integration, state reforms and the need to take notice of basic social needs (FRERES and SANAHUJA, 2006:49).

Presently, the European Union (EU) has bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements with all Latin American countries and groups, including Cuba.⁴

Recently, the EU has signed more ambitious agreements that envisage, over time, the establishment of free trade zones (for instance, with the MERCOSUL, with Mexico and Chile and, very recently, with Peru and Colombia, and with Central America as a whole). There has been a permanent contact with the Rio Group since 1990.

In 1999, the First EU-Latin America and Caribbean Summit took place, establishing a bi-regional strategic partnership which was further consolidated in the summits that followed, the last of which took place in Madrid last May.

Despite disagreements between Europeans and Latin Americans with regard to an increased opening of the latter to European industrial products, and the non-tariff barriers imposed by the former towards their agricultural products, the EU is currently

⁴ The admittance of Cuba to the Rio Group was approved in 2008.



the second largest commercial partner of Latin America, and the first commercial partner of MERCOSUL and Chile. According to data published by the European Commission, the volume of trade with Latin America has more than doubled since the beginning of the decade. Accordingly, in 2009 the trade of goods with Latin America amounted to 71 thousand million Euros with regard to imports, and to 63.4 thousand million Euros in exports (6% of the EU's total external trade). As for services trade, imports amounted to 19 thousand million Euros and exports topped 28 thousand million Euros, representing, respectively, 4.35% and 5.44% of the world's trade exchanges. The EU's direct investment in Latin America was 275.4 thousand million Euros. The EU's trade balance is negative with respect to goods and shows a surplus in the case of services.

The role of Portugal in Euro-Latin American relations

Regarding Latin America, and since its participation in the Conference of San Jose I in 1984, Portugal was a de facto member of the European political cooperation in issues related to Latin America. Accordingly, during the Portuguese presidency of the Council of the European Union in 1992, a third generation agreement was signed (framework cooperation agreement) between the European Union and Brazil. At the same time, the meeting between the Community and the Rio Group took place in Santiago, Chile. At the end of the Eighth San Jose meeting in Lisbon on 24-25 February 1992, the two regions issued a political declaration that expressed the direct relationship between democratization, economic development and social justice.

As part of the Portuguese presidency of the European Union in 2007, EU institutions established an Agreement for Strategic Association with Brazil, thus acknowledging the growing importance of that country at both regional and world level. The EU's interest for the "emerging power" appears to effectively conciliate Portugal's national interests with those of the EU.

In the post-crisis world, and as Latin America shows positive signs towards economic development and democratic consolidation, the Europe growth challenge may effectively find an answer in the diversification of its interests and decentralization of its attention to all States in the region. This way, Portuguese investment in Latin American countries and in projects, such as the creation of an Ibero-American Community of Nations, is justified, not only due to the national interests of Portugal in the region, but also due to the necessary strengthening of its negotiating clout in a Europe that may include in its strategy the creation of a true partnership with Latin America. The role of Portugal in Euro-Latin American relations appears to be that of facilitator of that strategy

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Notes and Reflections

HARD, SOFT OR SMART POWER: CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION OR STRATEGIC DEFINITION?

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The reflection presented here summarizes the discussions around conceptual differences, advantages, and risks associated with strategies inherent to *Hard Power* and *Soft Power*, as well as the emergent concept of *Smart Power*. The opportunity for this reflection was provided by the participation in the conference "Hard Vs. Soft Power: Foreign Policy Strategies in Contemporary International Relations" organised by the Academy for Cultural Diplomacy, at Cambridge University, in June 2010.

The discussion around the concepts of *Hard* and *Soft Power* (Pamar et Cox, 2010) is not a recent one and has been largely explored by the academic community in Thematic Meetings in the scientific areas of international relations. There are several authors, including the distinguished Professor Joseph Nye, Janice Bailly Mattern, and Judah Grunstein, who have analysed these concepts in great detail based on real examples, and using the United States of America as a common reference.

It appears to be generally agreed that *Hard Power* consists of the capacity, displayed by a country, to reach specific objectives through the use of physical force or economic influence, often recurring to military force, in an uncertain, though eventually effective manner. On the contrary, *Soft Power* (Nye, 2007) anticipates action through mediation and persuasion, which implies the adoption of strategic principles that combine symbolic or cultural reference elements with political or ideological values that reinforce leadership.

According to reference literature, the main difference between the two concepts appears to lie on the appeal to responsible and liable intervention characteristic of *Soft Power*, versus the simple imposition by force of *Hard Power*. *Soft Power* opens the way to new negotiation perspectives according to new horizons: international relations tend to improve from the merging of several factors presented in an interrelated manner by



Ambassador Pekka Huhtaniemi¹ who defines them as the "three Ds" in "*Hard Vs. Soft Power: Foreign Policy Strategies in Contemporary International Relations*", a meeting organized by the Academy for Cultural Diplomacy, held at Cambridge University in June 2010: Diplomacy; Defence; and Development. *Soft Power*, indeed, allows the merging of the three as it promotes: diffusion of social and cultural values that are essential to progress at the international level; the creation of social networks that facilitate exponential increases in human contact and the development of communication at world level; the empowerment of women, by recognizing their power to informally promote peace, prosperity, and security; the activity of civilian organizations in the mediation of conflicts and development of peace.

According to Philip Dodd², *Soft Power* is defined as a way of being tendentially free, democratic, and open, which, naturally, has political and economic implications. This is clearly expressed in Barack Obama's rhetoric. When one speaks of *Soft* and *Hard Power*, the ideas of peace building and peacekeeping are implicit, which gives it a strategic meaning for intervention, rather than a simple conceptual connotation. Jack McConnell³ approaches this topic establishing a difference between peacebuilding and peacekeeping. He recognizes the former essentially as a national strategy, which may be influenced by international forces, and associates the latter, from a methodological perspective, with the involvement of civilian society in the search for stability, a task accomplished by all actors rather than imposed by a few. In that context, *Hard Power* may be, under certain circumstances, an unavoidable resource in peacebuilding⁴. According to Hubertus Hoffman,⁵ the building and keeping of peace follow their own codes, which control the actions of the different players involved in these processes. These codes imply: 1) defining of a cost-success relationship, primarily in situations of tension and conflict; 2) focusing activity on the location, defining partnerships with local players, and reinforcing autonomy; 3) conceiving double strategies, including actions of *Hard* and *Soft Power*, diversifying possibilities through an approach that Hoffman defines as intelligent, close to the idea of what is designated as *Smart Power*; 4) avoiding analysis radicalisation and recognizing prior mistakes as a step to prevent them in the future; 5) opening the dialogue and debate in order to find more solutions on the ground, mainly at the civilian level, of innovative and alternate nature in their *modus operandi*; 6) promoting respect for human beings and valuing human rights through tolerance and respect.

¹ H. E. Ambassador Pekka Huhtaniemi, Finnish Ambassador in the U.K, conference participant who presented "The Finnish Approach to Hard and Soft Power" at the "Hard Vs. Soft Power: Foreign Policy Strategies in Contemporary International Relations", Academy for Cultural Diplomacy (org), Cambridge University, June 2010.

² Professor Philip Dodd, a guest professor from the University of the Arts London, and a participant who presented "A soft power constellation: China, US and India in the 21st century" at the Conference "Hard Vs. Soft Power: Foreign Policy Strategies in Contemporary International Relations", Academy for Cultural Diplomacy (org), Cambridge University, June 2010.

³ Jack McConnell, former Prime Minister of Scotland, who presented the paper "Peacekeeping or Peacebuilding: shifting the balance?" at the conference "Hard Vs. Soft Power: Foreign Policy Strategies in Contemporary International Relations", Academy for Cultural Diplomacy (org), Cambridge University, June 2010.

⁴ Bill Paker, Professor at Kings College London, who presented "The role of military force in the modern world" at the Conference "Hard Vs. Soft Power: Foreign Policy Strategies in Contemporary International Relations", Academy for Cultural Diplomacy (org), Cambridge University, June 2010.

⁵ Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann, President of The World Security Network, who presented "Codes of tolerance as soft factors of peace-making" at the Conference "Hard Vs. Soft Power: Foreign Policy Strategies in Contemporary International Relations", Academy for Cultural Diplomacy (org), Cambridge University, June 2010.



It is in this sense that, in the conceptual discussion, mainly considering the advantages and risks of the above mentioned concepts (*Hard* and *Soft Power*) when strategically applied to specific cases, a new concept emerged: *Smart Power* which, not amounting to the sum of those two prior ones, recognizes their potential, and combines human and knowledge dimensions. This concept is usually identified with the Obama Administration, which, contrary to the policies of the previous Bush administration, clearly dominated by the principles of *Hard Power*, still attempts to reinforce the values of *Soft Power*.

Smart Power, a concept developed in 2003 by Joseph Nye and later adopted by politicians and academics, requires the adoption of intelligent policies which combine in a harmonious, and often subtle, manner, elements of *Hard Power* with actions typical of *Soft Power*, allowing for more effective and successful results (Nye, 2007). This new concept values the importance of acting intelligently, determining action in function of specific needs: national and international context; cultural characteristics, current political system; economic influences. However, more than any other prior model, this one includes a strategic dimension, as it is driven by action that involves all, forces the shaping of partnerships at different levels of intervention, in the concept of *global partner*, and values different participation. Following some of the principles of *Soft Power*, *Smart Power* avoids some of the massive deployments of military forces and follows a diplomatic approach to the resolution of conflicts. It creates conditions for the development of new opportunities and the redefinition of integrated sustainable strategies, as they generate autonomy. At the international level, the concept of *Smart Power* appears to be gaining support and catching the attention of politicians, academics, and strategists.

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Critical Review

Noya, Javier (2007) – *Diplomacia Pública para el siglo XXI. La gestión de la imagen exterior y la opinión pública internacional*. Madrid: Ariel, 469 págs.

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The author of the book *Diplomacia Pública para el siglo XXI*, Javier Noya, is a researcher at the Real Instituto Elcano in the fields of external image and public opinion, in addition to being a Sociology Professor at Universidad Complutense and of Public Diplomacy at Escola Diplomática (School of Diplomacy). The study undertaken by Javier Noya is of major importance to all those who are analysing or following up the changes that have been taken place in the international area, more precisely in the area of diplomacy and of international relations. It must be pointed out that the issue of public diplomacy had its origins back in 1965, thanks to diplomat Edmund Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, and to Edward Murrow, a CBS journalist and head of the United States Information Agency during the Kennedy administration.

Whereas, in the past public, diplomacy was a mere propaganda tool, currently it aims to promote national interest, by understanding, inform about and influencing external matters. In this sense, public diplomacy sums up all activities of external communication targeted not only at the elites or opinion-leaders, but also at public opinion at large, and which, in the long-term, aim to influence positively the image and perception of a country. It must be stressed that the main goal of public diplomacy is to indirectly influence the behaviour of an external government, exerting influence on the attitudes of citizens through information, education, and culture.

Javier Noya chose to divide his book into six parts. The first refers to external image and its management, interlinking the external image actions with the country brand as an integral strategy that encompasses the economic, commercial, and tourist dimensions, besides political aspects, and as if dealing with a product to be sold as a reaction to the globalisation process.

In the second half, the author enters the theoretical and conceptual field of public diplomacy, associating it with the soft power theory proposed by Joseph Nye. The latter envisages two forms of public diplomacy; direct, and indirect. With regard to direct public diplomacy, it adopts a three-dimensional approach, as it covers daily



communication, strategic communication, and the development of relations in terms of their durability. Concerning the indirect form, it must be understood as meaning the role of live television, the positioning of the corporate fabric in the market, and everything encompassing culture, ranging from the British Council and the Camões, Cervantes, and Confúcio Institutes, to cinema, theatre, and literature.

In the third part of his book, titled "Estados Unidos, de la Guerra Fría a la Guerra de Irak", Javier Noya focuses his attention on the image portrayed by the United States regarding Europe and the Arabic world, in particular the impact of the Bush administration on the diplomatic front. In this part, the author studies the role of public diplomacy in the fight against international terrorism after September 11, such as the STARS strategy, which corresponds to the following:

- S: stimulate the awareness of relevant players in the USA about the anti-Americanism issue and corresponding consequences;
- T: transform north-American attitudes that may be aggravating the problem;
- A: accentuate the positive qualities of the United States and its contribution to the international community;
- R: recruit corporate leaders in world strategic markets so that they can establish bridges based on mutual respect;
- S: stand as a link between the private sector and the North-American government's public diplomacy.

With regard to part four, Javier Noya examines European power, specifically the examples of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. In what concerns the United Kingdom, the author analyses not only the impact of 9/11, but also focuses his attention on the image of the country after the intervention in Iraq, presenting examples of campaigns that act as stabilising instruments in image recovery among the population. Besides, public diplomacy should serve the eight strategic objectives of the Foreign Office, such as: (1) a world free of global terrorism and mass destruction weapons; (2) protect the United Kingdom from illegal immigration, drugs trafficking, and international crime; (3) promote an international system based on respect for the rule of law; (4) build a safe and effective European Union; (5) foster economic interests in an open and global economy; (6) encourage sustainable development anchored on democracy; (7) guarantee security and energy supply; (8) secure the safety and good government of British territories overseas.

As for France, the author stresses the elitist image as a synonym of luxury and "liberating power" under the motto "liberty equality, fraternity". According to the Legros report, France should undertake the following path: (1) strengthen the knowledge of foreign languages and cultures; (2) undertake an active policy in the exchange of students and scientists; (3) change the attitudes of political and economic elites in order to change the negative image. In the neighbouring country Germany, the public diplomacy strategy consists, above all, in defending the following: (1) act as a booster of the European Union; (2) compromise, at a global level, in finding solutions for political, economic, and ecological crises; (3) open up to the world in the fight against racism and xenophobia; (5) affirm itself as a land of ideas and research; (6) promote history in terms of music and popular art, and foster sports and fashion: (7) stand out as a land where life can be enjoyed.



The fifth part focuses on European Union cases and on the soft power carried out by transnational players, such as international organisations and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs). It must be pointed out that the European Union does not have a public diplomacy and that, according to specialists, its increased presence in the international arena is necessary to improve its image. However, despite not having a specific public diplomacy, it ends up exercising a series of public diplomacy activities, such as having delegations in EU countries, the external actions carried out by the Directorates-General for Education and Culture, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, and the intercultural dialogue programmes of the directorate-general for education and culture. In the face of this, it is equally believed that the European Union unequivocally needs a public diplomacy and a positioning strategy as a humanitarian power, since it funds around 70% of all humanitarian aid, which, by analogy, should sell itself as a "global alliance of democracies", and take advantage of its capacity for regional integration thorough the promotion of "region-building" and acceptance of its cultural diversity, ranging from culture to politics. With regard to the soft power exercised by transnational players, the role of the United Nations stands out, as it is viewed both as a universal organisation, particularly with regard to its General Assembly, and as an individual association, as illustrated by its Security Council. Besides the United Nations, Javier Noya touches on the issue of the legitimacy of NATO and of its role, given that it has a public diplomacy department set up in 1999 on the occasion of the Kosovo crisis. This department includes: (1) an academic affairs unit; (2) television and radio studios; (3) a network of officers in member countries; (4) information offices in Kiev and Moscow; (5) an integrated data service; (6) programmes such as the Committee for Modern Society Challenges; (7) publication of the *NATO Review*. In the specific case of NGOs, their humanitarian stance through promotion and defence of universal values among the public stands out.

Finally, the sixth and final part deals with the image of Spain abroad, in which the author describes, for almost one hundred pages, the inclusion of Spain in Europe and in the world, from Franco to current times. At the end, he delineates a public diplomacy strategy for the country as part of the global objectives of defence of the Brand Spain, with ten measures to implement such aspiration: (1) strengthen coordination among inter-agencies; (2) set up information and strategic services within each agency with analysis departments; (3) increase the culture of image mediation; (4) carry out market segmentation and, in addition, identification of countries; (5) reset objectives; (6) carry out training sessions in marketing and communication; (7) develop digital marketing, such as the Internet and television; (8) conduct cultural actions externally; (9) organise internal audience awareness raising sessions on public diplomacy; (10) reinforce coordination among central administration sectors.

In effect, public diplomacy must be understood as follows: (1) short-term (hours or days), when the management of news is done as a reaction to events, and in a way that reaffirms strategic objectives. Events are not brought forward, rather, answers to hypothetical scenarios are prepared in advance; (2) medium-term (weeks or months), whose strategic communication intends to actively influence the information agenda, by making things happen or by organising strategic activities to increase visibility and improve the valorisation of a country. This has to do with the strengthening of messages that affect perceptions; (3) long-term (years), in the context of building links to create and nurture social and cultural relations between countries and among



countries, and which are interesting from a strategic viewpoint and where our own values are acknowledged. Precisely, the management of news requires government communication professionals able to react, agile in their relations with the media, in the face of smears campaigns. Strategic communication requires medium-term planning with imaginative capacity to conceive and develop activities that can compete for public opinion from the exterior. It resorts to a network of intermediaries who collaborate without identifying themselves as participants. Relation building is built on by an entity or institution that is far from the political sphere in order to increase the trust it may generate. It requires the involvement of professionals with experience of the civil society, corporate marketing, NGOs, political parties, and trade unions.

With effect, this is a book whose reading is strongly recommend, for its scientific and academic quality, and for being a guide for implementing public diplomacy, as the latter is presented as an instrument with an international dimension. One of the aspects that perhaps Javier Noya failed to analyse is the growing role of public diplomacy combined with the smart power exercised by the Popular Republic of China in a multilateral perspective, particularly after September 11.

It must equally be noted that, in the case of Portugal, despite the fact it was not analysed in this book, public diplomacy is still at an embryonic stage. This despite the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to implement it in the context of external policy and corporate strategy abroad, in an attempt to identify niche markets with the support, among others, of the Camões Institute and the *Agência para o Investimento e Comércio Externo de Portugal* – AICEP (Portugal's Agency for Investment and External Trade). In fact, public diplomacy is a vital strategic resource for states as actors in international relations, and where public opinion relies on when it comes to influencing or improving the image of a country, both internally and externally.

Finally, Javier Noya underlines the importance for Spain to develop a European public diplomacy, and to carry out initiatives to brand the country in the context of a global and competitive world such as the one we have today.

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Critical Review

Valladares, Rafael (2010). *The conquest of Lisbon – military violence and political community in Portugal, 1578-1583*. Lisboa: Texto Editores, 332 pp (ISBN 978-972-47-4111-6)

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In this essay, Rafael Valladares, a researcher at *Instituto de Historia del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)*, analyses how, following the battle of Alcácer-Quibir, Philip II prepared and accomplished the “Spanish-Portuguese dynastic union” by simultaneously playing the political-diplomatic and the legal games, despite never disregarding the use of military strength.

The command of the military force of 18.000 men was given to the Duke of Alba, and, according to the author, the occupation campaign caused thousands of dead and wounded. When referring to his three-year campaign (1580-1583) and the subsequent annexation of Portugal, Philip II admitted: “I inherited it, I acquired it, and I conquered it”.

Romero de Magalhães, quoted in Valladares, writes about Portugal’s erasure of that war from its memory: “The remembrance of the violent occupation of the Kingdom (...) was forgotten or attenuated.” Valladares generalizes on this topic, stating: “Any society punished by military violence tends to omit, therefore, cross out, any reference to past suffering”, refusing to narrate that period of history and denying it.

One of the sources Valladares quotes recurrently is the controversial *Historia dell’unione del Regno di Portogallo alla Corona de Castiglia*, by Girolamo Franchi Connestagio. The book was published in Genoa for the first time in 1585, and, at the time, was successively translated into several European languages, becoming, as the author puts it, a “sort of bible for the 1580 events”.

Connestagio’s book, frequently perceived as too favourable to the Habsburgs or the “Austrias”, has, to date, never been translated into Portuguese or published in Portugal. Another inevitable source Valladares uses is the *Historia de Felipe II, Rey de España*, by Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, which was published in Madrid in 1619.



However, Valladares' research extended to *Archivo General de Simancas* (Spain's National Archive), the *Casa de Alba* Foundation, the historical archives of Spain's Ministry for External Affairs, the Collection of Original Documents for the History of Spain, *Archivium Romanum Societatis Iesus*, the Vatican Apostolic Library, and, in Lisbon, to the National Library (*Biblioteca Nacional*) and Ajuda Library.

This new contact with the collections of documents kept in these institutions, as well as the crossing of information found there with existing literature on "Habsburg Portugal" confer Valladares' research a deeper and more comprehensive stance on Philip II's campaign, the nature of the resistances he met, and the way he overcame them

The assault on Lisbon and the battle of Alcântara, the feeling of being orphan, the abandon on the part of several social bodies, Philip II's belief that the crumbling of the political community would result in the Portuguese "killing each other", and the slow resurgence of an opposition, particularly popular in nature, to the Philippine occupation, gain a new dimension in Valladares' essay, who is attentive to the slow rebuilding of a community identity in the occupied country.

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Critical Review

SAVIANO, Roberto (2008). *Gomorra. Infiltrado no Império Económico da Máfia Napolitana*, Caderno, 2008, Lisboa, 3ª. Ed.: 351 pp

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Organized crime is, currently, the number one threat on the planet. In Italy, the fourth economic power in the EU, the amount of business from organized crime is only surpassed by the total amount from public companies. According to the General Confederation of Italian Commerce, two thirds of the wealth generated by underground economy derives from criminal activities. Mafia interests control 20% of commercial companies and 15% of manufacturing industries, which represents 15% of the GDP (nearly 900 billion euros in 2000). The combined assets of the different mafias were in excess of 5.5 billion euros, somewhere between 6% and 7% of the total Italian national wealth available.¹

Countless publications about "the mafias" followed the assassination of the Kennedy brothers, who knew and fought organized crime. Some were well documented and/or with many references, and others were the result of great courage.² These and other qualities characterize the much-prized book by Robert Saviano, which we review in this text. The author was born in 1979, in Naples, territory of the "Camorra", and Europe's criminal organization with the largest number of members.³ Saviano has a degree in philosophy and is a journalist and organized crime investigator specialized in the Camorra. He is the son of a doctor who, during his youth, worked in ambulance service in an area where, on average, five people die daily. In an unpretentious text, rich in description, he shares documented facts, experienced and collected in the land of clans, where the modern law theory was subverted, where no one can stand against the

¹ FURET, F. (2003). "Economie de la Cosa Nostra", *Banc Public*, 116, January (<http://www.bancpublic.be>).

² TAPIA, René (2003). "Corrupção e crime organizado". In *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Portuguese edition, June: 2.

³ In the South American country where the author of these lines was born, slang borrows many words from different languages (the native language is expanded by words of different origins brought in by early immigrants) and "camorra" means a heated argument. "Armar camorra" (cause camorra) means to provoke a fight.



camorra (275-76).⁴ His memories of his father help us understand his moral commitment, his need to understand the economic and financial mechanisms of clan affirmation as an entrepreneurial organization that produces wealth through bloodshed and grows through a philosophy of fear (350-51). It is a system where homicide is a must (273).

His first memory, which he only later understood, is a dialogue he had with his father, when the latter explained that between a doctor and a philosopher, it is the doctor who may make decisions regarding peoples' lives, decide whether to save them or not, do good when he has the opportunity to do bad. "True good is when we have the opportunity to do bad, but choose to do good" (202). He only understood that conversation when he heard the story in the second memory, which he was told many times over: When an ambulance arrived and the wounded person was on the ground but the police had not yet arrived at the scene, they could not move him because if the news would spread, the *killer*⁵ would come back, jump in the ambulance and finish the job (202). Once, his father found a young man dying and against his colleagues' opinion ("Let's wait. They will show up, finish their job, and then we take him": 203), transported him to the hospital where he was saved. That night the *killer* went to his father's home and beat him up so badly that for a couple of months he could not go out in public. "Maybe that is, in part, the reason why I graduated in philosophy, so I would not have to decide in place of someone else" (id.).

The camorra is back in existence after years of silence (115). Under these circumstances, Raufer had to learn "the trade of living" (185)⁶ and decided to understand how this criminal entrepreneurial system that "generates the majority of the nation's economy" emerged in the "heart of Europe". With a multilevel entrepreneurial design (226), it manages to turn 500% profits (79) and, from drug trafficking alone, can generate five hundred thousand euros a day (137).⁷ In chapters of great objectivity, although not devoid of emotion, the author tells us about specific circumstances in the region which combine with current historic circumstances of world change and the emergence of new phenomena and processes, to determine these "retrieval strategies".

First, there is the logistic network of the international commerce of *haute couture* textiles (a worldwide commercial network, from the production to the *outlet* market where drugs often circulate (53-58);⁸ then, its connections with the other mafias which work as privileged intermediaries in the drug business;⁹ next, the unpredictable 1980 earthquake, which provided it with an opportunity to get rich through the appropriation of reconstruction funds,¹⁰ such as the funds for the construction of a new highway; these facts coincided with the fall of the eastern European regimes which the Camorra

⁴ In chilling pages, he tells how those who oppose the mafia's designs, such as journalists who defy pressures, mayors who oppose its control of public works or sanitation, and even clergymen who denounce it, are vilified, assassinated, and even cut up so that their bodies will not be found. There is also the case of a *mafioso* who contracted AIDS and is assassinated "so that he won't infect the daughters of any Camorra families" (323).

⁵ Slang in Italic in the original.

⁶ "Three thousand and six hundred dead since I was born (1979). The camorra has killed more than the Sicilian mafia, more than the 'ndrangheta, more than the Russian mafia, more than the Albanian families, more than the total numbers of deaths caused by the ETA in Spain and the IRA in Ireland, more than the Red Brigades, more than the RAN (Revolutionary Armed Nuclei, radical right wing groups), and more than all the victims of State that took place in Italy. Camorra has killed more than any other..." (145)

⁷ "There is not a single drug introduced in Europe than does not go through the Secondigliano market" (83).

⁸ Near the beginning of the text he shares a moving episode of his visit to the home of a tailor, who worked for the mafia for a salary of six hundred euros per month, when the tailor sees on the television an American actress during the Oscars wearing an outfit sewn by him.

⁹ "In alliance with Nigerian and Albanian clans and Ukrainian Mafiosi "(226) "in a position to establish a direct alliance with South-African cartels" (73)

¹⁰ "The 1980 earthquake destroyed the Valle di Lauro and the flow of one hundred million lira for reconstruction gave rise to an entrepreneurial Camorra bourgeoisie" (175).



initially served as intermediary, later as praetorian guard, to finally take over their arsenals.¹¹

It is an economic supremacy that does not derive directly from criminal activity, but rather from the ability to balance illicit and legitimate capital (242) "... involving a lower middle class removed from the mechanisms of crime but tired of entrusting its wealth to the banking industry" (68),¹² which runs into chronic unemployment and a total lack of social growth projects" (5) and work as employees in the organization that protects them, though without knowing who directs them. We are shown an example of the building of a mafia clan, with all its international, legal, and illicit criminal limitations (228): By killing Mário Iovine in Cascais, Portugal, in 1991... Casale's Camorra became a multipurpose enterprise... with conditions to participate in all businesses (investing) the amount of illegally obtained capital... Concrete, drug trafficking, racketeering, transportation, sanitation services, and the monopoly of commerce and supplying by imposition". It is, we may add, "one of the most flourishing intercontinental trafficking ventures that crime history has ever witnessed. From China, the clans transport and distribute several products in Europe: digital photo and video cameras, construction equipment and supplies, name brands like Bosch, Hammer, Hilti..." (59). In short, it is "a violent and fierce bourgeoisie that finds in the clan its most powerful and fierce forefront. (221).¹³

¹¹ "As soon as the socialist curtain fell, the camorra met with the leaders of the dissolving communist parties...Aware of their crisis, the clans informally acquired entire arsenals of weapons from eastern States - Romania, Poland, former Yugoslavia - paying for many years the expenses of guards, security personnel, and officers in charge of maintenance of military resources. In short, the clans secured part of the defense of those countries. In the end, the best way to hide weapons is to keep them in the barracks. So, for years, the bosses had as reference, not the weapons black market, but the complete arsenal of eastern European armies at their disposal" (191). "The weapons issue remains hidden deep in the guts of economy, locked in a pancreas of silence. Italy spends twenty seven million dollars. It is the 8th largest budget in the world R.T.). This is more than Russia, twice as much as Israel (...) three thousand and three hundred millions is the amount of weapons business in the hands of the Camorra, 'ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra, and Sacra Corona Unita (217).

¹² The new Camorra bourgeoisie of Casale transformed the extortion business in a sort of additional service, a participation in a racket initiated by the Camorra. Paying a monthly fee to the clan may entail exclusively funding their businesses, but at the same time it may include receiving economic protection with the bank sector, trucks being on time, or the service of respectable commercial agents. The racket works as a purchase of imposed services" (60)

¹³ "Investigations were increasingly leading to the repossession of the assets when Dante Passarelli was found dead in November 2004. ... With his death, the assets that would have gone to the State were returned to the family...Clans do not allow mistakes " (246).



Karl Max reduced the fundamental tools for acquisition of primitive capital to "money and violence" (Book 1, chapter 24, paragraph 6 of "Capital". He was referring to the State in the origins of capitalism. In this era of systemic crisis,¹⁴ when "the old one has yet not died and the new one is still unborn"(Gramsci), mafias do not replace the governments, they run parallel to them and gather the tools necessary to the "accumulation of great capital" (309)¹⁵where "ferocity is the real value of commerce: renouncing it means losing everything" (30). These days, when we begin to witness talk of corruption,¹⁶ texts of great factual and analytical richness such as the one we introduce, are both useful and necessary. To oppose barbarity requires more than the "courage of truth" Hegel referred to. Robert Saviano lives in hiding, under police protection.

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¹⁴ "Everything had changed in the past few years. Everything. Unexpectedly. Suddenly"(26).

¹⁵ "The business volume managed by the Schiavone family amounts to five thousand million euros. The total economic power of the Casalesi family, including real estate, land, stocks, cash flow, construction companies, sugar factories, cement industry, usury, and traffic of drugs and weapons, is about thirty thousand million euros", (229).

¹⁶ The example of waste dumps and toxic waste management as a mafia business, and the mafia's relationship with politicians, public service employees, the entrepreneur and unemployed graduates serving as environmental experts, is a classic one.