

Luis Leitão Tomé

The New World's Geopolitical Outline

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Acronyms

ABM Treaty	Anti-Balistic Missiles Treaty
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AFTA	Asian Free Trade Area
APEC	Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CCP	Communist Chinese Party
CFR.....	Council on Foreign Relations
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Community of Independent States
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EIJ	Egyptian Islamic Jihad
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ETA	Basque Nation and Liberty
EU	European Union
FAM	Foreign Affairs Minister
FDI.....	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAEA.....	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDN.....	National Defense Institute
IIF	International Islamic Front
IISS.....	Institute of International Strategical Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IPC	International Penal Court
IRA	Irish Republican Army
KEDO	Korean Energy Development Organization
MAR	Military Affairs Revolution
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSS	National Security Strategy

OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PECC	Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRCA	People's Republic of China Army
PSC	Political and Security Committee of the EU
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
PSOE.....	Spanish Labor Socialist Party
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
SC UNO	Security Council of the UNO
UNO	United Nations Organization
USA	United States of America
USCENT	United States Central Command
USD	United States Dollar
USEUCOM	United States Europe Command
USNORTHCOM	United States North Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States South Command
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

Preface

With this work we are having the possibility to follow an important approach of the recent evolution of our world in a very unique moment of the mankind history. In reality it's difficult to find a period of such change in quality, as well as in its speed and global output

The author, Luis Tomé, an university teacher of International Relations in Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, gives us a deep study on the world situation at the beginning of the second millennium putting together all the elements that are important for an interpretation of this period and a forecast for the future and developing a reaction between them, either in a multilateral or in a bilateral basis.

Since 1989/91 we are living in a world with a different paradigma of the past or even without any kind of parameters for framework. For the US realist school of political thought, which has been overstressed by the Bush neocons, the military force is the only way of giving order, peace and stability to the world and freedom to all the peoples. It looks like the ideals of the French Revolution followed by the Napoleonic expansion.

For his analysis the author recognises the characteristics and elements of the global disorder, elects the most important political units (USA-the only super power-, EU-a unique idea and successful construction-, RUSSIA-still in disarray but always a big power which can become a big problem- and CHINA-the current rising power), which he mixes with the new powers without territorial base, such as the economic, the finance corporations, the media, the return of the religions, the trans-nationals of the crime and terror, the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the ciber war, the regional and internal problems in several communities, sometimes very violent and looking endless. The UNO is not forgotten and the relationship of the others players of the game with it.

As a consequence the author considers the existence of a new system which he calls the "uni-multipolar order" since he does not accept the possibility of an easier explanation. The so-called imperial power of the USA is not a total true; that is a reality in the military, aero-space and scientific fields, but not in the economics, cultural and religious activities nor in the political influence and human intelligence (humint). This situation gives birth to a process of tensions which he calls a game of "mutual and multiple contentions" among everybody being the US the leading actor.

All the different possibilities, evolution and reactions have been studied and developed in this work by its author and we are witnesses of a very thorough and useful tool. Nevertheless, I am convinced that, with this basis, it is possible to try to go a little bit further, opening a broader space for discussion. It is a kind of food for thought.

Although the system introduced and explained in detail is very complex I believe the reality, today, is even more complex and very difficult to put inside a model and to frame it. All the experts in political science know this and it's hard to understand why the neocons are trying to simplify everything through the military option. In this regard this work has the merit of opening a wide range of perspectives.

There are several subjects raised in the book which should be underlined, such as:

- The states are not anymore the only political actors; although they still are the first ones, there are much more in the arena;
- Even limiting the rationale only among states, the western countries are loosing ground for new emerging powers, such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, etc;
- At the same time the globalization has been expanded through all the activities with obvious consequences for the states which are loosing control; considering all the international, multinational, trans-national activities, organizations and corporations, as well as the magnitude of some problems, the national states have lost capabilities and power. But, as a kind of contradiction and burden they still get responsibility for solving the social and security issues. The EU has been the best answer for these kind of new challenges, but is facing now a lot of huge problems to solve; some other countries and regions are trying to follow this example and the EU is looked as a point of attraction;
- Overlapping with tensions among states and communities we have the "new war" of the multinationals and trans-nationals of finances, economy, crime and terror against the states; this is totally new in the History. It is more than a network, this is a complex web of different and inter-connected systems. To survive in this new atmosphere each one needs prospective studies and solid intelligence services;
- The question of raw materials, sources of energy and oil should maintain their importance as a reason for conflicts and a struggle for the control of


some parts of land and the sea lanes of communications which are indispensable for the normal flow of those goods to the industries around the world.

The XX century could be defined as the century of the most violent shock among ideologies (democracies, fascisms and comunisms), a period of hecatombs (I and II world wars followed by the european decolonisations, the rise and fall of the Soviet Empire), the only part of History in which mankind got the possibility of producing and inventing almost everything and at the same time has the power and the temptation to destroy all, including the globe and all the humankind. At the dawn of this new century, the blind faith and the assumed only true of each religion have returned rising the danger of foolish violence spread around the globe and including all the population as a target to be destroyed .At the same time the difference between the very rich and the very poor is huge with millions of people starving, which is a situation without precedents in human history.

The rationale and goals to solve this equation might be three: to understand that the planet is very fragile, that it is the home for all mankind (without any exception) and that the resources and wealthy ought to be better divided and with more justice. Not very difficult, in principle!

This book opens a window to all the problems that we are facing today and deserves a complete and detailed reading. The author has no power to solve the world problems but he does his best opening some ways.

Lisboa, January 24th 2005

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Garcia Leandro', with a large, stylized flourish above the name.

GARCIA LEANDRO
LIEUT-GENERAL
UNIVERSITY TEACHER

Thesis and aims of the study

This book follows to a long reflection about the actual status of international relations and in particular about the world's new power architecture. It is an extended and enhanced version of an article published in the Volume 106 of the prestigious *Nação e Defesa* (Nation and Defence) magazine of the *Instituto de Defesa Nacional* (Portuguese National Defence Institute)¹. A few friends have suggested me to complete this article into a monograph format, due to the good reception of the analysis and the polemics around these issues. I decided to develop this work due to its importance and actuality and also to take the opportunity to assemble in one publication a jigsaw of other reflections about international relations specific topics previously written. I would like to inform that **this book is not about Iraq**. It is only another contribution about the “new world's order” in a geopolitics perspective that intends to be updated, serious, rigorous and justified. This is not about arguing “for” or “against”, “pro” or “anti” – the complexity of these questions makes it impossible to reduce it to the “black” or “white” used in many analysis. This study is based on several questions and facts that produced reflections, thesis and conclusions duly grounded.

The world's geopolitics and the international relations' actual system have definitely entered a new stage. Analysts have been prolific in multiplying visions, which try to understand the meaning of the “new world's order” and describe the post cold war paradigm – end of history, clash of civilization, geopolitical “chaos”, new empire, benevolent hegemony, world *American pax*, new cold war, imperial age, unipolar order, are descriptions found among many other classifications. Each of these perspectives captures aspects of the emerging reality although some are driven by political motivations and/or intentions; others evaluate new facts based on passed paradigms and concepts; others develop with the only purpose to oppose another; and others try to describe the new order as they wished it would be and not as it actually is.

¹ TOMÉ, Luis L., *Novo Recorte Geopolítico Mundial: uma ordem uni-multipolar, uma grande guerra e o jogo de “contenções múltiplas”*, in *Nação e Defesa*, n. 106 – 2º Série (“A nova carta do poder mundial”), IDN, Autumn-Winter 2003, pp 77-119.

My thesis does not intend to create, deny or follow any paradigm, but only to describe the actual international relations' status using a geopolitical and geostrategical perspective. To sum up and simplify, **I consider that a hybrid, complex and original model of world power structure, which we might call uni-multipolar, characterizes the new order, and coexists with two wide geopolitical and geostrategical movements: on the one hand, “a great war” against terrorism, weapons of massive destruction proliferation and “Rogue States” and, on the other, the game of “multiple containment” played by the USA’s hegemonic pressure and opposing powers which strive to contain or even invert its pretension.** This order derives mainly from the strategic impact rouse by three great events - the end of bipolar confrontation, the September 11th and Iraq’s recent military intervention – and, in a context characterized by the emergence of asymmetric threats and new strategies attempting to face them.

This study is divided in three parts that analyze these topics. The first part makes an attempt to draw the new world’s geopolitical order profile in terms of hierarchy and power distribution on the international relations, characterized as uni-multipolar. Here included is the North American hegemony analysis, the actual uni-multipolarization characterization, the uni-multipolarity limitations, the conditions of maintenance of this mixed order, positive effects, risks and dilemmas associated with uni-multipolarity, and the game of “mutual and multiple containment”. The second part makes a reflection about the relations between the USA and each one of the other great world and regional powers – European Union, Russia and China – in the scope of the multiple containment game and accounting the impacts coming from the end of cold war, the September 11th and Iraq crisis. The third part analyses the “new world war”, starting with the description of Al Qaeda’s war declaration and following the declaration of war to terrorism after the September 11th. It also characterizes the new asymmetric threats, in particular the “new type of terrorism” as well as the strategies implemented to face it, specially, the dilemmas and controversies about preventive and preemptive actions and North American “floating coalitions” or “will coalitions”. Finally, it analyses the UNO-USA relation in what concerns Iraq, considering the unilateral and multilateral questions. Conclusions will sum up the main topics stated in this work, uttering important ideas and thesis.

Introduction

With Westphalia Peace in 1648 emerged the modern international system whose basic principles shaped the international relations until the present days. The Westphalia order is based on the sovereignty of the States, which represents both the principle founder of the political society domestically, or, that supports the supreme authority of a political power (“*the sovereign does not have an equal power in the internal order...*”) and the **international order regulator** for the absolute State independence, that is to say, that a sovereign State is not submitted to any authority or power (“*...or superior power on the external order*”). The sovereignty established that internal policy and State institutions ought to be out of other States interference and, that in the international order, relations between recognized sovereign States should be “*inter pares*”. The fact that **formal “equality” is not compatible with differences in power and strength** showed that principles alone cannot establish behavior guidelines and conditioned the creation of a restrictions mechanism working through a balance that should avoid dominance from any powerful country – that is the **concept of power balance, mainly between great powers**.

These notions are clearly written in the most considered international regulator organ since the end of the 2nd World War – the United Nations Organization (UNO). **On the first paragraph of article 2 of UN Charter we read, “*The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.*”** At the same time the sovereign States have formally obliged themselves to refrain the use of force to solve differences, as stated on the fourth paragraph of the same article: “*All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*” However, there were two exceptional situations accepted: when there is a collective action organized by the Security Council against an aggressor State and the right to self-defense. In those days - 1945, when the United Nations Charter was written and signed, and especially on article 51, which establishes the right to self-defense - it is obvious that the idea was protection from aggressions coming from other States.

Maybe it is also convenient to remind that in 1945 the United Nations were founded by around 50 States (today we have 191) almost all Western; that USSR

was an ally in sequence to a war against the same enemy (Germany and Japan); that China was equally allied and still dominated by Chiang Kay-Sheck (People's Republic of China, with communist regime was only proclaimed in 1949, and its participation in the UN in replacement of the former would only occur in 1971); that decolonization processes were not yet in motion, etc. This is to emphasize that **back on those days the international order and the presuppositions were substantially different from nowadays**. To guarantee the power balance and responsibilities sharing was created the figure of the UN Security Council permanent member with veto power only accessible to the five war winners, USA, USSR, China, United Kingdom and France. The defeated countries - Germany and Japan were still enemies and of course excluded. Thus, on behalf of balance an inequality of fact between States was legally achieved.

Exceeded Paradigms

Despite the principles and rules established and formally accepted by the States which have continuously joined the United Nations, the **mechanism regulator of the international order came mainly from the effects caused by the confrontation between the two superpowers – USA and USSR. Therefore, the international order quickly became bipolar**. The international relations became hostage of the ideological, geopolitical and geostrategic superpower's considerations. The game of power had only two fundamental poles. Also, the development of nuclear weapons made less probable the war between those who possessed them. That developed the paradigm of the improbability of war consisting of a direct military conflict between the superpowers. The paradox in the nuclear era consisted of the growing nuclear capacity and the reduced will to use it. **The nuclear parity and the dissuasion by the “mutual destruction guarantee” imposed a new logic to the superpowers. The world's political bipolarization lived with the “cold war” and the balance of terror, and pushed the “hot” confrontation to peripheral areas**. Still, respecting the principle that “invented weapons end up being used” and suspecting their logic not to be valid for all countries, particularly those who have different considerations towards the human life value or those less informed about true apocalyptic effects of those weapons, **both superpowers agreed and managed the creation of mechanisms to regulate the nuclear weapons**

proliferation – once again on behalf of the international security the inequality between “equal” sovereign States was legally achieved.

These were the paradigms that lasted for four decades and a half on the international system. The Westphalia order principles remained basically valid – respect for sovereignty of States remained usually the international relations corner stone and the threats came from other States or coalitions.

Mutation of the international system and Westphalia order

The end of USA-USSR confrontation, the fall of Berlin wall and the USSR's implosion fifteen years ago, has dismantled the bipolar international relations system leaving the redefinition of a new world's power architecture and new international order open. **Without balance of powers or strategic rival, the USA have positioned has “hyper power”, turning many paradigms, concepts and even expectations obsolete** (essentially of those who anticipated or expected a multipolar order). Today we can say that the USA are the only totally sovereign power. This new world's order characterization deserves all attention and will be analyzed in the first chapter, but the truth is that **actually the Westphalia order is at stake**. Its principles are clearly in danger although there are no obvious alternatives. The traditional sovereign State face powerful pressures acting “beneath”, “below” and “inside”. As a consequence of globalization in its multiple dimensions, regional integration processes and new prominence of other international actors, the States are losing their relevance in the international stage – following to a long period when the international relations were mainly and almost exclusively relations between States and their agents – and now face the progressive erosion of formerly exclusive competences².

To this true phenomenon, nor bad or good, we should add others also relevant: **the national State concept is going through a metamorphosis and, territory as an element of national power has long lost it's meaning**. These facts may be associated with another, even more compromising of the traditional Westphalia

² For more detailed information about this topic: TOMÉ, Luis L., *O Estado e a Nova Ordem Internacional – entre a fragmentação e a globalização*, EdiUAL and Instituto Internacional de Macau, Lisboa, 2003

order: **the non-interference in other States' internal affairs principle has been abandoned in favor of humanitarian interference consolidation and even world jurisdiction.** This is not only used by the USA but also by other Western countries, the North Atlantic Treaty and even the United Nations. In the *2000 UN Millennium* summit the principle of humanitarian interference was approved by a large number of “non Western” States. During the 90's decade, the USA has undertaken humanitarian operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo; other countries have taken initiatives in East Timor (led by Australia) and in Sierra Leone (led by the United Kingdom). Except in Kosovo, all initiatives have been supported by the United Nations; in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO has led the interventions with the agreement and participation of European and North American allies.

On the other hand, **a State no longer withholds the monopoly of the use of strength and war** as established in the Westphalia order. This makes that threats to security and defense happen many times from non-State groups, such as terrorist organizations. Never like today “terrorism” has been such a dangerous threat to the international security – thus representing a fact that changes most of the usual concepts regarding threats, defense, security, strategy, politics and international relations. Besides, it is obvious that dangers proceeding from terrorism are actually linked to the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction (WMD). **The conjunction of these two threats: terrorism and WMD exponentially increase the danger.** Anyway, the main responsibility of eliminating, reducing or attenuating those threats and risks belongs to each State individually and above all depends of the collective and concerted action of States.

Part I

The Uni-Multipolar Order

The USA's Hegemony

The Uni-Multipolarity

The Game of “multiple containment”

PART I

THE UNI-MULTIPOLAR ORDER

All analysis describing the “new world’s order” inevitably depend on the interpretation of the international power structure and on the perception that each one has of the trail followed by the “hyper power” - USA as hegemonic power.

THE USA’S HEGEMONY

The North American hegemony is an unquestionable and undeniable fact resulting from more than its military power. **The USA is a superpower in all power domains**, summing military, political and strategic, economic, technological and scientific and cultural power. The skilful articulation of these fields creates an increase of power in each area individually and in the absolute power of the USA. Its political-strategical power depends and promotes the economic, which depends and projects its scientific-technological power, thus allowing expanding its culture and ethical values, which will again reflect its power in other spheres. All power domains articulate successively conditioning more power and influence accumulation. **Today, the USA are omnipresent military, politically, strategically and also economical and culturally. Its hegemony does not depend only of power to impose and coerce but also have its great influential and attraction ability.** Inevitably, the soviet empire’s collapse (collapsed from inside by its own contradictions) has brought a substantial increase of power to the USA, supported by strength, political, ideological and economical patterns, which have won the former confrontation.

Economical power

The North American economic supremacy is intimately associated with the scientific-technologic supremacy and the favorable conditions generated by the accelerated globalization process. This process – whose origins go back to the Discoveries and mercantile revolution, followed by the industrial revolution and,

more recently by the extraordinary technological innovations in the field of transports and communications that have substantially reduced space and time notions – includes all world in a system of narrow interdependence. In these terms, **the conditions proposed and imposed by the USA are extremely efficient. They work through the direct action of American governmental institutions, its powerful network of multinational enterprises controlling world markets and also through the international regulation agencies, such as the World Trade Organization, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, deeply inspired in North American concepts.** It is obvious that this work does not come from one country's initiative or one economical group and that most of the developed and developing countries will benefit with the globalization (it is the case of Asiatic economies and China, in particular). However, in the extent that the **USA control the economy sectors of high technology** and usually is highly competitive in most important sectors, makes them leaders and controllers of the process. Their economical supremacy is visible and projected by the fact that we live in a “**Dollar parity**” era, and most of the international trading uses the reference of North American currency. Despite their huge external debt, dependence of external markets and high deficit on the commercial balance **they have the highest GDP of the world. The USA's GDP represents around a quarter of the world's GDP, in just one country!** In a ranking referring to the most important and powerful companies of the world, half of the chart, or more, will present North American companies. Some voices foresee the USA's economical decline but numbers do not show it. Referring to decline, the most concerning and impressive is the European and not the Asian or the North American.

Cultural and Scientific-Technological power

The USA's cultural power is frequently devaluated and considered only in terms of its scientific-technological aspects. However, this area has big power of attraction and slowly shows great expression and domination. During the 20th century, the scientific production has increasingly moved from Europe to the USA. In the beginning of the 21st century, the **technological and innovation ability concentrated in the USA is significant as well as the increasing rhythm of intellectual exodus from all over the world heading to the country**, including musicians, artists or actors. The **English** language became “the universal

communication tongue”. TV, Cinema and Internet are channels that express USA's cultural supremacy and influence – they present a countless multiplying effect, projecting life and behavior patterns and exporting their values and ideals. Medals and sport achievements go to America at the same time as Nobel prizes and other international scientific awards. Their universities, research and investigation centers are the most prestigious and assume the role of international elite meeting and working point. The world's attention given to the cinema Oscar award ceremony or NASA progresses is unprecedented. **The immense and powerful dissemination of American cultural style and values affects similarly the development of other cultures.** Helio Jaguaribe, Dean of Rio de Janeiro Cultural and Political Studies Institute underline three of its most important effects: “ *the first refers to the fact that modernity and modernization, specially in what concerns youth from all over the world, is seen as equivalent to an Americanization process or something resulting from it. Institutions and American procedures, like democracy and neoliberal economy, super competitive individuality, unlimited consuming is considered desirable. Finally – the most disastrous – in all nations and social classes spreads the conviction that “the American way of life” and its high unrestricted consuming are universally accessible since American institutions and processes are adopted*”³. Certainly, the USA's own ethnic-cultural composition conditioned the absorption of many cultural inputs coming from diverse origins. Still, if there were doubts about real cultural power emanating from the US, they would vanish when we realize that none of civilizations is immune. Consolidated and millenary cultures, such as the Chinese, the Indian or the Arabic try to resist “external influences” making a reference to the USA. The “Western civilization” becomes Americanized even if the USA are “Europe's descendents”.

Besides the economical, scientific-technological and cultural power, the great founder and catalyst of the USA's hegemony is the military power, which means clear political and strategical supremacy.

³ JAGUARIBE, Helio, *O Novo Sistema Internacional* in Estratégia – Revista de Estudos Internacionais, IEEI, 16, 1st Semester 2002, p.27

Military supremacy and strategical expansion

The USSR implosion has accentuated the unbalance of the USA towards the rest of the world. They have a large military arsenal gathered to face the former soviet threat, capacity to projecting power, influence and strength all over the world, adapted the network of alliances made during the bipolar confrontation, and military omnipresence in all world. **The enormous American power finds a private world with one relevant adversary only.** Although the USA have tried to enjoy the “peace share” – ordering their soldiers return from foreign areas specially in Europe and Eastern Asia, reducing defense budgets, investing in the economical recovery and deepening bonds with former adversaries as well as diffusing democracy, human rights’ values and economical liberalism – the truth is that **they saw the end of the cold war as a chance to expand the strategical reach of America.** Many politicians and analysts have called the myth of isolation to defend and try to demonstrate “American’ strategical withdraw”. However, the reality has shown the **USA’s military intervention abroad more often than before.** Bush’s father administration invaded Panama in 1989, had Gulf war in 1991 (having sent half of a million American soldiers to Persia Gulf region) and made an humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992; with Clinton administrations there were interventions in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo; George Bush’s administration made already interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, they increasingly have used force in restricted ways with air raids and missiles attacks. All these military involvements, different in what concerns contexts and motivations, are a sign either of hyper power’s will to use war force or as of the assumption of world police role responsibility, as guardians of international order and security in diverse regions of the globe. In this period we have also seen a drastic reduction of the world military expenses: from 1.100 billion USD in the end of 1980 to 900 billion in the end of 2003. In the same period occurred an abrupt slow down in armament sales (around 50%) and a significant increase of armament market control by the USA and its allies: the USA have increased its share of 20% to more than 40% while NATO allies’ group have increased from 44% to 75%. According to the estimates from the prestigious *International Institute for Strategic Studies* (IISS), in 2003, the USA were responsible for 47.5% of the global arms deliveries by supplier (in the amount of 13,648 million USD) and for 56.7% of the market share of global arms transfer agreements by supplier (in the amount of

14,543 million USD)⁴. Just to compare the market share of others leading suppliers of arms deliveries, UK represents a share of 16.3% (in the amount of 4,700 million USD), Russia represents a share of 11.8 % (with 3,400 million USD), France and Germany represents 4.2% each (in the amount of 1,200 million USD each) and China represents 3.1% (with 500 million USD). In what concerns of global arms transfers agreements by supplier, in 2003, Russia presented a share of 16.8% and an amount of 4,300 million USD, Germany represents 5.5% of share and 1,400 million USD, France represents a share of 3.9% with an amount of 1,000 million USD, while China presented a share of 1.2% and an amount of 300 million USD⁵ (in fact, China is much more a leading recipient than a supplier of arms – in 2003, received 1,000 million USD of arms deliveries and celebrated arms transfer agreements in the amount of 500 million USD⁶). On the other hand, the USA defense budgets in the first post cold war decade were kept above 3% of the GDP (3.7%, in 2003). On Europe the average defense budget was reduced to less than 2% of the GDP. After the September 11th and due to the war against terrorism and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq the **American Defense budget has drastically increased**. In 2003, the US Defence Expenditure ascended to 404,920 million USD (without counting extraordinary budgets approved in April and September 2003 to support military operations and reconstruction missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the “war against terror”, in a total of 157 billion USD), which turns the USA responsible for almost half of the world’s military expenses.

While many opinions foreseen “the end of geopolitics” by the supremacy of geo-economy and International Law, the USA have launched a “*Military Affairs Revolution*” (MIR). The North American strategy and planning are still based on the supposition that their country might have to fight and win two wars simultaneously in different regions of the world – being the Korean Peninsula and the Gulf of Persia the favorite theatres for this strategic calculation. Besides, Washington have kept the alliances made during the bipolar era, adapting and

⁴ See *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, IISS, Oxford University Press, 2004, Tables 38 to 44, referring to the International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Arms Trade, pp. 353-359.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

expanding them and implemented “floating coalitions” and “will coalitions” whenever it was useful and necessary.

Military Omnipresence

In this post cold war era, in fact, the USA represent a military superiority and omnipresence never seen before in History. In peace times, around 255,000 North American soldiers are positioned outside of their territory, spread through more than 150 bases and military installations in 110 countries. Summing the additional forces positioned in Afghanistan and Iraq the number of American soldiers out of the country largely surpasses 400,000⁷! Continuing the sum we must consider the few thousand serving in vessels, aircraft carriers and submarines sailing permanently oceans and seas around the world, the *intelligence* and special operation units.

The great majority of North American military devices were inherited from the cold war period, especially from NATO in Europe (Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Turkey, Denmark, Iceland, Spain, Belgium and Portugal) and in Eastern Asia (having large contingents of almost 38,000 soldiers in South Korea and Japan). In the Old Continent, Partnership programs and NATO’s Enlargement have expanded the USA’s military presence to East and Southeast. Due to the enlargement, the USA and the Atlantic Alliance strategical reorientation, implementation of NATO’s new command structure and also to “new European fidelities”, the North American contingents might be moved to Eastern countries. Eventually they might move from Germany (with more than 71,000 American militaries) to Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria or even to the Baltic countries. NATO’s missions and interventions in the Balkans have also conditioned the expansion of the North American military presence.

Besides the maintenance of defense and security compromises coming from the former bipolar context, another recent element justifies a military omnipresence and also the creation of new coalitions and partnerships: **the war against terrorism and against weapons of massive destruction**. This campaign, linked to Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz principle that states “the mission determines the coalition” has promoted

⁷ Data about USA’s military presence is found in many publications and is not always coincident. Numbers here quoted are from Newsweek Magazine, of July 21, 2003.

a significant reinforcement of the North American military presence in the large region of Middle East and Central Asia configuring a real “strategical revolution” in this area of the world. Since the September 11th, the USA have created new bases in this region or its surroundings: Pakistan (Jakobabad), Kyrgystan (Manas), Uzbekistan (Karshi-Khanabad), Afghanistan (Kandahar, Bagram and Mazar-al-Sharif), Djibuti (Camp le Monier) Hungary (Taszar), Romania (Constanza), Bulgaria (Burgas). Meanwhile, the 5,000 militaries positioned since the Gulf War are withdrawn from Saudi Arabia, only leaving a “residual force”. In Iraq, it is expected the establishment of four military bases: Bashur, in Kurdistan; the H1, near the border with Jordan and Syria; Baghdad, near the airport; and Tallil, near Nassyria. Permanent contingents in other Gulf countries like Qatar, Bahrain and Oman have also increased. Involved in the campaign against terrorism, besides the traditional allies (European NATO, Japan, South Korea and Australia) other States are supported financially and military or with *Intelligence*: Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Colombia, Pakistan, Russia, Philippines, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore⁸.

The US’ strategical omnipresence and their world projection is clearly assumed and expressed in their ten strategical commands⁹. Five of those are functional: Space Command, Strategic Command (controls nuclear arsenal), Transports Command, Allied Forces Command, Special Operations Command. **The other five are geographical commands that divide the world in great regions:** North Command USNORTHCOM (includes all North America and part of Caribbean), South Command USSOUTHCOM (Central and South America), Europe Command USEUCOM (commands Greenland, Europe – including Russian Federation – and almost all African Continent), Pacific Command USPACOM (integrating Antarctic, all Pacific-Asia and Australia, Indian continent and shares Alaska with the North Command) and Central Command USCENTCOM (embraces a particularly complex and sensitive zone of 24


⁸ TOMÉ, Luis *A Omnipresença Militar Norte Americana e a Nova Nato*, in *Janus 2004-Anuário de Relações Exteriores*, Observatório de Relações Exteriores da UAL and *Publico* Newspaper, 2003, pp 24-25.

⁹ For more information about the Commands, see *A Política Externa Norte Americana*, in *Janus 2003-Anuário de Relações Exteriores*, UAL Observatório de Relações Exteriores and *Publico* Newspaper, 2002, pp 98-99 and the website: www.defenselink.mil.

countries, from Sudan to Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf and Central Asia to Pakistan)¹⁰.

These geographical commands are in charge of air, land and sea space defense from military, terrorist, nuclear chemical or bacteriological aggression, coordinating the response adequately. In times of peace, these commands allow the USA to search and intervene in domains of natural catastrophes, narcotics traffic, clandestine migrations, WMD traffic, assistance to civil population and military operations and exercises.

Map: Five geographical commands of the USA



Source: USA's Defense Department at www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifiedcommand/

¹⁰ For more information about the USA Central Command, see TOMÉ, Luis, *11 de Setembro: consequências na Ásia Central e do Sul*, in *Janus 2003...*, op. cit, pp 170-171 and the website: www.defenselink.mil

The North American military omnipresence as above described is both a consequence and a catalyst of the USA's hegemony giving an apparent unipolar character to the international order. This character is proved by the "almost unilateral" American military interventions in Afghanistan (it would have been easy to do it under UN and/or NATO sphere, that has for the first time invoked the collective defense clause, article 5) and Iraq. This idea is reinforced by American initiatives to maintain maximum freedom internationally – boycott to International Penal Court, unilaterally abrogated the ABM Treaty of 1972, non ratification of the Non Proliferation Treaty, not joining the 1995 protocol about Biological and Chemical Weapons, nor Agreements related with anti-personnel mines, abandoned Kyoto Protocol about global heating... Concluding, and quoting General Loureiro dos Santos "*the American national interests look at other States as entities of limited sovereignty, guarding full sovereignty only to themselves*"¹¹.

Enviably position

In fact, in the actual conjuncture the USA enjoy an enormous power disparity in relation with the rest of the world. **They cannot be coerced, imposed rules, guidelines and behaviors that they do not wish to assume and respect. However they enjoy a position that allows their virtual intervention where and whenever they want. Limits are set by themselves,** in their own terms and following their interests and ideals. If necessary, the international organizations they belong to are ignored and new circumstantial and convenient coalitions are made to meet their own objectives (will coalitions). The USA have no will to give in or share competences they consider exclusively theirs or any part of their sovereignty in a classical definition that says "*does not have an equal power in the internal order or superior power on the external order*". This is clearly assumed by Jesse Helms, External Relations Senate Committee president when he wrote in an article: "*It is true that 50 years ago the USA Senate has ratified the UN Chart. With this action America has not gave in a single "syllable" of its sovereignty to the United Nations. According to the American system, when international agreements are ratified they simply become part of USA's domestic Law. They have no bigger or smaller importance than any other*

¹¹ SANTOS, General Loureiro dos, *Regressa o Império Benigno?*, in *Visão* magazine, nº 549, 11 to 17 of September, 2003, p.54

*American domestic law. Treaties obligations may be over passed by a simple Congress act*¹².

The USA' strategic objective is to prevent any other power or coalition to match the American power, to reinforce the difference of strength in relation with other powers and to establish a real *American pax* in the world. They intend a world reformation based on their own moral patterns and the progress towards their world vision – messianic expressions of being an exceptional nation endowed with virtues and singular responsibilities. **The American people do not see their country as an Empire but as the last superpower.** They are absolutely conscious of possessing unmatched power and intend to preserve and consolidate this position. For many of them this supremacy carries the **moral obligation to play a regulator role on the international affairs** even if that is made at the cost of exceeding institutional mechanisms, that being considered the most efficient way to solve world problems or protect vital North American interests. Naturally they look at their country as one good power trying to contribute to the world peace, democracy, promotion of human rights and free trade. **Intimately they look at America as the great defender and promoter of liberties.**

The primacy of Law and International Law mean the external use of American values and law; human rights and trade liberalization are tools that legitimate the USA's interference and expansion. Thus it is understood “the humanitarian interference right” and exclusion and cast out of certain states from the idea of “International community” – these are identified as “Rogue States” potentially dangerous and out of control, dissidents of Washington's originated order and with no respect for the rules imposed by the USA: Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, North Korea, Syria, Sudan or Libya, just to mention a few. **For many, globalization itself** – considered as a process of dilution of traditional borders, increase of interdependence and interaction, rise of transnational reciprocity and intensifying of processes and activities that turn the world in one place – **is mainly the expression of USA' spirit of dealer and missionary**, coming up as a kind of ideology of the new world's order led by Washington. Those considering the existence of a unipolar or imperial order look at few international organizations,

¹² HELMS, Jesse, *American Sovereignty and the UN*, in *The National Interest*, Washington, Winter 2000/01, p.32, quoted by Admiral António Emílio Ferraz Sacchetti, “Estratégia e Relações de Poder” in *Anais do Clube Militar Naval*, vol. CXXXIII, July-September 2003, p. 442.

such as IFM, UNO, NATO and WTO as mere agents of American external policy, ambitions and interests. They represent **mere expressions of “the American empire”, based in the supposition of order and stability and not on conquering or territorial expansion.**

The USA generically have the power to veto or boycott proposals that **affect their interests.** However, the success of a relevant international initiative depends upon the North American participation. This is the mirror of an order that looks even more unipolar: the dominating power acquires a hegemonic position, defining unipolarity as the force distribution for only one power clearly alone at the top of hierarchy. This situation inevitably generates unilateralist tendencies in the USA due to three main reasons: first, they have sufficient power to act alone; second, they increasingly assume the role of world order regulator; third, they identify American interests and ideals with those of the international community – defending the first serves the second.

The frequent crisis and conflicts, and the end of cold war made clear that the international system is not self-adjusted or self-regulated, meaning that in the absence of another effective international regulator mechanism - as the bipolar scheme in which each one of the superpowers dominated its zone, and both dominated the international system – and “impotence” of the UN (due to lack of resources and necessary political consensus between the powers to impose the Organization’s authority in all occasions) the USA started to assume that role, step by step, either to secure their interests or on behalf of the “international community”. **However, this enviable position puts them as the most desired target,** due to their strategical dimension, their global responsibility and for what they stand for.

THE UNI-MULTIPOLARITY

The existence of only one superpower its an undeniable fact, but does not imply that the international order is truly unipolar, like in a situation where there are no relevant powers besides the superpower. Despite being hegemonic and possessing incomparable supremacy, **the USA do not practice an effective unipolarity,** although they long for it. **Four main reasons set limits to unipolarity.** In first place, it represents a model where only one power is relevant – in the actual model the **superpower coexists with other internationally very relevant**

regional powers, which prevent the USA to manage the world as unipolar. Secondly, the USA represent the superpower in full strength (joining political, strategical and military power with economical, scientific-technological and cultural power) **but having in some of these areas rivals with similar capacity**. In third place, **the world remains too anarchic and complex for absolute hegemony**. Growing complexity is the trend making the holder of supremacy unable to solve great international questions on its own. Finally, the **USA do not show preparation to run an “empire”**, not only due to external factors but also **for domestic reasons, because the US citizens refuse to assume the consequent financial and human sacrifices** – represented for instance by Vietnam or Somalia “syndrome”.

In relation to domestic factors inhibiting Washington to exercise the world's domination, it does not mean that Americans would not prefer a true unipolar order. In fact the USA face **significant socio-economical and political restrictions intrinsic to a democratic regime like theirs**. **These restrictions inhibit the USA to take advantage of this hegemonic moment to directly and preventively confront the biggest adversaries to their supremacy**. There is nothing new in this situation and its constraints. Right after the 2nd World War, in the brief period when the USA had the strategical advantage of possessing an atomic weapon only later possessed by Moscow in 1949, the Americans opted for a strategy of Soviet Union's “containment” instead of forcing Stalin to withdraw from its positions in Europe. At that time, the biggest request for a USA's force action came from Britain and not from the American. Winston Churchill criticized “containment” and laid objections to delaying negotiations until after the establishment of force positions. He argued that the Western position was stronger than ever, so the relative position could only deteriorate: *“ what will happen when they possess the atomic weapon and a large stock? You may calculate what will happen by the present events... We should not move along with imprudent and incompetent, waiting for something to happen, and I mean waiting for something bad. Western nations have far more chances to achieve a long lasting bloodless agreement if they make their fair demands before communists also have atomic power”*¹³. Since the end of the cold

¹³ CHURCHILL, Winston S., *His Complete Speeches, 1867-1963*, ed. Robert Rhodes James, Volume VII, 1943-1949, New York 7 London, Chelsea House in association with R.R.Bowker, 1974, p. 7710

war, many people have used this same argumentation referring to China or Russia. Today, like before, the USA are not willing to risk and bear necessary sacrifices.

Besides, the North American public opinion does not accept violent or evil ways of coercion, which makes it very difficult to impose unipolarity or preserve an imperial system. The American administration also feels the need to use the character of legitimacy on its foreign interventions. They look for UN covering, or the request of an Alliance (NATO) or a “will coalition” with other countries, that somehow legitimate their action to avoid the previously seen “demonization” of regimes and leaders. On the other hand, Washington always presents to American public opinion (and also international) a powerful justification of its initiatives, whether it is “universal democratic values” defense, security and “American vital interests”, or on behalf of the community of nations and international legality. In fact, not only other countries but also the North American population demand a sign of legitimacy from Washington. In a democratic regime this factor is crucial because governors depend on the population to maintain their position. **It would be very difficult for the USA to use unipolarity** because this requires not only reducing or containment of other powers but also the total marginalization of international regulation mechanisms (like the United Nations) and its ally’s alienation, which the American public opinion would not easily accept. We can see this issue as one of the most important in the 2004 Presidential electoral campaign in the USA due to Iraq crisis and its partners and allies problems. This marginalization and alienation should be easily accepted by an isolationist impetus rather than by the attempt to impose a unipolar world management.

The frequent references to “American empire” and an alleged “unipolar order” come more often from anti-American positions or justifications of the good character of this “empire” than from real facts descriptions. It is true that actually, the only power with prominence in all power domains, from *hard power* to *soft power*, being the only ones with capacity to promote their interests virtually all over the world are the USA. But this is only one side of the coin. The success of more important international dilemmas resolution, including the protection of some values and American vital interests depends either on the effective compromise of the USA or on the cooperation with at least some of the powers whose role and international and regional status are really indispensable. For instance, the combat against weapons of mass destruction proliferation and missile technology, the war against terrorism or pacification and stabilization of one area demand a wide collaboration among several powers, exactly because we do not

live in a truly unipolar order. This is why **other great powers, regionally important in the world's power architecture cannot be ignored** – although not having capacity to affirm their interests as globally as the USA – as their capacities, perceptions, ambitions and evolutions are carefully watched and judged by the superpower and other international actors. Among others, we can highlight France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (for now avoiding a direct reference to the European Union), Russia, China, Japan or India. Maybe this perception explains the reason why in moments considered as of unipolar or American unilateralism, the USA have tried to set up large coalitions with some of these powers and act on behalf of the “international community”, in the pursue of its objectives and sometimes controversial foundations.

Although in the height of their power, the **USA cannot and are not willing to coerce by force other great powers as Russia, China or India**. In the current context this is out of question even if the USA would like to establish unipolarity. In the relation with these powers deterrence is still in force.

On the other hand, the **international stability in several regions of the globe depend equally on the behavior of the only superpower as on the regional powers, although globally, the USA are the “essential nation”** to quote Madeleine Allbright. **From a geo-economical point of view the USA face rivals with similar power**, like the European Union and the Eastern Asian block led by Japan (and China in the near future). **In a more cultural or civilizational consideration the world is not favorable for American domain** – we just need to remember the difficulties of the North American culture or “Western values” penetration in the Arab world, in the immense China or in the great Indian democracy.

Another restrictive factor of the USA's unipolarity is the strategic aim to prevent the formation and consolidation of “anti-hegemonic coalitions”. In the present terms it does not seem possible to foresee a wide coalition integrating, for instance, China, India, Russia and the European Union. Although they all deny a hegemonic order, their coalition makes no sense even because some consider themselves adversaries or antagonists. However, the USA's pressure to manage the world in unipolarity might lead other great powers to overcome reciprocal disagreements and put together anti-American partnerships.

We may remember, for instance, “anti-hegemonic strategical partnership launched in 1996 by Russia and China united (only 10 years after Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok allowing normalization of relations between Moscow and

Beijing) or some analysis produced in the peak of Iraq crisis about a new strategical axis, France – Germany - Russia to oppose the USA.

Even if no other power or coalition has the same capability pretension of having the USA's ambitions and status, the American hegemony is moderated or balanced by significant regional actors. That fact justifies the North American search for a balance between unilateralism, multilateralism and even bilateralism in the relation with other powers. That also brings to the international order the medley and hybrid aspect of uni-multipolarity. Notwithstanding, this does not mean that the hyper power always depends of the articulation with other powers; or that other great powers are open to that cooperation in all occasions, submissive to American doctrines. This only reveals that the world is not truly unipolar. **The power structure shows the coexistence of a superpower, alone in its class and at the top of hierarchy, with other determinant powers.**

Long lasting character of the uni-multipolar order

To many authors, including North Americans, the present situation (whether considered unipolar or uni-multipolar) is unstable and transitory as in relatively short term the world's order will evolve to multipolarity, either through the emergence of new powers or through the future world's power distribution among several poles. So, some uphold that the USA should take this moment of supremacy to create power partnerships – in particular in the Euro-Asia space, fundamental for international stability and security – that will grant the prosecution of their interests in less favorable circumstances (Zbigniew Brzezinski). Others, equally foreseeing an order with more balance between three or four powers, defend that the USA should use their temporary position to safeguard their vital interests and not the international community's, or humanitarian interests of peripheral countries (Samuel Huntington and Henry Kissinger)¹⁴.

I do not believe that this kind of system, here described as uni-multipolar is short of stability and longevity. The “stability” question of the uni-multipolar

¹⁴ See BOTELHO, Teresa analysis *Os paradoxos do hiperpoder norte-americano*, in Janus 2003- Anuário de Relações Exteriores, Observatório de Relações Exteriores da UAL and Publico newspaper, November 2002, pp.103-103.

system as well as its risks and dilemmas will be analyzed in the next chapter. With reference to its more or less “long” character it is worthy of notice that the “long lasting” concept is extraordinary subjective in these affairs. For a few it is considered as one or two decades and for others it goes to half a century or more. If we look at History’s examples, in particular recent History where we can find “world orders”, a system considered as “durable” lasts for several decades, at least for 30 to 50 years. Not many will deny that a bipolar system has lasted for the period known in History as “cold war” and we can date it as of 1947 to 1991 – that is 44 years¹⁵ – being in fact durable.

If we consider a length of period similar to the cold war, the current international order transfiguration into another authentic unipolar, bipolar or multipolar order does not seem reasonable. Mostly because we cannot predict how the other powers might increase in a way to rival with the superpower. Or that the latter can decline in a way that the international order would become truly multipolar in a reasonably term. In the same way, I also do not believe that the USA will be able to increase their hegemony to the point of “drying out” or significantly reducing other powers, to determine alone the trend of the world and regional’s policies. In affairs this complex, with such large variables and contingency of factors it is obvious that any futurology seems risky and dispensable (although I recognize the interest and utility of some studies and thesis). Also

¹⁵ As relative as these issues of dating historical periods might be, the year of 1947 seems to be more adequate to date the beginning of cold war, because the American President then described “two distinct ways of life...” declaring the later known “Truman doctrine”; General Marshall presented an auxiliary and economical recovery plan for Europe (Marshall Plan); Foreign Affairs Magazine published the article by Mr X (George Kennam) proposing “containment” strategy which marked all the USA’s external policy during cold war. On the other hand, also in 1947, the USSR refuted with “Jdanov doctrine”; created the first mechanism of satellite control-Kominform; prevented Marshall plan’s acceptance to some countries under its domain sphere; accelerated sovietization of Eastern Europe by the “Salami tactic”. Prague stroke followed, as well as Tito-Stalin break up, first Berlin crisis and the formalization of GDR-Germany division, creation of COMECOM, NATO, the communist victory in China, Korea war, San Francisco system implementation, Warsaw pact, etc.... The year 1991 seems the more adequate to date the end of cold war, because after the fall of “Berlin wall” symbol like and freedom of Eastern Europe in 1989, or German reunification in 1990, cold war has meet its own end with Soviet Union’s fragmentation in 1991. If the conservative authors of “Moscow strike” in 1991 had been successful in August, it would have lasted a little longer. However other dates are accepted to mark the beginning or end of cold war in relation to the importance given to other events.

because History is fertile in more or less unexpected and sudden events which have caused accelerations and changes in evolution rhythms and in particular in the hierarchization and distribution of power (to demonstrate it we could call many examples of revolutions, wars, fall of empires, military defeats, stroke of States, etc.) However, if we invoke serious prospective sceneries and studies with best chances of evolution and considering only some of the present trends – without referring to unpredictable situations such as generalized confrontation among great powers, China's implosion, Russia Federation's fragmentation, a step back in European integration or serious US social-political disturbs, among many others – it seems that we should not easily presume the close end of the here described uni-multipolar order in terms of structure and power.

Effectively, the **limits to unipolarity** here exposed – internal constraints; search for legitimacy; existence of other regional relevant powers; competition and resistance of powers and international players in some domains of power; need of articulation with other powers to guarantee the successful resolution of some relevant international affairs; growing complexity of system and international relations - **make less probable that the USA will be able to impose a truly unipolar management of the international system.** I repeat, it does not seem that the international uni-multipolar order should be brief and in transition to unipolarity. I do not believe that the USA will have absolute domain of the world – even because I doubt of this intention. As General Garcia Leandro refers, the **USA may be already approaching a pre-rupture situation by the excessive expansion and over-stretched extension of its military responsibilities to the world scale,** which in a way, is convenient to their geopolitical adversaries, but not to Europe. This is a geo-strategy and geopolitical classic. In geostrategy terms it happened to Napoleon, Nazi Germany and Empyrean Japan in Pacific War; in geopolitical terms it happened to cold war's USSR, leading to its implosion; considering in a wide perspective of History, the same has occurred mostly to all empires¹⁶.

The sceneries proposing the transition to a new bipolar order always present the USA as one of the poles. The other pole is variable according to the authors, their perspectives and intentions. The chances of a pseudo-bipolarization between the USA and the “universal public opinion”, or between America and the “rest of

¹⁶ LEANDRO, General Garcia *Paz e Segurança*, in *Nação e Defesa*, n.106 – 2nd series (“A Nova carta o Poder Mundial”), IDN, Autumn-Winter 2003, p. 23

the world” seem so absurd that do not deserve any comments. Also, some thesis expressing the confrontation between the “Western” and “Islam” (it is not visible how Islam, so heterogeneous and diverse on the inside could be or would want to be “as a group” a pole of world power) are left aside. Other thesis, more credible and sustained usually point at China (very seriously considered by the USA, specially in the 90’s but still considered today), Russia (looking at the resurrection of the cold war rival), Europe (in a scenery of total political integration and tendency to compete for hegemony with the current ally USA) or in a scenery of articulation between two or more great powers (China-Russia or Europe-Russia, in a perspective of a new strategic powerful axis to face the USA’s unilateral pressure).

However, in a relatively short term of one or two decades, it does not seem probable that Russia, China or the European Union should be able to assemble enough capacity and power that would allow them to compensate North American power and project a bipolar system. In order to be a world power pole in a new bipolar system at short or long term, it should be necessary and urgent to do the following:

- a) Very high increases of military and strategical power to surmount the huge gap towards the USA and to be able to really project power, influence and force all over the world – this is not compatible with economic development priorities of any of these powers;
- b) Implementation of alliances and partnerships policy to allow Russia, China or the EU to form an “alternative” field to the USA and to have a world strategic influence sphere – hard for any of those powers for the lack of attraction and coercion ability;
- c) Working up on efficient strategies to skirt policies of “containment”, subversion or even confrontation directed by the USA and other regional powers.

In the long term these tasks are theoretically possible (in particular in what concerns China); in the short and medium term that seems as almost impossible. In **Europe’s specific case**, we do not see the possibility of positively wanting to reach the USA’s level of power or dispute the world hegemony with its actual ally. It would mean to mischaracterize the European Union and definitely put in cause the currently anemic “State Providence”. **Even if they “wanted” to do so, still had to put the question of “being able to do it”** – a fundamental problem that also concerns other powers. Above all it seems impossible to ascribe the European

Union that whim – although some leaders and countries would like to bring this perspective to reality – due to the immediate disastrous consequences it would have on the integration process and in new breaches among Europeans. **Is there European cohesion to resist a project based in such plans, or abilities to achieve such an assignment, we ask.**

The European Union is already considered a power but in the perspective of strategical and complementary partner of the USA – representing great part of the “Western countries”. From this point to the evolution to a bipolar system disputed with America it does not seem possible or desirable.

If this scenery does not seem likely **it is also not probable that in the short term a new alternative axis embracing two or more of the actual great powers will come up. The options might present a new EU, Russia axis, or a triple alliance between France, Germany and Russia; or another of Russia and China’s¹⁷ association; or this association extended to Japan or India. Theoretically all these associations can be foreseen but never in the short or medium term.** Any of these options would have natural difficulties in being successful on a bipolar system. Also, from the moment of starting their implementation they should face the **firm opposition, containment and subversion coming from the superpower (USA) and from other great, medium or small regional powers that would see it as a threat.** Besides, nowadays great powers try to restrain USA’s hegemony and unilateralism rather through strategical alliances and partnerships than by the implementation of counter forces. Also, **some of these powers – EU, Russia, China, Japan or India - do not trust each other and consider themselves as rivals** (in some cases its more appropriate to say antagonists), which prevent the creation of true alternative axis. The strategic partnership between China and Russia shows the difficulties of creating a counter force to oppose the USA. During the 90’s decade Moscow and Beijing were involved in pursuing objective and in 1996, launched together a strategical partnership “against hegemonic strategies”. After India’s participation being out of question (due to rivalries with China), China and Russia associated with ex-soviet countries of Central Asia of Shanghai Cooperation Group. However, this Group was not a real alternative nor able to impose bipolarization to the USA, as it did not soften North America’s hegemony.

¹⁷ This hypothesis seems the most solid even because is based on recent events. This association of China and Russia to face the USA is anticipated by ACHCAR, Gilbert in *La Nouvelle Guerre Froide Le Monde Après de Kosovo*, in Éditions PUF, Paris, 1999.

It did not exceed differences of interests, did not stop the USA' strategical expansion in Asia, mainly after the September 11th, and it did not prevent both countries of trying to be the USA's "main strategic partners". Great powers look for status recognition and important roles in the international stage and respective regions rather than forming a new world's power axis. This attitude might change, if the USA starts to impose a unipolar and unilateral world management that might lead to the approximation and articulation between some other powers.

Also, **it should be necessary that the USA would not increase its power and would do nothing to prevent the rise of a rival** to the successful emergence of other pole of power. This would not happen as Washington has already shown.

Since the end of cold war both analysts and political leaders have anticipated **perspectives and expectations of a true multipolar order**. However, that has not occurred due to the growing hegemony and incomparable supremacy of the USA. Nowadays, many continue to anticipate an international system whose power is divided in several poles, although not in the short term. Many of these theses seem more as a desire than prospective sceneries based in real facts and trends. In the short term the main obstacle to a multipolar or bipolar order has two sides. On the one hand, the inability of third powers to grow and impose multipolarity or bipolarity, and on the other, the supremacy of the United States and their will to be isolated at the top of the world power hierarchy. Defenders of a favorable evolution to multipolarity refer the conjunction of factors: emergence of new powers and decline of Americans. However, we can see by some facts that the actual trend, instead of American decline, is the decline of one other alternative power pole – the European. Despite the unquestionable military and strategical superiority, the USA still spend more money in defense than other great powers altogether. As previously referred, the North American alone are responsible for almost half of the world's military expenses – and even expect an increase of 30% until 2009. On its turn, Europe does not show appetite to increase expenses in defense. The scientific investigation investment is also higher in the USA than in Europe – for each active person the USA invest the double of the Europeans in scientific investigation: EUR 1200,00 per year against EUR 600,00 respectively¹⁸.

¹⁸ BARNIER, Michel, *Propositions pour une recherche Européene*, European commissary, in *Le Monde*, 09.07.03, in a quotation by GIL, Fernando, TUNHAS, Paulo and COHN, Danièle, *Impasses- seguido de coisas vistas, coisas ouvidas*, Publicações Europa-América, October 2003, p.167

The American economy will continue to be predominant in the next decades. For instance, American share in the world's GDP in 2000 was 25% and will be 24% in 2020 and 23% in 2050; Asia will rise from 35% to 43% and 45% respectively, and Europe will fall from 23% to 21% in 2020 and 12% in 2050¹⁹. At the same time, between the years 2000 and 2050 the active population in the USA will grow from 269 to 355 millions, while in the same period the active European population will diminish from 331 to 243 millions²⁰ – it is like 90 millions active Europeans would move to produce in the USA!!!

Although unpredictable, in the short term, the international system's evolution to unipolarity, bipolarity (either in a dispute between America and another power or an alliance of powers), or to multipolarity we have to conclude that the current uni-multipolar power structure will last for a while. It should last for the next decades, and its players should remain frustrated by their status and role either regionally or internationally. However, if we account the longer term, let's say 50 years the evolution might be different eventually to a mutipolar order.

Positive effects, risks and dilemmas of the Uni-Multipolar order

Recognizing that the characterization of the international order as uni-multipolar is not consensual we also assume that describing its risks and virtues is highly polemic. Mainly on an international environment marked by the Iraq crisis effects, when many understand the international relations based on a Manichean vision of “for” and “against”. Still, I believe this chapter to be very useful.

Meanwhile, two previous notices. First, the positive effects and risks inherent to this mixed and hybrid order live together, and might cross deeply depending on the circumstances. Once again, **the advantages and dilemmas of the uni-multipolar order represent different sides of the same coin** – that is why this topic is related to the next one about the multiple containment game. On the other hand we should not forget that, even in theory, **we are analyzing the current**

¹⁹ Numbers presented by GIL, Fernando, in *Impasses-seguido de coisas vistas, coisas ouvidas*, Publicações Europa-América, October 2003, p.166, quoting “*World Trade in the 21st Century*”, dir. Philippe Colombani.

²⁰ Ibid.

uni-multipolar order, comprehending a superpower, the USA that we consider benign, and other powers – in particular Russia, EU, and China – that I also consider benign through the share of common ideas, values and aims related with peace, stability, economical growth and international cooperation.

The question should undoubtedly be different if on the USA's position we would find the Soviet Union, or if Iran, North Korea or Syria would be powers comparable to Russia or China.

In theory, the **positive effects of the uni-multipolarity** mainly derive from **three essential factors**. **First**, the world's power structure as it is makes **impossible the international system management by only one power pole**. As previously referred the USA, despite their supremacy and panoply of powers, cannot determine or solve alone the most important international or regional affairs without calling for a source or justification to bring legitimacy to their action. **The superpower is forced to promote articulation of initiatives with other powers and international mechanisms**. This means that in the majority of situations solutions depend on the articulation of ideals and interests of the superpower and other relevant powers – although these do not possess the universal ambitions and ability of the first – which is an obvious advantage even if we tend to see the superpower as good. For instance, the promotion of security and stability in Europe depends equally of the USA' strategical presence, the European allies complementarity and of a strategical partnership with Russia. Eurasia evolution depends equally of Russian behavior and of China's behavior in Asia. In the same way, international security depends as much of the USA as of other powers' articulation and cooperation in what concerns the war against terrorism or weapons of massive destruction proliferation. The uni-multipolarity obliges to an agreement between the superpower and great powers in the management of the world and regional affairs.

In second place, the uni-multipolarity inhibits the confrontation between great powers. The **supremacy of the hyper power is so big** that others would not pretend to dispute with the USA the world hegemony in a reasonable term. Unless the hyper power begins to antagonize or absolutely tries to domain the world, **in the upcoming times other powers are "dissuaded" of searching for the same status as the USA**, due to the gap of power and strength. As we will see later on,

the strategies implemented are of **“multiple containment” more than confrontation.**

On the other hand, **one power’s clear supremacy and hegemony in the international system allows to manage and attenuate confrontation strategies among great powers and regional powers** – in function of its role, its abilities and political-strategical status. In a multipolar order, powers try to obtain hegemony usually through coalitions with one or other powers. As an example we can recall to the period before the Great World War or the period between Wars. In a bipolar context, each power tries to obtain a definite supremacy towards the adversary – during cold war the direct military conflict was avoided by the dissuasive power of nuclear weapons and **“mutual destruction guarantee”**. As we may see in History, in this kind of international orders the confrontation is inevitable and its consequences are very well known. In the uni-multipolarity sphere, the superpower is inhibited to coerce other powers – also to avoid collaborationism among them – and they are limited or inhibited on the implementation of expansion strategies of confrontation towards other powers or the superpower. In the uni-multipolar order, **on the international relations system the superpower tends to be an “international balancer” and on the regional system a “regional balancer”, articulating its action with other powers. We can see that the uni-multipolarity inhibits large confrontations between great powers.** It is the USA’ strategical presence, role or guaranty that prevents the emergence of old rivalries and antagonisms in Europe or Asia, for instance: in Europe the *American pax* makes less complex the relations between a few countries with Russia or reunited Germany; and in Asia it prevents Japan or India to confront again with China.

The third great positive effect is that the **uni-multipolar order has proved to be more multilateral than any other way of world power distribution.** History has demonstrated how periods of multipolarity or bipolarity have not been very multilateral, due to the use of blocking mechanisms and mutual mistrust. Obviously on an authentic unipolar order, the world’s management by one single power does not imply its articulation with other countries. However, **the uni-multipolarity effect makes multilateralism develop easily.** The success of finding solutions to complex international and regional affairs demands so much effective involvement of the superpower as cooperation with great powers – promoting the agreement of policies and efforts or multilateralism. In addition, if the USA do not exercise a world unipolar management it obliges them to have allies, strategic

partners and multilateral mechanisms to promote their ideals and interests in cooperation with others. **Multilateralism is also useful for the superpower:** as a grant of “legitimate force” for its actions, vital in the internal and external order; as a way to “attract” and influence other powers and countries with “common interests”, on behalf of “universal values” or of the “international community”; and as a way to surpass complexes and obstacles inherent to initiatives of one power only, or merely North American’s. If an initiative or condemnation should be presented in the United Nations’ Security Council, in the Atlantic Alliance or in the International Atomic Energy Agency, the object of the motion would be more pressured than if it had come directly from Washington, even if the initiative is American. Besides, any power would have less facility to oppose the USA’s initiatives if they appear under the auspices of an international mechanism. In a large extent, this justifies the USA’s search of multilateral mechanisms despite their supremacy and power. On the other hand, for other powers the multilateralism is the best way to associate, influence and contain the superpower. For European countries, Russia or China, the multilateralism is unquestionably the best way to attenuate the USA’s hegemony and unilateralist impetus. **The uni-multipolar world power distribution has constraints, which make the superpower, and other powers turn to multilateralism to follow their common interests, because multilateral processes, practices and mechanisms are easily implemented and developed here than in a typical unipolar, bipolar or multipolar order, due to the subsistence of the bilateralism among powers and the unilateralism of the superpower.** We can see that since the end of cold war the United Nations’ missions and multilateral sceneries have increased. Between 1948 and 1988 the United Nations have only led 13 peace missions; and between 1989 and October 2004 they have already launched 46 new missions.

The positive effects of the uni-multipolarity cannot hide the **existence of risks and dilemmas.** In a mixed uni-multipolar order **none of the main players is truly interested in maintaining the “status quo”.** The superpower would prefer a real unipolar system and usually acts as a hegemonic power. On the other hand, great regional powers would prefer a real multipolar system, without the limits and pressures coming from the superpower, which they would like to vanish. **The superpower will try to “refrain” the emergence of alternative poles of power, while the great powers will try to prevent the transformation of the supremacy into world domination by the superpower, losing their interests and values to**

the exclusivity of those of the *hyperpuissance*. These kinds of dynamics and rivalries may reveal dangerous if it means elaboration of policies, strategies and alignments for the confrontation. It also mean that **the uni-multipolar order may seriously damage the multilateralism if the main powers have no interest in promoting it**: if the superpower understands the multilateral mechanisms as merely “the breaks” of its hegemony and not adequate to the defense of its interests – it may marginalize them; other powers may assume the multilateralism as a way for the superpower to impose others the exclusive defense of its perspectives and interests – having no more value as it no longer promotes the interests of all.

THE GAME OF “MUTUAL AND MULTIPLE CONTAINMENTS”

In the current uni-multipolar international order occur a great geopolitical confrontation or better, a succession of geopolitical confrontations that represent “multiple shocks of containment and competitions”. In the first place, on a wider stage between the superpower, the USA and three great regional powers – EU, Russia and China. Afterwards, between other powers and regional dominant powers – in Europe, the United Kingdom versus Germany-France axis; in Asia, Japan (Northeast Asia), India (South Asia) and ASEAN countries (Southeast Asia) against China; in Eurasia, the GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia) plus Turkmenistan (from Eastern Europe to Caucasus and Central Asia) and Turkey (in relation to the Transcaucasia) versus the Russian Federation. This level of competition is often mediated, observed and orchestrated by the superpower. In third place, there is a reduced and varied level of geostrategic confrontation among “other powers” – India versus Pakistan, North Korea versus South Korea, and Israel versus Arab countries. This level of confrontation is simultaneously “observed” and controlled by the superpower and significant regional powers even suffers their interferences. Another level in this complex political chess refers to powers that try to increase their status and regional importance – Spain, Italy, Poland and Turkey, in Europe; Australia in connection with the Southeast Asia; Mexico in North and Central America; Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and, eventually again Iraq, in Persian Gulf/Middle East; South Africa, Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Congo and Nigeria in African sub-continent; Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, among others. Obviously all

countries try to increase their actions “refraining” or opposing the influence and hegemony of powers.

To contain the emergence and consolidation of other great powers, **the superpower might take advantage of old antagonisms and rivalries between those and other regional powers.** The USA’ status and power of attraction and coercion make possible to manage and manipulate rivalries either between great powers or between those and other regional powers, in a strategy of “dividing to reign”. For instance, in Europe before an hypothetically alliance between France, Germany and Russia, the USA would promote and support another alliance with the United Kingdom, Italy, Turkey, Poland and other Eastern countries as well as with Portugal and Ukraine. In Europe, there is a clear division whenever a crisis demands that the USA should or should not be supported. It should be worst before the conception of opposing coalitions. In the same way, in Asia, if putting China against Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and even Australia or India, the USA might play with antagonisms, rivalries and historical alignments. There is no doubt that when Washington realizes the emergence of an antagonist or rival power it would not try a strategical agreement between powers but to establish a new regional balance through the increase of power, status and strength of powers closer and simultaneously adverse to the growing force. Actually many Europeans prefer the “*American pax*” because they suspect from an “*German-French pax*”, or “*Russian-German pax*” as the majority of Asiatic would fear a “*China pax*” or a “*Niponic pax*” more than the “*American pax*”. This means that in the game of world and regional power, besides the superpower and great powers, the uni-multipolarity also involves **other powers that try to project bigger status, at the cost of great powers – favoring a partnership with the superpower – or “aligning” with one of them – associating in the containment or confrontation of the USA’s hegemony.**

On the other hand, this approximation or use of adversary’s antagonisms is also valid for the great powers in relation to the superpower. Effectively, **to refrain, oppose or balance the superpower, other powers may join together** (strategical partnership between China-Russia or France, Germany and Russia summits during Iraq crisis and war) or **promote “partnerships” with other antagonist countries, outcast or adverse to the “imperial American order”.** We all understand Moscow’ special relations with countries of the CIS, or with Serbia, Iran, Saddam’s Iraq

and other Arab countries; we all understand Beijing's "exchanges" or "deep links" with Pakistan, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Myanmar, etc.

These groups of dynamics – which involve the superpower, great powers and medium or small regional powers – already perceptible in the present, **increase the escalate risks of international environment degradation, accelerating the confrontation instead of cooperation.** Effectively, the uni-multipolarity lives with this dilemma due to the existent possibility of bad management of a situation, as consequence of the relative discontentment with its current position – hence trying to impose unipolarity or searching multipolarity in mutual containment.

Part II

The SuperPower versus the Three Great Regional Powers

The Transatlantic Relations

The United States–Russia Relations

The USA–China Relations

PART II

THE SUPERPOWER VERSUS THREE GREAT REGIONAL POWERS

In the world's power structure, **three internationally relevant regional powers** appear along with the superpower: **the European Union, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China**. These powers are totally different of each other in almost every aspect, from the relation with the superpower to their abilities and ambitions. But they also have common elements: **they are regionally prominent; they desire a real multipolar world**, where they can achieve a new status and have a determining role in the international affairs; and, **somehow their whims are "contained" by the USA**. Each one of these great powers tries to be recognized by the superpower as a relevant strategic partner in the resolution of great international and regional affairs and, at the same time, tries to set up anti-hegemonic strategies aiming to contain the American supremacy or only to avoid unilateral initiatives. These strategies are not articulated with each other nor in the geopolitical relation with the hyper power and are diverse having distinct objectives and ambitions.

THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

For many decades the transatlantic relation was seen as vital both for the American and for the European. To the world, this relation appeared harmonic and strong, representing the epicentre of "the West" or "the occidental world", by this meaning a specific community.

The four pillars of "the Transatlantic Community"

In fact, this transatlantic community exists and is based in four essential pillars:

- Common historical legacy;
- Common ideals and values;
- Economies deeply interlinked;

- A defensive alliance also promoter of security.

The **historical legacy** first results of the fact that the **United States are naturally “Europe descendents”**, in the extent that its discovery and creation started with European colonists, then followed by an exodus of emigrants from the Old Continent to the New Land. Also important for the historical legacy is the notion that the USA have several times **“Saved Europe”**, as their intervention was vital in the 1st and 2nd World Wars and during the Cold War. Since the Great World War’s intervention in 1917, the USA’s policy expressed their geopolitical interest in avoiding Europe’s domination by a hostile power (similar to the United Kingdom’s conduct, that through history has fought to avoid Europe’s domination by one single power, which might oppose British interests). The USA again intervened in the 2nd World War to defend their vital interest and then abandoned their isolationist tradition. Following to the 2nd WW, the USA avoided the European economic collapse and when Stalin created the Soviet Union threat, the USA offered to defend Europe in the West of the “iron curtain”. **Since 1945, the USA have not left the European territory, contributing for peace, stability, security, defense and development common to Europeans and Americans, and making peace and union between traditionally antagonist Europeans.** Even after the disappearing of the Soviet threat the USA have stayed in the Old Continent, according to former President Bill Clinton, to: *“help to secure historical democratic earnings in Europe (...) Erase the artificial line drawn by Stalin and unify Europe in security and not keep it divided in instability (...) answer to threats and conflicts that menace common peace for all”*²¹. This historical legacy connecting the USA to Europe is very important and gave birth to the other pillars of the transatlantic relation.

The transatlantic community is also grounded in the **share of ideas and values related with democracy, political pluralism, individual freedom and free market, the primacy of law and respect for fundamental human rights.** Based on these axioms, nations on both sides of the North Atlantic created a **net of relations and interests to express and reach a common destiny** able to face and defend them from adversaries, and to promote the expansion of those ideals and

²¹ CLINTON, President Bill, Graduation Ceremony of USA Military Academy, West Point, New York, May 31, 1997.

values. It is irrefutable that **many of these “Western values” have become “universal values”** inspiring the Law of nations and the mechanisms of international regulation – thus justifying “interferences” and humanitarian missions, the liberalization of the world trade, assistance to the development of populations in need or the support to democratic institutions proliferation and human rights. Most of the actions done on behalf of the “international community” come from the transatlantic community. Thus in this and other matters the transatlantic relation is essential for Americans, Europeans and to the world.

This transatlantic community is also well expressed in a **third pillar – the economic interdependence. The United States and Europe have the largest economies of the world, in many ways competing with each other, but deeply interconnected.** In 2000, American subsidiary companies in Europe have earned 333 billion USD, and European companies in the US have earned 301 billion USD. European investments in the USA have profited 835 billion USD, 25% more than American investment in Europe. Only in the State of Texas, the European investment is bigger than all North American investment in Japan. American subsidiaries in Europe employ 4,1 millions of people; European subsidiaries in the US employ 4,4 millions. This interdependence is ancient but has significantly increased on the last decade: the profit of European subsidiaries in the USA was five times multiplied to 26 billion USD²². Both economies together represent more than 50% of the world GDP – although they only represent 15% of the world’s population! **Considering the world economy, the weight and relevance of the transatlantic community is colossal** either at the level of global economic growth and wealth re-distribution, on the perspective of production organization and world trade, on markets liberalization, support to emerging economies, integration of other economies in the world trade or in what concerns decision making of mechanisms such as the IMF, the World Bank or the World Trade Organization.

Security and defense is obviously the fourth pillar of the transatlantic community. Since the beginning, the Atlantic Alliance lays at the center of the

²² The data here quoted is from CUTILEIRO, Ambassador José, *Relação Indispensável*, in the weekly article “O mundo dos outros”, in *Expresso* newspaper, economy and international supplements, p. 27, April 3, 2004.

transatlantic relation. Besides the community of values, interests, goals and common destiny, this Alliance was founded when a group of nations from both sides of the Atlantic joined to defend together specific populations and territories (of member countries) from a specific threat – the Soviet Union. It was created like a traditional collective defense organization. **Being successful during the Cold War,** facing and defeating the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, NATO **adapted to a world with no immediate enemy.** Nowadays NATO's **military functions and abilities** – as collective defense organization, peace, security and stability promotion in the Euro-Atlantic area and outskirts, with mechanisms and capacity for crisis and conflicts management and, as sponsor of embryonic EU strategic-military ambition (ESDP) – **coexist with the Alliance's political role** – to keep the USA linked to the European security, aiding on the stabilization in Central Europe and Balkans, contributing for the integration of “both sides” of the Continent and giving Russia a formal voice in the discussion of security.

Under the USA's leadership NATO has also: **evolved in the sense of becoming a collective security organization on the Euro-Atlantic area,** without losing its character of military alliance whose main goal is to defend its members; **developed and reinforced its political dimension** as essential mechanism for the strategic dialogue between European and American, and between allies and their “partners”; **expanded and embraced former adversaries eliminating the strategic void in Central Europe that for centuries had tempted the Russian and Germanic expansionism.** The Alliance has sponsored and launched cooperation programs and mechanisms with former adversaries and neutral countries, such as the *Partnership for Peace*, the *Euro-Asiatic Partnership Council*, *NATO-Russia Council*, etc. In 1990 the Atlantic Alliance represented a crucial “pillow” for German reunification, immediately integrating the former GDR; in 1999 it has allowed Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic's integration; in 2004 it has integrated another seven countries: Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. Today almost all European countries, even non-members and far within East are invited to participate in team exercises and trainings and receive military aid. Meanwhile NATO has adopted a *New Strategic Concept*; a *New Command Structure*; has interfered to impose and maintain Peace in Europe (Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, in Balkans) and has even acted as pacification force far from the Old Continent (Afghanistan); sponsored the “autonomous” ESDP/RRF of the European Union; stroke back, immediately and faithfully, to one member's aggression, for the first time invoking the collective defense clause (5th article, the

day after September 11th, 2001); and has determined and created a new force (*NATO Response Force*) to face new challenges and threats. This was all accomplished, despite some negative foresights in the sequence of the disappearance of the soviet enemy, the reason for its creation long ago in April 1949! The European and American teamwork represents a remarkable achievement.

EU-NATO Relations

The European's defense and security depends mostly of NATO, which integrates 19 of the current 25 EU members (in a total of 26 NATO members). In 2007, with the expected integration of Bulgaria and Romania, the coincident members will sum 21, of the 27 from EU and 26 from NATO. That means that a substantial part of "old" and "new" Europe will be allied to the USA and that NATO's European axis will match the EU in the geographical outline, except for Turkey. This overlapping is significant.

Great divergences between some European countries and the USA in reference to Iraq had a profound impact in the transatlantic and inter-European relations. There were many opinions about the unnecessary duplication and above all about the competition between both organizations. **Curiously, during that period the relations between NATO and the EU have intensified and institutionalized.**

Effectively, since January 2001 they had established formal relations but the big step happened on **December 16, 2002 with the approval of *EU-NATO Declaration* about the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)**. Since then, both organizations negotiated several agreements and documents about crisis management, that permitted the EU to replace NATO, for instance, in the peace keeping mission in the ex-Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, in early April 2003. In March 2003 they signed an agreement about *Information Security* that allows the exchange and circulation of classified information and material under reciprocal protection rules. Few days after, on March 17 **they agreed on several documents in the scope of the Berlin-Plus** – this term is related to the Berlin summit, in 1996, when NATO member's representatives agreed in the creation of the European Security and Defense Identity, that might use NATO's facilities. The Berlin-Plus arrangements try to avoid unnecessary resources duplication and have four elements: ensure the EU's access to NATO operational

planning; put at the EU service NATO's common capacities; NATO European command options for actions directed by EU; adaptation of NATO's defense planning system to incorporate available forces to EU-led operations. This projected models for the transference, control, restitution or devolution of NATO's resources and ability in operations led by the EU; consultation processes were created and the agreement about the development of "requirements for mutually reinforced coherent capacities" was reached. The Berlin-Plus arrangements were put into practice in the *Concordia Operation*, the first EU-led military mission that developed in Macedonia²³ between March 31 and December 15, 2003 (followed by a EU policing mission *Proxima Operation*).

There is also a **daily EU-NATO operational coordination in Bosnia Herzegovina** (where NATO have deployed forces from KFOR and the European Union has a policing mission – EUPM) **and in Kosovo** (where NATO have deployed forces from KFOR and the EU is responsible for the economical reconstruction). Both organizations maintain a **ritual of cooperation**: the Alliance's North Atlantic Council (NAC) meets the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), NATO's Military Committee meets EU Military Committee and there are several meetings between NATO's Secretary-General and the EU Foreign Policy High Representative or "Mr. CFSP" (Javier Solana, former NATO's Secretary-General). Further, the EU and NATO have agreed in a joint approach to Western Balkans pacification; EU-NATO Capacities Group tries to secure consistence, transparency and development of arrangements for common capacities to both organizations, especially in what concerns the EU "Great Objective" and NATO Capacities Compromise of Prague; and, **EU and NATO leaders express their commitment in the development of close cooperation to fight terrorism and weapons of massive destruction proliferation**, exchanging information about their activities regarding protection of civil populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks.

The fact that so many important agreements were negotiated in a short period and in an instable context marked by Iraq crisis may proof the great **commitment of the whole EU and NATO's country members in developing a**

²³ WITTE, Pol de, *Strengthen EU-NATO Relationships*, in *NATO Review*, Autumn 2003, web edition.

strategical partnership between these organizations. However, the reality prevents us from having so good expectations.

During the Cold War, the European integration was stimulated to strengthen the Atlantic partnership; today many of its defenders look at it as a counterweight to the United States hegemony. The European Defense and Security Policy (EDSP) and European military capacity represent the logical corollary of the European political integration.²⁴ The European Union's Helsinki Declaration of December 1999, express as the "Great Objective" "...its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises..."²⁵ appealing to the creation of a *Rapid Reaction Force* (RRF) until 2003, with at least 60.000 military forces to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year. This force should be capable of the full range of "Petersberg tasks" that include tasks such as rescue and humanitarian missions, and peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions. In May 2004, the EU assumed a new "Headline Goal" for 2010 with the purpose to have forces with a higher level of credibility and flexibility, to develop a wide range of missions, ambitioning to be able to decide the launching of an operation in 5 days and deploying ground forces in not more than 10 days after the decision is made.

The political leaders of both sides of the Atlantic countries and maximum leaders of the EU and NATO have repeatedly affirmed that EU's ambitions in terms of CESP are complimentary to the Alliance's and the strengthening of European military capacities should reinforce NATO as group – however, until now the emphasis in connection with the European policy and forces has been related with "EU's autonomy to make decisions" and not with military capacities increase. The EU and NATO appear more often as competing organizations than complimentary.

On the other hand, European and American leaders do not spare compliments about the achievements done under the scope of the Atlantic Alliance. Notwithstanding, today many opinions cynically refer to NATO's acronym as

²⁴ About Europe's evolution progresses and dilemmas in security and defense areas, see TOMÉ, Luis and TOMÉ, Paula Monge, *A Identidade e a Política Europeia de Segurança e Defesa*, in EdiUAL and Observatório de Relações Exteriores, Lisbon, 2001, pp.201.

²⁵ Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 27.

“No alternative to obsolescence”. Consequently, and quoting Henry Kissinger “remains the question of knowing whether the alliance is still considered the expression of a common destiny or if it is becoming a security network for mainly national and regional policies”²⁶. Why do these visible contradictions between what is said, what is done and what is felt exist? Why is there a growing feeling of miscoordination between speech and binding ties and bigger discredit about the “Atlantic community”? Naturally, the answers lie on the transatlantic controversy and squabbles...

Differences, divergences and squabbles

“It is time to stop pretending that European and American share a world vision or even live in the same world. (...) Concerning the up to date main international strategical affairs, the North American are from Mars and European are from Venus (...) When the point are national priorities, identification of threats, definition of challenges, and conception and implementation of foreign and defense policies, the USA and Europe do not go in the same direction.”²⁷

The current crisis in the transatlantic relations between the allies is not the first. Controversy has cyclically existed since the beginning: in 1956, during Suez crisis, the Eisenhower administration separated and opposed their British and French allies; between 1958 and 1961, the management of the “second Berlin crisis” was followed with great apprehension by France and Germany; in 1966, France left the military structure of the Alliance despite USA’s dislike; the USA replacement of the “Massive Retaliation” by the “Flexible Response” doctrine was very contested by the European; in the 70’s, after Vietnam’s problems, Nixon administration tried to redefine American foreign policy and a new transatlantic relation which met France and also Germany’s resistance; and, in the early 80’s the installation of American ballistic missiles of middle range (Pershing) in Europe, at the apogee of the euro missile crisis, was protested in public manifestations all

²⁶ KISSINGER, Henry *Does America need an external policy? Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, Gradiva (Portuguese edition), Lisbon, 2003, p.30

²⁷ KAGAN, Robert *Paradise and Power – America and Europe in the new world order*, Gradiva (Portuguese edition), Lisbon, June 2003, pp.11-12

around the continent. Hence, former crisis within the Alliance and transatlantic relations were usually a kind of “family quarrel” related with different interpretations of the arrangements for the common security agreed. **Today, we witness a significant difference towards the past: it is the common security and the common goal that are in question**²⁸.

In an article published in the *Foreign Affairs* magazine, Andrew Moravcsik makes a distinction between two perspectives about the seriousness and depth of the present crisis in the relations between Europe and America, following to Iraq war: the “pessimists” – who defend that differences of power, threat perceptions and respective values are inexorably forcing a divergence of interests between European and American – and the “optimists”, who affirm that recent problems result mainly from the conjuncture of internal policies, of “ideological stubbornness” and lost diplomatic opportunities²⁹. Like him I agree that both positions are right. But in the simplified Moravcsik’s classification I stay among the “pessimists” because I consider that the problem has a deep root, surmounting merely conjuncture circumstances.

Disparity of Power and Forces

In first place, **between Europe and the USA there is an enormous disparity of power and strength**, that is constantly increasing and that originates a **growing divergence between the superpower strategical culture** capable of global interventions, and their European allies. Cold War has caused Europe’ strategical dependence from the USA, due to the confidence in the North American nuclear protection and the hope that European security shall be protected by the balance of terror and the “mutual destruction guaranty”. The previous military capacity disparity increased significantly during the post cold war period, underlining Europe’s weakness and dependence of United States – the Gulf war, the Balkan, Afghanistan and Iraq’s conflicts showed the gap in terms of war capacities and military technologies. This happened because the allies have been going distinct

²⁸ KISSINGER, Henry, *Does America need an external policy? Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, Gradiva (Portuguese edition), Lisbon, 2003, p.28

²⁹ MORAVCSIK, Andrew, *Striking a new transatlantic bargain*, in *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003. Web edition

directions: while the Europeans have never been willing to significantly invest in defense, military programs, re-structure and modernization of their armed forces, the North Americans, despite their clear superiority, have substantially invested in military technology to increase deadly military capacities, more precision, from longer distance, with less risks for their armies and capable of avoiding “collateral effects” – assuming the leadership in “the military affairs revolution”. The numbers are elucidative and revealing. Presently, the EU distributes 48% of the common budget to Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – being a quarter to France -, while for the Security and Defense Policy are allocated only 0,5% of the common budget!!! There are intentions to change this situation, but the budget proposed for 2007-2013 still does not make a difference: 40% is for CAP and 1,5% for ESDP. One can say that as ESDP’s essential amounts should come directly from member States this small commitment is natural – this is true. But this also reveals the governments’ main budget concerns and priorities, besides the amount spent by the states in defense, are in average only 1,9% of their GDP. The Europeans represent around 65% of the Atlantic Alliance population. Collectively, the 24 European NATO members represent more than 2,5 million troops and the USA approximately 1,5 million (NATO’s total number in Armed Forces is around 4 millions³⁰). Nevertheless, the 24 European allies defense budget together represents a half of the American defense budget (respectively around 220 billion and 405 billion USD); and while the US spent per year between 30 to 50 billion USD in technological research and development, the EU countries spent together less than 10 billion USD per year. These numbers help to explain why the European capacity of projecting forces that is only 10 to 15% of the USA’s.

It might be hard to recognize this reality, but the European speech and the attempt to implement ESDP in the last years represent the answer to this disparity and power capacity. It is also an attempt of balancing and strengthening the European axis. Also the demographic trends show that at the same time that the North American population is growing faster and is younger, the European population is gradually diminishing and aging: *“Based on the actual trends the North American economy, now having the same dimension of the European, it might double in the year 2050. Currently the American population average age is 35,5 years*

³⁰ Canada, NATO’s ally in North America has 62 thousand troops. These numbers are referring to 2003. See NATO’ statistics, available on the internet at www.nato.int

*while the European is 37,7 years. In 2050, the average age in America will be 36,2. In Europe the current trends point to an average of 52,7 years old in 2050. Among many things, this means that the financial burden represented by the elder will be higher in Europe than in the USA. And this means that European will have less money to spend in defense in the years and decades to come*³¹.

The power and military capacities disparity has had severe consequences to the Alliance and to the transatlantic relation. To start with, the “share of the burden”, in which the European’s role is limited to supplying pacification and peace keeping forces, after the United States practically alone have done the decisive and “clean” phases of the military operation – that is, USA “*does the cooking*” and European “*does the dishes*”, as has been said in Europe. In the long term, this is not acceptable. On the other hand, in the extent that European forces are not very useful to the USA, NATO might tend to have less of alliance and more of a mechanism of American “protectorate” over Europe, and/or a forum for Washington to look for, not effective military support, but for political comfort for its initiatives – unconceivable for the European. Finally, the disparity effects created in the North American the propensity to resort to military force – unilaterally if necessary – unlike the European, incapable of projecting forces and launching surgical or devastating attacks from a safe distance.

Necessity and legitimacy of the use of force

In second place, between America and Europe exists a great divergence about adequate ways and processes to solve problems and about the need and legitimacy of the use of force. Due to its recent history, the European Union has become a fierce supporter of the *soft power* strategies – showing preference for negotiation and political, diplomatic and economical tools; using persuasion and its attraction power, as well as commercial relations and assistance to the development; frequently calling the International Law, international agreements, “international public opinion” and multilateral institutional mechanisms. Europe is more tolerant and patient and even prefers to live with the threats than to eliminate them by force. Intrinsically European became true “Olympians”, to

³¹ KAGAN, Robert, quoting a study in *The Economist* Magazine “Paradise and Power...”, op. cit., p. 98

quote Pacheco Pereira: “(...) today’s prevalence of what Kenneth Minogue calls “Olympianism”, that manifests, among other things, **in the utopic belief that all conflicts might be solved by negotiation and international organizations mediation. Hence, for the “Olympians” to go into war would be a contradiction for democracy, or at least a diminishing or suspicion of that quality of democracy.** The popular use of the term “empire”, created in a Toni Negri marxist pamphlet to label the USA, intends to establish the difference: democracies do not make war, empires do (...) **In the aftermath of September 11th, when Americans said that “they were in war”, the European, specially the French-German axis have pulled out immediately. Today the EU is the most important world institution, together with the international organizations bureaucracy, driving forward an “Olympian” policy**”³².

On the other hand, **the USA mostly use hard power strategies**, favoring coercion policies and punishing sanctions. They are inclined to act unilaterally and are skeptical in relation to formal multilateral mechanisms; they easily tend to act outside of their scope when necessary and especially if their values and vital interests are in cause. They prefer to eliminate threats, choosing the confrontation not only because they consider themselves able to do it, even alone, but also because they feel more vulnerable in their strategical dimension and by their global responsibilities. In fact, this attitude has sprout more vivid after the September 11th, which led American administration to abandon their initial isolationism to a new interventionism based on the “war against terror”.

Inevitably, **Europeans and Americans are more and more divided about issues like legitimacy, morality and legal use of strength**, or about the resolution of global affairs and threats elimination, mainly if it includes the military option. The Iraqi crisis has made these disagreements visible: even if some European governments understood and publicly supported the American assignment, almost all public opinion, European intellectuals and politicians have frontally opposed the USA’s attitude and specially the military intervention. At the bottom, **the divergences now are related with the means used for political ends.**

³² PEREIRA, José Pacheco, *Podem hoje as democracias conduzir uma guerra?* (2), in Publico newspaper, May 20, 2004. Underlined by the author.

Threats perception and strategies to face them

The third divergence between American and European is at the level of **perception of new threats and strategies to face them**. Along the years the USA have been defining as main threats to the world and their security the weapons of massive destruction, terrorism and “Rogue States”. Since the 90’s, the association and connection of these three threats is the biggest American nightmare. Several American administrations have declared it and little by little they have been warning it. The September 11th confirmed the worst fears and since then the North American feel vulnerable, look at themselves as a preferred target for some groups, States and asymmetric devastating methods and have assumed a warfare position to eliminate those threats. In Europe, although some speeches and official documentation make abundant references to those “new threats”, usually they are associated with other “challenges” - ethnic-religious conflicts, organized crime, narcotics and people traffic, poverty and social exclusion, migration, environmental degradation, infectious diseases. Objectively, **some European do not take the “new threats” as very preoccupant or dangerous** – even if the September 11th attacks’ had victimized more than 800 European citizens from NATO members in New York’s Twin Towers; that on March 11th in Madrid more than 200 people were dead; or that in Europe hundreds of individuals were arrested and several terrorist groups and cells have been dismantled, most with supposedly connections with the Al Qaeda; or, that in several European countries several explosive devices have been deactivated and some attacks avoided. Whether we recognize it or not, **threats are not perceived in the same manner in Europe or in America**. Maybe that justifies among some European a certain excuse of this new type of terrorism: every time that “terrorist acts are firmly condemned” and strong epithets like “hideous” and “barbarity” are used to describe them, it is immediately requested to “attack and eradicate terrorism causes”, sometimes suggesting that in the origin of those causes is the invisible and machiavellian hand of the USA and the “globalization”. In Europe, many opinions try to “understand” and in a way “excuse” terrorism, withdrawing the responsibility of this type of terrorism and putting the guilt in the White House – to whom they ascribe multiple mistakes, arrogance and imperialist attitudes. This also gives the idea that these threats will only happen in Europe if Europe supports America, or to those European “that will be on the side of the USA’s empire policy”. On the other hand, even “New Europe”, as Rumsfeld refers to Eastern Europe that is being integrated in Western

mechanisms, and for now very grateful to the USA, is more concerned with the reappearance of the Russian threat or the French-German hegemony than with “new threats”.

This divergent consideration of threats is absolutely decisive to forge different policies and strategical cultures, non-coordinated and even opposed in its implementation between the USA and their European allies (this topic will be developed in the third chapter “New strategies for new threats”). **This is also clear in the treatment given to “Rogue States” or in the perception of North American “preventive and preemptive actions” that caused such a fuss in Europe. Or about USA’s antimissile defense system.** We should not be surprised that **some European face political-diplomatic commitment or economical and humanitarian aid as the only answer tolerated for problems or threats resolution.** They also resist to the idea of military action outside Europe’s geographical limits, especially via NATO, even if those threats come from beyond.

For some European, the USA and their war strategy against these threats represent a bigger danger to peace and world stability than any of the referred threats. A survey done in 1999 showed that most French people considered that USA had “excessive power” and 68% showed concern with the existence of a unipolar world³³. Other surveys done in France in 2002, indicated the USA as the main adversary of France in the world with 31%, after terrorism (63%) and Islamism (34%), ahead of China (10%) and Russia (4%) – Germany is not mentioned. One year after the September 11th, French people (35%) considered the USA the fourth country to threaten the world, following to Iraq (62%), Israel (45%) and Afghanistan (40%)³⁴. Today these results would be even worst in relation to Israel and the USA.

³³ GORDON, Philip H. “The French Position”, in the *National Interest*, Fall 2000, p. 57, quoted by DE ALMEIDA, João Marques and RATO, Vasco, *A encruzilhada. Portugal, a Europa e os Estados Unidos*, Bertrand Editora, Lisbon, 2004, p.154

³⁴ BUREAU, Jean-François, *L'étranger dans le Champ de vision des Français*, in *Politique Étrangère*, Winter 2002-2003, quoted by DE ALMEIDA, João Marques and RATO, Vasco, *A encruzilhada...* op. cit., p. 155

The Transatlantic confrontation – the end of “Euro-Atlantic community”?

All these transatlantic divergences and differences have been originating **geopolitical confrontation between America and Europe that requests their mutual containment and that has been referred to as “Western civil war”** – representing a paradox between Allies. To the European growing resistance in following American initiatives the American answer with unilateral actions; to each North American action considered unilateralist the Europeans react with more fear and lack of support. The superpower is obliged to undertake the responsibility of defending threats (considered by some as threats to the superpower only) and expresses its annoyance for the European “ingratitude”, “weakness” and “pusillanimity”, losing the will to hear and negotiate with the allies. **The European try to moderate USA’s unilateralism through the “multilateralization” of its actions, this appearing as the great priority of some European countries external policy.** They permanently insist on harmonizing NATO’s remaining members positions and only act under the auspices and after the express approval of United Nations Security Council, an organ that in R. Kagan words, “... *is a pale resemblance of a genuine multilateral order (...) is the only instance where a weak nation as France has at least the theoretical power to control the North American actions (...), the United Nations Security Council represents to the European a surrogate of the missing power...*”³⁵.

The European usual resort to multilateralism, International Law, the settlement of international conventions, the international actions legitimacy, results mainly from their historical experience, from their world vision, and from a self assumed “civilizing mission” – to show the world the virtues and possibilities of their “Kantian paradise”. But these **tools are also intended to contain, contradict, and restrain the North American superpower.** For Europe and other powers the dilemma is that the United Nations Security Council have only one superpower – the USA. This is a new situation to which nobody really adapted, starting with the allies. **The USA may act alone and the geopolitical logic requests the preservation of the maximum capacity to keep on doing it.**

³⁵ In “Paradise and Power”, op. cit

However, Europe went even furthest in the adoption of a new *realpolitik* that valorizes power distribution in detriment of political values and points out at policies of alignment against the hegemonic power³⁶. Inherently **that causes rivalry and conflict among great powers and weakens the international organizations**. This is visible in the **growing European mistrust towards the American hegemony and unipolarity, in the frequent appeal to the creation of a "multipolar world" or in the vibrant praise of multipolarity virtues**. In 1998, Hubert Védrine, French former Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the American power was a problem to the world and that American foreign policy was not appropriated³⁷. Ten years ago, we would not believe that a **head of State or government from the Atlantic Alliance member States, together with the Russian President, would publicly attack the options of an ally** from whom depends their security and defense. Thus this had happened in October 2000, during Vladimir Putin's visit to France, by that time in presidency of the European Union. In a press conference the Russian president and Jacques Chirac – speaking in his EU president quality– has deliberately attacked the Clinton administration plan to study the revision of the ABM Treaty: "*The European Union and Russia have a similar idea. We condemn the revision of the ABM Treaty, because we believe that this revision will involve proliferation risks that might be very dangerous in the future*"³⁸. This competition with the USA, has other consequences as is shown in France's case that has been active in competing and strategically containing the USA, being followed by Germany and other European **in the establishment of strategical relations with other great powers as Russia and China**. In several occasions, Chirac and also Schroeder have made reference to a "strategical partnership" with Russia considering it essential for a multipolar world. In China's case, in 1997, after a visit to Beijing, Chirac and Jiang Zemin signed a joint declaration, stating that "*cooperation between both countries will speed up the progress towards a multipolar system, to avoid attempts*

³⁶ PIERRE, Thierry Jean *Les Déviances d'une Realpolitik Post-Guerre Froide*, in *La Revue Internationale et Stratégique*, 45, Spring 2002. About this subject see also DE ALMEIDA, João Marques and RATO, Vasco, *A encruzilhada ...*, op. cit., Chapter 3 – *A Realpolitik Europeia contra a hegemonia Americana*, pp. 111-169.

³⁷ Quote by HIPPEL, Karin von, "*Définir les origines du terrorisme: un débat transatlantique?*", in *La Revue Internationale et Stratégique*, n. 51, Fall 2003, p.104, 3rd note.

³⁸ Press conference of European Union – Russia Summit, October 30, 2000, cit in Henry Kissinger *Does America need a Foreign Policy*, op. Cit, p. 29

of world domination"³⁹. Obviously the problem resides "only" in the fact that **these strategic partnerships are perceived as opposing tools to the USA**. Besides, being unable to contain the USA's hegemony alone, **France and Germany have lately tried to drag the EU to the strategical rivalry with USA, under valuating the Atlantic Alliance framework**. Former French FAM, Védérine declared, "*the (transatlantic) community of values is based on an alliances system and is not enough to build a common identity*"⁴⁰.

Not long after the September 11th solidarity, the European had a growing feeling of discomfort towards the USA: in the Afghanistan intervention the American practically ignored their allies, and after they increased the pressure and targeted at "evil axis" (Iraq, Iran and North Korea). Thereby, **mainly after the early 2002**, the great strategical aim of Chirac's France and Schroeder's Germany among other European leaders and ex-leaders, seems to be the opposition to the USA's hegemony, partly because they fear a new American strategic expansion following to the war against terrorism. On February 6, 2002, long before Iraq crisis and 5 months after the September 11th, the here referred French FAM, Hubert Védérine underlined: "*Today there is the threat of a new "simplism" that is to relate all the world's problems with the war against terrorism. That is not serious (...) we should fight poverty, injustice, humiliation, etc. Today there is a clear difference between our vision and that of the American administration.*"⁴¹. In the same line the Foreign Affairs European Commissary, Chris Patten, accused the USA of imperialism and criticized its "*dangerous instincts*"⁴².

Since the summer of 2002, the American started to express their determination in military invading Iraq and **some European seized the opposition to the military intervention to demonstrate their opposition to North American hegemony – which goes until today**. In September 2002, the US approved their polemical *National Security Strategy* (coincidentally in the same month that France

³⁹ Brenner, Parmentier, *Reconcilable Differences*, p.23, quoted by DE ALMEIDA, João Marques and RATO, Vasco *A encruzilhada...* op. cit., p. 157

⁴⁰ Quoted by SERFATY Simon, *Ides Simples mais Idées Fixes*, in *La Revue Internationale et Stratégique*, Spring 2002, p. 102

⁴¹ VÉDRINE, Hubert, live interview in the TV show *Question Directe* in *France Inter*, Paris, February 6, 2002. See also LESNES, Corine, *Hubert Védérine dénonce le "simplisme" et l'unilateralism "utilitaire" des Américains*, in *Le Monde*, February 8, 2002

⁴² See *European Ease Criticism of Washington*, in *International Herald Tribune*, March 5, 2002

have approved its *Military Programming Law 2003-2008*) and made an enormous international campaign, especially with the allies, in favor of the military intervention against Iraq, having led the United Nations to make an ultimatum to Saddam's regime. Meanwhile, the European countries, under Washington's pressure and dealing with inter-European and EU divergences, defined their position as: any military action against Iraq should be legitimized by the United Nations Security Council. In this phase, **the European did not want an unilateral United States intervention but did not refuse the possibility of the use of force if within the UN's ambit.**

The German leaders Schroeder and Fisher suddenly led Germany to abandon this position. These and other known leaders of the SPD and Green parties, apprehensive and fearing to lose the elections have radicalized their pacifist speeches and assumed their frontal opposition to the USA. Schroeder declared "*absolutely against the war*" even legitimized by a United Nations' Security Council resolution and "*showed no availability to follow the American military adventures*". The former Minister of Justice, Herta Daubler-Gmelin, went even further in the demagogical speech, comparing George W. Bush to Hitler, and declaring that both used an external crisis to deceive internal problems. For most of the observers this change on the German traditional position was so surprising that could only be understood in the electoral campaign context. This is partially correct. But it is also right that **10 years after the reunification, Germany was willing to affirm itself as a "normal country"**, meaning to leave definitely behind Nazi guilt and emancipating its foreign policy from the United States. **Germany's position had created a delicate situation:** if the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution for the use of force in Iraq, Germany would not be in legal standards; so, Germans expected this resolution never to be approved, and the USA and British allies intervention without express authorization. In a strategy opposing to the US only the second option would be valid for Schroeder. As Germany is not member of the UN Security Council their position would not be relevant in reproving the proposal, so they hold together with France, that not only possessed veto power as shared the German expectations in containing the USA's hegemony and achieving the EU leadership through the French-German axis.

France's position led by both Chirac and Villepin, was not so surprising and even more fierce heading the opposition debate against the USA. French

leaders have frequently been recurring to a “Gaullist” speech, which at the same time did not prevent Paris to be a conciliating element between Washington and Berlin actively participating in the solution created by the Resolution 1441⁴³ (considered as a France and United Kingdom’s diplomatic victory). France has simply changed its attitude and took the opportunity to stress its opposition to the USA. In Chirac and Schroeder’s vision this opposition is essential **to emancipate Europe in its relation with the USA, turning the EU into a power – eventually rival of its traditional ally and as a way of better defending and multiplying the influence of France and Germany.** This point was totally coincident for Chirac and Schroeder as both were decided to reinforce French-German leadership in a crucial moment for the European project – with the approach to the EU enlargement and the discussion about the European Constitution.

In January 2003, with the celebration of the 43rd anniversary of the Treaty, this French-German goal was assumed and achieved, when **Chirac declared the French veto to any UN Council resolution authorizing the military intervention against Iraq.** To show the possibility of valid diplomatic initiatives the French-German axis proposed the “Mirage” plan. This consisted of the increase of the number of UNO and IAEA inspectors in Iraq’s territory, protected by “blue helmets” force and the reinforcement of air surveillance. Afterwards, there was the attempt to extend Iraq inspections. But nobody took these proposals seriously because of the scale in the transatlantic crisis whose consequences might reveal dramatic. **The opposition to the Iraq’s military program and pressure over Saddam passed to the opposition to the USA and pressure over the White House and its supporters. The crisis in a peripheral country and the divergence about the military option proceeded to a deep crisis within the United Nations, the transatlantic and Atlantic Alliance relations, and the European Union.**

On January 31, 2003, after having read the open letter from eight European countries’ leaders (United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) stating publicly their loyalty to the Atlantic alliance and their determination to support Washington in the Iraqi affair, the French President Jacques Chirac, showed his anger and said that “*besides ill-breeding,*

⁴³ See annex 2 for quotations on this resolution

*those countries lost a good opportunity to stay quiet*⁴⁴. The Letter of Eight evinced **not only the deep European division about the crisis, but also the loyalty to the USA of former Warsaw Pact members about to join the European Union**. It was clear; *“those countries”* were the three candidates and not the current members of the EU that President Chirac preferred to ignore! To top the serious divergences among the Fifteen, **Chirac’s words had a devastating effect in Europe especially in East**. After all, these countries had recently regained their full sovereignty after more than four decades of soviet domination, and were not willing to stand another “Brejnev”⁴⁵ with a new conception of “limited sovereignty”. Their **mistrust in the hegemonic intentions of the French-German axis** was suddenly made worse. Besides, since the end of the Cold War their option was to attach to the “West” and integrate in its institutional mechanisms – NATO and European Union – but now they were being told that they should **opt between America and Europe** (obviously this scenery was not exclusive to the Eastern countries). The nightmares summed up and the inter-European crisis accentuated. In February 2003, French Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie visiting Warsaw warned **that the support to USA might harm the admission to EU**, reminding – as Chirac had already done in the extraordinary EU European Council meeting – that France would have to ratify the entrance treaties and threatening with a referendum. In the same month, in Paris, a **summit gathered the French President, the German Chancellor and the Russian President, Vladimir Putin**. France was trying to create a new axis **opposite to the USA**, with Iraq as lead, but developing its vision of “multipolar world” in which Europe should counterbalance the North America’s hegemony. De Gaulle once said, *“Europe’s mission is to prevent American and Russian domination”*. Chirac was reformulating this idea and implicitly saying **that Europe and Russia had the mission to prevent the American domination**. For Central and Eastern European countries, another nightmare was taking shape – to be confined between the “Russian wall” of which they still suspect and fear and the “European wall” of Paris-Berlin axis that they start to mistrust. With no surprise and sometimes only symbolically, from Poland to Romania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary or Baltic States, **all Eastern European countries wanted to take part in the military effort to Iraq stabilization and be enrolled in the USA’s**

⁴⁴ DE SOUSA, Teresa, *Entre o coração americano e a razão europeia*, in Publico newspaper, May 1, 2003, p.7

⁴⁵ This term was used in a Czech republic newspaper, commenting Chirac’s words.

“allies” list. After all these countries were recently or would be soon NATO members. Donald Rumsfeld thanked the “new Europe” loyalty and despised, in his words, the “Old Europe”. Today, partly due to the historical celebration of integrating ten new members and seven new allies in NATO, the European context is more cordial. Anyway, in the first months of 2003, all parts should have been more cautious and wise than it happened.

The opposition to Iraq’s intervention was the ideal opportunity to show the French-German opposition (pretentiously European) to the USA’s “unilateralism”. But the USA is a democracy and in the North American administration as in its society – there are multiple tendencies and visions (frequently described in Europe as “pigeons” and “hawks”). In a moment of crisis, the pressure to isolate and contradict the USA had the effect of increasing the domestic support to the “hawks” in the direction of strong hegemony and unilateralism. Actually, there is a strange alliance between American neo-conservatives – that have no interest in the multilateralism and do not give much importance to the United Nations and the Atlantic Alliance, preferring “floating coalitions” – and traditional “Gaullists” and European pacifists – that dislike NATO and only expect the UN to stop the USA!

France might have fulfilled its ego with the veto announcement to any Security Council resolution that should legitimized the use of force over Iraq, maybe naively thinking that it would stop North American determination and/or would consolidate UNO’s authority. On the contrary, **the further developments put the UNO at the brink of a crisis.** It was the opportunity for the American “hawks” to show the United Nations, that it was unable to handle responsibilities and was no longer useful for the USA to be member. Instead of opposing and inverting, France’s position only exacerbated North American unilateralism. This might allow us **to understand Azores summit** (announced as “war summit” by propagandists) **in a different way.** This summit joined in Lages Base, George W. Bush, Tony Blair, Jose Maria Aznar and José Manuel Barroso, three days before the beginning of Iraq war. The USA, the UK and Spain achieved a dialogue and decided to not present to the UN Security Council a proposal for a second resolution to explicitly authorize the use of strength against Iraq. ***In extremis* this might have saved the UNO.** If that proposal should be presented – to force the veto and the proposal refusal, the Iraq military intervention afterwards should be

expressly against the will expressed by the UN Security Council – the crisis would certainly be worse and the United Nations might disappear as a relevant international institution. Maybe this was the ideal move for this Administration “hawks of the hawks” that saw the opportunity to definitely dismantle the main international regulation body created after the 2nd World War, and install a truly unipolar world of American hegemony. **In the current Bush administration there are opinions as Richard Perle’s: “it will be important to know, and understand, the intellectual sinking of the liberal concept of security through the law of nations administrated by International Institutions”⁴⁶.**

Also at the brink of a crisis was the Atlantic Alliance that passed the most critical moments in more than 50 years of existence. As referred by João Marques de Almeida and Vasco Rato, “*For many Europeans the question was no longer Iraq intervention but the future of the alliance with the USA. This political leap gave birth to the transatlantic crisis.*”⁴⁷. On February 10th 2003, during a NATO meeting, Turkey expressed the concern of its vulnerability in an eventual war against Iraq. The Turkey-Iraq border is 300 Km long and passes the instable area of Kurdistan⁴⁸. In the occurrence of war, Ankara feared Iraq’s reprisals through direct bombing or curds rebellion or even extremist or Islamic groups actions’. That caused the invocation of the 4th article of North Atlantic Treaty – “*The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.*” – and **the USA proposed the allies to start the reinforcement of Turkey’s capacity of defense. However France, Germany and Belgium were against this proposal**, because they did not want to accept even implicitly the inevitability of the war against Iraq. They considered that political actions were not yet exhausted so they rejected to organize Turkey’s defense and the intervention’s consequences. Obviously this originated a brutal crisis as **one of NATO’s main principles was questioned – the solidarity between allies**. As France is only part of the Atlantic Treaty and does not formally

⁴⁶ PERLE, Richard *Goodbye to United Nations*, in *Diário de Notícias* newspaper, March 29, 2003, p. 12

⁴⁷ DE ALMEIDA, João Marques and RATO, Vasco, *A encruzilhada...* op. cit., p. 150

⁴⁸ During the 1st World War, in 1915, the Curds took part in the Armenian population genocide, perpetrated by the Turkish. In 1920, with the end of the war, the Treaty of Sévres establish the creation of a Curd territory but the decision was forgotten and the Curd population was divided by Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and in less number by Armenia and Azerbaijan.

integrates NATO's military structure, the solution was to avoid it: in a NATO's Defense Plans Committee meeting Turkey's request was accepted⁴⁹. **France's position was not new. It has systematically contested the USA's leadership of the European security and defense, although not possessing an exemplary conduct on this issue.** As Almiral António Emílio Sachetti recalls *"In 1954, it was France that proposed and after made impracticable the European Community of Defense; it was founding member of NATO to abandon it in 1966; it has boycotted for more than a year (February 1969 to June 1970) the WEU Council of Ministers, and pressured its reactivation afterwards (February 1984); with Germany, took part on the creation of an "European army", the first attempt to create a North American independent defense; during the Gulf war, initially refused to integrate the coalition against Iraq, because the Chief Commander was American, and at last minute changed its attitude; it did not participate in Travemude's NATO summit (October 1993), when Les Aspin, US Secretary of Defense, presented the concept of "partnership for peace", etc. More recently, France surprisingly vituperated the future EU members that supported USA's policy for Iraq. On April, 29, 2003, after Iraq's war France supported a proposal also signed by Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg for the constitution of an autonomous military defense force..."*⁵⁰. We may add that, despite the United Nations Security Council (being France a permanent member) new resolutions' about Iraq – Resolutions 1472 (28.03.2003), 1476 (24.04.2003), 1483 (22.05.2003), 1490 (03.07.2003), 1500 (15.08.2003), 1511 (16.10.2003), 1518 (24.11.2003) and 1546 (08.06.2004) -, some of which encourage several ways of collaboration and participation of member States in Iraq's stabilization and reconstruction, and after consecutive appeals of the UN General Secretary in that sense, France (like Germany and other European countries) resists to send resources and capacities to Iraq.

This might help us to understand why Dominique de Villepin, French Foreign Affairs Minister has refused to say his preference for the winner of the war – if Saddam or Bush...

In a similar opposition to the USA, many interpretations and allegations about Madrid's attacks on March 11th, 2004 were made in Europe. For a

⁴⁹ This description follows SACHETTI, Almiral António Emílio's words in *Estratégia e relações de poder*, op. cit., pp.438-439

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 440

significant number of European politicians and analysts, this attack had an “obvious” and “direct” relation with Aznar’s support to the American intervention in Iraq. Meaning that, in the end of the day, former Spanish government and the American were the responsible for the tragedy – in a Manichean, simplistic, ignorant, fearless vision revealing bad faith. Few days after, when Zapatero’s government – that already affirmed his will to change Spain’s position towards Iraq – was ready to take over, another attempt in Spanish railways was deactivated. Later on, members of a terrorist group that prepared new actions exploded themselves in their apartment. **Zapatero’s PSOE had promised in March 2004’s electoral campaign, to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq**, which he did hastily right after his government took over. Many European circles applauded this position, notwithstanding the Spanish international compromises, or Iraq’s situation or subsequent developments at politic-diplomatic level. One year after Iraq’s military intervention, the Spanish new government changed its country position and associated with the French-German axis in the opposition to the USA. **Their legitimacy is unquestionable as it represents the most important electoral promise.** However, this was marked by March 11th attacks (occurred 3 days before the elections and with a vital role in the “turn up” of the voting results), by threats of new attacks against Spain and by the violence escalate in Iraq. **The risk is that Spain not only opposes to the coalition military presence in Iraq, but also to the USA generally or that its position is weak before terrorism –in this case we might watch the “domino effect” in terrorist targets, as they might consider to be able to influence electoral results and foreign policies of certain countries.**

The confrontation atmosphere is also perceptible in the idea that both the European and the American make of each other and of the transatlantic community – this image has evolved to an unexpected level between allies. Effectively, European and American currently look less at each other as “world’s good sides”. The European Union looks at itself as a “shining city on the top of the hill”, in a similar image that American have of themselves. Despite, **there are more and more Europeans to consider the USA a severe cowboy, more dangerous than other threats or even as the “evil empire”.** In Europe there is a growing anti-Americanism feeling with the correspondent syndrome of “**you deserve it!**” every time something goes wrong for the North American (particularly in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan or in the war against terrorism!) – this is aberrant, as we

are allies and our security depends from them. On the other hand, **there is an increasing number of American bearing a grudge towards the European, considering them “cowards” and “traitors”. For them they play their enemies’ game, acting like former sheriff’s assistants turned into preachers – equally absurd, because their security also depends on the cooperation with the allies.** Truly, many of these comparisons are based in old prejudices and ignorance and do not represent the majority but also reflect a significant progress in some public opinion sectors, intellectual elites and decision makers.

From this geopolitical gap between allies – the USA expressing hegemony and trying to make Europe to accept its leadership; Europe’s interest in “autonomy” and containment of hegemonic and unilateral actions of the superpower, through multilateralization and subordination to the International Law, in a growing will to rivalry - that was clearly demonstrated with Iraqi; question, resulting in a severe breach in the “transatlantic community”. This crisis, which was originated by a secondary and outcast actor in the international scenery (Iraq from tyrannical Saddam) but where opposing interests and values were in cause, from Europe and the USA - affected seriously the transatlantic relations, endangered the cohesion among the Atlantic Alliance, threatened the union and solidarity of the European Union (because their members divided in the support or opposition to the USA) and put the United Nations on the brink of a precipice. **The “West” is in danger, and the danger increased and/or became visible with Iraq crisis. The USSR’s failed objective – to separate the European from the American – is now happening with Iraq, the epilogue of a series of divergences and catalyst of a severe transatlantic crisis due to the irresponsibility of some leaders.** If the USA’s foreign relations have been affected with this crisis, this happened mainly with Europe and not with Russia or China. To such an extent that Eastern European countries pressured either by the USA and the French-German axis have said, *“We do not want to chose between the father and the mother”*⁵¹...

⁵¹ This expression is ascribed to Slovenia Prime Minister, but reveals the feelings of the candidates accessing to the European Union and others.

The Transatlantic challenges in the path of a “revealing Iraq”

“What I fear is not the American unilateralism, is the isolation, the distance, when we need a committed America”

Tony Blair, in the annual Labor Party congress,
in Bornemouth, September 30, 2003⁵²

“It (Europe) is a single entity – though it is culturally, ethnically and economically immensely diverse. For the first time in its history, this entity has an opportunity to establish an internal order on the principle of co-operation and equality among the large and the small, the strong and the weak, on shared democratic values. This is also an opportunity to put an end, once and for all to the export of coercion and wars. Should Europe fail to grasp this opportunity, we could be heading to a new global catastrophe, a catastrophe far graver than previous ones. This time the forces of freedom would not face a single totalitarian enemy. They could well be drawn into a strange era of all against all, a war with no clear front...”

Vaclav Havel, 1998⁵³

As previously referred the crisis about the military intervention in Iraq had significant consequences in the transatlantic and inter-European relations. It is amazing how fast this all happened. However, Iraq’s case gave us some lessons and launched new challenges. In many aspects Iraq has revealed previously existing symptoms:

- It revealed the difficulties in having consensus about collective security between American and European – the Cold War nostalgia and the team work done are not enough to continue to draw a common destiny;
- It revealed to both transatlantic sides the seriousness of divergences and the lack of a common strategical culture;
- It clearly revealed the huge disparity between power and strength of both sides of the Alliance due to the extraordinary combat capacities expressed by the USA during the military campaign;

⁵² Quoted in Publico newspaper, October 1, 2003, p. 15

⁵³ HAVEL, Vaclav, *The charms of NATO*, speech in Washington after being awarded the Fullbright Prize, October 3, 1997, in New York Review of Books, January 15, 1998, p. 24

- It revealed to the American the risk of unilateralism and the crucial role of the Allies in managing security, in reconstruction and peace keeping – fabulous capacities and easy military victory do not mean the achievement of political and strategic goals and stabilization;
- It revealed to the European the limitation and dilemmas of their ESDP and the risks of European fragmentation before a serious crisis with opposed policies to the superpower of which depend the European defense and security;
- It revealed the use of the EU, NATO and even UNO by some countries' political factions to obtain internal political victories and by some nations to obtain international importance – at the cost of the transatlantic cooperation and with overwhelming consequences for all multilateral mechanisms;
- It revealed a new awakening of European strategic conscience, recalling that it cannot avoid the burden of security management for the benefit of all.

The Iraq's case brings a brutal message: a transatlantic breach is very dangerous as it might shake some of the fundamental bases of international security. It is dangerous for European and American, for the Alliance, the EU cohesion, the United Nations, for Iraqi and Afghans. It might be dangerous for Bosnia and Kosovo, for the fight to terrorism, weapons of massive destruction proliferation and “evil States”, for peace promoting and keeping, in the end is dangerous for the European and the world' security. **The only to profit from this strategic irresponsibility are the enemies of democracy and West: terrorists, “lords of war” or some countries' evil leaders – people like Osama Bin Laden or Saddam Hussein. The first and main transatlantic challenge is to overcome divergences, reinforce the transatlantic partnership and keep the Atlantic Alliance political and military effective, expression of community of values and destiny.**

Thus, it is strange that some analysts and leaders have come to the conclusion that the USA and Europe, the EU and NATO should ultimately follow paths apart. For those, who consider that North American and European do not share the same world vision and that the Alliance is dead or pronounced dead, Europe might choose between two alternatives only: loyalty and obedient silence, since the USA are so powerful and dominant that Europe's only hope of

influencing its behavior is to be the loyal ally (Blair's option); or the re-militarization and competition, enabling Europe to have its own aims and develop its own comprehensive capacities taking on more responsibility for its own security and that of its neighborhood (so called Chirac's option). In these terms, as the Brussels' Director of European Policy Center, Fraser Cameron says, "*I am sure that in the long term Europe must adopt Chirac's attitude...*"⁵⁴ Robert Kagan and the North American radical neo-conservatives should be happy with this perspective coming from Europe – as they consider this European mission impossible, despite it distances Europe from the USA.

However, there is a **preferred option for the European and equally better for the transatlantic relation: a strong investment in defense and capacities but in a perspective of the USA and NATO complementarity, not of competition and conflict.** This is not new, this is only to put into practice the contents of official declarations and documents. As referred by General Garcia Leandro "*For Europe is not interesting to compete with the USA in the field of armament. It is not a question of inability. It is an option. It is another world philosophy (...) Sometimes there is no alternative to military force use and, if the USA are the biggest military power that accept all delegations, they cannot be abandoned in great crisis moments. Europe must have military capacities... that allow to teamwork with the USA. And let NATO continue to be a relevant common house as it interests both North Atlantic sides...*"⁵⁵.

The tasks split between the EU and NATO is clear and complementary. The EU's Defense and Security Policy (EDSP) is to harmonize progressively the security concepts and cultures of the European countries so they are able to gradually undertake the responsibility of civil and military security since the low until medium intensity level and develop a defined doctrine for peace keeping and consolidation. NATO has a permanent and crucial triple role: to grant the continuity of lower and higher intensity levels, or control the escalate; to secure that American and European work together to reach the world's security; and to

⁵⁴ See also the curious and clarifying debate between CAMERON, Fraser and MORAVCSIK, Andrew, *Debate – Should the European Union be able to do everything that NATO can?* in NATO Review, Fall 2003, Web edition, available at www.nato.int

⁵⁵ LEANDRO, General Garcia *Guerra e Paz*, op. cit. p. 21

secure the guarantee of essential security so that Europe's security re-nationalization does not shake its political bases and prevent its emergent projection capacity.⁵⁶

So, the second great transatlantic challenge is to implement complementarities. One year and a half after the Iraq's situation shows how vital that is. For the American the main lesson is that is harder to build peace than to lead a war. The USA could learn a lot with the way some of the Allies have done peacekeeping and stabilization. In peace re-establishment the USA definitely depend on Europe in what concerns civil and military power of low intensity. The European cannot juggle the lack of capacities and will have to invest, either to fulfill the EU ambition of being a stronger international security player or to avoid its troops to dye in vain in forced operations. Therefore **another transatlantic challenge is a new security agreement between Allies in which the American learn how to do peacekeeping and the European get better equipment to fight.**

Another transatlantic challenge, means to deepen the Atlantic Alliance cooperation or deepen the EU-NATO cooperation to be effective and real in crisis management. Both the EU and NATO contribute to the management, differently but complementarily. **Working with NATO the EU secure a faster and a bigger access to a substantially more coercive power. Europeans that presume a strong ESDP through a weak NATO are totally wrong** as, among other things, they forget: the lack of a strong, coherent European political objective, the lack of resources that allow a significant increase of military capacities and the impossibility of the ESDP suddenly becoming in a mechanism for planning and executing multinational European coalitions with several levels of military technology, consisting of coherent forces able to be projected to dangerous and distant places around the world. Without NATO, Europe takes the chance of being even more insecure and unable, lacking self-confidence, hesitating and probably without the notion of its place and mission in the world. If the Alliance disappears what is the alternative? How can Europe develop its own distinct and complementary security culture? **For those in the USA, that believe in NATO's insignificance and in America's ability to manage the world and all crisis alone, they will isolate America making it loose legitimacy and efficiency.** Will the USA be safer alone?

⁵⁶ LINDLEY-FRENCH, Julian *Unifying links* by, in NATO news, Fall 2003. Web edition.

We only expect that few opportunist politicians and intellectuals realize the damage caused to their own security structures by weakening essential relations either for the European Union and NATO – or that they are removed of their decision making positions. We could almost consider this as another transatlantic challenge. Chirac-Schroeder's thesis are not accepted in several Europe's sectors and countless leaders reveal great prudence. During the Iraq's process many European countries have chose to support, or at least not oppose, their American ally. Obviously **France and Germany's positions do not reflect all Europeans positions or the EU's position (actually there are several European positions and not only one)**. Officially the prevalent thesis tends to preserve the Atlantic Alliance, to reinforce the ESDP and to invigorate the EU-NATO cooperation.

In the United States, it becomes evident that the neo-conservatives messianic vision and unilateralist tendency will not be successful due to its inefficiency – already being corrected. **The White House policy has been severely criticized not only by Bill Clinton and John Kerry, but also by the many signatories of the document “*For renovation of the Transatlantic Partnership*”**. Here, among others, we find Democrats like Madeleine Allbright, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Warren Christopher or William Cohen and Republicans, such as Frank Carlucci, Robert Dole, Alexander Haig Jr. or James Schlesinger⁵⁷. These personalities from both great political parties are not European nor anti-American. That also shows that there are several world and transatlantic relations visions' in the USA. However we must note that the Bush Administration has always officially emphasized the present importance of the value and use of the Atlantic Alliance. In an article meaningfully entitled “*A Strategy of Partnerships*”, the former Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to Europe as follows:

“It is true that we have had differences with some of our oldest and most valued NATO allies. But these are differences among friends. The transatlantic partnership is based so firmly on common interests and values that neither feuding personalities nor occasional divergent perceptions can derail it. We have new friends and old friends alike in Europe. They are all, in the end, best friends, which is why the President continues to talk about partnerships, not polarities, when he speaks about Europe. Some authorities say that we must move to a multipolar world. We do not agree – not because we do no value competition and diversity, but because there need be no poles

⁵⁷ Document quoted by LEANDRO, General Garcia in *Guerra e Paz*, op. cit, pp. 22-23.

among a family of nations that shares basic values. We believe that it is wiser to work at overcoming differences than to polarize them further”⁵⁸.

Another great challenge for the transatlantic relations seems to be the future of European integration. While the American unilateralist impetus resulted from political decisions that may and are already being modified, the European integration challenge is structural for Europe, America and the Atlantic partnership. On both sides of Atlantic the traditional and official statements refer that European integration strengthens Europe, which automatically reinforces the whole Atlantic Alliance and consequently leads to a balanced relation within NATO. However for some authors, for instance Henry Kissinger, two other outcomes are possible: *“Europe that reduces its global responsibilities, taking a mini United Nations status and preaching moral at the same time that focuses on economical competition with the USA, or, alternatively Europe that defies the United States and builds a foreign and mediation policy between America and the rest of the world, very similar to India’s attempt during Cold War. With internal affairs prevailing and no security threat in the horizon, Europe might take its time to choose between these options. Therefore it might melt both approaches, as each one alone, would slowly destroy the Atlantic partnership”⁵⁹.*

During the whole integration process of Europe, the USA had a supportive role and showed it benevolently. Back in 1963, President Kennedy defended Europe’s unification to achieve a balanced relation:

“Only a cohesive Europe may protect us from the Alliance’s fragmentation. Only that Europe may allow full reciprocity in the Atlantic policy treatment between both sides of the ocean. Only with that Europe we may have a situation of “take and give” among equals, and balanced share of responsibilities and an equal level of sacrifice.”⁶⁰

This vision still prevails in Europe and the USA. However, **the current challenge fomented by the actual stage of the European integration and the transatlantic relations degradation is substantially different and uncertain.** As

⁵⁸ POWELL, Colin L. *A Strategy of Partnerships*, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, n. 1, January/February 2004, p. 30.

⁵⁹ KISSINGER, Henry, *Precisaré a América de uma política Externa?*, op. cit, p.45.

⁶⁰ KENNEDY, President John F., speech in Paulskirche, Frankfurt, Germany, June 24, 1963, quoted by KISSINGER, Henry, idem, p. 41

referred by Álvaro Vasconcelos, “*The European Union faces the need of redefining its relation with the USA, causing the evolution of ideological atlantism, proper of Cold War, to a Euro-American partnership. The reflection about the current (Iraq) war should be the catalyst of this change*”⁶¹. Waiting for the ESDP evolution is still necessary to clearly know Europeans’ ambitions and goals for their “autonomous” military capacities. Also, we should be aware of the direction chosen by the European Union in what concerns its role in the world and its relation with the United States to understand the impact of the European integration in the transatlantic relations and the American attitude towards different European integration options. Anyway, for all sake, **it is vital that the EU should integrate and maintain close links with the Atlantic partnership and that the USA keep on supporting the ESDP.**

The common and joint management of threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and “Rogue States” represent an important challenge and should be faced as vital for the transatlantic community of security and defense. The articulation between the USA and Europe, and NATO-EU is crucial for the clearance of common threats – and though much has been done in this sense it lacks a common strategy clearly and undoubtedly undertaken by all. Smaller and dangerous groups might easily have access to destructive power that until now was exclusive of the most powerful. The European and American, as world “good forces” should get prepared for this reality together.

A perhaps more immediate transatlantic challenge is the cooperation reinforcement in Afghanistan’ stabilization and above all, in Iraq’ stabilization due to its gravity and symbolism. In what concerns Iraq the European objections are reasonable – shared by moderate conservatives like James Baker or Brent Scowcroft and by many democrats like General Wesley Clark, Supreme Commandant Ally in Europe, between 1997 and 2000. However, **Europe should not misunderstand the Iraq’s war opposition with the USA opposition or the European dismissal in Iraq stabilization.** If the USA want help after the intervention they must be ingenious in the commitment of multilateral institutions and in the preparation of post war mechanisms – this should have

⁶¹ DE VASCONCELOS, Álvaro, *Vencer a Paz*, in *O Mundo em Português*, n. 43, IEEI, April 2003, p.3

been done before, but now they have no other choices. That is why Washington is acting cautiously in what concerns Iran, Syria or North Korea. They are clearly looking for the United Nations and NATO's involvement in Iraq. The Atlantic Alliance is emerging as a promising forum to organize peacekeeping and develop common principles to organize future interventions. **Following the United Nations Security Council and Iraqi government appeals, NATO has started to support the Iraqi security forces training** (as decided in Istanbul summit). **The chance of a NATO' stabilization mission in Iraq should be considered seriously as it already occurs in Afghanistan:** here NATO's mission has the United Nations approval and the military collaboration of other countries like Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine. In any of the cases NATO has to show its ability for these kind of missions (which is not happening in Afghanistan), or it will lose its credibility and power. The current problem lays in knowing if the European are willing and able to constructively commit on this process. Practically ignored in the war preparation, many European have been understandable reluctant in using their resources and troops – contrasting with the first Gulf war and with Kosovo. **To interrupt this complex conciliation process renouncing to the Atlantic Alliance and abandoning Iraq to chaos would represent a tragic victory for all that hate the Western community.**

It is now the moment for European to move on and for American to meditate. It is now the moment to reinvest on the transatlantic relations, on the Atlantic Alliance and on the EU-NATO relationship wisely, with transparency and realism. Not to do this is simply too dangerous.

THE USA-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Russia and its relations with the USA are totally different of “Europe’s” case above studied. The state of its relation with the USA since the end of Cold War and especially since the September 11th has an opposing curve to the USA-Europe relationship: in Russian case it shows progressive approximation.

Before this analysis, we should remind the existing perceptions about Russia, as well as some Russian perceptions about the west, and describe the new post-soviet Russia profile. Russia – with its geographical dimension and natural resources, its place on the United Nations Security Council and G-8, its natural influential area, its nuclear and strategical armament and all its past, present and potential future - represents a great power. But what kind of power and where is it heading to?

Images of Russia

*“Russia is a great country and I am not referring to geography. Russia is a great country on the inside. On the inside. There is a tremendous force on this side of the world. Where is it heading to, I do not know.”*⁶²

José Pacheco Pereira, May 2004

Western images of Russia are embedded with strong ambivalence. On one hand, it is a recent element on the international stage; on the other, is the heir of the “old” Russia of the Tzars. It is the main responsible for the dismantling of the feared Soviet Union but it is also “USSR’s mother and daughter”, as it was in its epicenter during seven decades and its legitimate heir. Russia is an “European” country, Slavonic and mostly Christian, and since the 18th century has always been involved on the Old Continent’s conflicts – Seven Years’ War, Napoleonic Wars, Crimea War, 1st World War, 2nd World War, Cold War. However, it is considered an “eastern” country, European but Asiatic, Christian but orthodox, Slavonic but oriental – always seated in both continents, Europe and

⁶² PEREIRA José Pacheco, *Impressões* in Abrupto, internet blog, May 20, 2004, comments on his trip to Moscow, in www.abrupto.blogspot.com

Asia, “*the Russian people*”, quoting Dostoievsky, “*has always been considered European in Asia and Asiatic in Europe*”⁶³. Cold, mysterious, wide, autocratic and violent, Russia has always been a *sui-generis* Empire State.

Russia’s image has also been originated by its **long expansionist period**. Right after its release from Mongolian domination (Golden Horde), Russia has not ceased its expansion until the 1st World War: it arrived at the **Urals and Caspian Sea** (16th century), conquered **Siberia** (end of 16th century and first half of the 17th century), pushed over the **Baltic** (end of 17th century and beginning of the 18th century), **the Black Sea and Crimea, shared Poland and took possession of Kamchatka peninsula and Okhotsk Sea** (18th Century). It has conquered the **Caucasus** and annexed **Finland** (end of 18th century and beginning of the 19th), conquered the **Central Asia – Kazakhstan and Turkstan, Pamir and Turkmenistan** – approaching the Afghanistan, Persia, Ottoman empire and Tibet -, occupied half of the **Sakhalin and Kuriles Islands** and had Amour and Ussuri regions given by China (second half of the 19th century). In the end of the 19th century, with ottoman decline Russia claimed an “**influence zone**” in the **Balkans and, in 1900, had military occupied Chinese Manchuria**, and even ambited Korea. Loosing a significant quantity of European territory between 1917 and 1920, the USSR would integrate great part of these and other territories in **1939-40 and after, in 1945** (Finnish Karelia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Eastern Poland, Rutenia, Bessarabia), and made its satellite countries of several European countries – Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. After USSR’s implosion, **the new Russia claimed again an empire status upon old territories, and in particular upon remaining members of the Community of Independent States** (consisting of 12 former soviet republic members – the exceptions are the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).

This strong expansionist impulse results, in Russian perspectives, from a certain moral superiority and from a huge insecurity and vulnerability complex. Their European borders have been challenged by Polish-Lithuanian, Swedish, English, Ottomans, French, German and Austrian; from the East came the Mongols and, seven centuries after, Russia has faced twice the Japanese (1905

⁶³ Quoted by STEPHAN, John J. in *Asia in the Soviet Conception*, in ZAJORIA, Donald S. (ed.) *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982, p. 35

and 1945); to confirm their possessions in the southwest wing, Russia had to face the Persian and Ottoman Muslims, and also the British.

To sum to all this is the fact that the Russian **empire has since ever suffered strong pressure for its disintegration** due to its wideness and its multinational character. **Russia has always been an empire of captive peoples**, forced by repression, violence, brutality and sacrifice.

On the western minds no one forgets that the **wideness of its territory and tenacity of its people was fundamental to save Europe twice**: in the beginning of the 19th century, with Napoleon, and between 1940-1945 with Hitler. But no one forgets also, that after having started the 1st World War against Austria-Hungary in the name of a pan-orthodox and a pan-Slavonic appeal (to help sister Serbia), **Russia betrayed its allies in Brest-Litovsk** (March 3, 1918), by prematurely withdrawing from the 1st World War; it is also present on minds, the **German-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, a week before Poland invasion and the beginning of war, that would turn Russia in a true ally of Nazi Germany** – with whom Poland has been shared in the two first years of the 2nd World War⁶⁴. Its schemes and diplomatic ability (despite not always being successful) have conditioned its alliance with the United Kingdom, Prussia and Austria against France; with France and the United Kingdom against imperialist Germany and Austria-Hungary; again with Germany to save the “October revolution”; with the UK, France and later Nazi Germany to avoid isolation; with the USA and other democracies to avoid the 2nd World War catastrophe; with the USA to have an “influence zone” in Europe; and, in the Cold War period, in an attempt to separate western European and North American through nuclear blackmail and pacifist messages.

Russia's History with Europe has left a heavy legacy of fear – as Finnish, Latvians, Estonians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Moldavians, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians or Polish may easily confirm. However **it has also left some nostalgia of the co-operation periods**. In Germany, some identify “historic mistakes” to not have followed Bismark, Ratzel or Haushoffer's advises, to not attempt the invasion and occupation of such wide territory and

⁶⁴ In fact, it was a Non Aggression Pact of 10 years, but should be more than that. For further information see FURET, François, *O Le Passé D'Une Illusion*, (Portuguese Edition), Presença Publishers, Lisbon, 1996, specially chapter 9 “A segunda guerra mundial”, pp 362-441.

always maintain open a diplomatic option with Russia. France might recall that in the 20th century it was saved twice by its alliance with Russia. Also the United Kingdom reminds that but also the Russian threats to the Bosphorus and their approaches to India. With such historical legacy, plenty of ups and downs, **Russia originates contradictory perceptions on the European minds. Today, some Europeans imagine again a wide cooperation and partnership with Russia to balance the USA; however, others search in the USA a warrant against the resurgence of an aggressive Russia.**

Obviously, the USA's historical experience with Russia is more recent and less direct. Considered as the symbol of European autocracy, this did not prevent the USA of buying Alaska in 1867, and in 1904-1905 they were caught by surprise by Russian defeat by the Japanese. The 20th century has left a negative but curious legacy of the USA-Russia relationship. For several months during the 1st World War the USA and Russia were allied; **after the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917, Russia has become the incarnation of absolute evil** (despite the most famous author of the revolution report was North American, John Reed in "Ten days that shook the World"). The USA had even supported a civil war against the "red". Only in 1934 the diplomatic relations should be re-established with Russia, because in that period the communism and capitalism were considered as barriers against Fascism and Nazism. Again no relations between 1939 and 1941, **but due to Hitler and later to Japanese Empire, the USA and Russia faced again common enemies.** Following to its resistance and victimization, to Europe's total destruction and to its euro-Asiatic capacities, President Franklin Roosevelt considered the USSR as one of the piles of the new world's emerging order. However, this honeymoon was very short. **The expansionist conjugation of communism and Stalinism led the USSR to dominate half of Europe, imposing the Old Continent an "iron curtain".** The USA, with President Harry Truman, implemented the "containment" strategy and the international relations quickly became bipolar, with hostility and confrontation between the superpowers. Due to the impressive accumulation of nuclear weapons this war was always "cold" promoting a series of negotiations between the powers about control and armament reduction. Independently of serious ideological and geopolitical divergences, the nuclear weapon represented a risk of cataclysm, threatening the whole world. Both superpowers should limit, or if possible eliminate this threat. Today, no

matter what geopolitical or geostrategical differences exist, a strong collaboration at this level is indispensable.

The New Russia

Post-soviet Russia descriptions are ambivalent due to this historical legacy but not only. Being only one of the fifteen parts of old Soviet Union, **the new Russia in its present situation is the biggest state of the world.** It spreads for 17.075.200 square kilometers and contains eleven different time zones. Moscow is closer to Paris, London or Lisbon than to Vladivostok that, on its turn, it's closer to Beijing, Tokyo or Seattle than to the Russian capital. **In the last fifteen years this colossal country has embarked on a dramatic and extraordinary change.**

Evolving from communist dictatorship to multiparty democracy, with more than 700 political parties registered and having political leaders freely chosen in ordinary elections – between 1991 and 2003, there were seven national, four parliamentary and three presidential elections -, **Russia is still pointed out as an unfinished democracy, with imperfect political institutions and civic freedoms:** Russian leaders are accused of elections' manipulation through a tight control of the state media, prosecution and censorship of independent press and the use of judicial and administrative resources to intimidate or turn the rivals unable. In June 2000, *The Economist* magazine considered Russia a “*phony democracy*” and more recently, the *Freedom House* group classified Russia with “5” on the political freedom and “5” on civil freedoms in a scale of “1” (best performance) to “7” (the worst); in what concerns “political pressure, control and violence” against the media, the *Freedom House* gave “30” to Russia in a scale of “0” (best) to “40” (worst)⁶⁵. On December 7, 2003 the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also expressed reserves about the last Russian parliamentary elections, noticing the “*intense use of State means and media favoring*” in benefit of Pro-Russia Party, the pro-Putin's party⁶⁶, (that got more than 37% of votes). However, it is curious to **note that no matter Putin's clearly pro-western foreign**

⁶⁵ Data quoted by SHLEIFER, Andrei and TREISMAN, Daniel in *Russia – a Normal Country*, in *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 83, n. 2, March/April 2004, pp 31-32.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp33-34

policy, more than its predecessor Boris Yeltsin, his power handling is correlated with a significant increase of western criticism on Russia's democratic attitude. For instance, Z. Brzezinski in a text wrote on the Fall 2003, said: *"I am concerned with the unconditional smoothing towards a government of ex-KGB agents as in a mature democracy... If Russia should be part of an extended area, it should not take with itself the imperial luggage, or a genocide policy against Chechnya's population; it cannot kill journalists and repress the mass media. I think that we should be sensitive to these facts..."*⁶⁷. Colin Powell seems to have listened him. In an article published in the late January 2004, in Moscow daily newspaper "Izvestia", coincident with his official visit to Moscow, the US former Secretary of State has harshly criticized some aspects of the Russian policy: *"It seems that Russia's democratic system has not achieved a balance between executive, legislative and judicial powers... the political power is not totally according the law's rules... main aspects of civil society, such as freedom of press and political parties development do not have a stable and independent character"*⁶⁸.

In the same day, Pacheco Pereira, after a recent trip to Russia describes his "Impressions": *"Some freedoms have stabilized but there is no 'freedom atmosphere'. Putin rules with his KGB's friends. He seems a man without personal corruption temptations but enjoys the autocratic power. The power show pleases him and he climbs alone the long Kremlin's stairs, stepping on an endless red carpet to swear in an isolated lectern his fidelity to Russia. It is natural that by his attitude he imagines to give Russian power a new image, depressed by difficult and vain years. But so much ostensive solitude power is also an autocratic sign. (...) Putin's Russia reveals its strangeness, the strangeness of transition moments, when nothing is defined. Moscow's city centre is full of luxury stores, imported vehicles fill gigantic highways and prices are exorbitant. Today Moscow is more expensive than Tokyo. The five years ago beggars and indigents selling grandfather's samovar or youth's rollers and kitten baskets are gone from the metro stairs access and the big luxury shopping mall next to the Red Square. However "Chechnya" the national issue remains taboo. Vocabulary is checked. Millionaire Russians in prison remind to "new capitalists" the risk of the job. The difference between*

⁶⁷ BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew, *La Seguridad de EE en un mundo unipolar*, in Politica Exterior, 97, January/February 2004, p. 61

⁶⁸ Quoted in Público newspaper, January 27, 2004, p. 16

*what is legal and illegal remains discretionary, mainly in the economical field. Who makes the decision? The political power.*⁶⁹

Although in great controversy and turbulence, the planned socialist economy regime gave room to a capitalist economy based in private property. There are frequent descriptions of “wild capitalism” practice, associated with the immense power of oligarchs and mafia networks, which led the country to the “economical collapse”, “massive unemployment”, “growing poverty” and “brutal disparities”. Between December 1991 and December 2001, Russian rouble devaluated more than 99% in relation to the American dollar. In the last decade of the 20th century, some consider Russian economical performance as “*a tragedy of historical proportions*”⁷⁰, defining the country as the “*most virulent kleptocracy of the world*”⁷¹. **Corruption in Russia is also described with impressive records**, always having a high position in several reports and rankings: 142 in 160 countries, on the World Bank list of 2001; 71 in 102 countries on the Transparency International ranking of perceptions of corruption in 2002⁷².

However, **over the last years Russia has been showing an important economical recovery**, changing many of the perceptions coming from the Yeltsin’s era. In 1998 it overcame the financial crisis – in that year its fiscal system collapsed; it refers admirable economical growth rates (6,4% in 1999, 10% in 2000, 5% in 2001, 4,3% in 2002 and 7,1% in the first half of 2003); its currency is stable; the inflation seems under control (in 2002 it was around 10-12%)⁷³. Consequently, a more self-confident Russia no longer needs international institutions’ funds but even started to pay part of its huge external debt. At the same time, Russia is negotiating to achieve in the short term its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) with minimal concessions. It is estimated that Russia will double the GDP within one decade – but still, its share on the world economy

⁶⁹ PEREIRA, José Pacheco, *Impressões* in Abrupto, website blog, May 20, 2004, comment on his trip to Moscow, at www.abrupto.blogspot.com

⁷⁰ SANDERS, Bernard, member of the USA congress, quoted by SHLEIFER, Andrei and TREISMAN, Daniel, op. cit., p. 21

⁷¹ LEACH, James, cit in *ibid*.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 30

⁷³ Data quoted by RUMER, Eugene B. and WALLANDER, Celeste A., in *Russia: Power in Weakness?*, in the *Washington Quarterly*, 27:1, Winter 2003-2004, p. 59

will be only 3%⁷⁴. Anyway what makes Russia economically important to the rest of the world are its energy resources.

In the energy sector, Russia stands as one of the most important international players: it is one of the biggest oil producers (the second, after Saudi Arabia in some opinions) having 10% of the world's reserves and is the world's biggest producer of natural gas – with 30% of the world's reserves – to add to its 20% of coal reserves. This gives way to the USA contract with Moscow gas and oil conducts to allow the access to the Urals, Siberia and Caspian hydrocarbon; and, China and Japan compete to attract Russian pipelines that will satisfy their needs. Also the European Union is a growing consumer of these Russian resources: 45% of Russian energy exportations are to the former 15 members of the EU; 21% of the EU(15) oil imports come from Russia, which represents 16% of total EU(15) consumption; 41% of EU(15) gas imports come also from Russia, representing 19% of the total consumption in the European Union of 15. These numbers have a significant increase with the 25 members' European Union (most of new members are from eastern Europe and already depend on Russian energy), and increases are estimated for the European imports of Russian energy resources until 2020, mainly due to the growing dependence of gas of which Russia has fabulous reserves. The European support to a substantial part of Russian pipelines in construction is not innocent (Yamal-Europe pipeline, Shtockman gas camp, Drouzba-Adria pipelines connection or electric networks inter-connections, as well as the funding of the viability study of Northern European pipeline). So, the energy sector growth to 20% of the Russia GDP⁷⁵ is not surprising. Actually, the Russian energy production makes it a vital partner for prices and markets' stability, especially due to the unsteadiness of the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Russia's energy resources are a catalyst of power and influence projection: it injects the "health" that sustains the economy; balances the budget; funds national defense; provides the neighbor States with strategical cover giving them a supplementary incentive to integrate the CIS; increases its stature before the Middle East's main powers as Saudi Arabia, Iran or even Israel; and is an extra excellent

⁷⁴ TRENIN, Dmitri, *Pirouettes and priorities – Distilling a Putin doctrine*, in The National Interest, Winter 2003/2004, p. 78

⁷⁵ Data quoted by CLAIRET, Sophie, *Le dialogue énergétique Europe-Russie*, in Diplomatic Magazine, n. 7, February-March 2004, p. 40

motive for developing good relations with powers such as the USA, EU, China, Japan and India. At the bottom, oil and natural gas give Russia a prominence in the international relations that it never had before in the post-Cold War world.

After 15 years of reforms Russian military forces are a pale version of the Soviet military power. In 1985, the USSR disposed of the world's biggest military contingent, with around 5 million and 300 thousand troops; today, Russia has five times less power with 1 million of effectives in its armed forces⁷⁶. Russia has a rather reduced capacity of military power projection beyond frontiers and its capacity to defend the territory and sovereignty has been severely tested in Chechnya. The expected modernization has successively failed due to the lack of political support and mainly to the lack of financial resources, resulting in a **significant gap between Russian aspirations and the reality**. Russian defense budgets have declined, being in 2003 of 65,200 million USD⁷⁷ (the global military budget of the CIS was around 75,000 million USD) – which means that its military budget is seven times smaller than the USA's -, however, this value represents 4.9% of Russian GDP (while the American defense budget is only 3.7% of its GDP). This restriction does not allow Russia an efficient and necessary recruitment, renovation, training, equipment, maintenance and above all, modernization of the military sector. **Degradation of Russian armed forces has come to a deplorable condition**, suffering many fatal accidents: the nuclear submarine Kursk, in 2001, that victimized the whole crew; another nuclear propulsion submarine, close to the harbor, in August 2003; collision between two MI-24 helicopters during a military training in Russian Far East before the eyes of the Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, also in August 2003. These are just few of the cases and the most publicized aspect of such degradation, that is a consequence of lack of resources for adequate maintenance of military equipment and necessary trainings. For instance, the Russian press constantly refers to electricity cuts due to lack of payment in military bases, delays in official salary payments and malnutrition cases and even hunger among privates. There are also reports of desertions, corruption, abuse and lack of discipline in the Russian army. Generally, Russian armament is obsolete having at least one-generation

⁷⁶ See *The military balance 2003-2004*, p.336 and *The military balance 2004-2005*, p. 354

⁷⁷ Ibid.

delay (some say even more) in what refers to conventional weapons in comparison to the USA. It is not surprising that Russian strategies and doctrines keep on highlighting the nuclear weapons, their only “equalizer” in relation to the USA and their advantage in relation to other powers.

Russian defense industries sell few of their present production to the domestic market, so they depend on exportations – in particular for usual customers and big buyers like China, India and Iran – to be able to sustain their production. In 2003, Russia was the third major arms supplier, in the amount of 3,400 million USD, which represents 11.8% of market share by supplier of the global arms deliveries – right after the USA with 13,648 million USD (47.5% of market share) and the United Kingdom with 4,700 (16.3%) and ahead of France and Germany (representing 4.2% of market share each with a figure of 1,200 million USD each). In the same year Russia was second in the ranking of arms transfer agreements by supplier, in the amount of 4,300 million USD, representing a market share of 16.8% of the global arms transfer agreements by supplier – only surpassed by the USA with amounts of 14,543 million USD and a rate of 56.7%, but right ahead of Germany (1,400 million USD and 5.5%) and France (1,000 million USD and 3.9%)⁷⁸.

Russian army has pacifically withdrawn from Eastern Europe, Vietnam and Cuba and part of former Soviet republics. **Instead of a belligerent adversary, the Europeans find in Russia a partner willing to cooperate** in disarmament, in the combat to massive destruction weapons proliferation and terrorism and in crisis and conflicts management. **However, the Russian army has everywhere a blamable behavior in Chechnya** - being criticized by the USA and the EU, NATO and OSCE and the Council of Europe – and does not seem ready to abandon some positions in the Transcaucasia and Central Asia. In the whole, this gives Russia an ambivalent and contradictory image: is partner but feared, has an emergent economy but chaotic and corrupt, is democratic but not totally. **This led to ambiguous relations of western powers with Russia on the last fifteen years of changes:** on the one hand, supporting the transition, trying to consolidate Russia's democracy and market economy, giving relevance to its energy production and assuring it a respectable role in the international and European affairs mainly in security matters; on the other, condemning its internal policy, trying to “contain”

⁷⁸ *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, op. cit. p. 359.

its imperial impetus towards neighbor countries and fearing that the Russian situation affects the international security – through weapons exportation, namely missile and WMD technology; through a “back to the past”; or through a nationalist and anti-western evolution. Actually, Western countries fear more Russia’s internal evolution than its international policy, and **their policies towards Moscow try to influence the domestic situation as much as Russia international behaviour.**

Russia and “West” in the first post Cold War decade

With the Soviet Union fall down, Russia’s dimension was diminished as in many centuries ago. Again it found itself geostrategically “stuck” in the Euro-Asiatic area, but with a collapsing economy and strong tendencies for central policy weakness and territorial disintegration. Immerse in a deep and traumatic transition, the new Russia soon defined priorities for its external policy:

- Protect the interests of Russian populations beyond new frontiers, especially in the territories of “near ex-soviet neighbors”;
- Restore the imperial domain in the old soviet area, reintegrating it through mechanisms of the Community of Independent States (CIS);
- Obtain support for undergoing reforms from the “west”;
- Regain little of the lost stature, in order to be a relevant player in the major international affairs, specially in what concerns European security – affirming the United Nations at the international level and the CSCE at the European level, implementing an “equal partnership” between the Atlantic Alliance and Russia;
- Develop links with the west, both the USA and the European Union;
- Keep an important position on the Asiatic affairs, strengthening ties mainly with China, and with Iran, Iraq, India and Japan.

In the first times of new independent Russia, President Boris Yeltsin and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, affirmed that the country’s future should be linked to the west through its compromises with democracy and market economy and that security and economical development should depend on a tight cooperation with the USA, Western Europe and Japan. In June 2000, in my report to NATO I described Russia’s initial expectations: *Politically, the “West” should treat Russia as an ally that had brought about the end of communism.*

*Economically, however, Russia deserves the kind of massive aid extended to those defeated and/or destroyed in the Second World War.*⁷⁹

For that, Russian government used the nationalist and communist strategy in the geopolitical and geostrategic negotiations with the west, trying to demonstrate that Russian pro-western orientation needed stimulation. As Andrei Kozyrev said in the first article by a Russian Foreign Minister published in *NATO Review* in February 1993: “*If we began to be seen in Western capitals as something “unnecessary” or “dangerous”, this would only encourage our “national patriots” to increase their attacks on current Russian policy and would sustain their chauvinist desires to close off Russia in pseudo-superpower isolation*”⁸⁰. In the same symbolic article Kozyrev also made a very important warning: “*we are opposed to closed groupings, to doctrines such as Pax Americana, Pax Germanica or Pax Eurasiatica*”⁸¹

However, **this Russian policy almost exclusively pro-west did not last long** – Russia suspected of the west, and the west did not trust new Russia. **The most paradigmatic case is maybe Russia’s relationship with NATO.**

Russia and NATO in the first post Cold War decade

For some time, the possibility of the Atlantic Alliance enlargement to the East did not seem to bring great concern to Moscow. In August 1993, President Boris Yeltsin visited Warsaw and showed sympathy with Poland’s desire to join NATO, stating the final Polish-Russian Declaration of August 25: “*Such a move would not be counter to Russian interests nor to the pan-European integration process*”⁸². However, few days later, in October 15, in a letter addressed to the USA’s President Bill Clinton and other Western leaders, Yeltsin dramatically changes his position and shows his **frontal opposition to the possible admission of the Central and Eastern European countries to NATO**. He pointed out that such a decision would cause a negative response from Russian society: “*It is important to take into*

⁷⁹ TOMÉ, Luis L., *Russia and NATO’s enlargement*, final report for NATO Research Fellowship 1998-2000 program, June 2000, p. 12, available on the internet at www.nato.int

⁸⁰ KOZYREV, Andrei, *The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance*, NATO Review, Vol. 41, n.1, February 1993, Web Edition, p. 3.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5

⁸² Quoted in *ITAR-Tass Carries Russian-Polish Joint Declaration*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report – Central Eurasia (FBIS – SOV), FBIS – SOV – 93-164, 26 August 1993, pp. 13-15, in International Herald Tribune, 26 August 1993.

account how our public opinion may react to such a step. Not only the opposition, but the moderates, too, would no doubt see this as a sort of neo-isolation of the country as opposed to its natural introduction into the Euro-Atlantic space – and the illegality – “the treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany signed in September 1990, particularly those of its provision that prohibit stationing of foreign troops within the FRG’s Eastern lands, excludes, by its meaning, the possibility of expansion of the NATO zone to the East”⁸³.

Russia, asserted Yeltsin in the same letter, favored a situation in which its relations with NATO would be “*by several degrees warmer than those between the Alliance and Eastern Europe. NATO-Russia rapprochement...should proceed on a faster track*”⁸⁴. In other words, Russia did not see or treat NATO as an enemy – on the contrary, it wished to move closer to the Alliance – but did not wish Eastern countries to become members. At the end of his letter, President Yeltsin expressed Russia’s readiness, “*together with NATO, to offer official security guarantees to the East European States with a focus on ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, and maintenance of peace in the region. Such guarantees could be stipulated in a political statement or co-operation agreement between the Russian Federation and NATO*”⁸⁵. Russia signaled to seek a “droit de regard” over the decision on expanding the Alliance, on the one hand, and pretended to determine the processes and means of ensuring the security of its close neighbors, on the other. The will and positions of Eastern European States, as well as Alliance members were simply ignored in the letter. Today we know that totally **ignored was Russia’s opposition to the Alliance enlargement**: in April 1999, NATO formally integrated Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic; five years later, in April 2004, another seven countries, among which three ex-soviet republics, were joined: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. Meanwhile Russia signed the agreement in June 1994 and integrated the Atlantic Alliance’s Partnership for Peace program; followed by other military co-operation agreements. In 1997, joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council-EAPC (that replaced the former North Atlantic Cooperation Council and whose name was

⁸³ Letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to US President Bill Clinton, 15 September 1993, reproduced in SIPRI Yearbook 1994, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, Appendix 7 A, pp. 249-250.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

suggested by Russia), signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act and created the Permanent Joint Council with the Alliance. But their leaders showed Russian evident discomfort towards NATO. In December 1994, in an OSCE summit, President Boris Yeltsin made another threatening warning: “*Europe, which has not had time to rid itself of the legacy of the Cold War, runs the risk of plunging into a “Cold Peace”*”⁸⁶. In effect, to the enlargement issue was added the growing role of the Atlantic Alliance in the European security, as its activism in the Balkans has proved.

NATO’s actions in former Yugoslavia contributed to drastically deteriorate Russian perceptions about the Alliance. In the summer of 1995, following to allied bombings over Serbian positions in Bosnia – under a United Nations Security Council resolution of which Russia is permanent member – Russian Minister of Defense stated, “*We might objectively face the task of increasing tactical nuclear weapons in the Western regions*”⁸⁷. Russian apprehension derived mainly from the fact that NATO no longer developed the proclaimed purely defensive missions, as demonstrated by a liberal Dumas character, Alexei Arbatov: “*The massive air attacks on the Bosnian Serbs on the Summer of 1995 demonstrated that force, not patient negotiations, remained the principal instrument of diplomacy and that Moscow’s position was only taken into account as it did not contradict the line taken by the United States. In the eyes of the majority of Russians, the myth of the exclusively defensive nature of NATO was exploded*”⁸⁸. Afterwards, Russia intensified its diplomatic efforts to denounce the USA’s hegemonic position and NATO’s aggressive character – in 1996, Russia and China announced a partnership to oppose the “hegemonic practice”, both in Asia and in the world.

But, the most serious crisis was still to come with Kosovo. At the same time that NATO formally integrated three Eastern countries and approved its **New Strategic Concept** (considered by some Russians as deliberately provocative as it permitted the Alliance’s intervention in all Euro-Atlantic area on behalf of security, stability and human rights, even next to Russia borders), **precisely on**

⁸⁶ Cit. in DANNREUTHER, Roland, *Escaping the enlargement Trap in NATO-Russian relations*, *Survival*, 41-4, Winter 1999-2000, note 1, p. 162

⁸⁷ Cit in *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, September 29, 1995.

⁸⁸ *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, March 14, 1997.

the celebration of the 50 anniversary, the Alliance started an air-strike against Serbia due to the serious crimes committed in Kosovo against Albanian population. Immediately after air strikes began, Russia suspended its participation in all NATO's co-operation mechanisms –Partnership for Peace, the Founding Act, and Permanent Joint Council –, withdrew its military mission from Brussels, and ordered NATO's information representative in Moscow to leave the country. In an official statement, Russian Ministry of Defense was very hard in accusations, declaring “*there is no opportunity today to continue cooperation with NATO – the organization which committed an aggression, the organization which has destroyed the agreements reached in a persistent joint search, as well as ruined those constructive foundations on which this cooperation was beginning to form*”⁸⁹. Another Defense Ministry's official added: “*NATO, as an organization that has committed an act of aggression and a crime, has no right today to be part of European security system*”⁹⁰. NATO not only carried old Cold War perceptions, but in Russia there was a growing conviction about “*NATO not being an institution or instrument of security but of war, murder and aggression*”⁹¹.

Strong Russian objections and its reaction to NATO's campaign against Serbia were conditioned by a number of factors, including historical links, Russia's political turbulence, the Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasia complex, its perception of NATO's recent transformation and expansion, and the bitter Russian sense of loss of superpower status – the feeling of being humiliated and marginalized. Viktor Gobarev has even compared the situation with the Nazi aggression, in the 2nd World War: “*Every country's absolute national interest is to secure protection against any form of aggression. For the first time since 1941, the year of Hitler's invasion, Russians have felt what they see as a direct threat to their national sovereignty. The fact that the war on the Yugoslav Federation has not been formally declared makes it even more threatening: Hitler attacked Russia in 1941 with no declaration of war. Both the Russian elite and ordinary people believe that Serbia is being beaten to humiliate Russia and teach it a lesson*”⁹² On the other hand, Russia

⁸⁹ “Russia suspends relations with NATO”, BBC SWB SU/3496 B/\$, 30 March 1999.

⁹⁰ Statement by IVASHOV, General at a press conference on 31 March 1999, BBC SWB SU/3497 B/8, 31 March 1999.

⁹¹ BBC SWB SU/3497 B/8, March 31, 1999

⁹² GABAREV, Viktor, “Russia and Kosovo – Feeling Threatened”, The World Today, June 1999, p. 17.

genuinely feared that Kosovo was only a precedent: “*Who can guarantee that, if not Russia, then somebody else close to Russia will not be punished in the same way?*”, asked one Russian deputy of the Duma⁹³. Gobarev plays for the same idea: “*Russians were convinced that the Alliance was not going to stop after bombing Belgrade. The most likely candidates for the next NATO attacks, they felt, were former Soviet Union Republics where separatist movements were on the rise. Such situation always provides an opportunity to launch interventions on humanitarian grounds. After that, many fear bombing will turn to Russian itself in an effort to end separatist movements, most likely in the Northern Caucasus*”⁹⁴. These fears were fanned by renewed appeals from Georgia and Azerbaijan for NATO to intervene in their own internal conflicts⁹⁵.

In the 2000’s report for NATO, I summarized:

“The main source of Russian disappointment with NATO is the perception that the member States of the Alliance have consistently made promises and offered concessions, particularly over the issue of enlargement, which they have subsequently reneged upon. This perception has resulted in a widespread consensus in Moscow that NATO’s stated intention of developing a genuinely cooperative relationship with Russia cannot be trusted, and that the Alliance seeks to marginalize and exclude Russia from European and international affairs... that sought to contain Russia’s political influence and prevent it from re-emerging as a strong regional power... Moscow started to realize that NATO enlargement would be neither accompanied by Russia’s integration into the Alliance, nor by a most profound NATO-Russian dialogue, nor even by NATO’s transformations into a political institution (...) In fact, the fora where Russia has both a voice and a veto, such as the UN

⁹³ Transcript of the Plenary Session of the Russian State Duma, 3 February 1999.

⁹⁴ GOBAREV, Viktor, op. cit.

⁹⁵ Georgian President Eduard Shevarnadze suggested that events in Kosovo could set a good example for a speedy and fair settlement of the conflict in the Abkhazia and sought military intervention from the west to guarantee the return of Georgian refugees. Azerbaijan (that had for years a conflict with Armenia due to Nagorno-Karabach) sought to exploit the Kosovo crisis to establish closer military cooperation with NATO and Turkey. They offered the territory to establish a NATO base and expected the support in Armenia conflict. Azerbaijan was also the first CIS’ state to volunteer for peacekeeping duty, as a part of a Turkish battalion with NATO forces in Kosovo.

*and the OSCE, have been marginalized. As Kosovo showed, Russian positions, opinions and suggestions were completely disregarded by NATO*⁹⁶.

On the other hand, as Nadia Arbatova defended in a Conference in Lisbon in 1997: *“Russian democrats do not understand what Russia did after the dissolution of the USSR to be punished in such a way... One of the lessons drawn by Russian political elite... is that any attempts to be better and to become part of the civilized international community won't be appreciated and paid off politically if you are weak and if you are not inducing fear: nobody liked the USSR, but its position could not be ignored at least because it was military strong. So Russia may be tempted to come back to more self-assertive if not nationalist course in order to revive its prestige and power. In sum, what Russian nationalists failed to do – to destroy New Political Thinking – was done by NATO's extension...”*⁹⁷.

Russian Failures

As demonstrated during the first post cold war decade, Russia did not achieve its main geopolitical goals on the Atlantic Alliance relation: concerned it watched NATO's transformation from strictly defensive organization to security and defense organization in all Euro-Atlantic area, affirming itself as corner stone of the European security; did not stop NATO's expansion to Eastern Europe, despite its clear and strong opposition; protested and threatened without success, NATO's intervention in Kosovo against Serbia, a historical ally; never saw the recognition of playing an important role on the European strategic decisions, it was only offered “voice, but no veto” through NATO-Russia Founding Act and Joint Permanent Council. Following to Kosovo crisis, this mechanism would be rejected by Russia as it considered that it institutionalized the principle of “19 against 1” instead of “19 plus 1”.

Still in the European security scope, in its first decade of existence, new Russia added two other big failures to its geopolitical and geostrategic ambitions.

⁹⁶ TOMÉ, Luis L., *Russia and NATO's Enlargement*, op. cit, pp.42-44

⁹⁷ ARBATOVA, Nadia Alexandrova, *Russia and the European Security after the Madrid Decisions*, International Seminar about “NATO's Enlargement and the future of Europe” IDN, Lisbon, October 9-10, 1997, pp. 4-5, text distributed in the Seminar.

On the one hand it was not able to make CSCE/OSCE the great pillar of European security, having former members of the Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact an equal status, as suggested in the early 90's. **On the other, having developed the notion of “two wests” – the “far west”, or the USA, powerful, arrogant and hegemonic, and the “near west”, or the European Union**, that Moscow wished to work with for a real integration in “the European common house”-, Russia never truly saw, the implementation of distinct policies from these “two Wests”, not being able or aloud to take advantage of the growing divergences between the European and the North American. More than dividing the “west” Russia was looking for both the USA and the EU's recognition of great power status and their commitment on the strengthening of links with Moscow. **Despite having developed specific relations with the USA and the European Union, Russia have failed its essential goals**: partly because during closer periods between the Russian Federation and the USA, Moscow “forgotten” Europe, ridiculing its lack of strength, or vision, or both; or, because the Europeans have never considered new Russia as part of the “new European house”, opting for focusing on domestic issues (as the single currency, the enlargement, the institutional deepening, the revision of the treaties and CFSP/ESDP) and on the transatlantic relations; or, still because the USA were skilful in the management of perceptions and “western” policies for the new Russia. Actually, either politically or economically new friction points constantly arouse between the EU and Russia: Chechnya, access to Kaliningrad, production quotas and wheat market, human rights, anti-dumping measures, steel quotas, etc.

During the 90's, mainly due to NATO's evolution and activism, Russia frequently accused the USA of the practice of “containment” and “interference” policies. However these accusations were based on Russian perceptions on the North American policy and strategy towards the **former soviet area, Russia's external policy priority, and where it has also summed a few geopolitical failures**. Since the beginning of their independence the Baltic States have tried to stress out their individuality in relation to Moscow searching for a link with the “west” – **Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have always refused to join the CIS, preferring to bet on their integration in NATO and in the EU. Among the Community of Independent States, Russia became aware of the difficulties to restore its domination, particularly with GUUAM** (acronym with initial letters of the involved countries – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia) **and Turkmenistan**, which are protected by the USA and continuously try to

avoid Moscow's instructions. These Russian "difficulties" occur even in countries where they have a strong military presence and where Russian mediation is vital for the stabilization, as occurs in Georgia and Tajikistan. In fact, **every time those ex-soviet countries try to affirm themselves before Russia, they usually do it heading towards the "west", particularly towards the USA. On its side the USA promote in the ex-soviet area a "geopolitical pluralism"**⁹⁸, as designated by Z. Brzezinski. This endeavor to oppose Moscow's natural influence, specially in the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Transcaucasia and Central Asia – in these last regions the USA, have never stopped insinuating and supporting Turkey, their geopolitical pawn. So, in its external policy first priority - the ex-soviet space – Russia's aspirations were relatively "contained" by the USA. Furthermore, the "west" revealed few comprehension by the way Russia was dealing with its most delicate internal problem, Chechnya, even pulling out a campaign for the stop of hostilities by Moscow. **To counterbalance the American ascendance in its outskirts, Russia attempted to reinforce the integration mechanisms within the CIS, mainly through the Collective Security Treaty, the energy resources management, the economical interdependence reinforcement, the mediation of conflicts and the stronger military presence.**

In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Russia never surpassed the supporting role level, despite the Arab and Muslim countries' great criticism to the USA. In what concerns Palestine, the leading role was always performed by the USA, followed by the European Union, though Russia has been included in the "Quartet" that would afterwards launch the damaged "Route for Peace" (the fourth element are the United Nations). To increase its status in the region, and mainly to counterbalance the USA and its pawn Turkey, **Russia has developed relations with States outcast of the American order, especially with Saddam's Iraq, Iran and Syria** – becoming one of the most important commercial partners of these countries -, and has rehearsed approaches to the Arab League and the Islamic Conference. For instance, during Clinton's administration, Russia celebrated an agreement with Iran, in the amount of 800 million USD, to build a nuclear reactor in Bushehr.

⁹⁸ BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew, *The Premature Partnership*, in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, March/April 1994, pp. 67-82.

In the Eastern Asia chess, Moscow's power relevance abruptly declined, including within the Northeast Asia, where Russia is physically present by its Far East. Although by the 90's all border disputes were solved with China, Russia was never able to project power or influence over the Eastern Asia region. With no adversaries or regional allies, it maintains until today the conflict over Southern Kuriles/Northern territories with Japan (USA's ally). Korea's dilemmas have been essentially managed by the USA and China "the external powers" that play the leading role. **To countervail the American hegemonic growth, Russia and China have since 1996 announced a "strategic partnership"**. On the Russian perspective, this "strategic alignment" was also important for the stabilization of Central Asia and for the promotion of Russia status in Eastern Asia. Although it represented a new challenge for the USA, this "partnership" had clear limitations, being its most visible and relevant dimension the astronomical Russian armament sales to Beijing. In 1998, when Russia suggested this partnership extension to India, neither this country nor China have accepted, due to traditional differences and rivalries still not solved between them. Anyway, this confirmed Russian geopolitical incapacity in creating broaden coalitions to face the North American hegemony, and its reluctance and tenacity in containing and even confronting hegemonic practices. And the same applies to China⁹⁹.

During the first post cold war decade, these Russian geopolitical and geo-strategical failures – strongly marked by the gap between their initial expectations and their current situation – have helped to stress out the decline of Russia's stature and role. Being a fact that Russia's transition was supported by the "west" (that always feared Russia's "back to the past" or the re-appearing of an aggressive, expansionist and anti-western Russia) it was relatively "contained" by the USA in geopolitical terms. On the opposite, Moscow was the promoter of strategies aiming the "containment" of the North American supremacy, namely through the partnership with China and the development of bonds with some "outcast States" of the American order, mainly with the purpose to alleviate the North

⁹⁹ About new Eastern Asia order, the redefinition of the power balance and main disputes and conflicts in the region, see TOMÉ, Luís, L. *Segurança e Estabilidade no Nordeste Asiático*, in *Estratégia* Magazine, Vol. IX, Instituto Português da Conjuntura Estratégica, Lisboa, 1997, pp. 265-236; *A Segurança e a Estabilidade no Noroeste da Bacia do Pacífico*, in *EdiUAL*, 2000, 303 pp.; and *A Segurança na Ásia Oriental*, *Instituto Internacional de Macau* (IIM), Collection "Milénio Hoje", n. 3, editions in Portuguese and Chinese, 2001, 70 pp.

American pressure in both Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and to increase Russia's international status.

The geopolitical leap after September 11th

Coming from the soviet secret police world, Yeltsin's successor Vladimir Putin soon defined the great lines of his government: re-boost Moscow's authority and regain Russia's international dignity. Internally that has mainly reflected in two vectors: it initiated a new and very violent campaign in Chechnya (vindicating a series of attacks occurred in Moscow in the Fall of 1999) to demonstrate Moscow's force and determination on Russian political and territorial integrity keeping; and launching a vast anti-corruption campaign, specially against Russian oligarchs, to sustain an authoritative attitude but also to recover Russian finances and gain the confidence of foreign investors and international organisms to whom they have debts. Externally, Putin started maintaining an anti-western rhetoric, following to Kosovo crisis, and assumed the imperial Russian position towards ex-soviet space. On December 31st 1999, on the day before his ascendance to the presidency, the up to then Prime Minister Putin wrote: *"It will not happen soon, if it ever happens at all, that Russia will become the second edition of, say, the US or Britain (...) For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change"*¹⁰⁰ In May 2000, in Putin's inauguration speech, he explicitly re-affirmed Russian imperial tradition: *"We must know our history, know it as it really is, draw lessons from it and always remember those who created the Russian state, championed its dignity and made it a great, powerful and mighty state"*¹⁰¹. The truth is that Putin soon realized that to undertake the fundamental transformation of the Russian economy, it needed to attract great inflow of investment and technology primarily from the West. On the other hand, he quickly assumed that Russia's international stature critically depended on how he would be treated by Washington. So the new Russian President began to change Russia's attitude towards the USA, restarting a constructive dialogue with Washington.

¹⁰⁰ PUTIN, Vladimir, *Russia at the turn of the Millenium*, December 31, 1999, quoted by KISSINGER, Henry, *Does America need a foreign policy?...*, op. cit., pp.66.

¹⁰¹ Cit. in *ibid*.

Putin explicitly acknowledged American global supremacy, something that Yeltsin and Yevgeny Primakov, then foreign minister, had found hard to do. This supremacy, for Putin, was but a geopolitical fact, conditioning Yeltsin attempts to counter-balance the USA to be useless and harmful. By unilaterally deciding to drastically slash the Russian nuclear arsenal, further reduce and restructure conventional forces and eliminate two important remaining vestiges of erstwhile Soviet global military presence—the Lourdes base in Cuba and the Cam Ranh base in Vietnam (and all this before September 11th)-Putin was trying to signal to Clinton’s ceasing administration and to Bush’s new Administration that he was finally pulling out of virtual competition with the United States.¹⁰² Putin was starting to adopt a “no contest” attitude, but still showed reserves towards a series of US actions, such as the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the growing American military presence in the former Soviet south and the possibility to admit the three Baltic States to NATO. Effectively, there was missing a catalyst event, which would significantly transform the geopolitical tradition of new Russia. That event would not be long on the September 11th...

In fact, the September 11th brought about a significant leap in the geopolitical relationship USA-Russia. If observers might refer to significant changes in the world geopolitical chess in the aftermath of the tragic September 11th 2001, is in connection with the answer and strategical North American expansion and with the Washington-Moscow relations, that went through more radical changes in few months than since former USSR’s collapse.

Russia’s reaction to the attacks was ready and undoubtful. President Putin quickly understood that the September 11th would push forward an abrupt historical acceleration, announcing a new geopolitical outline to which Russia should adapt.¹⁰³ The first foreign leader to contact President Bush – on board of the *Air Force One* and just arrived at Nebraska Strategical Command -, the Russian President granted his country total support in the fight against terrorism. While Bush ordered the North American army to maximum alert level, Putin announced that Russian forces alert level – particularly nuclear forces – would not be raised,

¹⁰² TRENIN, Dmitri, *Pirouettes and priorities: distilling a Putin Doctrine...*, op. cit., p. 77

¹⁰³ See TOMÉ, Luís and TOMÉ, Paula Monge, NATO, *Russia e Segurança Europeia após o 11 de Setembro*, in *Janus 2003-Anuário de Relações Exteriores*, Edition UAL and Publico Newspaper, Lisbon, November 2002, pp. 108-109.

breaking the procedure in force since the 50's. Maneuvers of the Russian fleet and air force in the North Pacific were immediately suspended to avoid any risk of supplementary tension¹⁰⁴.

The firm condemnation of September 11th attacks was widely shared by the Russian political class. With the exception of Vladimir Jirinovski group and Liberal-Democrat Party – one of its deputies, Mitrofanov declared at the Duma “*Russia should supply the Afghanistan with nuclear weapons, as it was facing a difficult situation with the USA*”¹⁰⁵. Notwithstanding the undivided support to Washington, there was no consensus within the Russian strategic community about the position to adopt concerning the announced American counter attack, nor about the modalities of anti-terrorist cooperation with the USA.

After a brief period of hesitation, Russia has assumed an historical geopolitical change. For the first time since 1945, Moscow and Washington were facing a “common enemy” and Russia shows its willingness to embark on a new “great alliance”. Few days after the attacks, President Putin announced the “five points” of Russian participation in the international coalition against terrorism: exchange of information, permission to fly over Russian aerial space for humanitarian missions, contribution in eventual rescue operations in Afghanistan, authorization for the use of military bases in Central Asia, and enhanced support to the North Atlantic alliance. Russian leaders understood the opportunity to re-enter on the international geopolitical game: ten years after the USSR dissolution – a period during which the gap of power between the weakened Russia and the USA, only superpower, has always increased – Washington would be tributary of a biggest co-operation and Moscow had something to offer.

Some have concluded, a bit harshly, that Putin would be ready to give full power to the USA’s “crusade” against international terrorism. But that would mean to forget that Russia had no motive to humbly embark on an adventure in which it might suffer serious repercussions. Actually, in the short term Putin’s

¹⁰⁴ DUBIEN, Arnaud, *A Russia e as consequências do 11 de Setembro de 2001*, in *As Lições do 11 de Setembro*, Coord. By Pascal Boniface, IRIS, Portuguese edition – Livros Horizonte, June 2002, p. 125.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted by KHAMRAEV, Vitor, September 20, 2001, in WPS Monitoring Agency (www.wps.ru)

attitude would not cost a great deal to Russia: Afghanistan was long before at Moscow's sight line, particularly due to the alleged support from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to the Islamic faction of Chechnya's rebellion; on the other hand, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were already supporting the North Alliance, the power they desired to be set in Cabul.

Russian leaders, that months before the September 11th had already denounced the international terrorism (to justify their repression in Chechnya), have since then continuously established the parallel between these events and the situation in the rebel province. In the Bundestag speech, on September 15, 2001, President Putin declared that the attacks inflicted to Moscow two years before, in the fall of 1999¹⁰⁶, and the attacks to American cities carried the "same signature". The first reward for their collaboration was to obtain political support (or at least a mollified attitude) from the west towards the war led against Chechnya – important for its priorities being Chechnya far in front of Afghanistan.

The USA have also enticed with financial compensations, such as the reduction of Moscow's external debt from governmental creditors of the Paris Club, or the American support to Russian request of fast accession to the WTO, in the horizon for 2004. Russia was also rewarded with the announcement of an investment of 4.000 million USD by the American giant oil company Exxon in Sakhalin 1 plant. In the height of Russian-west honeymoon, on October 2, 2001, Moscow has even dared to sign a frame-agreement with Iran to supply armament in the amount of 7.000 million USD, sure that Americans would prefer to remain silent to not disturb the "Holy Alliance" – as it happened.

The major risk for Russia, which aroused bigger reserves, was to see the USA's military installation in Central Asia and even in Caucasus permanently.¹⁰⁷ Despite of inherent risks, Russia did not stop to look for initiatives. Having convinced Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to coordinate their policy with Moscow, Russia's goal was not to dissuade these countries from receiving North American troops in their territory but to pass the message to the world and especially to the USA that their decision was made after Russian approval. Being an easy task in Tajikistan – a country dependent of Russia for its security, where more than

¹⁰⁶ Attacks to residential blocks in Moscow, on September 1999, that made more than 250 deaths, ascribed to Chechnyan rebels.

¹⁰⁷ See TOMÉ, Luís Leitão, *11 de Setembro: consequências na Ásia Central e do Sul* in *Janus* 2003, op. Cit., pp. 170-171.

25.000 Russian soldiers are deployed – this mission was more complicated in the Uzbekistan: willing to be apart from Russian control, in February 1999, it has abandoned the CIS Collective Security Treaty and organized military exercises in the territory within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace. Anyway, the American administration had to negotiate with Russia the right to lead operations from ex-soviet republics' territories and current members of the CIS. The same way, in Caucasus at Georgia's Pankisi Gorge Mountains they negotiated the deployment of 200 special troops, near the border with Chechnya, Russia, to collaborate with Tbilissi in the campaign against terrorism – actually, Moscow and Washington increased the pressure over Georgia, regularly accused by the Russians of accommodating rebel Chechnyans in their territory.

The doubling of American military presence in Caucasus and Central Asia, in a climate of “strategic alliance” with Moscow, has clearly reinforced the USA's strategic assets in this vast and important region. Thus, in a “great negotiation” context with Russia, that foresees both “condominium” in the region. Certainly, Putin was forced to accept it with no chance of rejection.

Putin has also politically used this moment to affirm Russia as “fundamental strategic partner”. In the European stage, this has passed through Russia's closer approach to the EU – obtained monthly consultations with the Political and Security Committee (PSC), ESDP main organ; strengthened reciprocal commercial ties; made progresses on Kaliningrad issue, important for Russian access to its enclave after the EU's enlargement to Baltic countries¹⁰⁸ – and, specially achieved a new cooperation with NATO. Enthusiastic about the sudden improvement of their relationship, the leaders of the Atlantic Alliance and Russia have cleared the way for new opportunities of closer collaboration and a heightened relationship. Russia's main goal had not changed: above all, it endeavors to be treated as an influential power on the decision making about European security architecture. Therefore, the institutionalization of the cooperation at “20” through NATO-Russia Council, in May 2002 was like a Russian dream coming true and the promise of no more “19 against 1” times in NATO. After providing Russia with “voice but no veto”, NATO was for first time giving the possibility to take part

¹⁰⁸ About the strategic impacts of the EU's enlargement see TOMÉ, Luís Leitão, *Segurança Europeia e Alargamentos da UE e da NATO*, in *Estratégia* magazine, Vol. XIV, Instituto Português da Conjuntura Estratégica, Lisbon, 2003, pp.341-354

on the Alliance's decision making in subjects such as countering terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, civil emergency planning, humanitarian crisis and ethnical conflicts. The creation of mechanisms at "20" with Russia, without the existence of previously coordinated positions does not mean that Russia may veto over NATO decisions or action: NATO retains the freedom of make decisions and act, over any issue compatible with its responsibilities as stated in Washington Treaty and in its new strategical concept. Meanwhile, Moscow stopped contesting NATO's expansion and quietly accepted NATO's invitation, on Prague Summit of November 2002, to seven new countries¹⁰⁹ to join the Atlantic Alliance, in 2004, among which there were the three Baltic States. Actually, even Russia's accession to NATO started to be considered either by Moscow or by the west.

Russia also quietly accepted the file about American anti-missile defense. Until the summer of 2001, the Russian leaders have threatened Washington with "asymmetric measures" and a new "armaments race" if the American unilaterally abrogated the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, but after the September 11th they defended that such a decision "*would not harm the confidence relations established between both countries*"¹¹⁰ being in any case for the continuing of the strategic dialogue. Consequently, it is not surprising that President Bush and President Putin have signed a new Treaty for the reduction of nuclear arsenals, establishing a significantly low "plafond" until 2012 (1700 and 2200 nuclear heads, respectively for the USA and Russia, being today still around 5500 and 6000 each), and that Moscow has opted for discretion when the USA formally announced the unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty, in 2002. In reality, Russia stopped opposing to an inevitable project, trying to obtain compensations such as the maintenance of a bilateral strategic-juridical framework and the industrial participation in the project.

After Iraq

Opposite to what happened on the September 11th and to America-Europe relations we do not see significant changes on the geopolitical relationship between

¹⁰⁹ Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.

¹¹⁰ Declaration by General Balouevski, number 2 of Military Russian Head of State, quoted by DUBIEN, Arnaud, *A Russia e as consequências do 11 de Setembro de 2001*, op. cit. p. 132

Russia and the USA after Iraq crisis. Despite of Russian clear opposition to Iraq's military intervention – to be expected, as Russia together with France were Saddam's main commercial partners! -, the relations with Washington were not seriously affected. Still with supplementary incidents – such as, the “diplomatic Russian train” bombing, or the accusations that a Russian company should have recently sold technology for missile mislead, or the suspects about some Saddam's regime members that were refuge in Russia. Actually, according with some analysts, Moscow might even have agreed with a second proposal of resolution in the SC of the United Nations, which expressly authorized the use of force against Iraq¹¹¹, to avoid ending again isolated. But seizing the opportunity created by the French pre-announcement of veto and the vehement French-German opposition, Russia would strengthen its contest to the USA on this issue – either for domestic reasons and for international affirmation -, and took the opportunity to strengthen ties with the French-German axis. During the crisis, successive meetings and official contacts between Putin, Schroeder and Chirac led some opinions to foresee a new strategical axis between the three European powers to balance the Anglo-American axis – that, if true, would in fact bring serious consequences for the geopolitical European and world chess. Maybe it is still early to have the real picture of this crisis' effects but this scenario does not seem probable.

Anyway, the North American intervention in Iraq and subsequent installation in this country have relevant geostrategic consequences for Russia: puts Moscow into second role in Iraq, when previously it was one of its main partners, meaning a more problematic access to Iraq's immense oil resources; deprives Russia of one of its “problems” in the geostrategic relation with the USA, as the new Iraq, finally stabilized, will not have motivation and ability to contest the USA and, eventually, play Russia's game; due to the significant reinforcement of their military presence, the USA have the best position to project power and influence and to prevent Russian influence in all Middle East and Central Asia region; and, increases the pressure and surveillance on Russia's other important strategic partner – Iran.

However, Moscow will not stop to seize opportunities. Besides the strategical approach to Europe, Russia might intend to take advantage of the Arab's reaction to the new North American positioning, as well as of the coolness between the USA and Turkey relationship. Turkey is Russia's direct competitor in the pipelines

¹¹¹ See RUBIN, James P., *Stumbling into war*, in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003

projects and planning of oil and gas routes from the Caspian Sea. On the other hand, Moscow tries to benefit its international political stature on account of the good relationship it has with Iran: first, helping in the resolution of the Iranian nuclear program problem (similar to China's action in North Korea), standing a vital partner on the fight against massive weapons proliferation; afterwards, because in a way it might contribute for Iraq's pacification due to Iran's influence over Iraqi shiites. Furthermore, Russia is fundamental on the elaboration of UN's role in Iraq, and it also tries to gain benefit of it.

Accounting the interests in stake and Russia's traditional geostrategic positioning, the USA have shown much more "comprehension" for Russia's attitude towards the Iraq crisis than for France and Germany "betrayal". Maybe this helps to explain the easy and fast restoration of links between Russia and the USA. A proof of good relations between both countries is that, during Putin's official visit to the USA, on late September 2003, he said to have the goal "*of making Russia the biggest oil partner of the USA, until the end of the decade*". Through its President, Russia also declares to "*be committed in the war against terrorism and in the maintenance of the strategical partnership with the USA*". This does not mean that Russia is not concerned with the USA's hegemony "containment" – it only shows that concessions and benefits expected from the relation with the west, and specially with the USA, drive Putin's ideas despite of Russia's traditional geopolitical vision. This represents a huge risk, which can turn Russia to a victim of the "floating coalitions" and put it at the hand of the North American geopolitical trumps. Russian leaders certainly meditate about this, but alternatives to put forward Russia's role and political stature in open conflict with the USA can bear even bigger risks and disadvantages.

The Russian challenges

Actually, the Russian political elites recognize that they made a mistake in thinking that the proclamation of a new country would be enough for former enemies to hold Russia and did not understand that for western countries Russia lost the Cold War. For Russian people the price was too high, and they consider that their country was not treated respectfully nor faced as an equal partner by western countries. Thus, the hardest challenge that Russia faces is to know how can a potentially powerful country with an agitated history develop a stable relation

with the rest of the world¹¹². Although immense, but reduced to ancestral border limits, Russia has to adapt to its new dimension and the loss of empire at the same time it edifies democratic institutions that are historically unknown.

The USA and European countries owe to Russia the recognition that it is undergoing a historical transition, understanding its multiple specificities, helping it to be successful in the reforms and stimulating it to embrace a new external attitude that should not harm its neighbors nor western interests. On the other hand, the USA and Europe must recognize the importance of giving an important role to Russia on the international affairs without grounding it in its historical patterns, creating an effective system of co-operation with Moscow. For instance, the existent consultation mechanisms and political collaboration in the scope of the OSCE should be strengthened; NATO-Russia Council should effectively give Moscow a voice; the EU-Russia dialogue must be deepened; the G-8 and the United Nations must be used to elevate Russia status as great power and continue to integrate the country in the international community.

The European integration was used to pacify Europe, promote the common interests and the economical development and to anchor a significant number of countries to “western world”. Later, the west used efficiently the “bait” of EU and NATO’s accession to help Central and Eastern countries to head West and incentive good reforms. For now, the same cannot be offered to Russia, and so the West, or better the “two wests” need to find good incentives to help the Russian transition in a pro-west direction – the participation in the WTO does not seem enough. On its side, Russia faces the challenge of a non-institutional integration, quite different from Germany or Japan’s experience after the 2nd World War, or from the Eastern States currently.

As referred, after the September 11th, there was a significant strengthening of relations between Russia and the USA with real progresses that should not be really affected by the Iraqi crisis. There are comments that say “*Putin has had more benefits with the bilateral relation than Bush*”¹¹³. Independently of whom have had more benefits lately, actually in the political plan seems that Bush needs Putin more than its Russian homologue, or, that the USA have more to ask and

¹¹² KISSINGER, Henry, Does America need a Foreign Policy?..., op. cit. p. 69

¹¹³ GOLDGEIER, James M., *L'État actuel des relations américano-russes*, in *Diplomatie Magazine*, op. cit. p. 24

Russia more to offer than the opposite. Actually, Russia is indispensable in determining issues of North American foreign policy. Iraq for instance. Being a fact that Putin was faster than Chirac and Schroeder in the reconciliation initiatives with the White House, it is also true that he did not offer anything yet to his friend George W. Bush for post war reconstruction. And, while permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia is also decisive for the UNO commitment in Iraq stabilization and reconstruction. Afterwards, there is Iran, one of the toughest points in the American-Russian relations. Putin's position is almost the same; on the contrary, after great hostility towards Teheran, Bush's attitude evolved for a far more conciliatory tone either for the achievement of a "denuclearization" agreement for the country or for obtaining Iranian help in Iraq' stabilization through this country's influence over the major Shiite population. Russia is also relevant for the North Korea nuclear program management, being integrated in the "conversations at six", where there is also the participation of the USA, China, Japan and both Koreas. This means that the USA need a vast Russian collaboration for the success of their efforts in the non proliferation and in the solution of some delicate problems at this level. Finally, Russia is relevant in the fight against terrorism, either through privileged relations with Arab countries or by their Intelligence.

The Russian Asiatic policy is highly influenced by concerns related with its Far East and Siberia viability. Kremlin is certainly desirable of maintaining good relations with China and expanding the mutual commercial links, but shows growing concern with the possibility of Chinese immigrants crossing the border, changing the ethnic aspect of the region and questioning Russian identity. Effectively, Russian demographic decline – from 150 million of inhabitants in 1991 to 144 in 2002, and as estimated by the United Nations to 126 million in 2025¹¹⁴ – is an issue plenty times addressed by Putin. Moscow also intends to develop economic and other links with Japan, but the territorial conflict of Kuriles Islands still represents an obstacle. Putin maintains a good relation with the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and the Russian-Japanese dialogue is in the same way focused on security and energy. A new co-operation level due to the North Korean nuclear program and missile technology and the suggested Angarsk pipeline for

¹¹⁴ RUMER, Eugene B. and WALLANDER, Celeste A., *Russia: Power in Weakness?*, op.cit. p. 61

Kakhodka – in direct competition with Angarsk-Daquin, China route – symbolize perfectly the current opportunities in the Moscow-Tokyo relationship. Still in Asia, Russia is trying to revitalize relations with India, looked as less problematic partner and a surplus for the regional balance.

In a great extent, the new Russia, considering the re-evaluation of its foreign policy, must reflect on and solve questions that have always been in the center of its foreign policy during the 19th and 20th centuries. To start with, finding a balance between its international ambitions and its real capacities. The unbalance of these two factors has originated catastrophes in the past (Crimea war in 1854-1855, Russian-Japanese war in 1904-1905, the 1st World War), and was one of the major causes for the end of the USSR, and one can say that was also the main reason for countless Russian failures in the first post cold war decade. Another problem consists in the resolution of an old debate between Russian elites: Russia's place should be more at west or east? To these crucial questions Russia has decided to answer, as the journalist Rémi Gamba said, "*adopting a policy that might be qualified as multipolar, based in non ideological criteria and grounded on the national interest notion*"¹¹⁵. Russia considers that its western policy should complement the eastern policy, that a strong relation with the USA and Europe may increase its maneuvering on the foreign policy ambit, or that the participation in the APEC summits allows a role in Asia and the preservation of interests. Mainly after the September 11th Russia has understood that its foreign policy and national security cannot be achieved through isolation, but through a more intense collaboration with its partners in the search of the common interest. Within this frame, Russia is challenged to articulate its interests in all directions, from the USA to the Community of Independent States. From the economical point of view, the European Union represents a natural strategic partner, with whom it develops more than 50% of the external trade and from whom they receive most of the external economic help. From the political point of view, Russia mainly and sometimes simultaneously plays with the CIS, the USA, China and Europe, but also with Iran, India, North Korea, Israel and Saudi Arabia. To manage finding a satisfactory balance for the Russian interests in the middle of such diverse agenda represents and enormous challenge only to be achieved by a truly great power.

¹¹⁵ GAMBA, Rémi, *Les défis globaux de la politique étrangère de la Fédération de Russie*, in *Diplomatie Magazine*, op. Cit. P.18

THE USA-CHINA RELATIONS

During the Cold War period, China could be described as “a regional power with global influence”¹¹⁶. Much less powerful than the two super powers, China’s interests were focused on Asia. But as the threats to its security came from both of the super powers, **PRC considered its geostrategic and geopolitical positioning dependent of the relations with the USA and the USSR and dependent of the relations of the super powers between themselves.** Now, making the most either of its global limitations or the expectations and fears of the United States and the Soviet Union, China would be able to implement an independent policy and gain access to a privileged place in the bipolar system. Specially, since the beginning of the 70’s, the time that a strange “triangular link” between the Washington-Moscow-Beijing’s axis took place, where China participated in the USSR’s¹¹⁷ ‘containment’. Nevertheless, the end of the “double Cold War” – between the two super powers and between the two great communist powers – had significant consequences for China’s geopolitical and geostrategic framing as well as to all Asia, the same way it would happen after the September 11th.

After the end of the “double Cold War”

During the Cold War, East Asia reflected the bipolar structure of the international system, though regional policies were simultaneously familiar with another phenomena – from the decolonisation to civil wars, from the hot wars (Indochina and Korea) to the other Cold War between China and USSR. However, with the end of the double Cold War significant changes occurred in determining variables to the Asia-Pacific security.

- *The Soviet Union implosion – without meaning a “power void” or the increase of the region’s instability – allowed the USA to abandon their containment strategy, revising their strategy in the Pacific and readjusting their military*

¹¹⁶ According to Michael Yahuda’s formula in (1996) *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995*, London and New York: Routledge.

¹¹⁷ About the Cold War effects in Asia-Pacific see, TOMÉ, Luis Leitão *A Segurança e a Estabilidade no Noroeste da Bacia do Pacífico* - Parte I – O Impacto da Guerra Fria, p.23-73; and Michael Yahuda, op. cit.

situation in that region; allowed China to reinforce their strategic security (freeing itself from a heavy threat with the soviet siege) and to redirect south and to maritime spaces; allowed Japan to stop being regarded as the USA forward aircraft-carrier in the communism containment, permanently leaving behind the Yoshida doctrine and recovering political-strategical ambitions; allowed South Korea to significantly improve its relations with Russia, while North Korea was deprived of one of its powerful allies; allowed the Southeast Asia to be free of the possibility of a major conflict between the great powers and to advance on regional cooperation.

- *Geo-economic factors have prevailed and an improvement on the relations between the region's countries had occurred with visible effects on the progresses of the incipient regional cooperation. This is proved by the ASEAN enlargement, the APEC and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) creation, as well as the bet in making free trade areas in the scope of the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA), in 2003, and the APEC between 2010 and 2020. In parallel, a certain "Asian identity" began to develop, laid on presupposed "Asian values" facing the competition and integration processes in other globe regions and to the so called "western values", which shows the increase of the Asia-Pacific confidence on the thesis that points the "21st century as the Pacific century". Yet, the fact that greater priority was given to geo-economic factors also brought into view new commercial tensions, either among the Asian countries or specially between Asian and the western countries, particularly the USA – as it is obvious in the American relations with the Nipponese ally and with China.*
- *The end of the double "Cold War" has also dissipated the reasons for regional or sub-regional conflicts and the considerations of global power, so that the differences have become "regionalized" or localized. This means that they stopped being directly involved in global geopolitics calculations of the great powers, becoming possible to re-value the national security complex in an exceptionally stable environment, due to lack of open conflicts between the main powers. This would allow either the resolution of conflicts – Cambodia and East Timor – or a greater opening to soften tensions -like in Korea. Yet, this greater strategic autonomy equally opens way to the reappearance of conflicts and differences (Taiwan, Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, Spratley and Paracels archipelagos), to the restitution of old rivalries (Sino-Japanese and Sino-American) and to the appearance of resentments (Chinese-Japanese, Nippo-Korean, Chinese-Vietnamese).*

- *As the autocratic anti-communist regimes lost purpose, there were significant progresses on the **democratization processes** of some societies (South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia), and **the coexistence between still formally communist regimes (China, Vietnam and North Korea) with other several region regimes became much easier**. By the way, in contrast with Europe's situation, if in Asia the end of the Cold War did not correspond to the disappearing of the communist regimes, it revealed even more distinctly the **nationalist roots of these Asian regimes**. Although this situation does not cause, for now, a true ideological conflict, it means that **in Asia there is still a vast resistance to ideas of political liberalism** and that many might be tempted to proceed in "more Asian" political ways and alternatives to the Western type Democracy, thus making market economy and economic liberalism coincide with authoritarian regimes and political power monopoly systems.*

*These changes, and others that we could invoke, reveal that the **environment in which Asian countries develop their policies is far more positive and benign than the Cold War context**. Yet, this "post Cold War new order" is more uncertain, more volatile and much more unpredictable than the former bipolar order. This paradox situation derives from four factors:*

- *Because the **redefinition of the scale of powers is in course**;*
- *There are still several **unsolved conflicts and differences, many of which involve great powers**;*
- *There is a **dormant armaments race**;*
- *And the **lack of cooperation and regional organization about security issues persists**¹¹⁸.*

As far as China is concerned, the end of confrontation between the super powers would withdraw importance to Beijing's international role, because of its apparent minor intervention capacity in the structures of the global power, as well as it had happened as a result of its "intromission" on the bipolar balance. Nevertheless, without the USA-USSR dispute constraints, China has re-valued the Asian context as a space for affirmation. That would work as a lever for taking part as one of the world system's great powers anticipated as a multipolar one.

¹¹⁸ TOMÉ, Luís L. *A Segurança e a Estabilidade na Ásia Oriental*, Instituto Internacional de Macau (IIM), Coleção Milénio Hoje, N°3, Portuguese and Chinese editions, p.13-14

On the other hand, the end of the Soviet siege – that a foretime reached from Vladistok to Hanoi, passing through Kabul and a strong soviet military presence along the vast border with China - and **the normalization of relations with the new Russia, that has significantly reinforced PRC strategic security**, allowed to redirect Chinese interest to south and to maritime spaces, particularly over China's seas.

China's international affirmation has gone through three fundamental vectors:

Firstly, by its **audacious economic reform policies and by the success of its integration on the regional and world trade**, and because of that the establishment and the consolidation of its economic and commercial relations with Japan, ASEAN, the USA and Europe, as well as the increment of commercial bonds with other Asian States and with Chinese communities overseas has become vital. The pursue of the economic development is, in fact, priority to China, because it is, simultaneously, a source of reinforced military power and a justification to, internally, legitimize the Chinese Communist Party.

Secondly, **it has tried to show that it is a stabilizing power instead of a threatening one and, of being up to the responsibility of being "Asia's natural leader"**: it has normalized relations with Russia, solving border differences with Russia and with other former central Asian Soviet Republics; it has re-established relations with South Korea; it has deepened bonds with Japan; it has given a significant contribute to the adhesion of the two Koreas to the United Nations; it has ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1992), after it's own adhesion to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1988; it has accepted that commercial relations with Taiwan, the "rebel province" should be developed, proposing its integration within "Motherland" under Deng Xiaoping's principle - "one country, two systems", which allowed a peaceful return to its sovereignty of Hong Kong (1997) and Macao (1999). The PRC had also a important and constructive role in two regional conflicts: is has decisively contributed to the end of the conflict in Cambodia so that United Nations good offices could reach that country, helping to make all Indochina peninsula stable; and its status near Pyongyang was crucial - first to the adhesion of North Korea to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to IAEA, and after to the resolution of the conflict opposing North Korea to the USA and to the IAEA, on the course of its nuclear program (1993-1994). Simultaneously, China has strengthened bonds with each and every

one of the Southeast Asian countries and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and has joined several regional and international organisms from APEC's (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) – which goal is to reinforce economic bonds between all Pacific waterside States, either from the Asian Continent and South Pacific or from the American Continent – to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – founded in 1994 to promote the dialog about security issues on Oriental Asia, that gathers from Southeast Asian countries to great powers such as the USA, Russia or China -, going to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or to the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC).

Thirdly, PRC 's recovery strategy of a greater regional and international status as gone through the attempt of **affirmation of a certain “Chinese imperial” order in Asia and by the strict defense of the non-interference principle**: strong maintenance of its integrity and political and territorial union – with prominence to Tibet, Mongolia, Xingjian but also Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan; bet on reorganization, re-dimensioning and great military modernization, simultaneous to the significant and not very clear increase on its defense budgets; fierce persistence on not submitting to external prescriptions, specially the “western” ones; the claim of a sovereign space so wide that it overcomes many of its neighbor's interests and positions – Japan (Senkaku islands), India, Taiwan and the Southeast Asian countries (Paracel and Spratlys archipelago, on the South China Sea¹¹⁹). But, such Chinese whims, if “natural” and not very surprising, instill on their neighbors great fears about “Great China's” true intentions and ambitions.

To counter-balance the different powers before Beijing, many of the Asian States, particularly on the Oriental edge, are looking for shelter on the United States strategic presence. The American on their turn, have never made a secret that they faced China, in the new post Cold War context, more like a strategic

¹¹⁹ In reality the dispute over the Paracels islands (in Chinese *Xisha*, in vietnamese *Hoang Sa*) involves just PRC and Vietnam. Over the Spratlys Islands (in Chinese *Nansha*, in vietnamese *Truong Sa*), the situation is more complex since it involves China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. About Oriental Asia conflicts see TOMÉ, Luís Leitão, *A Segurança e a Estabilidade no Noroeste da Baía do pacífico*, op. cit., Parte III – *Principais Disputas e Focus de Tensão*, p.221-266.; and *A Segurança na Ásia Oriental*, Instituto Internacional de Macau (IIM), op. cit., Chapter on *Diferendos e Conflitos Regionais*, p. 24-34

rival than as a strategic partner. This way, if it is true that the new environment was more favorable to China's geostrategic affirmation and to the defense of its interests, the country saw itself face to face with the grounded fears of many of its neighbors and in a way "contained" in its aspirations, by the United States.

In the new context, China was no longer worried with Soviet Union's old threatening and hegemonic intentions, thus being in a better position to prosecute an economic modernization strategy. But the "century of humiliations" at the hands of foreign powers, from 1840 to 1949, and the level of threats that it endured from the two super-powers during the bipolar period, deeply marked its external relations, particularly with the United States. Indeed, during all the post Cold War period, China was paying more and more attention to the USA's Asian policies. Beijing considers that the USA are practicing an hegemonic strategy. **To Chinese ruling classes and analysts, the American purpose is to stop global power redistribution in the sense of multipolarity, in sharp confrontation with China's intentions.**

The United States are the keepers of the complex regional balances and therefore, its role is determining to other issues that directly interest and influence China's geostrategic context: **Japan status** - a preferred USA ally since 1951 and where the Americans have a significant military situation (about 38.000 soldiers); **the situation in Korea** - the USA are also South Korea allies, maintaining in their territory about 37.000 militaries and show great suspicions and even hostility towards North Korea, a likely new nuclear power and Beijing's ally; the **Taiwan issue** about which the United States keep a unilateral defense warranty (*Taiwan Relations Act*), since 1979; or the **situation in Southeast Asian** – Washington keeps privileged relations with Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Brunei, some of which are disputing with Beijing the Spratlys Island possession.

China and the United States also have very distinct perspectives about subjects such as the human rights, nuclear proliferation, armaments' sale and missile technology, the treatment towards "Rogue States", commercial liberalization, political democratization, minorities rights, Tibet self-determination, etc. – well, practically all these issues were conducted by the USA and led Beijing to be under Washington's accusations several times. In China those accusations were considered as subversive and as a super power abusive interference in their sovereignty. In fact, **besides evident interest of both in keeping world and regional stability and in promoting economical development and growth – extraordinarily**

important to the moderation of both - it is difficult to find truly common interests between the Chinese and the North American.

As a consequence, during the post Cold War, **China and the USA have set up diametrically opposite strategies and often turned against each other: the USA tries to keep the *status quo* that gives the country its hegemony**, trying to show the advantages of the *pax Americana* (including to China, by keeping Japan under the American strategic dependence) – which to most Asian countries is definitely more desirable than a “*Chinese pax*” or a “*Japanese pax*”; **China, the unsatisfied and revisionist power**, trying to contradict North American hegemony, affirms a status that it thinks is untitled to, based on its History. To implement its strategy, the USA have been keeping part of their important “San Francisco System” (formerly set in name of the containment policy of the USSR and of the Asia-Pacific communism) sustaining a significant local military presence and promoting regional balances through the increase of Japan status, ASEAN and of Australia (remember the Australian role on East Timor).

Because of all this, **China regards itself as the new target of the North American containment, on a post-bipolarization context**. In order to oppose American hegemony in Asia, to break up with USA's containment and enlarge its own status, **China has adopted a modernization policy of its conventional and nuclear forces**, considered absolutely vital to defend its national interests and purposes; it has committed on a **strategic partnership with Russia** (announced since 1996 and confirmed with the signature of a new 20 year Chinese-Russian cooperation and mutual support treaty, in July 2001 in Moscow); it has **reinforced the alliance with Pakistan** (also important on the difficult Beijing-India relation), supporting its access to nuclear technology; it has kept a **certain tutorship over North Korea**, helping on the development of its missile technology and eventually on its nuclear “civil” program; **it has deepen bonds with Myanmar**, a state “stuck” in Indochina Peninsula and in a way proscribed of the international community; **it has sold armaments and military technology to “Rogue States”** such as Syria, Libya, Sudan, Iraq and Iran, hostile to the USA and with which has developed important commercial bonds; it has kept a cordial and tolerant relation with the Taliban Afghanistan; and it has **sought to develop a “strategic concertation” on Central Asia through the “Shanghai Group”**, that gathers China, Russia,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on a partnership regarded in Beijing as a ‘model’¹²⁰.

In the end, so that its goals could be reached, **China has skillfully managed the commercial trade “bait” of a gigantic and growing market with 1300 million of potential consumers and the mediation of the instability and conflict risks.** It was this joint strategy, indisputable source of some strategic gains after the end of the Cold War that was jeopardized after the September 11th.

China’s geopolitical and geostrategic situation after the September 11th

The September 11th placed Beijing under a huge dilemma: the expression of a true international compromise side by side with the USA, could allow China to obtain advantages in terms of status and image and win some dividends on the internal anti-terrorist fight, but that would mean to freely accept the super power to interfere in an area that Beijing considers as part of its own sphere of influence, without giving any special attention to Beijing’s interests. Maybe this dilemma explains the **ambiguity of Chinese position right in the aftermath of the attacks.** Expressing its condolences and condemning terrorism, the Chinese government has insisted on the need to establish a firm proof of Al-Qaeda’s fault and of Afghanistan support; on the interference of the United Nations Security Council; and on the respect for innocent lives. After the 5th Article has been invoked by the Atlantic Alliance, Beijing’s spokesperson stated that “China would oppose to any NATO action outside Europe” and showed concern on sending North American troops to Pakistan. Simultaneously, President Jiang Zémin was multiplying his appeals to gain France and Russia’s support on China’s request for the involvement of the United Nations SC, the only way Beijing had to regain the control of a situation that would bring serious consequences. In reality, **the Chinese ambiguities and doubts brought into light China’s contradiction that simultaneously claim**

¹²⁰ To a more developed analysis on the Chinese geostrategic positioning see, TOMÉ, Luís L., *A Segurança e a Estabilidade no Noroeste da Bacia do Pacífico*, op. cit., Parte II – *A Evolução das Grandes Potências*, Ch. 8 *China imperial ou imperialista?*, p.124-160; Parte IV – *The new regional order*, p. 267-282; *A Segurança na Ásia Oriental*, op. Cit.

for a world power status but is indifferent to everything that is not a threat to its interest area, on a Chinese-centric logic¹²¹.

The huge American pressure after September 11th was felt during the APEC summit, in Shanghai, on December 2001, when it ended up making the first political declaration, in 12 years of history, by condemning September 11th attacks and calling them “terrorist” and considering international terrorism as “a threat to peace and world security”. But the most significant indication was the American reinvestment in all Asia, including the Eastern part, which contributed to redesign all Asian strategic landscape. Submitted to unsolved tensions and unbalances, **Asia is one of the regions where the United States’ weight has greater influence on the evolution of regional balances.** The Asian scene, considered on a broad sense, from Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, has not escaped to the chain reaction phenomena induced by the attacks, and today is the focus of the USA’s strategic concerns. **From the great world powers, PRC was potentially the most delicate “target” for the consequences of American reinvestment on Asia, the “great war” against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the “Rogue States”.** To Asia more than detonator, the September 11th was a “discloser” of the reality of power and strength relations¹²².

Just like Moscow towards Chechnya, **Beijing immediately tried to gain compensations and made its thesis about problems in Xingjian, in Tibet and even in Taiwan prevail.** Yet, in the beginning of March 2002, the USA State Department made public a document where muslims Uygures from Xingjian, in Northeast of China, were not recognized as “terrorists”, and stating that the United States would not pact with any regime using the war against terrorism as a pretext to restrict the freedom of a people or deny its right to self-determination. This report on human rights situation in the world also makes clear that “serious abuses against the human rights in Tibet and in Xingjian persist”. In parallel, Washington has not diminished the arms supply to Taiwan.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² See NIQUET Valérie, *As repercursões para a Ásia dos atentados do 11 de Setembro*, in *Lessons from September 11th* op. Cit., p. 135-152

True Beijing support on the war against international terrorism must include the neutralization of some of the opposition strategies towards the USA that China has been promoting since the beginning of the 90's. In particular those that many times assume the shape of proliferating activities towards States considered dangerous: from Sudan to North Korea and from Libya to Iran. On this matter, PRC's scope of action has been clearly reduced. It is a paradox that the USA had denied to stop sanctions against China for having supplied Pakistan with material susceptible of being used in the production of missile and nuclear weapons – which Beijing denies – when the American have stopped the nuclear sanctions on Pakistan and India, after the September 11th, in the name of the fight against nuclear proliferation!

In the Northern flank, the perspective of a “new strategic companionship” between the United States and Russia is very worrying to China: it could as well throw down the strategic China-Russia partnership - created to counterbalance the American hegemony – and it confirms the threat of a anti-missile strategic defense so harshly criticized by PRC. Indeed, though Beijing tries to involve Russia on denouncing the risks induced by American positions on the region – *“the will to control Afghanistan will give the United States the possibility to encircle Russia on the South and China on the West”*¹²³ - Moscow has radically changed its geostrategic positioning without consulting its Chinese ‘ally’. On the other hand, just like the Chinese-Russian partnership, the Shanghai Group fragilities were exposed by the regional consequences of the September 11th attacks. Again, without consulting the Chinese partner, the other member countries decided to help the Americans, allowing them to settle militaries on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and have logistic and humanitarian support on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

The same consequences occurred in China's Western flank concerning the “Chinese-Pakistan alliance”. This alliance that laid on the existence of a common enemy –India – was the most solid relation that Beijing made with its neighbors. In fact, the very close military collaboration developed with Pakistan, allowed Beijing to handle the destabilizing proliferation against the United States. But, the President Musharraf of Pakistan regime, “pinned to the wall” by the North Americans, immediately knew that Pakistan would isolate itself if they refused to

¹²³ Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, September 24, 2001 (periodical)

cooperate and could even be set aside with the Taliban as part of the United States targets. In addition, this occurred in a scenario where India was ready to give Washington total support because of terrorism in Kashmir. So, in the name of its regime survival and to keep Pakistan's sovereignty, President Musharraf accepted a place on the American orbit – even because he knew that Washington would reward Pakistan cooperation. So Pakistan once again became United States' strategic pawn, thus making Chinese support less relevant. On its turn India, the old PRC rival, following an American support tendency, did not hesitate to try to improve its status as regional power in the fight against terrorism, at the expenses of China and Pakistan. At the same time, the post-Taliban Afghan regime is under tight American and international community control, in name of stability and country reconstruction. Even NATO has turned to that territory with a security assistance mission – against the Chinese interests.

If after the September 11th Beijing considers its strategic situation over its Western flank worrying, then, on its **Eastern flank** the rebirth of a military-political role of Japan brings new concerns. More specifically Tokyo decided to authorize sending an AEGIS cruiser to the Indian Ocean and Self-defense Japanese Forces were able to participate on medical and logistic support to the militaries in combat. And since the first day of the American-British Afghanistan intervention, auxiliary human aid support material was sent to Pakistan. Keeping within the limits of its Constitution, Japan had its ray of action and its intervention level increased far beyond the previous actions conducted by Tokyo on the frame of UN's peace maintenance operations. Besides of a traditional economical help role, Japan had reinforced its status on the international scene by playing an important role on the process of making a wide 'anti-terrorist coalition'. This was the result of its policy and good relations with the Arabian world that, since the first petrol crisis, is one of the few aspects that distinguishes Tokyo and Washington external policy. Finally, the grounds of the USA-Japan Alliance were reinforced: for example, by the strategic importance of the military basis settled on the archipelago at the level of force movements and power projection to all Eastern Asia (Korea, Taiwan and Asia Southeast), Central Asia (Afghanistan) and South Asia (Indian Ocean). Once again, this is an adverse situation to Beijing's interests.

In the Southeast of Asia, that is, China's South and Southeast, there was an American "return", quite obvious on sending special troops to Philippines – to

aid Manila's government on the fight against the muslim terrorists in Mindanao archipelago – and on the support given to some local countries on the control or fight against the Islamic fundamentalism, specially in Indonesia and also in Malaysia.

The “war against terrorism” has contributed to reinforce old USA alliances and to enlarge existing partnerships and coalitions, as well as to significantly reinforce the American military presence on the region. After having struggled against the Soviet Union's “siege” whims and having faced the American hegemony, **PRC has much to fear from a share of vigilance and control roles by the USA and their allies or partners – new and old – around China.** Exceptions made to Myanmar and North Korea¹²⁴. The consequences of these “siege” are even more significant because they show a context of strong rivalry China-USA. The United States have never forgotten the way Beijing handled the EP-3E observation airplane issue, in April 2001 and the will to humiliate the new President Bush.

As result of all this, after the September 11th, **China's geopolitical and geostrategic situation has become more delicate** and its maneuvering scope more narrow, towards the new United States strategic expansion. **Despite, the Sino-American relations have met a significant improvement since then, for a special reason: specially terrorism, but also the nuclear proliferation and the ‘Evil States’** have clearly become the main security concern for the United States, thus replacing the “Chinese threat” which had been dominant on the analysis of many North American strategists and ruling classes, during the 90's. This extraordinary change – which oddly, seems to have passed unnoticed – caused a much bigger contention on the mutual criticism between Washington and Beijing and has, in a way, restarted a new USA-PRC partnership. Above all, **the North Americans have given China the recognition of a global role on the fight against the proliferation of WMD and, of an indispensable role on stabilizing East Asia, for example on the control of North Korea – one of the countries of the ‘axis of evil’-, and its nuclear program and missile technology.** Then, it is not odd that the United States have reaffirmed on the polemical *National Security Strategy*, approved on September 2002 that “*We welcome the emergence of a*

¹²⁴ See TOMÉ, Luís Leitão, *11 de Setembro: as consequências estratégicas para a Ásia-Pacífico*, in *JANUS* 2003, op. Cit., p. 174-175

strong, peaceful, and prosperous China". Or, that Colin Powell, the US former Secretary of State, has said *"we welcome a global role for China, so long as China assumes responsibilities commensurate with that role. China's leaders know all this. Neither false fear about the future nor the overhang of Cold War enmity prevent us from cooperating where our interests coincide"*¹²⁵. Considering the present Sino-American relations as the best of the last decades, Powell defends that *"is not just because the September 11 attacks led us to shuffle priorities, nor only because we championed Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization; nor is it the result of the accession of a new generation of Chinese leaders. It is certainly not because we have ignored Chinese human rights abuses, China's still unacceptable weapons proliferation activities, or the reluctance of China's leadership to match political to economic reform. We have never downplayed these difficulties. The Sino-American relationship has nonetheless improved for a reason that transcends all these particulars: neither we nor the Chinese believe that there is anything inevitable about our relationship any longer - either inevitably bad or inevitably good. Instead, we now believe that it is up to us, together, to take responsibility for our common future"*¹²⁶.

The Iraqi crisis

If as a consequence of the September 11th, sensitive changes have occurred in China's geostrategic and geopolitical positioning, the Iraqi crisis did not bring many changes, under that point of view. Still in the beginning of 2004, Collin Powell said, *"Today, however, U.S. relations with China are the best they have been since President Richard Nixon first visited Beijing more than 30 years ago"*¹²⁷. But the consequent international polemic and fracture has been used by Beijing to try to gain back some maneuvering scope on international policy, particularly on the quest of its anti-hegemonic strategy. Opposite to Russia and France China had no specific interests on Iraq – unless like any other country, to maintain relations to benefit from the Iraqi oil and the country and region stabilization. Maybe because of this, some observers conclude that, like Moscow, also Beijing could

¹²⁵ POWELL, Colin L., *A Strategy of Partnerships*, op. cit., p. 32

¹²⁶ *ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

abstain on the case of a second resolution to legitimize the use of force against Saddam – if China saw itself isolated and “counterparts” up to its main interest were offered.

Regardless of this type of interest, the truth is that **China conceives the North American gesture as part of a great hegemonic strategy and military interference** – set since the end of the Cold War, more obvious since NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and now very clear on Iraq. To a country traditionally defendant of the non-intervention principle, that causes great apprehension: before and during this period, Chinese leaders have always denounced it publicly. Under Beijing’s analysis, this crisis proves their thesis. A thesis that is now more visible. On the other hand, **the military intervention in Iraq occurred on the context of two North American strategic elements that highly preoccupy Beijing: the pressure against the ‘axis of evil’** – about which China fears some kind of domino effect on the USA interventions on the States that Washington considers “Rogue”; and the **new doctrine of preemptive and preventive actions** - that the Chinese leaders consider to be an attempt to arbitrarily and unilaterally legitimize the use of force on international relations, on the American side.

Nevertheless, **China did not seem very impressed with Franco-German axis opposition to the way the USA behaved.** Or, in another way, by not showing surprise, the Chinese leadership, not only remembered “former cases of interference” in which, the European either participated or supported, as they said that they expect “the same type of opposition in similar issues and cases”. In the codified Beijing’s language this is **an effort so that the Europeans revise their positions to face the United States**, to oppose to any North American whims towards Syria, Iran and mostly, North Korea and to prevent NATO from being an interference instrument, at least outside Europe. The reality though is that **Beijing suspects this “Western” crisis to be above all conjunctural. In this context, Beijing does not see many possibilities to establish any strategic partnership between Europe and China, in the sense of coordinating anti-USA policies. About Russia, Beijing has been trying to regain the “strategic partnership” spirit.** But if Iraq crisis seems to show the need of this partnership to counterbalance the United States hegemonic and unilateralist impetus, the Russian political turnover after the September 11th has undermined Beijing’s trust in actually establishing those bonds – even though Russia also has strongly protested against an American military intervention in Iraq.

The always very legalist China, shows **unquiet on the ease with which Washington has marginalized the United Nations and the Security Council on this process.** This is a point of total convergence between Moscow, Beijing and the Paris-Berlin axis, in the sense that all insist in restoring the United Nations SC legitimacy and authority. In reality, China, “Europe” and Russia see UN’s Security Council as the main way to contain the North-American unilateralism. Because of that any step that the United States give in the direction of marginalizing and reducing its authority is felt like a threat by the other powers. **France, Russia and China have been adjusting positions so that proposals approved by the SC about Iraq respect two principles: do not legitimize an Anglo-American intervention *a posteriori* and to give to the United Nations the political and economical leadership on the transition in Iraq.** It is the only way to limit the North-American dominion over that country.

The Chinese worries lay in another three factors. First, about the technologic supremacy showed by the North American armed forces during the campaign “Iraqi Freedom”, that clearly shows the growing distance between the USA and China’s military capacities – justifying the Chinese bet on the urgent modernization of Defense. Second, because of the **asymmetric processes used by the Iraqi resistance** who have either shown extremely capable of achieving the American and its allies’ interests or launch “chaos” that favors the subversion against the coalition presence on that territory. Under Beijing’s logic **that can foment its own “separatists” –Tibet and Xingiang, specially – to prosecute a similar strategy**, laid on this kind of asymmetric process, of “the weak against the strong”. Third, the Chinese concern about the **USA’s intention to put aside certain regimes and to confront what they call the “Rogue States”** is great. Fearing itself to become in any way a USA “target”, China’s next concern is to include North Korea, its ally and *protégé*, in President Bush so-called “axis of evil”. It is worth to analyze the issues surrounding the North Korean nuclear weapons and missile technology exportation programs.

The crisis around North Korean nuclear program and missile technology

In the end of 2002 and in the beginning of 2003¹²⁸, North Korea admits having a secret program of uranium enrichment to nuclear weapons; suspended the moratorium about ballistic missile tests; dismantled the sealing and surveillance equipment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meant to monitor its suspicious installations; expelled the IAEA inspectors; reactivated the Yongbyon central and announced to reopen a reprocessing central to begin weapon plutonium production; declared its own exit of the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); renounced the agreements celebrated with IAEA; threatened South Korea, Japan and even the USA to retaliate with nuclear weapons, should they start a preemptive action against any of North Korea's facilities; it was prepared to respond with a preventive attack to any military American reinforcement on the region; and it has launched "experimental missiles" that flew over South Korea and Japan. In short, **Pyongyang has violated all the mechanisms meant to stop the nuclear weapons and missile technology proliferation, that North Korea had joined or agreed with: NPT, IAEA, Agreed Framework, the North-South Joint Declaration about the Denuclearization of North Korea, the moratorium about ballistic missile tests.** North Korea has also announced it "might not have another option" but to violate the armistice celebrated with South Korea in 1953 and it has suspended military contacts with the UN Command in charge of supervising that armistice and the Demilitarized Zone. In April 2003, Pyongyang had already admitted to have nuclear weapons.

On its turn, the United States have suspended free oil supplies to North Korea (which reached 500 thousand tons per year) and have moved 24 B-1 and B-52 long-range bombardiers to their military base in Guam, 3500 km away from Pyongyang; the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), international consortium set within the frame of the Agreed Framework of 1994, has suspended the construction of the two LWR reactors, that were meant to supply energy to North Korea; and three of the major donors – USA, Japan and South Korea – of the World Food Programme (WFP) in North Korea have

¹²⁸ About a more detailed evolution of the USA-North Korea relations on the past two decades see, for example, TOMÉ, Luís L., *Cronologia Coreia do Norte-EUA*, in *JANUS* 2004, p. 34-34.

drastically reduced their donations: from 340 thousand tons, in 2001 the USA have donated in 2002 only 100 thousand; in 2001 Japan has donated more than half of the food aid and in 2002 gave nothing.

Behind of all the rhetoric, the behavior and North Korean threats, there is an endemic vulnerability complex and an enormous feeling of insecurity, in a country that has been living under the danger of eminent collapse for over a decade: in 1995, WFP has created an emergency support to the country - in 2001, it has placed there 800 thousand tons, the greatest food aid in history. It certainly is one of the greatest world scale tragedies, whose real dimension is impossible to confirm because of the secrecy of the last Stalinist regime on the planet. Besides the regimes' survival, Pyongyang greatest concern is to avoid the country's collapse. **In large scale, this crisis results from North Korea's need to have international aid using the triumph or the blackmail of nuclear weapons and the sale of missile technology to gain financial, food, energy counterparts and the suspension/reduction of the American sanctions.** It is certainly a very risky strategy that can become fatal, but the truth is that it had some success during the 1993-94 crisis with the celebration of the complex Agreed Framework.

On the other hand, the strong insecurity and vulnerability feeling towards the American pressure is fundamental to understand the North Korean behavior. Pyongyang fears to be the next American target and hence the manipulation of its missile and nuclear programs, not only to dissuade a possible preventive/preemptive United States attack against Korean facilities but also to establish direct negotiations with Washington and even obtain a non-aggression pact with the USA. **North Korea's conduct is far more justified by the fear of Bush Administration's intentions than by a real intention to attack South Korea, Japan or the USA.**

China's role can be determining to the closure of this crisis, in the sense that Beijing is Pyongyang only true ally and its national interests end up being at stake. Mainly, Beijing tries to stop Pyongyang's regime and North Korea to collapse because of the predictable negative consequences to China's own stability and security. On the other hand, the privileged relationship with Pyongyang gives Beijing a unique role and status, allowing the prosecution of two other purposes: to consolidate and develop stronger relations with South Korea and increase its influence over the Korean Peninsula, that China considers its natural influence area. But if such purposes do not coincide with the purposes of other regional powers such as the USA, there are other interests in China that do coincide and

that can determine the crisis evolution: the Korean regime and system reform – Beijing has made pressure on Pyongyang to promote profound social and economical reforms, giving its own model as example; the North-South cooperation and integration through peaceful measures and social and economical mechanisms, that in the future might lead to a political unification; and the stability of the Korean Peninsula and of the Northeast Asian, for example, by ways of a denuclearized Korea (North and South) and of a Pyongyang's responsible behavior on security affairs. This does not mean that Beijing accepts the Peninsula *status quo* – it certainly would prefer the reduction or the end of the USA military presence and influence and the launching of wide reformatations in North Korea. **On behalf of its own interests, China has good reasons to assume a determining role on the peaceful resolution of this crisis. The existence of a nuclear North Korea might lead to a significant change on the strategic calculations on the region (and even in the world) and change the scale of power on Northeast Asian, in the way that South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan might intend to follow it. If the USA want to solve the problem peacefully with North Korea it is not because they fear a Beijing's military involvement but because they think of China as a moderating factor to Pyongyang thus leading to a diplomatic solution to the crisis.**

To the USA, Korea's issue is placed much more to the level of its capacities and less on the level of its intentions on the sense of appearing as a real, immediate and direct threat. This helps to explain the 'whys' on the American persistence in a peaceful solution to the North Korean crisis and the "difference" of treatment as compared to Iraq. **The military option is much riskier with North Korea than with Iraq.** Any conflict with North Korea would have serious consequences, specially to South Korea. The great urban Seoul area, with more than 10 million inhabitants and also where most of the 37.000 American militaries are, is less than 80km from the Demilitarized Zone that separates the South and the North. Pyongyang has at its service more than a million soldiers that are in great majority near the south border, equipped with more than 8000 artillery units, 3500 armoured vehicles, 500 or 600 aircrafts, 200 helicopters, dozens of submarines and some hundreds of missiles capable of reaching all South Korea or Japan with conventional or non-conventional heads – North Korea is since long supplied with chemical and biological weapons - and probably with one or two nuclear bombs. This vast arsenal – supported by 6 billion USD budget, which represents

about 30 to 40% of the North Korean GDP, according to some estimatives – makes very difficult to set a defense mechanism in case of conflict. When the Clinton administration pondered about a military operation against North Korea in 1993-94, the Pentagon has calculated 4 months of intense fights, involving over 600 thousand South Korean militaries and half a million of American effectives to reinforce the already present South Korea contingent. At the time, President Clinton's councilors estimated 52 thousand American casualties during the first 90 days of war – in perspective, let us say that the Americans have lost 55 thousand soldiers on 1950-53 Korean War and 58 thousand in Vietnam War, from 1957 to 1975). Some estimates calculated a total of million and million and a half victims, apart from costs around trillions of USD. Because of all this, the military option was then abandoned and even today it is not faced as a true option, but as a nightmare that must be avoided to all costs.

International security misinterpretations and/or dangerous interpretations might occur because the risks associated to the use of force are often compelling. To spread the message that North Korea will not be attacked because of its military power is the same as to invite other countries, namely the called "Rogue States" to immediately start an armaments race that would make them immune to an American attack. This would have serious negative consequences to world security and to the fragile stability in some regions. On the other hand, **to condescend with the obvious North Korean violations of the non-proliferation regimes would contribute to the effective dismantling of these fundamental mechanisms of international order regulation** – South Korea, Japan and Taiwan could follow but also Iran, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, and perhaps Brazil, Argentina and South Africa once again. **Within a decade, the outcome would be a world covered of nuclear States, some deeply hostile between themselves and other with terrorist groups connections - the worst scenario of all.** Because of all this, and though **Bush Administration** prefers a peaceful solution to remove North Korean nuclear weapons, it **does not definitely exclude the possibility of a military conflict.** Simultaneously, it seems to **hesitate between continuing to pressure on Pyongyang to go back to the non-proliferation regime and to NPT, and AIEA and the Agreed Framework in a challenge that might become perpetual or to accept the inevitability of North Korea becoming on the next nuclear power, thus focusing its attention on the proliferation Korean activities and hoping for a better Pyongyang's collaboration.** To condescend or

to accept the blackmail or to put pressure until a conflict bursts it is a tremendous dilemma for the United States. Meanwhile, Washington seeks another strategy: to promote a “power concertation” – USA, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and European Union – that is able to solve peacefully the North Korean problem. Beijing has specific and direct interests and an important role that is trying to increase.

China’s importance today

With a millenary civilization and having the world’s largest history, China assumes today a new great international relevance, because of the conjugation of several favorable factors to its emergency as great power: a fast economic growth – between 7 and 10% along the past two decades; **integration on the world and regional economies**, proved by the adhesion to APEC and WTO and the exponential increase of its commercial trade; the sensitive **modernization of its military sector and coercive power constant increase**, thus promoting respect and fear amongst Asian countries, specially Taiwan, India, Japan and the ASEAN countries and making a supplementary challenge that the United States should not neglect; and an **extremely vast population of 1300 million inhabitants** with the benefits it can bring in terms of potential power and virtual consumers.

Chinese economy is the greatest world economy star and the greatest source of economical international dynamism. The Asian economic-financial crisis of 1997-1998, the world’s economy slow down of the past few years, the crisis caused by the SARS epidemic (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) at the end of 2002, do not seem to have seriously affected the impressive Chinese economic growth that, in 2003 was around 8%. Indeed, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and a market of hundreds of million of consumers sustain a great part of its economic growth. **Chinese economy has a growing influence on world trade:** in 2002 Chinese external trade represented 5% of the world trade, that is, about 620 billion USD, almost doubling the 2,7% that China represented on the world trade just seven years before¹²⁹. That tendency seems to have continued as in the

¹²⁹ Numbers quoted by SUTTER, Robert *Why does China matter?*, in the *Washington Quarterly*, 27:1, winter 2003-2004, p. 77

end of May 2003 Chinese external trade had increased 40% when compared to the previous year.

Inevitably, that situation is **quite attractive for foreign investment** and has an extraordinary impact on neighbor countries, although it might be negative. In the beginning of the 90's, Southeast Asia was receiving 61% of the foreign direct investment (FDI) to the developing countries, while China was getting 18% - at the end of the decade, the situation was already completely reversed¹³⁰. In 2002, the FDI has grown 13% in China, a truly amazing figure considering that the FDI in developing countries fell over 25%. During the first five months of 2003, FDI in China has registered a 42% increase. According to Beijing estimates, in 2005 FDI in China will reach 100 billion USD¹³¹.

Chinese economy is more and more important to the United States, because China is its 4th largest trade partner and source of great part of the America's trade deficit (responsible for over 130 billion USD in 2003). About 11% American imports come from China and USA's exports onto the Chinese market are quickly increasing (22 million USD in 2002), result of the sudden increase of consumers in China (around several million every year). China's trade position – considering the Chinese imports and exports importance as relative towards a certain country or group of countries – is still the largest one on the European Union and in Asia it is Taiwan's, South Korea's and Japan's main trade partner.

The Chinese economic performance affects the production, distribution and the pricing of some key sectors. For example, automobile sales in China have increased 56% in 2002, with over a million and 130 thousand vehicles sold; it is the largest market for mobile networks and a fabulous potential growth, since that number is little more than 13.5% of the countries' population; Boeing estimates that China will be the largest market for aerial commercial trips outside the United States within the next 20 years; in 2002, China replaced Japan on the second largest personal computers market, right after the USA; on tourism it is estimated that China will become the main tourist exporter in one or two decades. China is also more and more capable of affecting the world exchange rates and the commercial trade prices, by accumulating currency reserves: it will have 346

¹³⁰ DAPINO, Catherin and LIN, Juo-yu, (2003) *China and Southeast Asia* in Richard Bush and Catherin Dalpino (eds.), Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2002-2003, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC p.83.

¹³¹ SUTTER, Robert *Why does China matter?* op. cit, p.78

billion USD worth in currencies, the second largest right after Japan. It is calculated that Chinese creditors hold about 9-10% of the United States' Federal Treasury on the hands of foreign creditors. Under WTO's hat the opening of the Chinese market to the banks and to foreign insurance companies will happen soon. In 2005, great international groups will compete equal to equal. Because of that, home loans, personal consume loans and the insurance market will become the most profitable business in China, in the next few years.

This economic growth has not been totally painless, since the economic transition reformations in China also have caused: thousands of public companies to shut down; millions of people to be unemployed; millions thrown to misery; rural migration and a great pressure on the main urban centers; social tensions and disparity grow; regional differences increase; corruption and crime spread; difficulties on the fiscal system and state bureaucracy start to appear and are unable to efficiently respond to such a quick progress; differences between local and central power grow. **Anyway, the Chinese growth is unquestionable and some foresee that if the present tendencies continue, China will have the largest economy in the world within a few decades, between 2040 and 2050.**

As far as military power is concerned, despite the Chinese defense expenditure has a very significant difference of the United States defense budget (from 56 billion USD¹³² to more than 400 billion USD, in 2003), on the last decade **Chinese military capacities have, not very clearly, quickly increased**. Chinese eagerness to modernize its military system, has led Beijing to acquire significant amounts of equipment and technology, since the beginning of the 90's, in order to increase its power projection abilities, on missiles, naval and aerial power, for example. In 2003, China alone, received 1,000 million USD in armament and made arms transfers agreements as a recipient in an amount of 500 million USD¹³³. As a result of the Western embargo on the arms sale to China because of the Tiananmen

¹³² Data regarding Chinese budget vary depending on the source used. Usually foreign sources indicate rather higher figures than those from Beijing, since the Chinese Defense Budget does not include many of the commercial activities from EPL and other expenses directed to "civil areas". The number that is quoted here is from *The Military Balance 2004-2005*. One of the highest numbers for Chinese Defence Expenditure was pointed out by the Pentagon on a report from July 2003, presenting an amount of 65 billion USD.

¹³³ *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, op. cit., p.359.

Square tragedy in 1989, it is Russia that supplies most of Chinese requests: surface fighting ships, submarines, fighter-planes, bombardiers and air-ground missiles, air-air missiles and ground-ground missiles, apart from ballistic missiles of short and medium range (specially to refrain Taiwan separatist impetus). It is estimated that only in four years, from 1999 to 2002, China has bought Russia more than 2 billion USD in equipment, doubling the average number of that type of acquisitions on the 90's¹³⁴. The same way, China has been increasing the number and the sophistication of its nuclear weapons.

There is great concern before such increase of capacities and modernization of the Chinese armed forces, specially, in Taiwan but also in India, Japan and in the Southeast Asia, among others. Nevertheless these fears are not limited to China's neighbors. Despite the confidence in the capacity of controlling China's military emergence, the United States still pay great attention and even demonstrate some concern. In 2003, the USA's Defense Department alerted on the consequences for Taiwan of the construction of short-range missiles in China (450 in 2003), of the modernization of the military aerial and naval resources, and in the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) commitment on focusing on a surprise attack that allows Beijing's control over Taiwan before any USA intervention¹³⁵. Also in 2003 a report¹³⁶ done by an independent research group related with the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), predicts that China will become *Asia's "greatest regional military power"*¹³⁷ within one or two decades, surpassing Japan; it suggests that the increase of aerial and naval military capacities will require *a sustained and robust U.S. naval and air presence that can offset the ability of Beijing to leverage future military capabilities into a real advantage against U.S. and allied interests in the Asia-Pacific region over the next twenty years*¹³⁸ and alerts that *"The Taiwan Strait is an area of near-term military concern"*¹³⁹. CFR warns that Beijing's option might be the use of force even though the scale looks favorable to the United States and to Taiwan and that PLA presently has the

¹³⁴ SUTTER, Robert *Why does China matter?*, op. cit., p.80.

¹³⁵ United States Defense Department (2003) *Annual Report on the Chinese military power*

¹³⁶ *Chinese Military Power*, (2003) Council on Foreign Relations, New York, electronic edition.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

capacity to air raid Taiwan with short range and intensive missiles and aerial means, as well as prolonged air and naval attacks¹⁴⁰.

Based on its territorial size, its vast population, its strategic localization and on its growing economic and military power, **China has become the most important Asian power**; geographical and interest factors have made **Asia the main arena for China's international affirmation**. It is clear that China has always preferred Asia, but during the last decade it has been doing it by **promoting economic, diplomatic and military interchanges; participating in the multilateral Asian organisms and revealing more flexible on territorial disputes**.

In reality, China has been quite **pragmatic about promoting regional stability – of which it takes obvious profits in terms of economic growth and political influence – without compromising its security, territory sovereignty or other interests**. After a 1995-96 more bellicose posture about Taiwan that, has alarmed all neighbors, in 1997 China has adopted a “New Strategic Concept” that underlines the Five Principles of the Peaceful Coexistence, mutually favorable economic relations and an increased dialogue to promote trust and the peaceful resolution of differences. Beijing has tried **to narrow economical, political and military bonds on the region**. In 2002, China was vital to the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Group – which also includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan - and has proposed an Agreement to have a free trade zone and Chinese-ASEAN security pact. Beijing has also been working closer with ASEAN, Japan and South Korea in the called “ASEAN Plus Three dialog” that emerged from the 1997-98 financial crisis.

Indeed, **Beijing has been more open to multilateral Asian organisms**, thus changing the past posture that interpreted such regimes as opposition to Chinese interests. China has become an active participant on the dialog about regional security, in the frame of the ASEA Regional Forum (ARF), and has agreed a conduct code with other Southeast Asian countries about the differences about Paracel and Spratlys Islands. Apparently, China understands today the multilateral mechanisms as a way to **promote its influence, of restricting USA's policy and to isolate Taiwan** from other Asian countries. That is precisely what China tries to

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

favor while a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, APEC, ARF, The Shanghai Cooperation Group or WTO.

China's real importance derives still from other factors, some of them previously stated. On the one hand, because of the crisis' **"arbitrage" around North Korean armament program and as a consequence its influence on the WMD proliferation activities or at the combat to that proliferation.** On the other hand, because it **has kept territorial disputes with several neighbors:** India, Japan (Senkaku Islands), Vietnam (Paracel archipelago) and Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysian Federation, Singapore and Vietnam again because of Spratlys Islands, plus the border delimitations on the Yellow Sea (with the two Koreas and Japan) and on China Sea and South China Sea. Specially, the greatest source of potential conflict is the **Taiwan issue:** Beijing shows willing to make use of force on the integration of the nationalist island. Many believe that is China's medium-term true intention, when it is provided with other military capacities. The importance of this issue is clear not only because of serious risks of instability to all Eastern Asia but also because of the possibility of American involvement –that holds a unilateral defense warranty with Taiwan, since 1979, with the *Taiwan Relations Act* that, has replaced the previous Defense Treaty¹⁴¹.

In the end, **China's importance today essentially derives from the huge potential regarding to what it might become in the future and what that will mean on the international relations system and on the geopolitical reordering of the force and power relations** - because of its past, of its size, of its emerging economical and military capacities, of the inflexibility on its national interests defense, and because of its growing influence on regional and international matters. Either way, China's evolution and Beijing's future behavior as well of other powers with China, remain a great unknown.

¹⁴¹ About the Taiwan issue see TOMÉ, Luís L. *A Segurança e a Estabilidade no Noroeste da Bacia do Pacífico*, op. Cit., *Parte III – Principais disputas e focos de tensão*, p. 221-266.

The Chinese unknown

If we try to describe **China's attitude** since the end of the bipolar confrontation, we will probably reach the following conclusion: its policies reflect an ambivalent “**double personality**”, making more positive, conciliating and stabilizing policies and attitudes coincide with another posture, clearly more aggressive, expansionist and dangerous. But this has reflections on the analysis made about China – referring its muscular diplomacy, force diplomacy or hot/cold policy – either on the other countries policies and attitudes towards China which vary depending on the interpretation of Beijing's goals.

China's evolution is alike one of the greatest unknowns of the international system, making the task of understanding if China is or is not a threat to world and regional stability and security a complex task. The Chinese unknown derives from two major issues: **on the one hand, to know if China will be able to avoid its own collapse, like it happened with the USSR, on the other to know if its ambitions will turn into a threatening attitude to its neighbors and to world and regional security.** The answer to these questions will determine the world's configuration in the 21st century. Because of de duplicity in China's political character it is possible to find arguments capable of validating both appreciations.

On the “Chinese collapse”

To those defending the Chinese collapse, China presents all the symptoms of a country on the brink of a crisis: overpopulation, population ageing, with negative consequences on the resources production and distribution; struggles for power, political staff renewal and friction among Chinese CP leaders – about how much of the central control should be kept over the economy and about the concessions the party must make; rupture between the political *nomenclature* and the other Chinese political classes that demand new roles and rights, which conflict with CCP policies; instigation of ideals and principles opposed to the traditional regime's parameters, like the integration of “other Chinas” – like Hong Kong and Macao – the contacts with the Chinese Diaspora abroad and with other countries; increase of tensions between Beijing's authorities and LPA militaries, with the sector that insures the regime the monopoly of its less subservient physical strength; Beijing's difficulties in keeping the local and regional elites subordinate – conflicts about the definition of authorities and funds distribution are frequent – and in

solving differences between the richest cost provinces and the poor inner regions; discontentment between the farmers; generalized corruption; ineffective fiscal system and richness distribution; growing criminality; and ideological void that limits national policy orientation. To this perspective, the most likely scenario to China's future is a reprise of the events after 1911/1912 following republic implementation, when the regional "lords of the war" have cut the country into smaller pieces and dominated those challenging central authorities. It is to predict China's collapse on the best possible way and avoid international crisis. And the best way to reduce its effects will be through the **progress of the democratic reforms.**

In contrast, there are many analysts that **do not believe in the Chinese collapse.** Knowing that the Chinese leadership is facing harsh challenges they do not believe that China's disintegration is going to be one of them, because nor the regime nor the party are more vulnerable with the economic reforms since they no longer have problems in embracing **nationalism with a new source of legitimacy** and they can even conduct that over a population that shares a common identity. And if **history serves as example, we can say that China tends more to union then to disintegration** –it is a mistake to use the "lords of the war" argument to make forecasts about the Chinese collapse because they were fighting amongst themselves to unify the country under their own power. The territorial divisions occurred only because they disagreed on whom should make the unification. Every leader's ideal in China, and also Chinese people's ideal is one of unification and not division. Likewise, this perspective **refutes the notion of "China's ungovernability"**: ideological nationalism increases cohesion and facilitates the task of working to a common purpose; relations between local and central authorities are now more institutionalized and the established hierarchies allow to discipline the subordinate levels; with reformations the central economic control has diminished in certain areas but the economic growth favors and legitimizes Beijing's government; the collapse theory defends that the fiscal system is chaotic but the governmental revenue has not only increased as its sources have become more diversified. And also, it rejects migrations as being one of the sources to disintegration; on the contrary, they will make national integration stronger because they increase interaction amongst the countries different regions. Even more important is the fact that migration makes policy stable since it reduces the unevenness of regional revenues. Under this point of view, **political stability is**

the minimum requirement so that China continues to economically grow and progress on its reforms. That is why usually it is argued about the need of a politically and economically strong central government, in order that it can impose financial discipline and make the necessary revenues transfers. This conditions the growth without hyper-inflation risks so that China becomes able of bearing the pressures of the quick development and of the economic transition.

Regardless of agreeing or not with the invoked arguments it is necessary to recognize that **the Chinese collapse would throw China into an abyss and that it would be highly dangerous to stability and security in all Asia and likely all world.** Stability in Asia cannot exist if China is not a tight and stable power.

On the “Chinese threat”

The arguments that place China as threat to regional security starts by mentioning the fact that **PRC follows the military power reinforcement way** (as it is proved by its global defense budgets – from 21,616 million USD in 1985 to 43,551 USD in 2001 and 55,948 USD in 2003 – and by the *per capita* costs in armament – from 21 USD in 1985 to 34 USD in 2001 and 43 USD in 2003¹⁴²), which happens in a context that Beijing’s authorities consider as the most peaceful and secure of all times in the People’s Republic history. On the other hand, China demonstrates a particular interest in acquiring armament systems that allow its forces to project power much beyond the Chinese borders and it is known its **lack of transparency** on Defense related issues¹⁴³. These factors allow suspecting that **China seeks to acquire a military machine strong enough to coerce its neighbors to accept its demandings and to respect its interests.**

A second argument sustains that the **communist regime’s values are hostile to peace.** Many governments, specially those of the democratic States, recognize and accept principles as the peaceful resolution of differences, the human rights,

¹⁴² See figures and tables in *The Military Balance 2003-2004*, op. Cit., p. 337 and *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, op. Cit., p. 355.

¹⁴³ On this matter see, for example, CARRIÇO, Manuel Alexandre G. (2003) *Leindo folhas de chá chinês – uma incursão analítica sobre o orçamento de defesa da República Popular da China e as actividade comerciais do Exército Popular de Libertação em prol do mesmo*, in *Estratégia*, Volume XIV, Lisboa: Instituto Português da Conjuntura Estratégica, p. 355-418

international interdependence and cooperation and the importance of the international law. Nevertheless on this regard, China shows to be highly conservative, behaving as a 19th century or early 20th century Asian or European power, with an archaic sovereignty sense, with unsolved territorial claims and willing to use force to solve differences and to reorganize the scale of powers. **China seems to challenge every modern liberal conception:** it has an authoritarian government that represses the population political freedoms; it holds by strength an empire of captive people; it threatens to take Taiwan by force and practices intimidation tactics on China's Seas; it resists multilateralism on security affairs; it maintains open breaches on agreements meant to control weapons of mass destruction; and it wants to benefit from international trade without honoring the rules. It is assumed that liberal values contribute to peace. Then in this sense, **a Chinese regime that does not follow these values is a threat to peace.**

Another justification commonly invoked is related with **the historical image of China, aspiring to be the dominant power in Asia.** For centuries the Chinese have faced their civilization as the center of the universe. Traditionally, the Chinese do not accept the Westphalia concept of sovereign equality between States, though today Beijing constantly invokes it specially on its relations with the USA – **international relations were understood under the Confucianism spirit that prescribed a conduct unequal amongst, in which, China saw itself on the top of the hierarchy** and the other people as inferior or barbarian. China's role on that order was to keep stability, gather neighboring States tributes, and to promote its civilization. The legacy of this point of view is a very strong belief between the Chinese people that China is the natural and proper Asian leader. With such intend, PRC tends to elaborate a political agenda and to look to edify an order without considering its neighbors interests, regarding only its own interests and goals.

Finally, it is said that **all the great powers are dominating and a powerful China will be no different.** If China reaches the potential level it seeks, soon it can become a power like the 19th century Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the Nazi Germany, the imperialist Japan or the 20th century USA. Each and every one of these countries has used its superior power to establish certain hegemony in order to protect its interests. There is no convincing reason to think that China, as a great power, assumes a different posture. **If the opportunity to establish a dominant role in the region comes, China will take it.**

In the reverse sense, several arguments can equally be evoked to justify that **China is not a threat to regional security**. To begin with, **China wants a stable international environment** that allows maintaining the trade and investment level that so much benefits its economical growth and political prestige. So, it is China's interest to contribute to security and stability in Asia and in the world, and the possibility of reaching its aims by the use of force is diminished.

This perspective also defends that, **historically and even on the top of its power China has not shown commitment on territorial expansion** or conquests in contrast with the Japanese and the European. The common explanation is in the Chinese culture: on the one hand, **Chinese believed the outer world to be inferior and barbarian and with nothing valid to offer; on the other, they were also driven by an ethic code that only justified the use of force in extreme and fair cases**. If China's present and future leaders are influenced by these historical and cultural heritage it can be certain that, China will not use its power to make profit.

Thirdly, Beijing's leaders insist that its regime is a **peace adherent regime** and it will never threat its neighbors and at no time will coerce small countries. China is proud of distinguish itself from other countries for **not having "hegemonic policies"** and for assuring that it will never have the initiative of using nuclear weapons. Even if very powerful, China will remain a benign and trustful actor, a force of peace rather than a threatening war machine.

In fourth place, it is also argued that **the continuous Chinese military restructuring and modernization is limited, reasonable and there is no hegemonic aspiration behind it**. Though, presently they represent the world' second military budget; Chinese military expenses are quite low when compared with USA's expenses –in 2003, China's global Defense budget was about 56 billion USD, far from the 405 billion USD the United States spent on Defense; GDP's percentage on Defense has also stabilised (from 4% in 1985 to 3.7% in 2001 and 3.9% in 2003); and its effective soldiers numbers has drastically decreased (from 3.900 million soldiers in 1985 to 2.820 in 1999, and about 2.250 in 2003)¹⁴⁴. Still, some argue that the cost increase in China's Defense is due to inflation, operational costs and to the resolution of shortage in some sectors. On the other hand, military modernization serves **more internal political interests – maintaining public order**

¹⁴⁴ *The Military Balance 2004-2005*, op. Cit., p.355.

and keeping armies' fidelity to the regime – than obscure or perverse intentions on foreign policy.

In the end, there is not a Chinese threat mainly because **China does not have yet the necessary capacities to favorably change the power scale in the region thus imposing a Sino-centric order.**

To this perspective, **the fears expressed towards China are comprehensible** because of two reasons: **the rise out of a new great power is always followed with tension and apprehension** which is normal but not justifiable in this case; then because **the other States fearing their own power and status decrease** do not easily accept the rise out of a new power and tend to consider it as *status quo* and their own interests “threat”.

Chinese challenges

Considering what was previously stated, apart from the **inherent challenges resulting from a fast economic growth, by the coexistence** (some prefer to call it a “historically unsustainable coexistence”) **between market economy and world's economy integration with political authoritarianism or the maintenance of its political and territorial cohesion**, China offers a great source of important other challenges to the evolution of its geopolitical relationship, specially with the Asian neighbors and with the United States. This happens because **the “Chinese unknown” causes a great dilemma about what is the correct political attitude towards Beijing:** by promoting China's integration in regional and international communities, other States expect to take advantages of the gigantic Chinese market and to contribute that Beijing becomes more moderate and proceed with other reforms; but enriching a still authoritarian China is also reinforcing its power, increasing its capacities to threaten the established order and to dominate its neighbors. No other country is facing this dilemma as directly as Taiwan, which is one of the greatest investors in China and the main target of Chinese military threats. But a similar logic works not only towards the USA and Japan, but also to the weaker neighbors in Southeast Asia.

As China's power increases, Beijing gains confidence to make more and more pressure on international affairs. For now, **China seems committed in continuing to stabilize regional and international environment which insures good conditions to the economical development** – China's present priority that

should remain the same within the next two decades, as the new President Hu Jintao announced. The crucial issue is to **know whether China is not going to develop sufficient power so that in the future it can choose a different way of facing international relations** – eventually a harsher and less cooperative way.

China is the State with greatest potential to rival the United States during the 21st century. This raises two questions. The first is to know **if China will indeed be able to accumulate sufficient power and influence to even the United States' supremacy** (in short term that will be the intention), **and if that will make Beijing adopt a rivalry strategy towards Washington**. The second is to know **if the United States chooses to contain and delay China's rise out as a great power or if they will try to develop an Asian structure based on the scale of powers and collective security, open to cooperation with all the great Asian power – including China** – flexible enough to resist Beijing's interests. The answer to these questions will determine a great part of this century's international relations course.

North American policy towards China is ambivalent, since it keeps dependent of considerations about China's internal policy and international behavior, (since the end of the Cold War) and because it faces China as rival and partner simultaneously. That is why **it has been difficult to overcome the mix of cooperation and disagreement** that, has been the characteristic of Sino-American relations in the turn of the millennium. Despite having consolidated its economical relations with China, supporting China's integration in WTO and normalization of USA-China's economical relations, **the United States have never defined convincingly which frame and geopolitical part they want for China**.

The issue is not how to name the Sino-American relation but to know **what is its geopolitical content**. On this issue there are several variables and dilemmas. **Beijing's point of view** is that the main challenge is not to conquer and domain neighboring countries but to keep a maneuvering enough to, for example, face the North American hegemony, and that would allow to become more modern, rich and with more power and influence. **Washington's point of view** is that the main challenge is not to subvert or to promote a change on the Chinese political regime, but to integrate China on the international community, thus satisfying to some extent China's ambitions without letting it harm American or other Asian countries interests.

Cooperation relations exist to the common interests of both and to limit mutual differences effects. **There are common interests for both** – related with promoting security and stability resulting in better trade and economic development conditions – **and issues enough to test their commitment in cooperating:** Korea's situation and future of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology proliferation allow to test the perspectives of a stable relationship.

Even though China often criticizes the United States “hegemonic attitudes”, **it is not a Chinese interest to provoke the North American and to confront the greatest world military power during this phase of development and affirmation.** That would divide Asia and would compromise not only its economic growth and political capital but China would also have to: take the burden of a conflict, risk to be isolated; take the risk of permanently losing Taiwan and even other territories; give other powers and countries of the vast Chinese periphery a much greater possibility of persecuting its ambitions on China's expenses and with the United States support; and Washington would have the possibility to set a wide coalition and a containment or even conflict strategy towards China. What are the advantages of a conflict strategy without capacities to win it? What would China win with such conflict, unless the United States left no other choice? Such risks can only be taken if China considerably increases its power and/or if its interests are seriously harmed by the United States.

No matter how much the Americans fear Chinese attempts to dominate Asia, **the USA should calculate the risks of instigating Chinese nationalism. To confront China would compromise American's main interests in Asia,** namely those related with the economic development, regional stability and security. It is obvious that as China is developing its “overall national strength” its power will become a more significant challenge. Nevertheless, the United States have diplomatic, political, strategic, economic and military advantages that permit many other options without entering into conflict with China. Unless Beijing leaves no alternative, what would the USA win with a confront strategy? On the other hand, to prevent China's rise out using containment mechanisms like those used against the USSR during the Cold War not only would exacerbate Chinese nationalist spirit but could also turn against itself several Asian countries – besides seriously compromising a fight against terrorism, the WMD proliferation and the “evil States”, because in such scenario China would do anything to break the containment set against it.

It would be nationalism and not communism to lead China into confront with the United States, because of the global hegemony in Asia, on account of Taiwan. The sensitive Taiwan affair is deeply symbolic because it has to do with China's unity and with the defense warranty offered by the United States. But it is also geopolitical and geo-strategic in the sense that it relates with the power balance in East Asia and with China's power projection and influence into the Pacific Ocean and China's Seas. The Taiwan affair is, since the proclamation of the People's Republic, the most complicated problem on the United States-China relations. It fits in the category of the problems without a close solution and that degenerate explosively. That is why *the challenge consists in living with a problem that should be lightened but that cannot be solved. The nature of the problems is clear and the self-control it imposes on all parts is even clearer.*¹⁴⁵ If Taiwan – definitely stating its independence towards motherland - stops its contention and disturbs the tacit agreement that has kept peace it will be a *casus belli* that most likely will make an unpredictable conflict burst, with very negative consequences to the island. If Beijing tries unification using military coercion Taiwan will furiously resist and an American intervention will likely follow – with the inherent escalating risks. If Washington formally renounces of the “United China” principle a military conflict is likely to develop. This means that Taiwan will continue to be a ghost state that in fact exists but that is not in the community of nations. However, the alternatives are too risky and to the involved parts is better to prevent the worsening of the problem.

Though, a permanent threat of conflict and the cyclic crisis, **the Taiwan affair has a different shape from the past.** Taipei has long abandoned the pretension of representing all China as it did until the 70's (to be remembered that only in 1971 People's Republic of China replaced Taiwan/Republic of China in the United Nations and right after as a permanent member of the Security Council), now looking for the international recognition and direct negotiations between equal parts with China. On its turn, Beijing holds the “three maintenance policy” - to maintain the diplomatic blockade, maintain military pressure and maintain commercial bonds -, offering a peaceful integration based in the ‘one country, two systems’ principle (the same principle used with Macao and Hong Kong) and simultaneously threatening to use force if necessary in order to promote its

¹⁴⁵ KISSINGER, Henry, *Does America Need A Foreign Policy?*, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

unification. Either way, Beijing refers to Taiwan more often has one of the two separate components of China instead of the usual rhetoric about the “renegade province”. Commercial relationships are growing stronger and trips and contacts between the two sides are more often. Anyway, the danger of a conflict is real and many situations can become “the last straw”. Recently, after Taiwan’s president Chen Shui-Bian has been re-elected stating the intention to make Taiwan adopt a new Constitution in 2008 – attitude that China regards as formal declaration of independence – Beijing made again a force demonstration in Hong Kong – the greatest since the integration in 1997 of the Special Administrative Region, with 8 war ships – to warn the nationalist island: *‘We, the People’s Liberation Army are always on call, ... If necessary, we have the ability to preserve the stability of the Taiwanese political situation’*¹⁴⁶ said the Yao Xingyuan fleet’s Vice-Admiral. **Taiwan is much likely the greatest challenge in the United States-China’s relation - and it should continue to be. But it is also Taiwan that can calibrate with greatest precision the relationship and cooperation level in the Sino-American relations.**

¹⁴⁶ Quote from Público newspaper, May 1, 2004; English version of the quote extracted from *The Guardian* Friday April 30, 2004 (www.guardian.co.uk/)

Part III

The World War against Terror

Al Qaeda's Declaration of War

The September 11th and the
declaration of "war against terrorism"

Asymmetry, Asymmetric War and Asymmetric Actors

New Type of Terrorism

New strategies for new threats

Uni-Multilateralism, "floating coalitions"
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PART III

THE WORLD WAR AGAINST TERROR

“The story of the human race is war. Except for brief and precarious interludes, there has never been peace in the world”

Winston Churchill

For many centuries, the conflicts occurred specially between monarchs – emperors, kings or princes, tsars, sultans, califs or mandarins – who were trying to expand their power and specially, preserve or increase their domains to other territories and populations. Even after the coming of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia, that pattern has not been changed. Meanwhile the national States have consolidated and **with the French Revolution the attachment to the King was replaced by the attachment to the Nation.** In 1793, R.R. Palmer said that *‘wars amongst kings ended; began wars amongst people’*. Then, the Congress of Vienna in 1815, or the second Peace of Westphalia, did not establish different rules or motivations, it only consecrated the alliance of the traditional powers which would - in the name of the **dynastic-imperial solidarity** - **last until the First World War. After that,** as a result either of the Russian Revolution and of the reactions against it or the political and social-economic post-war situation, **the conflict between nations assumed a strongly ideological aspect:** first between Communism, Nazi-fascism and Democracy; than, after WWII, between Communism and Liberal Democracy embodied in the two superpowers during the Cold War.

Such as in previous occasions – Westphalia, Congress of Vienna, post- World War I and post-Second World War – **also in the end of the Cold War the definitive end of war was also longed for as a conditioning element of international relations.** In the beginning of the 90’s there was a great hope and conviction that never again a conflict between great powers or a world war would occur – if such, then the ‘wars’ would be perfectly localised and related with phenomena emerging again, such as nationalisms, separatisms and ethnical and religious extremisms, besides the conflicts related with resources, specially oil, natural gas and water. In the last decade of the 20th century, a **new geography and a new typology of conflicts** has been much discussed and analysed, with the international community

and the main international regulation mechanisms committing themselves mainly on the **crisis and conflicts management** (previously regarded as secondary).

Though the likeliness of a military conflict between the great powers remained low, a decade after the end of the bipolar clash not only a new pattern of conflict has emerged (asymmetric wars), but specially a new world war against “terror”. That is, the new type of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the “Evil States”.

AL QAEDA’S DECLARATION OF WAR

During the first post Cold War decade, the West grew confident on the illusion that external threats had virtually disappeared, and that the dangers now had essentially economic and social origin. Simultaneously, the decrease of terrorist actions, particularly airplane hijacks, caused many entities responsible for the fight against terrorism to lower down their surveillance; by the end of the confrontation between the great powers the task of making a new replacing strategy was a complex one.

Meanwhile, terrorist groups were appearing and proliferating which threatened democracies and the regimes of “moderate” pro-West Muslim countries. These threats were not motivated by the rivalry between superpowers, nor helped by the secret services of those that neither were behind the Iron Curtain, nor commanded by policies of specific States. They tended to be based on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, instead of the class struggle, the anti-colonialism or the anti-imperialism they intended to act against the Western powers and influences. These threats embodied in the new terrorist groups, whose motivations were hard to understand because they were not included in standard patterns. They were enlisting the great majority of its members based on a profound hatred towards the West and on the anger, ignorance and despair present in the middle of “moderate” Arabian regimes, supported by the West.

One of those groups was the Al Qaeda (The Base), founded in 1989 by Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi millionaire that planned to set a vast pre-medieval caliphate that could extend from the Middle East and Central Asia to Pakistan (the reason why Osama claims the title of *emir*), with a fundamentalist political-religious-social program, very close to the Taliban’s “program” and their version

of the *charia*. Bin Laden was well known to the United States, which had worked with him in Afghanistan in the fight against the soviets during the 80's¹⁴⁷. But the **threat that he and his group composed revealed only gradually**. From the anti-Soviet resistance, Al Qaeda started to demand the retreat of either the American soldiers from Saudi Arabia and Israel from Palestine, later proceeding to total war, becoming on a flexible, multi-cause terrorist group. **Bin Laden, himself, and Al Qaeda changed goals as time passed.**

During the first half of the 90's the main Al Qaeda's target were American soldiers and the pro-Western Arabian regimes – specially the American troops in Saudi territory, after the Gulf War, was regarded by Bin Laden and by many Muslims as treason and profanation of Islam sacred place, forbidden to non believers. **In the first appeal to a holy war, in 1992, Bin Laden was encouraging followers to attack either the American soldiers in Saudi Arabia and in the Horn of Africa and the “non Islamic governments of the muslim countries”.** In that appeal he hardly mentioned Palestine. In 1993, Islamic fundamentalists connected to Al Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center. Because of the American pressure and because he had become excessively de-stabilizing, in 1994 Saudi Arabia withdrew Bin Laden's nationality and the family repudiated him.

In the early 90's, Bin Laden redirects his fight and clearly aims at the United States, Israel and the West in general. In October 1996, he made a new declaration of *Jihad* appealing to the martyr of Americans “*to expel the Satan troops of the holy places of Islam*”. The document, with more than 40 pages, catalogued the atrocities and the injustice made against Muslims, especially by the Jewish and the Western powers. In that same year, a **bomb attack against general Khobar Towers' headquarters, in Saudi Arabia**, killed nineteen Americans. In 1997, in an interview with Robert Frisk, journalist of *The Independent*, Bin Laden confirmed the war declaration against the United States: “*the war against America is simpler then the war against the USSR. Some of our men have fought against Americans in Somalia*

¹⁴⁷ Born in 1957 and graduated in 1979 in engineering in Jeddah (near Mecca and Medina, Islam holy cities), heir of one of the most important financial clans of Saudi Arabia – the Bin Ladens of puritan wahabits, next to Saudi's Home and members of the Arabian elite -, Osama Bin Laden was one of the few “princes” that, moved by a militant pan-Islamism, left in 1979 to the Afghan *Jihad* against the Soviets. Turkin bin Faiçal, brother to the king and chief of the Saudi secret services (until August 2001), would have introduced Bin Laden to the CIA agents, in Istanbul who were preparing the anti-Soviet resistance.

*and were amazed with their moral weakness. With the help of God we will make America a shade of what it is ...*¹⁴⁸.

The fundamentalist Islamic threat continued to grow as Al Qaeda was integrating more and more militants running from the Arabian repression. That increased the number of members and diversified its financial and logistic support sources; fused other groups in its own net; outspread its men and its cells all over the world, from the former Soviet republics, to the United States, from the Southeast Asia to Middle East, from Europe to inner Africa; spread its message of hatred to the West and redefined as main targets the lives and Western interests, as well as the Arabian and Muslim traitors; and intertwines with the Taliban in Afghanistan, country led by Mohammad Omar “the commander of the believers”, (friend with Bin Laden since the anti-Soviet *Jihad*) and that hosted Al Qaeda since the middle of the 90’s.

Osama Bin Laden became the main *Jihad’s* banker and instigator against “the alliance of crusaders, Zionists and their collaborators”, representing to the pan-Islamic nationalism the “Old of the Mountain”, the dread of the 11th century crusaders, who send their *hashishim* (assassins) to kill the enemies of faith wherever they were – a legendary hero made real¹⁴⁹. And Al Qaeda started to include in its orbit other fundamentalist Islamic groups, such as the Saudi Islamic Renewal Movement, the Egyptians Islamic *Jihad* and Al Gama’at Islamiya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and later the Chechen resistance, Bangladesh Jihad Movement, the Ansar al Islam, based specially on Iraq and Europe, the groups Abu Syyaf, Laskar Jihad, Jemaah Islamiya, Moro Front of the Islamic liberation of Philippines, Kumpulns Mujahedine Malaysia, on the Southeast Asia, several Pakistan jihadian groups and many other. Initially, these groups had their own purposes, causes and motivations that became adapted and fused within Al Qaeda, many times as a way to survive but also in the name of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, of an hatred to the Jewish and the Western and of the Muslim defense.

That was what happened for example with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Their original purposes were to fight the oppressive secular leaders of Egypt,

¹⁴⁸ MENDES, Maria João, *Bin Laden, a Al-Qaeda e o trilho saudita na nova Jihad global*, in *Janus 2002- Anuário de Relações Exteriores*, Edited by Observatório de Relações Exteriores of UAL and *Publico* newspaper, 2001, p.17

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

turning the country into an Islamic State. But the group started to decline when its leader, Sheik Omar Abdel Raahman was arrested in the United States and other EIJ's leaders were killed or forced to exile. That is why, in the beginning of the 90's, Aymari al-Zawahiri decided to reorient himself from the "near enemy" – the secular rulers of Egypt - to the "distant enemy", specially the United States and other Western countries¹⁵⁰. This change allowed EIJ to broaden its collaboration with other terrorists who wanted to hit West and receive financial and logistic support from Al Qaeda. As counterpart of the financial aid, Al-Zawahiri has contributed with about 200 loyal, disciplined and well trained followers that would become the heart of Al Qaeda leadership and where several members of the "Shura" came from (Shura is Al Qaeda's top organ right next to the *emir* Bin Laden), and made by members of other terrorist groups.

Another group that has evolved on its initial purposes and has fused into Al Qaeda was the **Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)**. Its founding mission was to oppose the corrupt and repressive post-Soviet dictator, Islam Karimov. But soon, it would make an alliance with the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar and after with Al Qaeda, assuming the anti-Western and anti-American agenda, also condemning music, cigarettes, sex and alcohol – in a new puritanism that has decreased the support of the original IMU's supporters, less extremist and less ideological, in Uzbekistan.

In February 1998, in an evident maneuver to expand his network, Bin Laden created the International Islamic Front (IIF) to the Jihad against Jewish and Crusaders, on a scheme of formal alliances with other radical Islamic groups. Apart from Bin Laden's groups and Al Zawahiri, the IIF members include the leaders of Egyptian Gama'a al Isalamya, the general secretary of the Pakistan religious party, known as Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and the Bangladesh Jihad Movement Leader. Later, IIF would include the leadership of the Pakistan pro-Jihad organizations Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. Apart from these formal alliances, Bin Laden's network has also developed connections with a great variety of groups spread around the world – in some cases, Al Qaeda has supported these allies by directing them and by giving financial support; in other cases the groups have shared fields, operations and logistics. The Al Qaeda became a powerful conglomerate, promoter, and supporter of other

¹⁵⁰ See STERN, Jessica, *The Protean Enemy*, in *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003, web edition.

groups, besides working as a kind of franchising. Likewise, bonds with Palestinian groups become stronger, particularly the Hezbollah, considered as “*the most sophisticated terrorist group in the world*”¹⁵¹, based in the south of Lebanon, back supported by Syria and Iran and very active in the Paraguay-Brazil-Argentina triangle. Iran will insure the co-ordination with the Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

The influence of the radical Al Qaeda’s message and the Islamic myth around Bin Laden kept spreading. **In less than a decade, Al Qaeda has become a gigantic and powerful pan-Islamic, fundamentalist and radical octopus**; a complex network of terrorist groups and individuals, a battalion of believers that wanted to fight the regimes of their own countries as much as to destroy the Christian West and Jews. Their militants come from all the Arabian countries and from all the Muslim populations moving around the globe in dozens of States.

In February 1998, Osama Bin Laden has issued a *fatwa* against the United States, exhorting to a holy war and declaring every American as a legitimate target - specially, he appealed the “believers” to attack civilians (purpose that would have had the opposition of some Al Qaeda’s members, who have abandoned the group¹⁵²). A little later, in August that year, Al Qaeda’s terrorists driving **trucks loaded with explosives made themselves explode by hitting American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya**. At this point, the United States (involved in the political turbulence caused by the Bill Clinton/Monica Lewinski affair) have decided to strongly retaliate, with cruise missiles shot against the Al Qaeda’s training fields in Afghanistan (Bin Laden has made a tight escape) and against the Al-Shifa’s pharmaceutical products factory, in Sudan, suspected of producing components to weapons of mass destruction, financed by Bin Laden (these suspects were never conclusively confirmed). **In October 2000, the American war ship USS Cole was attacked by suicidal terrorists** on the port of Aden, Yemen. This time, Washington did not immediately retaliate, but the campaign against Al Qaeda and against terrorism continued to be based essentially in information services, in judicial actions and in secret operations...until September 2001.

In a new appeal to a *Jihad*, delivered to the Arabian Qatar Al Jazeera television, on October 7th, 2001, coincident with the beginning of the American bombings on Afghanistan, **Bin Laden tried to turn the war against terrorism,**

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

declared by the United States, after the September 11th attacks, into a war between Islam and the West. To do so, he has emphasized elements commonly used by the Muslim populations such as Israelite occupation of Palestinian lands, the suffering of the Iraqi children because of the United Nations' sanctions and the many humiliations inflicted on Muslims by the Western. **To defend Islam with pride and dignity and to end humiliations, the true Muslims should pick up weapons and use all type of violence against the Western crusaders, especially against the United States.**

THE SEPTEMBER 11TH AND THE DECLARATION OF “WAR AGAINST TERRORISM”

“But on the September 11th, 2001 everything changed. The September 11th has radically changed American policy, which as abandoned isolationism, sketched in the beginning of Bush Administration in turn to a new interventionism based on “the war against terrorism”. This American interventionism did not meant the return to Clinton’s “olimpianism”(even so interrupted by some inconsequent attacks against Al Qaeda in Sudan), but to a more aggressive posture in which the national American interest had a predominant part and a prevailing interventionist attitude”

José Pacheco Pereira, *Público* newspaper, May 20th, 2004¹⁵³

Though it had been declared before – by words and by actions - by the Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, **this new world war began with the terrorist attack on the day 11th of September 2001.** It was a dramatic human tragedy, broadcasted live worldwide, but has unquestionably marked a turning point in international relations and in the world’s geopolitical panorama. **America realized not only that it was a target, but above all that is was vulnerable within its own territory-** *“America is no longer protected by vast oceans”¹⁵⁴*, George Bush would declare – **and it was ready to counter-attack.** The United States have experienced before the cruel taste of terrorism, but that was usually directed to external facilities and its

¹⁵³ PEREIRA, José Pacheco, *Podem hoje as democracias conduzir a uma guerra?(2)*, in *Público* newspaper, May 20, 2004.

¹⁵⁴ BUSH, President George W., *State of the Union* Speech. January 29, 2002. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/

impact was essentially symbolic, never questioning the American's integrity in their own territory. Before the September 11th, the American response mainly included some condemnations, some disperse raids and criminal prosecution of the responsible caught. But the attacks against the World Trade Center and against the Pentagon were both highly symbolic and perpetrated into the heart of the world's greatest military power in history, being also a new challenge to international security and to the democratic societies' way of life. **The American Administration immediately abandoned isolationism assuming a new interventionism to respond to the greatest strategic challenge since the end of the Cold War.**

The September 11th was also an attack against humanity and against all West in particular, an idea well expressed by the French newspaper *Le Monde*: "*We are all Americans*". **Either the United States' allies or the international community have assumed an unprecedented combat against this type of terrorism.** At the same time, fearing that these groups could unleash more deadly means, that combat would involve a much greater commitment on the non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as a higher and less tolerant pressure on those States and regimes that would sponsor or support either terrorism or WMD proliferation. This new challenge was, since the beginning described as a war - a different kind of war, for sure, but a truly global one in which it is essential to triumph. The enemies are the terrorist groups and all their supporters, as well as those who take part in proliferation activities.

September 11th attacks marked the beginning of the "*first war of the 21st century*", according to President George W. Bush. On the Address to the Nation by the end of the day September 11th 2001, the US President stated "*America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world and we stand together to win the war against terrorism*"¹⁵⁵ and warned: "*We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.*"¹⁵⁶. On a context profoundly marked by terror and by tragedy, on the following days formal declarations would follow, repudiating terrorism and in many cases showing willingness to fight the war against terrorism, since countries like Russia, China, Pakistan, India or Saudi Arabia to entities such as

¹⁵⁵ BUSH, President George W., *Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation*, September 11, 2001, available at www.whitehouse.gov/

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

the United Nations, the European Union, OSCE, IAEA, APEC, G-8, the Islamic Conference Organization, the Community of Independent States, the Arab League, etc. On that day, the **Atlantic Alliance stated that such acts** “*underscore(s) the urgency of intensifying the battle against terrorism, a battle that the NATO countries - indeed all civilized nations - must win. All Allies stand united in their determination to combat this scourge.*”¹⁵⁷ On the morning of September 12th, in a meeting with the National Security Team, Bush was more explicit in the way he was facing the attacks: ‘*The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.(...) Freedom and democracy are under attack. The American people need to know that we’re facing a different enemy than we have ever faced. (...) The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world. We will be patient, we will be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determination. This battle will take time and resolve. But make no mistake about it: we will win. (...) This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil. But good will prevail.*’¹⁵⁸ On the day after the attacks, NATO was **equally treating these attacks as an act of war, invoking for the first time in its half century history the famous automatic collective defense clause:** “*The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.*”¹⁵⁹ Also the **Security Council of the United Nations** has adopted on its 4370th meeting, held on September 12th, the Resolution 1368 (2001), where it is stated: “*Determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter (...) Expresses its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism*”¹⁶⁰

After the Senate had authorized on September 14, 2001, the use of whatever necessary force against the involved, the President of the United States would say

¹⁵⁷ Statement by the North Atlantic Council, September 11, 2001, www.nato.int/

¹⁵⁸ BUSH, President George W., *Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team*, The Cabinet Room, September 12, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/

¹⁵⁹ Statement by the North Atlantic Council, September 12, 2001, www.nato.int/

¹⁶⁰ Security Council Resolutions available at www.un.org/ (bold by the author)

“War was declared”. Also on that day, in a speech at the Episcopal National Cathedral, in Washington, George W. Bush has stated: *“Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history, but our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others; it will end in a way and at an hour of our choosing”*.¹⁶¹

The most sustained war declaration would occur, though, on the **presidential speech in Congress, on September 20, 2001**. On that occasion, the President of the United States assumed not only a state of war but also **clearly identified his enemies**: *“On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack. (...) Americans are asking, “Who attacked our country?” The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as Al Qaeda. They are some of the murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS Cole. Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. (...) This group and its leader, a person named Osama bin Laden, are linked to many other organizations in different countries. (...) There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction. The leadership of Al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan we see Al Qaeda’s vision for the world.”*¹⁶² In sequence, **Bush launched an ultimate to the Afghan Taliban**: *“the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide*

¹⁶¹ BUSH, President George W., Washington DC (Episcopal National Cathedral), September 14, 2001. Bold by the author.

¹⁶² BUSH, President George W., *Address To A Joint Session Of Congress and the American People*, United States Capitol, Washington DV, September 20, 2001, at www.whitehouse.gov

in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate."¹⁶³ Bush was committed to show that he does not confound the Islamic radicals with the common Muslim and Arabian, emphasizing: "*The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated*"¹⁶⁴. And he appealed to the international community saying: "*This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us.*"¹⁶⁵. Questioning about the way the Americans would face and win this war, Bush stated: "*Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and even covert secret operations in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.*"¹⁶⁶ About to finish, Bush dramatizes and makes his speech more radical, making pressure to the rest of the world to take his side. None "non-alignment" would be possible: "*Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.*"¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

More than just rhetoric, these words were definitely inaugurating a new “great war”, with the entire world as a “combat stage”. The opponents are the new asymmetric actors that use old processes and create a new paradigm of conflict: the asymmetric war.

ASYMMETRY, ASYMMETRIC WAR AND ASYMMETRIC ACTORS

The tragic success of the suicidal-attacks on September 11th, 2001, as well as many other acts perpetrated a little all over the world (from Bali to Madrid, Riade, Casablanca or Groznyy, from Afghanistan or Turkey to Iraq), have re-launched the debate about the information services efficiency and about security schemes against a new threat typology. The unquestionable success of the military campaigns led by the United States on the Gulf War, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and Iraq, show how the American armed forces are invincible against traditional opponents. But, if it is impossible to defeat the United States when they are using all their capacities – there is no State or coalition that can rival the hyper-power – its opponents can look for means to avoid frontal and symmetric confront instead, as a way to reach their purposes. **Americans have felt before the difficulties of fighting asymmetric actors, in Vietnam for example, in Lebanon¹⁶⁸ or in Somalia.** In the present context, even the same significant reinforcement of security measures since the September 11th in most countries and as well as a much tighter surveillance on suspicious movements and activities, do not prevent nor the existence of attacks nor asymmetric actors determination in reaching their goals. It was always known that security is never absolute – nevertheless towards the new threats the counter-terrorism and security principles are quite vulnerable. **Since New York and Washington’s attacks, that some qualify as “hyper-terrorism”, the topic of asymmetric threats and asymmetric war has become priority to the Western democracies that are trying hard to understand its origins and to look for means to fight it effectively.**

¹⁶⁸ In April 1983, a suicidal bomb on the USA’s Embassy in Beirut killed 63 people; in that same year in October, a bomb attack to a marine quarters killed 299 people.

Symmetry, Dissymmetry and Asymmetry

In strategic language, **symmetry is understood as the fight with similar capacities, using identical processes** - it can be said that it is the paradigm of wars and “traditional” conflicts, between State actors and/or coalitions, or even groups, like in many civil wars. **The Dissymmetry is the search by one of the antagonists of a qualitative and/or quantitative superiority**, thus trying to make the best of that advantage to achieve his goals. Dissymmetry is a clear will to implement a joint strategy that tries to impose superiority, as “means to reach ends”. That is why dissymmetry needs great investments and great logistical and technical support, making of it a state-strategy and not a non-state group strategy. On the other hand, dissymmetry can only be effective if the opponent is using detectable and predictable means to face it.¹⁶⁹ So, the United States have been looking for dissymmetry towards all their potential rivals, supplying itself with totally out of proportion capacities. Like in the Gulf War and the interventions in Balkans and Afghanistan, war in Iraq, in 2003, was a military success of the coalition forces because they knew the Iraqi capacities and that by their all-level superiority, they could stop Saddam Hussein’s plans. Yet, when the Coalition opponents’ started to use asymmetric processes, showing to be effective in that field, difficulties have increased.

Asymmetry resides in the opposition between adversaries having capacities and means completely out of balance, thus being the weaker the one using different processes, exposing its differences, in order to explore all the vulnerabilities of the opponent. Asymmetry has its origins on the conflicts in Antiquity, of which the David and Goliath episode is the best portrait. When an **opponent voluntarily chooses to go round that disparity**, by using asymmetric means, technology and superior capacities, as evident as they might be, no longer give significant advantage. **Asymmetry consists of refusing the combat rules imposed by the strongest opponent**, making its own operations totally unpredictable – though of considerable dimensions - on the basis of more reduced means and capacities. **Asymmetry is the privilege of the weakest trying to defeat the strongest one this way. It opposes the insecurity of the strongest to the asymmetry of the weakest.**

¹⁶⁹ See COUNMONT, Barthélémy, A Hiper-potência americana e a Dissimetria, in *As Lições do 11 de Setembro*, op. cit., pp. 21-32.

This “weak into strong” strategy uses technically simple means, different and innovative (classic armament used in non-conventional ways, like the WMD, new technologies like biotechnology or genetics; or even by transforming civil equipment into weapons), or the method (guerrilla, terrorism, suicide-bombers), and the targets (public or symbolic), aiming at the opponents’ flaws. **The invisibleness and unpredictability as well as the lack of moral restraints and the capacity to commit suicide, are the main weapons** of asymmetry and it has a multiple effect: media impact, psychological effect, economic consequences, social disturbance and politic determination disturbance. Asymmetry is a category that symbolizes the new way of threat, which is multiple, diffuse, omnipresent and unpredictable, and that replaces the only and visible threat, thus requiring new strategies to oppose it.

Asymmetric War

The notion of asymmetric war finds multiple examples in History on how it can be applied. On the military treaty, “The Art of War”, written about two thousand and five hundred years ago, the Chinese **Sun Tzu predicted asymmetry as a strategic concept.** In several occasions, **Empires have faced that dilemma:** for example, the barbarians that sacked Rome or the rebellion of the Boxers in China, had means clearly inferior to their opponents. **Certain great battles** gave the “weak” the opportunity to defeat the mighty ones: the Portuguese victory in Aljubarrota facing the Castilians in 1385 or the English victory over the French cavalry in Agincourt in 1415, are significant examples. More recently we can recall many **difficulties that several colonial powers had to efficiently face some liberation movements**, though there was significant difference in means. We can also quote many **problems experienced by the two superpowers during the Cold War, towards opponents with substantially inferior means** - the USA in the Vietnam, during the 60’s and 70’s, and the USSR in Afghanistan during the 80’s - have perfectly demonstrated that difficulty. Indeed, the capacities developed by the United States and by the Soviet Union during the bipolar period were in such a manner relevant and symmetric between them, that facing the irrationality of direct conflict, they have abundantly recurred to asymmetric actors to reach “the other side”. **Palestine’s case** is also an example: Israel a military powerful State opposed to groups that often use asymmetric processes, including terrorism. More

examples can be found on those several cases in which **certain States have confronted terrorist organizations in its own territory** (ETA in Spain, IRA in the United Kingdom, Tiger-Tamil in Sri Lanka, the Red Squads in Italy, etc), **with guerrilla groups** (mainly in Latin America, in Africa or in Southeast Asia) **or with criminal and malefactors associations**. Finally, nowadays we may also call, the numerous difficulties that great powers face when confronting asymmetric opponents, like **Russia in Chechnya** or the **United States in Somalia, first and then also in Afghanistan and Iraq**, after the victory on conventional military campaigns.

Using simple processes and means, **asymmetric war can be regarded as “the weapon of the weak”** in the sense that it allows multiple actors that do not have but limited means, to have a considerable destructive capacity. At the same time that implies the **use of unpredictable means** to that purpose (civilian vehicles, commercial airplanes or trains) and especially **unsuspected** (apparently common citizens), the use of **capacities that the traditional defense means are not adapted to defend** (chemical weapons, bio-bacteriological and nuclear, explosives, air ship hijacks), the use of methods that **refuse conventional war** (terrorism, guerrilla) **the choice of unpredictable targets and places that are more difficult to control** (public places, transportation and supply networks) and the **surprise effect** – this being the main and most important characteristic. **The invisibility and unpredictable character** of the asymmetric attacks directly derive from the “weaknesses” and from the surprising means used by those actors.

Actually, **asymmetric war inverts a lot of the traditional equation**: those who have a great disparity of means cannot use a substantial part of their capacities (nuclear weapons, for example), as other part of their means is clearly ineffective to fight asymmetric opponents; and those who don't have capacities equivalent with the opponent manage to, via asymmetric processes, achieve huge results from their opponents, despite the limited means (when compared with the opponent). So, **asymmetry exists in function of the (uneven) confront means as much as the results gained (un-proportionally)**. As we have seen before, the dilemmas related with war and asymmetric processes do not constitute, in themselves, something new. Yet, those concerns were marginal until the September 11th. In fact, the terrorists responsible for those attacks were few and not very armed, with very less resources than the opponent and their preparation was done with little more than some infiltrated elements in the USA and with some weeks of access to all piloting practice. Incomparably weaker than the United

States, those terrorists had considerable results, out of proportion and right in the core of the greatest military world power in history. The news and the new threat are, essentially, on the **new opportunities that the asymmetric actors have, particularly terrorist groups**, opportunities that they did not have in the past. It has a simple logic: what if instead of a commercial airplane loaded with fuel and passengers the terrorists had used a nuclear weapon? What if instead of backpacks loaded with explosives the terrorists in Madrid had used chemical components? What if...

So, the new and serious risk arising from new asymmetric threats comes from the junction of two especially worrying elements. First, because asymmetry always includes the “weaker” trying to get more and better capacities either to have more equivalent means as the opponent and to have more considerable results. More specifically, the risks reside in the possibility of asymmetric actors having weapons of mass destruction - in this case, either the “weaks” are or not State or non-State actors, they would have “hyper-means” with potentially catastrophic consequences. Secondly, because as clearer is the dissymmetry or the unevenness – as it happens now in favor of the United States – the greater is the tendency to have its opponents using asymmetric means and processes, thus avoiding a symmetric confront. Like much before September 11th attacks, the former American Secretary of Defense William Cohen, saw: “*American military superiority actually increases the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical attack against us by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically.*”¹⁷⁰ Dissymmetric in essence, the North Americans have been trying to impose many of its goals by superiority – in this sense, the intensification of asymmetry and the new paradigm of asymmetric warfare can be the great reverse for that dissymmetry. This is the great paradox: despite having a never previously reached superiority (dissymmetry), the United States are more vulnerable then ever to the asymmetric war. The relation between dissymmetry-asymmetry is an obvious one. In *Time Magazine*, some weeks after the September 11th, Gary Hart has well synthesized the new threat: “*America is not prepared, either offensively or defensively, for the conflicts of the 21st century. We are the strongest military power in the world,*

¹⁷⁰ The Center for Defense Information, *Military Domination or Constructive Leadership?* in *Defense Monitor*, n°3, 1998, p.8

*but for the wrong century. Conflict is now carried out by civilians against civilians. Perpetrators belong to no state, wear no uniforms and obey no rules of war (...) other attacks will follow*¹⁷¹.

Asymmetry is the only way to contest, contain Western military superiority. It is replacing the conventional means of war and it might place itself on every level of a conflict (tactical, operational or strategic), with essentially strategic purposes. In this sense, *“asymmetric war marks the end of the “classic war”, founded on the relative balance of forces between two poles and on the nuclear dissuasion in its strict sense*¹⁷².

Asymmetric actors

The asymmetric actors can be State or non-State entities and those can be either independent of States or have bonds and even be supported or instruments at the service of political objectives and of the strategies of certain governments, or their intelligence services, within the frame of its regional and international policy. Asymmetry can come from vulnerable or strategically inferior countries, who are trying to re-establish a certain parity or avoid an intervention from another power; from Rogue States involved either in proliferating activities of WMD or with terrorism; or of non-State actors, like terrorist groups, the “lords of war” or other criminal, supported or not by States. Nowadays, **the tendency seems to be the proliferation of non-State actors, widely independent from States.** These have new motivations – fundamentalism, organized criminality – and reject the predictable and ethical rules, thus fading the barrier between politic-ideological motivations and criminal association – for example, by the confusions of methods between organized crime, terrorism and guerrillas¹⁷³.

The asymmetric actors have un-proportional means and have different military and political purposes. They look for the strategic advantage derived from their own weaknesses, thus going round its opponents’ technological and political superiority, **using alternative means and solutions.** The asymmetric

¹⁷¹ HART, Gary, in *Time Magazine*, October 8th, 2001

¹⁷² CÉMENT-NOGUIER, Sophia, *Un concept aux multiples facettes. Sécurité du fort contre asymétrie du faible*, in *La Revue Internationale et Stratégique*, PUF, n. 51, October 2003, p. 89

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

actors are “*acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action.*”¹⁷⁴. Likewise they are looking to **produce un-proportional effects and the symbolic destruction of vulnerable points, with the purpose of breaking the opponent’s determination. The psychological side is essential – insecurity and vulnerability are the intended effect.** Asymmetric actors can reach the national territory of a State, or its citizens, forces and interests abroad, or its allies’ interests, they can reach civil or military structures. Specially, they aim to public opinions and the States’ political will, a side on which democracies are vulnerable due to certain tranquility with their security. **The asymmetric actors totally change the traditional postulates in security issues,** to a point that we can consider that asymmetry has the effect of reinforcing the general feeling of insecurity un-proportioned.

The disparity of what is at stake and the objectives to attain are also favorable elements to asymmetric actors. The aimed one, is usually a powerful State, always with something vital to defend: territory, population, economy, way of life, as well as the security and integrity of all its interests. An asymmetric actor does not have the same type of restraints, nor ethical, nor moral or juridical, not even in protecting population’s rights. At the most, leaders put into equation their own situation; the non-State asymmetric actors have no territorial bases, nor forces or infrastructures that might be dismantled in the classical sense, but have subterranean networks that are often controlled by a central authority.

On the other hand, **towards powers that cannot surpass a wide set of juridical and moral rules and international compromises, the asymmetric actors, that is, the Rogue States and especially non-State groups, benefit from a large scope for action.** Things that are not allowed to democracies are often tolerated to dictatorships; what the armed forces and security services cannot do, certain disperse groups without any ethical, moral or juridical constraints, can do. In these circumstances, either it is used by a State or by terrorists and either it is used under the way of guerrilla or WMD use, the asymmetric war is a powerful weapon, that is more and more used by some actors.

¹⁷⁴ METZ, Steven, JOHNSON II, Douglas V., *Asymmetry And U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, And Strategic Concepts*, Carlisle Barracks (Penn.), US Army War College (USAWC), Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), January 2001

Asymmetry and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The relation between asymmetry and weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons is, simultaneously, **extraordinarily dangerous and paradoxal**. It is a **paradox**, because, traditionally, **nuclear weapons are the weapons of the “strongest”, they symbolized power** – that is why mechanisms such as NPT restrict the “club” of those who can own nuclear weapons. It also gives nuclear weapons a more strategic importance, a mean of dissuasion and preventing the “weakest” from its use. The nuclear weapon is exclusive to States and only to the strongest ones. Yet, **nuclear weapons belong to the domain of symmetry, according to classical strategic doctrines** – in the sense of parity or strategic balance between two poles, like during the Cold War, between the United States and the USSR - thus, resulting in nuclear dissuasion, **or then to the domain of dissymmetry**, in which the goal is to add a differential of power - either to those who do not have that kind of weapons as to those who have them in smaller quantity and quality.

As we have seen before, asymmetry does not lay in equal means and surely not in the search of power, as such. On the contrary, asymmetry tries to undermine a much stronger opponent. The essence of asymmetry is in destabilizing an uncontested conventional superiority by the use of atypical and non-conventional means, and traditionally nuclear weapons do not correspond to these criteria. Under this perspective, **the incompatibility between asymmetric actors and nuclear weapons would seem obvious**. Indeed, when the relation between nuclear weapons and asymmetry is put into equation we stand before a **great paradox: the paradox of establishing bonds between “weak” asymmetric actors, who possess the symbol of power, the nuclear weapon**. The paradox is obvious because its supported on the historical success of dissuasion that combines symmetry with nuclear weapons.

The fact is that **nowadays, one of the greatest challenges of asymmetry lies on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**, including nuclear weapons. **The possibility of asymmetric actors having those weapons is indeed worrying** because, among other reasons, many of those, starting with terrorist groups, are proven to be “irrational”, difficult to identify and impossible to trace geographically. **This would make the principle of dissuasion invalid, as well as the complex control mechanisms** of both regulations and transfer of fissile materials and sensitive technologies from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to the Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Plus, the possession of nuclear weapons by asymmetric actors would **clearly destabilize the highest point of the “strongest”** who, so far, had not truly put into equation the use of nuclear weapons, except for “strong ones”. That is, the nuclear as an attribute of the Power-State, with a military force on the service of politic and “great strategy” in Clausewitz sense.

The sequence of this huge paradox is quite concerning: in order to keep the necessary conditions so that **an actor might be, simultaneously, asymmetric and nuclear it is necessary that its nuclear conception is totally atypical and non conventional.** For example, and in the worst case scenario, that it does not see the nuclear weapons as something which use should be avoided to all costs, but as something that is an excellent mean (the best one) to cause significant damage to its stronger opponent. And that means **the intention to have that capacity not to dissuade but to use it as soon as possible.** The alternative scenario is also concerning – **the scenario of the evil blackmail of asymmetric actors over the Power-States or over the international community.** These dilemmas are applicable to all type of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and even to a significant part of missile technology – the differences are, on the one hand, that chemical and bio-bacteriological weapons are of much easier use and proliferation (proved by the fact that many States have this type of armament and the cases of use of Anthrax, sarin gas, and mustard gas) than nuclear weapons and, on the other, by the more significant damages caused by the hypothetical use of nuclear weapons.

About the use of WMD and in particular about the use of nuclear weapons, it is obvious that the typology of the “asymmetric possibilities” vary as the actors are State-actors or non State-actors – important element since it implies the setting of different strategies. **In the case of an asymmetric State-actor,** its identification, location and monitoring forces to enter in the **classic nuclear scheme,** where dissuasion and prevention principles and punishing mechanisms might work – which in that case would “*make inadequate to attribute the nuclear its asymmetric effects*”¹⁷⁵. Either way, **that does not erase the conventional risks associated with proliferation:** the risk of irrational and suicidal attitudes on the side of States and regimes that are in an asymmetric position towards its opponents;

¹⁷⁵ That is the opinion of, for example, GASTELLIER, Laura, *Armes Nucléaires et asymétrie*, in *La Revue Internationale et Stratégique*, n° 51, Fall 2003, p.99

the risk of blackmail of those States and regimes that are about to collapse or in a desperate situation or are feeling particularly vulnerable; and the risk of giving that type of means to other actors (States or terrorist groups) in order not to respond for the cost of such use, thus reaching their own political purposes and giving other actors those capacities to face common adversaries.

Still, **the most concerning affinities between asymmetry and WMD are within the frame of non-State asymmetric actors, for example when terrorist networks access WMD.** It is important to underline that the terrorist might gain access to a nuclear that is a different kind of the State-nuclear. In reality, the possibility of terrorists setting nuclear heads is rather small, since it would require far too important resources for non-State actors and specially because of the complexity of means required is such that would make it too obvious (and total and utter discretion is fundamental so that the non-State actors can perform their operations or use the nuclear). Here lay the basis of the myth built around the Nuclear Suitcase that cannot be easily traced or identifiable, thus allowing its use by the terrorists under a perfectly asymmetric definition. So, one of the certainties about the association of non-State actors and nuclear weapons, is in the fact that **the vectoring of such weapons cannot be done but by unconventional ways** – not with the help of ballistic missiles but always looking the advantage through the use of more surprising vectors – and **on the need of previous fissile materials supply** – essential requisite to the existence of this hypothetical relation, but still a delicate one (despite the rumors about the proliferation of these materials, specially from the former Soviet Republics, like Russia, as well as China and Pakistan). At this point it is necessary to distinguish between the highly enriched uranium (that the terrorists might already have the capacity to turn into a simple “improvised nuclear weapon”), and plutonium which is much more difficult to transform into a weapon¹⁷⁶.

The terrorists present at least four types of nuclear threats: those that **cause highly radioactive materials to disperse**, using conventional explosives (Dirty Bombs), or other means; **attack or sabotage onto nuclear facilities**; that they **use untouched nuclear weapons**, like the tactic ones, either bought in the black market, “given” by other actors or simply stolen; and that they **steal or buy fissile materials**

¹⁷⁶ POTTER, William C., FERGUSON, Charles D., and SPECTOR, Leonard, *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terror and the Need for a Prioritised Response*, in *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2004. Web edition.

with the intent of building a nuclear bomb¹⁷⁷. The specific issue of the tactical nuclear weapons is quite sensitive, since they are smaller and are dispersed over several places and in many cases do not have electronic blocking systems that prevent its unauthorized use¹⁷⁸. Besides the international appeals to increase the security of those weapons and to reduce its number, neither the USA nor Russia have shown much commitment in doing it – even if important advances have been done since 1991.

The paradox relation between asymmetry and WMD exists and can occur, under certain conditions though. Either way, that association is possible and so, truly terrifying.

NEW TYPE OF TERRORISM

Ambiguity and use of “terrorism”

There isn't a universally accepted definition for terrorism. It is one of those concepts that, being identifiable is difficult to give an exact definition. Yet, a similar definition to the one given by the United States Code is acceptable. In use since 1983, according to which, **terrorism** “*means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.*”¹⁷⁹ The term terrorism is indeed imprecise and polemic - the multiple lists of organizations and movements considered as terrorists show that ambiguity. Since two centuries ago the “terrorism” concept is often used to indistinctively name all those who use violence to try to change political order. We must also recognize that History is full of moments where terror and violence has been used on “non-combating targets” with political purposes and that **many of those previously called terrorists ended up as respectful state men** – from Michael Collins, Ireland, to African and

¹⁷⁷ ALLISON, Graham, *How to Stop Nuclear Terror*, in Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004. Web edition.

¹⁷⁸ POTTER, William C., FERGUSON, Charles D., and SPECTOR, Leonard, *The Four Faces of...*, in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004. Web edition.

¹⁷⁹ Terrorism – Definition in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d).transcript from *Patterns of Global Terrorism* 2001, US Department of State, May 2002

Asian anti-colonial leaders, from Nelson Mandela to Kadhafi. On the other hand, it is also important to explain that **terrorism is not only Islamic**: other types of terrorism are in activity a little bit all over the non-Muslim world – ETA in Spain, IRA and Ulster Unionists, FARC and paramilitaries in Colombia, the Tiger-Tamil in Sri Lanka, the Maoists in Nepal, etc. We could also list **several examples of true state terrorism**, in the past and present – from the Jacobin dictatorship in France (March 1793-July 1794) to the genocide campaign of the Red Khmers in Cambodia, for example. As a principle of action, **terrorism was claimed nearly by all the political families**.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that **September 11th was not the first terrorist act that decisively contributed to a sudden change in History: in 1914, the assassinate of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand**, successor to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian empire, by a Bosnian-Serbian named Gravilo Pricip, member of the pro-Serbian group Black Hand, hastened the Great War.

The first to propose a **terrorism doctrine was the German Karl Heizen**. In 1848, on his essay *Der Mord* (The Death) he considers that all means are legitimate to hasten the coming of Republic and Democracy: *“If you have to explode half a continent and shed a blood bath to destroy the barbarians have no scruples. The one that does not gladly sacrifice his own life to have the pleasure of exterminating a billion of barbarians is not a true Republican”*¹⁸⁰. But **modern terrorism would show up in the end of the 19th century in Russia**, as a way of political action against the Tsar regime. That was to force the government to increase repressive security measures in order to raise the opposition between citizens and cause a revolution. **The terrorist acts were then integrated, first in the nationalist fights against European Empires**, especially in the Balkans against the Habsburgs and later in **the fight against colonialism** as weapons against the “occupying super-powers”. In the Liberation wars, of communist inspiration, the terrorist assassinate and sabotage would be used during the first phases – the called latent or incipient insurgency – to eliminate local leaders or even civilian populations, thus spreading terror and fear, undermining the authority and leading the metropolis’ governments

¹⁸⁰ Quote from RAMONET, Ignacio *Objetivos da Guerra*, in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Portuguese Edition, Year 3, n. 32, November 2001, p.1

to repress¹⁸¹. **Terrorism also became a way of fight in the Middle East**, where Palestinian organizations, such as the Yasser Arafat's *The Palestine Liberation Organization*, **used terror to affect Israel**. As a consequence of the increase of Israeli military power, terrorism allowed the “weaker” Arabian States to fight back – supporting and sometimes secretly directing terrorist activities against Israel – without assuming the risk of conflict in a conventional war. **Terrorist activities were also instigated against Western interests from States as Libya or Iran. The Western States were also targets of terrorist activities:** RFA and Italy have suffered with the Red Army Faction; Germany with the Baader-Meinhof group; Italy with the Red Squads; the UK with IRA; Spain with ETA. There were more terrorist activities in Portugal, France, Greece and Turkey.

Despite the differences – sometimes significant – between that type of terrorist activities, “**traditional terrorism**” is, specially, a tactic to draw attention to its “cause”, usually aiming at political or military targets, in agreement with its perfectly declared and claimed political purposes. Often, terror is used to force negotiations either those involving territorial or political claims or the liberation of comrades. That is why these type of groups are only scarcely involved in indiscriminate killings, concluding that it would repulse the “social base of support” that they are trying to attract to their cause – obviously, this paradigm has exceptions. On the other hand, having very precise purposes and political, social and national motivations the conventional terrorist groups usually limit their activities to a certain territory or country. Its members are usually recruited within a delimited population group according with the group's specific causes (ideological, nationalist or religious). There are only few cases of traditional terrorist groups with transnational characteristics even if they are supported by services of foreign countries or with connections outside the origin country.

¹⁸¹ CLARK, General Wesley K, *Winning Modern Wars – Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire, Portuguese edition, Temas e Debates*, Lisbon, 2004, p.128

Characterization of the “New Type of Terrorism”

The “New Type of Terrorism”¹⁸² that as emerged in the last few years is rather distinct of the “traditional terrorism” and constitutes a substantially more dangerous threat to international security and to the security of the States. Of the **main characteristics of the “New Type of Terrorism”** I would highlight the following:

- It considers **that all means are good and justifiable in function of their purposes**. This means that groups like Al Qaeda instead of using a commercial airplane loaded with passengers and fuel used as missile or instead of using explosives on a passenger train, if they could get hold of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, if they could aim at nuclear centrals, dams and public supply networks they will not hesitate in using such means and targets in order to **cause the greatest possible number of material damages and human victims** –after all, it is just about “infidels”. In an interview to the journalist Paulo Moura from *Público* newspaper, Omar Bakri Mohammed – considered a *jihaidist brain master* of Al Qaeda and of Islamic terrorism in Europe, dweller of London, stated: *“We make no distinction between civilians and non-civilians, innocents and non-innocents. We only distinguish between Muslim and non-believers. The life of non-believers has no value. It has no sanctity (...) we are not hypocrites. We do not say “we sorry, it was a mistake”. We say, “you deserved it”. We assume that the purpose is to kill as many as we can, to provoke terror. So that in the West you think, “Look what has happened to us”(...) the divine text is clear about the need to provoke as much damage as possible. Therefore, the operational has to make sure that he kills as much as he can kill. If he doesn’t do so the fire of Hell awaits him”*.¹⁸³ So their actions are always spectacular and particularly

¹⁸² I have used the designation “New Type of Terrorism”, for the first time right after the September 11th, because I could not find a better alternative formula – I prefer this one to, for example, “Transnational Terrorism”, “Fundamentalist Terrorism”, “Catastrophic Terrorism”, “Post Modern Terrorism” or “New International Terrorism”. I keep this notion because, though ambiguous and subjective like others, it is the term that best identifies the specificity that I see in the terrorism in question. About this designation and characterization see TOMÉ, Luís L., *O 11 de Setembro e o Terrorismo de Novo Tip*, in *Janus 2003*...op. cit. pp. 116-117.

¹⁸³ MOHAMMED, Omar Bakri, interviewed by Paulo Moura, published in *Pública Magazine* from *Público Newspaper*, April 18, 2004, pp.28-31. Bold by the author.

tragic, and they might become even more catastrophic – it is only a matter of means and opportunities at their disposal;

- Its **motivations and causes are multiple and its purposes diffuse and not always claimed**, but are always generically based on the hatred to the “infidel Zionists”, *crusaders*, and *non-Islamic Muslim traitors*, in a profound feeling of “great rejection” and humiliation inflicted on the Muslims by the West and their allies, in total repulse for the Western values and way of life; by the desire to use violence and terror to gain the Muslim dignity back; the determination in replacing the “moderate” Muslim regimes with “true Islamic regimes”. They are **committed in the *jihad* against infidels and motivated by the hope of reconstructing the caliphate**. This way, the “New Type of Terrorism” is **capable of gathering a great number of groups and individuals** whose initial “causes” do not necessarily coincide (often they have national origins such as political regimes oppressing them); later they fuse with the generic radical defense of Islam and in the hatred to infidels. **It is also capable of associating distinct causes** such as Palestine or the military presence in the Middle East, the defense of “traditional Islamic values”, repulse for modernity, for the intervention in Iraq, Kashmir, Chechnya, the despise for the “corrupt” Saud or the Egyptian government, the hatred to the “satanic Western people” or the making of an Islamic state in the Southeast Asia, etc.;
- Either way, **amongst their several targets we can highlight the Americans, the Western people, the Jewish and the moderate Muslims and Arabians that are not, in their extremist vision, Islamic**. **Towards the democratic regimes**, the purpose is (always by the use of terror) to affect security, well fare and the stability of the target societies; to foment disagreement and cause intolerance, as well as to make economy fragile, disturb the way of life, social tranquility and political environment, question democratic institutions and condition political decisions. **In the case of Muslim authoritarian regimes**, the purpose is, above all, the subversion and to dethrone the “moderate” and secular – in the end, to instigate an Islamic Revolution;
- **It does not reveal any type of moral, ethical, ideological or political restraints when elaborating attacks**. Mostly, it shows **total contempt for human life (other people’s or their own’s)**. The distinction is only between Muslims and infidels, both on the track of death: the nonbelievers either

convert or die, burning in the fire of hell, because “*the propriety and the life of a disbeliever do not worth a thing*”, the Muslims have the duty of being martyrs, of committing suicide, in defense of Islam, becoming martyrs is rewarded with paradise. As one of Al Qaeda leaders said: “*You (Western people) love life as we worship death*”;

- **It grounds its actions, or tries to make them legitimate, on a radical vision of the Islamic experience, on the strict application of the *Charia*¹⁸⁴ and on a integrist and literal interpretation of the Sunna (The Prophet’s Tradition) and of the Koran, the “holy” text that teaches everything, has all answers and that justifies all violence. It acts in name of a faith – the Islam – but it only takes from it the extremist justifications to political violence against all infidels. It evokes Maumee’s teachings, but highlights only passages where radicalism is inspired. That way, this perspective faces Islam as a total system governing human existence that should be applied in all time, in all places. The separation between faith (*din*) and the State (*dawla*) is not conceived; it fights for the establishment in a global scale of the sovereignty of God – to do so, *Jihad* must allow to suppress all obstacles standing in the way of Islam’s propagation on Earth; it is understood that “salvation” implies the return to the “true path” (*al-sirat al-mustaqim*) that has inspired the first Community of the Believers, and the return to the *Salaf* Puritanism (Maumee’s Companions) whose example should be strictly followed¹⁸⁵; it has the pretension to expand the concept of *Jihad* unilaterally, only related with the “holy war” (thus forgetting that it is also men’s inner fight to improve himself, to defeat his egoism, dominate instincts and this way letting the will of God penetrate all his being)¹⁸⁶; it wants to return to a caliphate system and medieval delirium of forced conversions; it defends the killing of “infidels” and “apostates”; it intends complete application of the *Charia*’s rules; it exalts the martyr, since the obligation of the *Jihad* predicts the possibility of martyr (*sahid*) and of**

¹⁸⁴ The *Charia* (Shari’a) is “the law established by God”, that is, the set of rules revealed to Maumee by God, applicable to Muslims’ religious and social life in the heart of the community.

¹⁸⁵ PINTO, Maria do Céu *A Jihad Islâmica e o contexto Europeu*, in Adriano Correia (Coord.), *Terrorismo*, Livraria Almedina, January 2004, pp. 443-445.

¹⁸⁶ About the *Jihad* see KEPEL, Gilles, *Jihad*, in *Pouvoirs*, n.104, 2003; PINTO, Maria do Céu, *A Jihad Global e o contexto europeu*, op. Cit., pp.439-459; or ALMEIDA, Eugénio Costa, *Fundamentalismo Islâmico – A ideologia e o Estado*, Autonomia 27, 2003

mujahid, the fighter of the *Jihad* that eliminates the infidels, makes the “effort in the path of God” thus, giving his life to sacrifice. **It is some kind of divine terrorism in the name of “Ala, the All Mighty One”**. In the aforementioned interview, Omar Bakri Mohammed stated: “*The seculars say that “Islam is the religion of love”. It is true. But Islam is also the religion of War. Of peace but also of terrorism. Maumee said: “I am the prophet of mercy”. But he also said: “I am the prophet of massacre.” The word terrorism is not new to Muslims. Maumee said more: “I am the prophet that laughs when killing my enemy”. It is not only a matter of killing. It is to laugh while you’re killing.*”¹⁸⁷

- **It possesses a truly transnational or internationalized character.** The supporters are not definable by nationality or ethnics, or by ideologies or religions, but by the identification with a radical and violent interpretation of the “Islamic *Jihad* integrism” with followers spread all around the globe. The targets of their actions are not restricted to a country, a region, or a continent. Its members do not have a motherland – “*the world is its address and its field of action*”¹⁸⁸, **their will to attack and to become a threat goes as far as the limits of their presence.** The groups and individuals that fit into this new category of new type of terrorists are nomads that wander, act and present themselves virtually, anywhere, from the Philippines to the USA, Pakistan, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Indonesia, Turkey, Yemen, England, Tanzania, Germany, Sudan, Egypt, France, Malaysia, Algeria, Italy, Afghanistan, Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, etc. **This type of terrorism has no permanent physical bases, and its groups and cells proliferate** either in the heart of moderate Muslim and Arabian States as in the heart of “failed States”, unorganized and without law, or in the inner of liberal and democratic States¹⁸⁹ or even in many conflict zones;
- **It works within a network, also transnational, by the association of several groups, cells and individuals** - that until recently were relatively isolated – either by the making of formal alliances or by informal contacts and

¹⁸⁷ MOHAMMED, Omar Bakri, interview published in *Pública*, op. cit., p. 29

¹⁸⁸ BISHARA, Marwan, *A Era dos Conflitos Assimétricos*, in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, nº 571, October 2001, p.20. Bold by the author.

¹⁸⁹ On the manifestations of this type of terrorism in Europe see, PINTO, Maria do Céu, *A Jihad Global e o contexto europeu*, op. Cit., pp.439-459

supports. The “New Type of Terrorism” is not an exclusive product of a faction or group, but it results from the coming up of **a network connected by Islamic fundamentalism and by common hatreds**. Its members and supporters might initially belong to groups as divergent as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Ansar al Islam, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement, Hezbolah, the International Islamic Front, Hamas, the Bangladesh Islamic Movement, Abu Sayyaf, Laskar Jihad, Jemaah Islamiya, the Moro Front of the Islamic Liberation of Philippines, Kumpuln Mujahedine Malaysia or many other groups and pro-*Jihad* cells spread around the world. They are connected and they interact informal and formally between themselves, sharing the same adversaries and the same “successes”. Its cells can be planted on the opponents’ territory, laying “asleep” until some order or better opportunity, but can also spontaneously appear by the association of individuals that, meanwhile, have chosen their radical message and are now motivated to violence and martyr. **The conglomerate action of Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda is essential in this case, becoming itself a gigantic federation or confederation** of several groups and militant cells included in its orbit¹⁹⁰ and to whom it was giving logistic and financial support, worth in million of dollars within the sphere of the Global *Jihad*. However, the management of this network is not centralized. It is done by logistic, financial and information support, and specially, by the “inspiration” and divulgation of hatred messages, of the appeal to violence and sacrifice; of pro-*jihad* reasoning and power and strength examples that now and then are demonstrated against their enemies. So, **Al Qaeda acts directly** –using their own active members or members of other groups gravitating on its orbit, or of cells “planted” or “asleep”- **or using a franchising logic** with largely autonomous groups or **indirectly through the concession of all kind of support** to certain groups that are motivated but in lack of capacities or **then through the sheer “inspiration” of individuals, cells and groups that spontaneously assume the initiative**. Such diversity hugely increases the possibility of action and makes the implementation of security and intelligence schemes more difficult;

¹⁹⁰ On this topic see the aforementioned *Al Qaeda’s war declaration*

- It has adopted a kind of “virtual organization”, a non-vertical and hierarchic style like organization but essentially horizontal and partitioned. A hierarchic organization is extremely dangerous to its members because once “infiltrated” it is possible to “follow” their actions, especially in more advanced societies where electronic surveillance offers greater opportunities of monitoring and penetration in the structure and in the chain of command. On a non-centralized or hierarchic scheme, **individuals, cells or groups operate independently**, ignoring the existence of others nor their actions, and they do not always report to a central as if they belonged a typical pyramid organization. This way, **Al Qaeda’s leaders do not need to permanently give operational indication or orders**, and they do not always venture in directly coordinating or commanding operations – instead, **they just “inspire” certain cells or individuals to act by their own initiative or to supply the means and the logistic** so that they do it in the best moment. Clearly, this makes the work of watching every terrorist (or potential terrorists) much more difficult, as well as the prevention of their actions. In certain occasions, those cells are only discovered when they ceased to exist because their missions are suicidal ones. *“Each cell has a magnet and two or three more people and a budget. From that, in the right time they act alone, never contacting anyone”*¹⁹¹ as referred by the theoretic *jihadist*, Omar Bakri Mohammed. He added: *“there are many freelance willing to set actions just like those of Al Qaeda. The Madrid attack was committed by one of these groups”*.¹⁹² Such type of organization does not need a direct and formal recruitment and becomes more omnipresent and more immune to actions of infiltration and surveillance;
- It shows to be gifted with specially unusual, powerful and deathly means: it counts with extraordinary financial resources, around the hundreds of million USD¹⁹³; it uses more and more powerful destruction means, including ground-to-air missiles launched from mobile platforms, with

¹⁹¹ MOHAMMED, Omar Bakri, interview published in *Pública*, op. cit. p.30

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 31

¹⁹³ About financial mechanisms and the powerful financial means of the terrorism see further in this book *The Origins of the New Type of Terrorism*, specially *Terrorism and Poverty* and *The action of the Islamic integrists and Muslim diasporas*

known efforts to use certain chemical, biological or even nuclear agents; it has logistic and operational capacity not only of large scale but it also has a huge technical complexity. In 2001, terrorists attacked a military American airplane with a ground-to-air missile, in Saudi Arabia. In November 2002, two AS-7 missiles were launched by terrorists against an Israeli airplane, taking off from Mombassa, Kenya, with 271 passengers on board¹⁹⁴. Also in November 2002, the Scotland Yard arrested three individuals with alleged Al Qaeda connections, suspects of planning to release cyanide in the London subway (where more than three million people circulate daily)¹⁹⁵. Meanwhile, according to Barton Gellman of the *Washington Post*, documents found in Pakistan in March 2003, revealed that Al Qaeda had already acquired the necessary material to produce botulinum and salmonella toxins and the chemical agent cyanide, and was very close to producing anthrax, a much more lethal agent¹⁹⁶. There are still those who consider the possibility of Al Qaeda (in cooperation with Hezbollah or other *jihad* groups, the Pakistanis for example) recruiting scientists with access to sophisticated biological armament or nuclear programs.

The “New Type of Terrorism” derives from the conjugation of all these characteristics and not of each one faced individually, because that way we would always find exceptions. Thus, it should be separated from the “traditional terrorism”.

Advantages and opportunities that terrorism has or orchestrates

The “New Type of Terrorism” is more dangerous, more omnipresent, more invisible, more diffuse, more radical and more catastrophic. It has several advantages and opportunities that turn it into a greater and harder threat to fight.

¹⁹⁴ STERN, Jessica, *The Protean Enemy*, op. Cit.

¹⁹⁵ *Autoridades britânicas descobrem plano para libertar gás tóxico no metro de Londres*, in Público newspaper, web edition, November 18, 2002

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

- a) **Deterrence does not work** against this type of groups: they do not have a territory or population whose integrity should be defended; their rationality does not follow a regular pattern measured in terms of “costs-benefits”; and, lastly, their members do not mind “giving” their lives in the name of the “cause”, expecting to be rewarded by Ala after the earthly death. **More than anything they want to become martyrs.** In this sense, there will always be candidates to suicide;
- b) In the fight against terrorism, **those playing defensively have to protect all their vulnerable points in the entire world.** On the other hand, the terrorist has only to choose and attack the most vulnerable targets or to set a more surprising action;
- c) **The costs of a terrorist action are infinitely lower than the costs necessary to the defense** of that sort of attack: to paralyze an entire airport or a public transport terminal, an Ak-47, a hand grenade or a backpack with explosives is enough for the terrorist; yet, the defense of that airport costs many millions of Euros or dollars. **The results gained by terrorist actions are also extraordinarily out of proportions, considering the costs of the operation** -apart of the human tragedies, of course. We know the dimension of the results of some terrorist attacks and when compared the costs of those operations are, indeed, very small. According to calculations in a United Nations report, the costs are estimated to be 30,000 USD, in the case of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, in 1998; between 5,000 and 10,000 USD in the USS Cole attack, in 2000; about 500,000 USD, on the September 11th, in 2001; 20,000 USD in the Djerba Mosques, in 2002; 127,000 USD in the Limburg attack, in 2002; 74,000 USD in the Bali attack, also in 2002¹⁹⁷. The attack against the Twin Towers was the most important sinister ever to be repaid by insurance companies: about 40,000 million USD¹⁹⁸. The costs directly associated with “the war against terrorism”, to reinforce security means and preventive mechanisms

¹⁹⁷ BRISARD, Jean-Charles, *Terrorism Financing -Roots and trends of Saudi terrorism financing -Report Prepared for the President of the Security Council - United Nations*, New York, December 19, 2002, quoted by Adelino Torres, *Terrorismo: o apocalipse da Razão?(Islamismo político, sociedade, economia)*, in MOREIRA, Adriano, *Terrorismo*, Almedina, January 2004, p.22

¹⁹⁸ TORRES, Adelino *Terrorismo: o apocalipse da Razão?...*, op. Cit., p.33

or with the impact in economy and tourism certainly raise to many thousands of million USD or Euros;

- d) Terrorists can **take advantage of all the elements produced by the civilization of progress** that they condemn. It is ironic but **the globalization possibilities, specially in terms of transportation and communications**¹⁹⁹, allows them to: move from country to country and region to region or to very easily communicate; to gain access to a certain type of means, growingly lethal; to spread their network of contacts and supports; to diverse and increase the complexity of their financing net; to spread their radical message and promote new recruiting and above all, to become a more omnipresent, undetectable and diffuse threat;
- e) Terrorism also take advantages of vulnerabilities inherent to democracies, with open, multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies - where often the presence of important Muslim minorities occurs - and of the freedom of individuals, warranties that **facilitate its circulation, penetration and approach to the intended targets**. Indeed, democratic societies “offer” those groups a wide variety of opportunities to their invisibility and to the selection of their targets (and for that, imagination is the limit). Then, **because having an opinion it is not a crime in a Democracy** it is also possible that in the heart of the democratic societies **the more radical perspectives spread more easily** - like those of Omar Bakri Mohammed, living in London, that publicly expresses sympathy and support to the Al Qaeda, saying that its members “*are the best people that have ever lived on earth (right after the Prophet and his companions)*“²⁰⁰, or considering as legitimate the September 11th attacks, described by him as “*great work*”, or that “*The life of a non-believers has no value*”²⁰⁰, etc. On the other hand, **democratic regimes have ethical, moral, juridical and political restraints** that prevent from doing just anything in the fight against terrorism. **Terrorists, instead, have no kind of ethical or juridical limitations to their actions**. The unevenness is obvious. But it is vital to be that way because it is also about a war of values.

¹⁹⁹ See ahead *Terrorism and Internet*

²⁰⁰ See MOHAMMED, Omar Bkri, interview published in *Pública*, op. Cit. Pp.25-32

- f) The Islamic integrism terrorist groups **also take advantage of the existence of a vast network of Mosques, Koranic schools or *madrassas***, spread in several countries, and of **several Muslim organizations that help the population in need with education, social work**, increasing the sympathy of those helped by those organizations, **as well as the new communication media**, specially the internet - all this is used as a “transmission belt” and of contact, through which they establish bonds, raise financing, spread their extremist message and recruit new members. On the other hand, **Islamic terrorism and integrism also take advantage of a wide Muslim Diaspora**, whether in financial terms or to “penetrate” in the non-Muslim societies²⁰¹.
- g) To their purposes of generating terror, terrorists **are benefited by the media coverage that increases their strength and their omnipresence** - gaining impressive effects in some Muslim populations that this way feel revenged and attracted by this form of fight, or in the heart of the usually “quiet and secure” democratic societies, now deeply unquiet and insecure. This means that terrorism is “*an instrument of International Policy that has a visibility and importance that never had before when objectives were local or regional*”²⁰²;
- h) Terrorism is also commonly **associated to poverty, despair and social exclusion or marginalization phenomena**²⁰³, including in the heart of industrialized societies and home to a certain type of emigration, making that an advantage to increase hatred and to find many candidates to sacrifice and vengeance. On the other hand, terrorism **has benefited from a greater degree of technical preparation of some of their devotees followers**²⁰⁴, sometimes educated in the West, transferring to the terrorist operation a new capacity with more complex techniques and also more devastating ones;

²⁰¹ See ahead *The action of Islamic integrists and the influence of the muslim Diaspora in favour of terrorism*

²⁰² LEANDRO, General Garcia, *Uma visão militar sobre o terrorismo*, in CORREIA, Adriano (Coord.) *Terrorismo*, Almedina, January 2004, pp. 332-333

²⁰³ See further in this book *The Origins of the New Type of Terrorism*, specially *Terrorism and Poverty* and *Terrorism and Social exclusion and marginalization in the Western Societies*

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, see *Terrorism and Instruction*.

- i) **To self-financing and set the logistics of their operations, terrorism is correlated with other, more classical, criminal activities** – narcotic traffic, money laundering, human traffic, façade companies, bank assaults, document forging, money forging, extortion, kidnaps, arms smuggling, etc – making sometimes very difficult to distinguish the border between common criminality and the direct or indirect support to terrorists activities. In reality, at the same time it can be at the service of a political cause it can also be at the service of strictly criminal purposes. The requirements are practically the same and *“at a certain point it can be difficult to distinguish what is Political Purpose and what is sheer Criminal Action, which makes a ambiguity complex to solve”*²⁰⁵. On the other hand there are still reports and suspects of organizations, banks, insurance companies, that having apparent legal activities are supporting terrorism secretly²⁰⁶.
- j) Finally, **the conventional capacities and means of security and defense to fight terrorism reveal themselves ineffective to face it**, in the sense that terrorism sources are diverse, there are many potential terrorists and of unclear origin, and their potential acts are never ending. Either way, the solutions cannot be of a military character only, or gained by less than a wide and deep international cooperation.

In short, the carrying out of the terrorist action is relatively cheap, with unproportioned and tragic effects but diabolically difficult to fight²⁰⁷.

Terrorism and the Internet

The virtual omnipresence of terrorism is increased by the use of the most modern ways of communication, of which the internet is a paradigmatic example. It is one of the many cases of modernity at the service of terrorism. In fact, **the internet opens a new field to terrorist action and never ceasing opportunities to**

²⁰⁵ LEANDRO, General Garcia, *Uma visão militar sobre o terrorismo*, op. Cit., p.333.

²⁰⁶ See BRISARD, J.C. *Terrorism Financing...*, ONU 2002, op. cit.

²⁰⁷ See TOMÉ, Luís Leitão, *O 11 de Setembro e o terrorismo de novo tipo*, in Janus 2003..., op. Cit. pp. 117

foment terrorism in several ways. Firstly, because by this mean, **terrorists can potentially interfere with all web related or dependent circuits**, causing serious disturbs in companies, banks, stock markets, health and supply services or government agencies; either by the installation of virus or by penetrating systems. Then, **the internet is a rather simple, cheap and fast contact form**, also between terrorists, making the exchange of messages or even coordination of operations easy – which obviously is done in a way to confuse or go unnoticed through the electronic surveillance systems. Thirdly, the web **allows fomenting a true “jihad culture”**, by the diffusion of messages that stimulate hatred and the holy war against “Jews, crusaders and their allies”, of fundamentalist interpretations of the Islamic faith or by giving detailed explanations of the humiliations imposed on the Muslim people by the Western people, always in the sense of justification and instigation of the use of violence and terror against the “infidels”. Indeed, there are several *jihad* web pages and radical Islamic chats available on-line that are decisive to make known the “radical” teachings. Fourthly, **the internet hugely broadens the field of recruiting**, not only amongst Arabian or Muslim populations that have access to the internet but also amongst the new converted to Islam of other origins, some and other are seduced by the radical fundamentalism message and sharing some common hatred or causes - from Israel to the “Western”, the Muslim “non-Islamic traitors” regimes, the United States or to the violent defense of Islam opposed to the values of the infidels. This **virtual recruitment via net offers still other advantages: it reaches new layers, young people specially**, that other way would not have access to their radical messages – the internet widely increases the field of potential recruits, when compared to the traditional methods, such as Mosques and *madrassas*- **and allows the radical members to attract people with higher scientific and technical training**. Likewise the suspects on Al Qaeda attracting and recruiting Western Muslim people growth. This scenario will surely increase the danger and the difficulties for the surveillance and intelligence systems. Fifthly, **the internet also allows terrorists to obtain precise and detailed information about several elements** – for example, places and schedules of transport networks, plants and descriptions of cities or other places, topographies of certain potential targets, exact locations of where guns or explosives can be bought, etc – **that are later used to prepare their operations**. In the same way, terrorists or potential terrorists find **in the net many pages that explain in detail the production and use of hand-made or more sophisticated explosives**, or even chemical weapons of home production, as well as the necessary means to produce

biologic and nuclear weapons – we all know that there is information just about anything in the net. There are even Islamic web sites (but not only Islamic) that offer on-line courses and explanations about the making and the usage of guns and explosives. Obviously, this makes the task of preparing attacks or the task of training new recruits and sympathizers much easier. **The idea is that, once the message is received many internauts take the initiative in their own hands, with the means they can get and the teachings they are able to obtain – in this sense, the internet has become in a powerful instrument serving terrorism.**

The Terrorist Threat

It has been said in several occasions that “**The New Type of Terrorism**” is **hyper at the results, but not at the means at its service**. The greatest fear, **the greatest threat is that these networks have much more lethal capacities, especially weapons of massive destruction**. It is undeniable that terrorists are interested in the acquisition of radioactive nuclear materials and chemical and bacteriological agents to criminal or blackmail purposes²⁰⁸. But as sophisticated as their resources can be (financially and technically) they will not have those weapons unless they have other “help”. In the same way, it is undeniable that some Rogue States are looking to endow themselves with WMD and missile technology, whether in the name of self-defense and of the “deterrence” principle, whether to potential blackmail or even aggression. **If the terrorists networks are to be sheltered and supported by State entities and their services**, the possibility of those groups having and using weapons with greater destruction capacity, in particular new explosives, missiles or even WMD, significantly increases. It is precisely the association of these elements – the Rogue States that once having WMD or using them or making them reach terrorist groups that on their turn will use them irrationally against their enemies – that consists of today’s “hyper-threat” to international security.

Apart of the association to WMD and with State support, the terrorist threat exists at other levels too. For example, by the possibility **of this type of Islamic**

²⁰⁸ In reality, if the making of nuclear weapons is more complex the use of chemical and biological weapons is less detectable and its usage is simpler, which makes it in a certain way, more dreadful nowadays.

integrism terrorism joining with other non-Islamic groups, coordinating operations and promoting exchanges of information and resorts, which can mean the proliferation of “more irrational” attacks and at a greater scale perpetrated by traditional terrorist groups, such as ETA or IRA – it would be as if these groups were included on the international *jihad* orbit, and Al Qaeda having more cells. This scenario, even if not very likely, on a theoretical point of view, because of the political-ideological-religious embarrassments, should still be considered since it is quite concerning: after all, it would give new means and capacities to some traditional groups and it would add to the “New Type of Terrorism” a significant quantity of new recruits and new cells, already organized and connoisseurs of the “environment” and with the advantage of being non-Muslim and thus more difficult to detect. **The hypothesis of association can be tempting to the traditional groups that are feeling particularly vulnerable** or under pressure by the security services of a State: in the past some contacts were known, between Western terrorists and Islamic terrorists; and it is known that some Islamic groups have fused into Al Qaeda in difficult periods, changing or evolving their goals – and that can happen to non-Islamic groups, Western groups including. **The collaboration does not have to be in the shape of formal alliances**, difficult to establish, for sure, but only by the establishment of bonds and cessions of means, logistics and information.

On the other hand, **even if not in close collaboration, and impressed with the results achieved by the international *jihad* network, the traditional terrorist groups might be tempted to follow their *modus operandi***, leaving behind the relative rationality on the choice of their targets and on the impact of their attacks, with the purpose of causing more terror and to reach their objectives.

Finally, the terrorist threat also places itself at the level of **the copy effect to other Islamic groups and individuals**, that even without any kind of relation with Al Qaeda, but “inspired” by their message and example, spontaneously decide to take the initiative. The intelligence services are concerned with the phenomena of “dormant cells” but also, more and more, with the “**spontaneous cells**”.

The Origins of the “New Type of Terrorism”

Even though the European and American strategies are trying to converge in the combat against terrorism, the truth is that it is extremely difficult to establish strategies and practical measures to fight the deep origins of terrorism. Some

factors of the causality of the “new type of terrorism” that are usually considered are indeed, possible causes and can facilitate or exacerbate terrorism; other, though are only presumed causes meant to discredit or to justify a given political response. **From the most common factors mentioned as the origin of terrorism, it is worth to ponder on the following ones:**

- The relation between terrorism and poverty or underdevelopment;
- The association between terrorism and instruction, or the “manipulated instruction”;
- The association between terrorism and exclusion and social marginalization that many Muslims are submitted to in the Western societies;
- The existence of Rogue States and failed States, a fertile land to illegal economic activity and to the fortification and implantation of terrorist basis;
- The conflicts recovered by Islamic extremists;
- The action of Islamic integrism and the influence of the Muslim Diasporas in favor of terrorism;
- And the intimate relations between terrorism and Muslim autocratic States.

Terrorism and Poverty

The relation that has been established between terrorism and poverty is not a new one. Even after the September 11th, several politicians, including President Bush, but especially many Europeans, have established a direct relation between the two phenomena. So, in the International Conference on financing development, in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, the participant heads of State and government declared that the fight against poverty was deeply connected against the fight against terrorism. **If, spontaneously we can be led to establish that relation** – because we tend to associate the terrorist actions with the “despair” in which some operational men are, without “nothing to loose” – a deeper analysis of the available elements does not confirm that tendency. For example, **if poverty really was the deep origin of terrorism, the great majority of terrorists would come from the poorest areas in the world, particularly, South-Saharan Africa – which is not the case.** The same way, if the main motivation of the terrorists was their despair because of the poverty level they live in, then **it would be difficult to understand how, after consecutive years living with some comfort in the more developed societies (which is the case of many groups, “dormant” and**

“spontaneous” cells), are they still willing to sacrifice their lives. In essence, Fernando Gil’s words are righteous, when referring that *“there is no relation of need between humiliation and poverty, on the one hand (to note that in many of its aspects, terrorism is a very sophisticated product of globalization) and the will of annihilation by other”*.²⁰⁹

A 2002 Princeton University study about terrorism in the Middle East, showed that, on that region, not only the terrorists had a level of life superior to the limit of poverty, as they also had completed secondary school, at least²¹⁰. The information gathered so far, about the antecedents of Al Qaeda’s members, seem to confirm those results, especially in what concerns **skills to adapt to foreign societies**: without much problems to find a job, to rent an apartment, taking a university degree or to enroll in piloting courses – it would all be more difficult if they had not a previous preparation and were really coming from very poor classes.

On the other hand, even if some terrorists have rather modest or very poor origins, generally, **the new type of terrorism is not, by no means, “poor”; on the contrary, it shows to be specially gifted with all kind of means, starting with financial means**. Bin Laden was a Saudi millionaire, with a colossal financial empire that he has made available to terrorism, and several other Al Qaeda’s **ruling class members come from well-off or high middle class**, and even with university education. Besides, from what is known of the financing schemes of the integrism terrorism, it is known that **it uses funds coming from all type of illicit activities, but very lucrative ones**, such as narcotic and guns traffic, **of significant supports of bankers and business men, of façade companies, of the Muslim Diaspora, of Islamic bank institutions “Zakat” funds** (a legal donation – a “tax” that is part of the “pillars of Islam”, which objective is to purify from sin) – assessed in about 10,000 million USD per year and there are proofs that the Zakat is not only about charity²¹¹. In the executive summary of the *Terrorist Financing* report, presented to the president of the United Nations’ Security

²⁰⁹ GIL, Fernando *A tentação pacifista*, in *Jornal Diário de Notícias*, September 28, 2002. Bold by the author.

²¹⁰ KRUEGER, Alan, B., *Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is there a Causal Connection?* in *Working Papers*, n. 9071, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, May 2002.

²¹¹ There are abundant references to the Zakat in several versicles of 30 *Suras* the Coran. See TORRES, Adelino, *Terrorismo: o apocalipse da Razão?..*, op. cit., p. 99

Council, in December 2002, Jean-Charles Brisard states that Al Qaeda would have received from Saudi Arabia only, within a decade, “*between 300 million USD and 500 million USD over the last ten years from wealthy businessmen and bankers representing about 20% of the Saudi GDP, through a web of charities and companies acting as fronts, with the notable use of Islamic banking institutions*”²¹². **Terrorism had and has important government support also** like it happened before with Libya, Sudan, Yemen and Afghanistan, among others, and still today with Syria and Iran; to that is added the support given by relevant sectors of countries such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. So, **the new type of terrorism (of which Al Qaeda is the corner-stone), is not poor, it is rich, very rich.**

This means that poverty is not the main causal factor of terrorism. Yet, even if “terrorism” is rich **that does not mean that their operational men have not quite poor origins, or that there is no relation between terrorism and poverty.** In reality, it should be made a **distinction between the “origin of terrorism” and the “origin of terrorists”,** considered individually. What we want to analyze here is the causal vector of terrorism; otherwise, we would have to go into the domains of psychology, sociology and theology; variables to consider when searching for individual motivations of each one that perpetrates terrorists attacks.

Still, we must **consider obvious that: poverty feeds terrorism and is orchestrated by it.** That happens for several reasons. First, because, poverty – as well as many cases of social exclusion and marginalization in the Muslim and Western countries – **greatly increases the resent and hatred against those regarded as responsible for the situation,** making a favorable atmosphere so that, in the poorer means, integrism Islamic terrorism finds echo in its radical message and looks for recruits. Secondly, **the populations in need are specially receptive and eager of all kind of support** that many times ends up being given by solidarity organisms that function as mechanism to approach integrism members to certain population layers. Thirdly, **we can establish a more direct relationship between the suicidal-attacks and poverty, in certain circumstances,** since, on the one hand, **some of those terrorists have nothing to loose,** unless their own life that they want to offer in order to become martyrs (it should be mentioned that many

²¹² BRISARD, Jean-Charles, *Terrorism Financing – Roots and Trends of the Saudi terrorism financing*, UNO 2002, op.cit.

studies prove that **the will to become a martyr is a much stronger reason to suicide than the despair of being in a economically difficult situation**) and on the other hand, the **families of the perpetrators of these attacks are generously compensated** by several charity works – we can easily imagine how the reward can attract a poor family. The mechanism of the financial reward of the suicidal-attacks is common in Palestine, promoted by the Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and other groups. Saddam Hussein also offered a significant amount (first 10,000 and latter 25,000 USD) to the families of the suicidal living in West Bank and in the Gaza strip. Either way, after making several interviews to suicidal candidates, the Pakistanis journalist Nasra Hassa, concluded that they were coming from educated middle class families²¹³. On the contrary, the researches done by Jessica Stern, especially in Cashmere, conclude that many suicidal volunteers are coming from poor families²¹⁴.

Terrorism and Education

The education level is a supplementary factor to have in account in the relation between the integrist Islamic terrorism and poverty. Effectively, in some Muslim countries, poor families (and not only) send their sons to Koran schools or *madrassas*, normally funded or free – often students have room and food, clothes and books at no charge for the families. Frequently, **the students are educated in radicalized *madrassas***, with a fundamentalist perspective of Islam, where they are instilled with the “hatred to the infidel” as well as with some technical ability²¹⁵. It is worth to remind that many of the taliban that took the power and hosted Al Qaeda in Afghanistan have attended *madrassas* in Pakistan. However that was not the case of the terrorists that made the September 11th attacks. Interesting to know is that **many of the Al Qaeda’s operational staff has knowledge in science and technical areas, often obtained in Europe and North America, including at university level**. This means there is no exclusive connection between lack of education or the *madrassas* orchestrated education and the new

²¹³ HASSAN, Nasra, *Na Arsenal of Believers. Talking to the Human Bombs*, in the New Yorker, November 19, 2001, pp.36-41, available on the web at www.newyorker.com

²¹⁴ See STERN, Jessica, *Pakistan’s Jihad Culture*, in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 79, n. 6 Nov./Dec. 2000, web edition.

²¹⁵ HIPPEL, Karin, *Définir les origins du terrorisme...*, op. cit., p. 106

type of terrorism – once again in this domain, Al Qaeda enjoys the benefit of modernity and science obtained in higher education with ancestral education procedures.

Terrorism, exclusion and social marginalization on the Western societies

One can say that **exclusion and social marginalization suffered by many individuals and Muslim minorities on the Western societies** instill and emphasize hatred and criminal and terrorist behaviors. One of the main reasons that make immigrants to join terror groups, such as Al Qaeda, is the alienation and ostracism they suffer often, as Muslim minorities living in the West. Obviously, this exclusion and the non-integration frequently happen because the emigrants cannot access formal structures of the host State due to their illegality. Consequently they **search for aid and comfort in the Mosque and Islamic cultural centers**, the same places where they can find fake identification documents. In many of **those places they get in contact either with “informed” integrists or with a lot of fundamentalist Islamic literature**, that teaches them how to survive among “infidels” and encourages them to martyr. These individuals are **highly vulnerable to aggressive recruitment campaigns** produced by extremist groups operating all over Europe and America and are specially **influenced by radical anti-Western messages**. Anyway, we must say that **many of the suicide terrorists or detected terrorists lived “integrated”** within the host societies, with a job and an apparently normal house and social life. Thus, the marginalization and social exclusion phenomena do not represent a main source of terrorism (to be so, the “integrated” would never become terrorists, and other terrorists would appear as there are many non Islamic outcast) but are many times used by integrism and Islamic terrorist groups.

Terrorism, “Rogue States” and “Failed States”

In what concerns the environment where terrorism is proliferating, is funded or based, **some analysts associate it with “Rogue States” or “failed States”**. **However, the distinction between both situations must be done**. In the case of **“Rogue States”**, as was the Taliban’s Afghanistan, or Saddam’s Iraq, or Libya, and still is the case of Iran and Syria, terrorism is supported and instigated or manipulated by the governments according with their political goals for the regional

or international arenas. Thus, **an alliance is established between the State actors and the terrorist groups**, which allow the latter to extend their networks adding capacities and having territorial bases and to the States “to continue their policy by other means”. **In the case of “failed States”**, such as Somalia, Yemen or Sudan **there are several factors that particularly attract terrorist organizations**: weak or non-existent government structures; corruption, crime and generalized scarceness; the international community’s inability to regulate and oversee, from the trade to population and goods movements, and landing strips; unguarded coast shores or borders. In theory, **terrorists under these circumstances are able to act with total impunity**, without fearing severe repression from the government or the international intervention. This does not necessarily mean that these States will become terrorist breeding grounds, that might also happen, but they are indeed attractive territories for the implementation and even settlement of terrorist groups, often pursued in other places. However, we should underline that the mobility of terrorist groups does not exist only on these States, **because many groups and cells “infiltrate” and settle in other States fully consolidated, whether they have authoritarian and repressive regimes or democratic and liberal**. This makes it hard to establish as a determining cause of terrorism the existence of “lawless States”.

Conflicts and terrorism

The relation between conflict and terrorism is very old, as in many occasions in History terrorism has been used like a weapon by one or both parts in confrontation. More recently, the **Palestine conflict** is intimately related with the terror activity. **Conflicts and wars perceived as threatening to Muslims are exacerbated by the Islamic Integrisism and by the participation of “foreign volunteers”**, in a large extent linked to the “new type of terrorism” and Al Qaeda. This phenomenon approached the past ideological wars that have attracted foreign recruits, as for instance in the Spanish civil war, 1936-1939. **Osama Bin Laden and many other Al Qaeda members fought against the soviet occupation of Afghanistan**, the period ascribed to Al Qaeda’s creation. Afterwards, there is information of its participation in several conflicts, namely in **Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Ossetia, Dagestan, Eritrea, Kashmir, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Georgia and Iraq**. There are suppositions that they also attempted

to influence Kosovo but the American stopped them²¹⁶. Al Qaeda's network interference may turn conflict territories and bordering countries into terrorist breeding grounds like it happens in Palestine or like it happened in Sudan or Afghanistan. The leader of Egyptian Islamic *Jihad* and number two in Al Qaeda, Ayman Al Zawahiri, Bin Laden's "right hand" wrote that his visit to Chechnya had the purpose of establishing a new training camp²¹⁷. **The new type of terrorism might also manipulate and exacerbate existent or latent conflicts.** Ultimately, we see the direct association between terrorism and conflict **currently in Afghanistan and Iraq, lands turned into breeding grounds and magnets for terrorists,** being the violence cultivated and manipulated by terror.

Integrist Islamic action and the influence of Muslim Diasporas in favor of terrorism

The financial support that promotes the Islamic terrorism comes from multiple sources. Special attention is attached to the **role and significance of some Islamic charity associations.** Effectively, one of Islam tenets is charity that should be done in a way without humiliating the receiver. Nevertheless this way of doing charity considerably complicates the superintendence on this domain, being difficult to determine how a few Islamic organizations inclusively supported by governments, **propagate their extremist ideology through the aid they provide.** To this regard, Rohan Gunaratna noted "*according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) a fifth of all non governmental Islamic organizations around the world have infiltrated from Al Qaeda and other groups supporting terrorism*"²¹⁸ A report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) underlines that "*the quick progress of integrist movements in Somalia since 1990 is less associated with its popularity rather to the access to an important external funding*"²¹⁹.

²¹⁶ Ibid. P. 109

²¹⁷ WRIGHT, Lawrence, *The Man behind Bin Laden: How an Egyptian Doctor Became a Master of Terror*, in New Yorker, September 16, 2002, pp.80-81

²¹⁸ GUNARATNA, Rohan, *Inside Al-Qa'ida: Global Network of Terror*, Hurst and Company, London, 2002, p. 6

²¹⁹ ICG, *Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State*, in ICG Africa Report, n. 45, May 23, 2002, p. 13.

In a great extent, the inflow coming from the Muslim Diasporas circulate among these charity networks, subsidizing and promoting either the integrism and its radical anti-West ideology expansion or the Islamic terrorist activity itself. On the other hand, the Diaspora is also important as it facilitates the infiltration of terrorist groups in many non-Muslim societies, like with European or American “cells” in the host countries.

Hence not being right to say that the Diaspora is in the origin or cause of terrorism, in reality it facilitates the action of integrists – that has been happening since a long time, although independent of their interaction with terrorist activities – and of terrorist networks such as the Al Qaeda.

Terrorism and autocratic Muslim States

I am forced to agree with Karin von Hippel when he refers those autocratic States with large Muslim majorities and with serious lack of democracy and government accountability are maybe the biggest “new type of terrorism” breeding grounds. Effectively, the terrorists that took part in the September 11th attacks and most of Al Qaeda’s members and affiliated groups, who collaborated or have been arrested for other terrorist acts come from these States. They oppose to what is considered repressive or profane in their own countries and accuse their leaders of not being truly Islamic and of being corrupted by Western influences. So they intend to establish “true Islamic States” to allow those countries to return to the “holy path” and find the ancient glory. These individuals anger is primarily directed against “non Islamic regimes of Muslim countries”; however since they are unable to express it in a constructive way and of raising changes locally they redirect their hatred against Western countries, starting by the USA, that support non representative “corrupts” and maintain the Muslim humiliation²²¹.

Among those countries we may name Algeria, Egypt or Pakistan. But the most eloquent case is Saudi Arabia. In the official report “Financing Terrorist”, published in October 2002, the New York’s Council on Foreign Relations stated: *“it is worth stating clearly and unambiguously what official U.S. government spokespersons have not. For years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda; and for years, Saudi*

²²¹ Ibid.

*officials have turned a blind eye to this problem.*²²² Also in a book published in 2001, Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié wrote, “almost all Islamic networks settled in the Near East, Africa and West would be financed through Saudi State and economic international institutions controlled by it: the Islamic Conference Organization (created in 1970), the World Islamic League (non-governmental organization with missionary goals, created in 1962), and mainly the holdings and Saudi banks such as the Faisal Islamic Bank, Dar al-mal, Dallah Al-Baraka”²²³. In the 90’s, the Saudi still offered “to Osama Bin Laden all means he ambitioned at the financial and operational level. And this relation would subsist, no matter what Saudis might affirm, until very recent times, beyond Sudan exile and many other attacks that might be ascribed (...) Osama Bin Laden would affirm in an interview not published agreed with a French periodic, that “Saudis have chosen (him) to be their representative in Afghanistan”²²⁴. Many elements collected allow them to affirm “there are many references to “state terrorism”, when we talk about Libya or Iran. Saudi Arabia is spared from the black lists for the simple reason that it is very important in the world oil stage. Without such wealth it would probably be well positioned in that lists”²²⁵. Osama Bin Laden represents a symbolic character of religious moves and interests that “lay under the Saudi regime”²²⁶.

In the same way, the report *Terrorism Financing - Roots and trends of Saudi terrorism financing*, by Jean-Charles Brisard for the United Nations Security Council, December 2002, includes a list of names of seven important Saudi personalities (Khalid bin Mahfouz, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Abdullah Suleiman al Rajhi, bankers and Adel Abdul Jalil Batterjee, Mohammed Hussein al Amoudi, Wa’el Hamza Julaidan, Yasin al Qadi, businessmen) and important Saudi charity organizations (Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation-Al-Bir Society, International Islamic Relief Organization-IIRO, Muslim World League-MWL, Rabita Trust and World Assembly of Muslim Youth-WAMY) that have financed the Al Qaeda.²²⁷

²²² Quoted from TORRES, Adelino, *Terrorismo: o Apocalipse da razão?*, op. Cit., p. 100

²²³ BRISARD, Jean-Charles, DASQUIE, Guillaume, *Ben Laden: La verité interdite*, 2001, p. 109, quoted by Adelino Torres, op. cit. p. 101

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid. , pp.99-100

Perceiving a warfare, and considering themselves as the preferred target of terrorist attacks and of “Rogue States” hatred, and facing the shock of their vulnerability before the asymmetric processes that are or might be used against, in the aftermath of September 11th the USA decided to establish a confrontation strategy and eradication of these asymmetric threats, being followed by a major part of the international community, although sometimes in different directions.

NEW STRATEGIES FOR NEW THREATS

“Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s defense... The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology — when that occurs, even weak States and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends — and we will oppose them with all our power.”

President George W. Bush,
West Point – Graduation Speech, New York, June 1, 2002

After September 11th attacks, the USA government, the European governments, the European Union and the United Nations, as well as other international organizations and States, responded to the war against terror with the **adoption of new and reinforced strategies that aim the step-up of political-diplomatic, economical-financial, police, military and intelligence activities and the implementation of new juridical and financial tools.** The “solutions” and **adequate answers** to fight the new threats – mainly terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction proliferation -, are generally unanimously known and recognized by all powers and specified in official documents produced on this subject. They all refer the need to **prevent and “anticipate” attacks and control the traffic** of materials susceptible of producing nuclear, chemical and bio-bacteriological weapons, which depends of good information systems and of the extraordinary collaboration and complicity among several *Intelligence* services. **Therefore, supervision, control, prevention and international co-operation are vital.** Everyone also recognizes that the “war against terror” implies a **wide range of**

activities: diplomacy and political pressure, aiming to reduce support to dangerous groups, raise a large international cooperation among States and within multilateral mechanisms, isolate terrorist supporting and/or sponsoring regimes, control WMD traffic and “proliferation” activities, prevent or solve conflicts and pacify certain regions that often attract terrorism; **economical-financial measures**, to “close” sources and dismantle terrorist groups’ funding networks; **measures for “development aid”**, to limit phenomena of poverty and exclusion of populations in need that are often manipulated by terrorism and supply the ground for recruitment. On the other hand **secret and military actions might turn into an option**, by three ways: eliminate physical bases or “training and operational camps” of terrorist organizations; use the threat of force and pre-positioning of troops to “dissuade” some regimes of continuing proliferation and terror supporting activities, denying those networks the “sanctuaries” from which they operate under governmental support and their lethal means; or even “to punish” those regimes that are illegally committed in gaining and /or spreading weapons of mass destruction and missile technology that are clearly sponsoring or propagating international terrorism.

Divergent strategies between European and American

Nevertheless if the majority of “solutions” and “answers” do not generate great international controversy (the difficulty is their effective implementation) mainly in what concerns terrorism and WMD proliferation, **there are however other essential components of the USA’s strategy for the “war against terror” that raise polemics** among the international community and are even opposed by many of their European allies. Besides, as recognized by the European “Mr. Terrorism”, Gijs de Vries, in a speech in Washington, on May 13, 2004: *“The EU and US strategies to combat terrorism have a lot in common. We do not only see the same threat. We both believe that no country can win this fight alone, that international, especially transatlantic co-operation is key in the fight against terror. We agree that a wide range of measures is necessary in this global campaign. Richard Armitage recently named five fronts for the US: diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence, and law*

*enforcement. Our security strategy is similar. We are in it together, but that does not mean that our response is or has to be exactly alike.*²²⁸

These polemic vectors of the North American strategy, that are described in documents such as the *National Security Strategy* of September 2002, and the *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism* published in February 2003, are the following:

- Coercive pressure upon the “Rogue States”,
- Possibility of formal multilateral mechanisms alienation,
- A new perception about preventive and preemptive actions.

Those vectors are added to the new American principle of “floating coalitions” or “will coalitions” which may imply the alienation or exemption of traditional alliances if necessary.

Coercive pressure upon “Rogue States” and multilateralism

One of the divergences in the fight against new threats between European and North American is the treatment given to the so-called “Rogue States” or “evil”; another controversy refers to the use of force in the “war against terror” and the importance given to the formal multilateral mechanisms. To simplify, let us use as examples the documents produced together by the European Union and the USA. In a document entitled *European Security Strategy – A secure Europe in a Better World* presented at the European Council, in Brussels on December 12, 2003, by Javier Solana, it is stated, “*Large-scale aggression against any Member State (EU) is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats, which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable*”²²⁹ While listing the main threats the document explicitly refers to terrorism, affirming “*Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical*

²²⁸ VRIES, Gijs De, *European Strategy in the fight against terrorism and the co-operation with the United States*, speech in CSIS European dialogue lunch, Washington, May 13, 2004, p. 3. Available on the internet at www.europa.eu.int

²²⁹ *European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World*, document presented by the CFSP High Representative, Javier Solana, European Council in Brussels, December 12, 2003, p. 3, available on the internet at www.europa.eu.int

bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable”²³⁰ – and the proliferation of weapons of massive destruction, described as “potentially the greatest threat to our security”²³¹. Alike the North Americans, the European Security Strategy assumes that “The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction”²³². Even so, this real “European Strategic Concept” only relates terrorism and WMD proliferation with the regional conflicts, “failed States” and organized crime, or, it does not refer the relation between those threats and “Rogue States”.

Well, the USA’s references to threats not only mention “Rogue States”, “outcast” or “evil” but also affirm to fight against them. Although in their *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the USA affirm: “we will not have a single, inflexible approach to handling the recognized state sponsors of terrorism. Each case is unique, with different interest and legacy issues involved. Each situation demands specifically tailored policies”²³³ they consider acting “independently” to change the behavior of those countries: “when States prove reluctant or unwilling to meet their international obligations to deny support and sanctuary to terrorists, the United States, in cooperation with friends and allies, or if necessary, acting independently, will take appropriate steps to convince them to change their policies (...) Of particular importance is working to prevent terrorists from acquiring the capability to use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, or high-yield explosives”²³⁴.

On the other hand, the North American government states “The United States does not propose to undertake this difficult challenge (war to terrorism) alone. The United States has neither the resources nor the expertise to be in every place in the world. (...) Our friends and allies face many of the same threats. It is essential for America to work with its friends and allies in this campaign”²³⁵. This principle of

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid., p. 4

²³³ *National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 18. Available on the internet at www.whitehouse.gov

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 17

²³⁵ Ibid. p. 23

attempting to cooperate with its “friends and allies” is constant in all American speeches and documents that also highlight the American commitment in **acting under multilateral organizations’ scope**. Regardless, they also end to equally admit the possibility/necessity of USA’s isolated initiatives outside of official multilateral mechanisms. This attitude is clearly distinct from the Europeans’, which always appeal to official multilateralism and international organizations. For instance, the here-referred *European Security Strategy* says “*the end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own*”²³⁶ and adds “***Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. (...) The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. We want international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken***”²³⁷.

Like the North American, the European countries are considering to act military on war against terrorism and against weapons of massive destruction proliferation, but unlike them they express determination in only doing it under the scope of official mechanisms, in particular the United Nations. This idea is expressed, for instance in the *EU Strategy Against Massive Destruction Weapons Proliferation, of December 2003*: “*Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organizations form the first line of defense against proliferation. When these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role*”²³⁸.

²³⁶ *European Security Strategy – A secure Europe in a Better World*, op. cit. p. 1

²³⁷ *Ibid.* P. 9 Bold by the author

²³⁸ European Union, *EU Strategy against Massive Destruction Weapons Proliferation*, December 2003, Chapter II, paragraph 15. Bold by the author. Available on the Internet at www.europa.eu.int

The use of military force in the war against terrorism and WMD proliferation, specially to coerce and punish “Rogue States” – despite their ability to sponsor terrorism and take part in proliferating activities – is highly polemical, in the extent that it contains “interference right” and “attempts on State sovereignty” that are not widely accepted. Still, **Bush Administration went even farther when announced as part of their strategy of fight against new threats the “preventive and preemptive actions” and “will coalitions”**. Actually, the prevention and preemption strategy is not new. The news is how the USA are emphasizing it and the emergence that the North American new strategic doctrine gives it in the *US National Security Strategy*, approved in September 2002.

Preventive and Preemptive actions

With the September 11th attacks very recent in everyone’s memories, President **Bush started indicating a change in the USA’ strategy**, in his State of the Union speech, on January 29, 2002, by two expressions used: *“we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world (...) I will not wait on events, while dangers gather”*²³⁹. In the same speech, Bush refers to the “axis of evil”, mentioning Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Afterwards in another speech at West Point, on June 1, 2002, the American President clarified the implications of his new strategic doctrine, comparing the current situation with the Cold War period: *“For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply.(...) If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long (...) We must take the battle to the enemy(...) and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act”*²⁴⁰. Not long after, Vice-president Dick Cheney has quoted the Israeli bombing to Iraqi nuclear premises in Osirak, built with the French support, near Baghdad,

²³⁹ Bush, President George W., *State of the Union* speech at the Congress, January 29, 2002. Available on the internet at www.whitehouse.gov

²⁴⁰ Bush, President George W., West Point Graduation Speech, New York, June 1, 2002, Available on the internet at www.whitehouse.gov

on June 7, 1981, as an example of necessary actions to be taken against those who have nuclear ambitions like Saddam Hussein²⁴¹. More explicit was Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, when he intervened in the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), on December 2002: “*The notion that we can wait to prepare assumes that we will know when the threat is imminent (...) When were the attacks of September 11th imminent? Certainly they were imminent on September 10th, although we didn’t know it (...) anyone who believes that we can wait until we have certain knowledge that attacks are imminent, has failed to connect the dots that led to September 11th*”²⁴².

Meanwhile, on September 17, 2002, the Bush administration introduced the new *US National Security Strategy* (NSS) one of the most controversial documents in the post cold war USA. The fundamental meaning of this document is found on Chapter 5, entitled Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening us, Our Allies and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction. It begins by **explaining the USA’s need of adopting a new strategy**: “*We must be prepared to stop Rogue States and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction (...) We cannot let our enemies strike first. In the Cold War... Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of Rogue States (...) For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack (...) international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat (...) We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries*”²⁴³. Right after, the document expresses the new strategy in one of the most controversial phrases: “*The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,*

²⁴¹ Cheney, Vice-President Dick, Speech to the Veterans of the Foreign Wars in Nashville, August 26, 2002. Available on the Internet at www.whitehouse.gov. Bold by the author.

²⁴² See www.dod.gov/speeches/2002/s20021202-depsecdef.html. Bold by the author

²⁴³ *US National Security Strategy*, Chapter 5 - Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening us, Our Allies and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction, September 2002. Available on the Internet at www.whitehouse.gov. Bold by the author.

*even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively (...) We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions"*²⁴⁴.

The long quotation here referred is quite clear about the reach of this revision and the USA's motivation for "actions" they are willing to undertake in the "war against terror", as well as about the controversy it has triggered (we shall return to this subject later in the book).

However, their new strategic doctrine about "preventive and preemptive" actions is still "in progress"²⁴⁵, showing some ambiguity on the concepts of "prevention" and "preemption". The concept of "imminent threat" is also closely attached to this concepts redefinition.

"Prevention", "Preemption" and "Imminent Threat"

Confusion and controversy between "prevention and "preemption" is nothing new, specially when the objective is to have legitimacy for an action, for creating domestic or international law or defining a specific action in a specific case. Anyway, **on a strategic speech the "prevention" notion makes reference either to crisis or conflicts management or to strengthen a pre-positioning, before an eventual threat. Hence, the "preventive action" should be carried out to avoid the confirmation of a threat or aggression that would request the use of major strength. On the other hand, the "preemptive action" notion has been used within the frame of "legitimate defense" to designate an anticipated military act before a direct and imminent threat; the aggressor is attacked on the precise moment that he is thinking of attacking us – as in 1967 when Israel started the "Six-day war" in the imminence of an Arab attack. That means that apparently the "preemptive action" implies the use of lethal force anticipatorily, while the "preventive action" might be faced as an alternative to major strength. To some degree, this is the interpretation, when the *USA National Security Strategy* affirms,**

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Following the expression of HEISBOURG, François, *A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and its Consequences*, in the *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2003, pp.78-88.

“to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively”.

Similar expressions to this one (and to others already referred) are written in other countries' strategic defense concepts without raising any polemics. That is the case of *France's Programming of Military Law 2003-2008*, also approved in September 2002. This document redefines the French strategy post September 11th, based on the four traditional pillars: deterrence, prevention, force projection and protection. Nevertheless, on the Chapter 3 – Strategic functions, the resort to preemptive action is admitted: *“Outside our borders, within the framework of prevention and projection-action, we must be able to identify and prevent threats as soon as possible. Within this framework, possible preemptive action is not out of the question...”*²⁴⁶. A bit further, on the detailed description of strategic functions, the need for prevention is reasserted. *“Prevention is the first step in the implementation of our defense strategy, whose choices have been confirmed by the appearance of the asymmetric threat phenomenon. (...) Through intelligence, it must have the capability to anticipate and assess any situation autonomously”*²⁴⁷.

For all that, **how can we understand all polemics and quarrels about this subject between France and the USA?** The explanation lies on two short phrases of each of the documents analyzed. **In the French**, *“...possible preemptive action is not out of the question, where an explicit and confirmed threat has been recognized.”*²⁴⁸. On the other side, the *US National Security Strategy* defends *“taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack”*²⁴⁹. So, the American new strategic doctrine foresees the possibility of **undertaking a preemptive action, using lethal force in the scope of “prevention” or, before the threat is effectively imminent** - as in 1981, when Israel bombed the Osirak nuclear reactor. This means that instead of a preemptive action being exclusively triggered as self defense mechanism before an imminent threat, the **USA begin to consider using it priory and offensively in**

²⁴⁶ *Loi de Programmation Militaire de la France 2003-2008, Chap. 3 – les Fonctions Stratégiques*, available on the internet at www.defense.gouv.fr. Bold by the author.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ *US National Security Strategy*, op. cit

the field of prevention. In the case of France and other countries the possibility of acting preemptively depends on the occurrence and recognition of an evident direct and imminent threat.

Preemption and Iraq

The concept of “imminent threat” and the resort to preemption, in particular to face new threats (that are inherently diffuse, “invisible” and unpredictable) is deeply subjective being the reason for most of the divergences. However, **the question might be even worst if the potential threat comes from a “Rogue State”** – because it implies a judgment about “good or bad” government, regime or behavior and about the emergency of preemptively resorting to force. Well, this judgment is seldom coincident among great powers, **as was seen in Iraq.**

It is worthwhile to stop and quote **some passages of the controversial Resolution 1441, unanimously approved by the UN Security Council in the 4644th meeting, on November 8, 2002** (see Annex 2). Using a specially serious language, after recalling to successive resolutions referring to the Iraqi armaments program, **the Security Council**

“(...) Deploing the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programs (...)

(...) Deploing further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)(...)

(...) Deploing the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification (...)

(...) Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations (...)

1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations (...)

2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime (...)

3. *Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other (...)*

4. *Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations (...)*

5. *Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access (...)*

10. *Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programs (...)*

13. *Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations (...)*²⁵⁰

In a large extent, the Coalition's military intervention in Iraq was driven by the conviction that if Saddam had weapons of mass destruction –having possessed it and used it before, it was a serious threat for the world's security and specially for some of its neighbors (Iran, Kuwait, Israel and Saudi Arabia) and for the USA (specially through terrorist groups to whom he might supply those weapons). Consequently and even with remaining doubts about the existence and location of those WMD in Iraq, **Washington decided to act “preemptively”, without express authorization from the UN Security Council, to “prevent”/stop Saddam's regime access to those weapons.** Thence, the American and British emphasis on the UN Security Council resolution 1441, where it demanded Saddam to “prove” having get rid of all that armament, and the unconditional cooperation with the UN and IAEA inspectors or he would “*suffer serious consequences*”. *Per contra*, the French-German axis, Russia, China and others non-recognition of Saddam's

²⁵⁰ United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1441 (2002) available on the Internet at www.un.com. Bold by the author.

Iraq as direct and imminent threat (although admitting the possibility of disposing of those weapons), could not consider the use of force. So they left to the USA to “prove” that Saddam was an imminent threat, namely through the unequivocal demonstration of his illegal possession of weapons of massive destruction – subverting the formal request on the text of the resolution 1441, which they approved -, and insisted on the continuing of inspections until a *de facto* confirmation of his possession of those weapons. Opposing considerations led to the known impasse.

In fact, it is extremely complex to integrate the new preventive/preemptive actions amplitude and the renewed concept of “imminent threat”, as defined by the new North American strategic doctrine, within the scope of the International Law and the frame of the United Nations. Not only because it depends from a delicate analysis of each case, but also because the threats perception and its “imminent” character change according to the analysis and interests of each of the powers involved. Consequently, referring to the **events around Iraq** we have to admit that **this subject has become even more complex and ambiguous**. In fact, **having created a new strategic doctrine**, which spread the possibilities of resort to preemptive acts on the field of prevention – having Iraq at sight -, **the USA invoked the successive violations of several (seventeen) UN resolutions to “punish” Iraq’s behavior**.

Hence, the military intervention in Iraq was simultaneously “preemptive” – as an anticipatory act to prevent the threat of its alleged possession of weapons of massive destruction - and “punishing” – to sanction Baghdad for not complying with the UN SC resolutions, aiming to dissolve Saddam’s regime.

Maybe for all ambiguity and polemics raised by the real meaning and amplitude of the new US “preemptive acts”, the former Secretary of State Colin Powell in an above referred article published in early 2004, (long after the intervention in Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s removal) regrets that “*some observers have exaggerated both the scope of preemption in foreign policy and the centrality of preemption in U.S. strategy (...) The discussion of preemption in the NSS takes up just two sentences in one of the document’s eight sections*”²⁵¹ and clarifies that “*as to*

²⁵¹ POWELL, Colin L., *A Strategy of Partnerships*, op. cit. p. 24

*preemption's scope, it applies only to the undeterrable threats that come from non-State actors such as terrorist groups. It was never meant to displace deterrence, only to supplement it (...) The United States' National Security Strategy does commit us to preemption under certain limited circumstances*²⁵². So, it is now public - after the intervention and all controversy, and at times when instability in the territory and uncertainties for Iraq's future grow - **that preemption is not a strategy to use against States but only against "non-State actors"**. However, apparently that was not the vision until Iraq's intervention.

Regardless of other considerations we might do about preemption and its relation with the Iraq crisis, it is worth to recall an essential paragraph of the US National Security Strategy that is seldom referred: "*The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression (...) The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just*"²⁵³.

UNI-MULTILATERALISM, "FLOATING COALITIONS" AND "WILL COALITIONS"

Although some affirm it, the USA's interventions after the Cold war have **not really been "unilateral"**: Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia have occurred under the United Nations hat; in Kosovo they were accompanied by the remaining NATO countries. In Afghanistan, although they opted to do it with British allies only, they priory gathered an impressive international coalition against terrorism, which isolated the Taliban regime since the beginning; they had NATO' support - that for the first time had invoked the collective defense system included on the 5th paragraph; and obtained a UN Security Council's resolution that legitimized their "self defense" right. Finally with Iraq, they had other countries' military collaboration and assembled a coalition of supporters (44 countries, according to the White House) that politically helped carrying the burden. Nevertheless, **every time that their vital interests are at stake and are not sufficiently protected within**

²⁵² Ibid., pp. 24-25, Bold by the author.

²⁵³ US National Security Strategy, Chapter 5, op cit. See Annex 3.

the multilateral mechanisms and formal treaties and conventions, Washington easily opts by the unilateralism – as demonstrated the Kyoto Protocol and the International Penal Court boycotts, non signature or ratification of several international armaments conventions (for instance, anti-personal mines, biological and chemical weapons), abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the **military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (simultaneously and contradictory “unilateral” and “multilateral”)**, etc. The permanent and vehement American reference to “allies and friends” also says implicitly that although preferring to act within multilateral mechanisms, if possible, they can also act alone, if necessary, but they would prefer to do it with traditionally close countries, that must colligate with them.

On the USA' strategy, **unilateralism and multilateralism do not mutually exclude each other, proceeding with the formula “multilateralism when possible, unilateralism when necessary”**²⁵⁴. Actually, *“instead of the heavy alliances architecture inherited from the cold war period, the American leaders started preferring “floating coalitions”, defined each case for each specific mission”*²⁵⁵ for the campaign against new threats, *“to surpass inherent limitations of the formal multilateral mechanisms and alliances”*²⁵⁶. Using an innovative formula **“missions determine coalitions”, the USA take the initiative and the followers will access the “will coalitions”**. The examples succeed: a **“coalition” for the campaign against the Taliban** (USA, United Kingdom, Australia, NATO group, Pakistan, India, Japan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia were in the front line), **another to stabilize Afghanistan** (NATO mission under the auspices of the United Nations, with the military collaboration of countries like Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine); a **great coalition for the war against integrist pan-Islamic terrorism** (USA, Russia, European Union, NATO, Israel, India, Turkey, Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Japan, Pakistan and others); a **coalition for the military campaign against Saddam's regime** (mainly the USA, United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, Spain, Denmark, Kuwait and Qatar) and **another, broader for the “stabilization**

²⁵⁴ On this subject see ALMEIDA, João Marques de, *Hegemonia Americana e Multilateralismo*, in *Janus 2003*, op. cit., pp. 106-107

²⁵⁵ See GASPAR, Carlos, *O Regresso do Realismo*, in *Janus 2003*, Op. Cit. pp. 104-105

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

phase” of Iraq; a coalition for the resolution of Palestine issue (USA, UNO, EU and Russia – the main actors of the *Road Map*); **another to solve peacefully the problem of North Korea armament program** (USA, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia, besides the ONU and the IAEA); **another to pressure Iran** to give up on its nuclear program (UNO, IAEA, EU, Russia, China and the USA); **a coalition for the effective fight against weapons of mass destruction proliferation** (Proliferation Security Initiative), etc. Well, one can say that this is the height of the **uni-multilateralism**.

Let us now analyse some **recent examples of this uni-multilateralism** in which the USA take the initiative and the leadership, to be afterwards broaden to “allies and friends”.

One is the *Proliferation Security Initiative* (PSI) formally announced in Poland on May 31, 2003 by George W. Bush, in the peak of Iraq crisis. The PSI is a rather unformal “coalition” between 14 countries, for now – Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, United Kingdom and the USA – having other 60 countries endorsed this initiative. Recently the USA has celebrated treaties with Liberia (February 11, 2004), and Panama (May 12) to strengthen the PSI. Being justified by the new threats and answering to the UN’s appeal to effective efforts against the proliferating activities, the main goal of the PSI is the “**preventive and, if necessary, preemptive interdiction of proliferation**”, or to harmonize and coordinate efforts to control weapons of mass destruction traffic through the exchange and analysis of information, group exercises, and a biggest collaboration in the detention and inspection of suspect vessels and aircrafts entering in the territorial seas or airspace of member countries. For instance in October 2003, the USA, the UK, Germany and Italy acted under the auspices of the PSI by intercepting an illegal cargo of centrifuge pieces for uranium enrichment in Libya. Currently, there are several exercises on the scope of the PSI, in the Mediterranean and Pacific and the members have launched a campaign for the adherence of Asia and Middle East coastal countries. The PSI fifth meeting was held in Lisbon’s Palácio Foz, on March 4, 5, 2004 proceeding with former meetings deliberations, of Madrid (12/06/2003), Brisbane (09/07/2003), Paris (3-4/09/2003) and London

(9-10/10/2003). To celebrate the PSI's anniversary Poland has offered to host this year's meeting in Krakow²⁵⁷.

Another example of this multilateralism – different from the former, as it happens within a formal alliance, NATO – is the brand new **NATO Response Force (NRF)**. An American initiative launched on November 2002 during the Prague Summit, the NRF was conceived to have **great flexibility, technologically advanced and with fire power, high readiness, high interoperability integrating sea, land and air capability aiming to face more effectively the current asymmetric threats and answer to new challenges**. By 2006, when the final Operational Capability will be reached, the NRF will “only” have a contingent of 21,000 militaries (a small figure, if we remind that NATO disposes of 4 million and 300 thousand troops), ready within 5 days and self-sustainable for 30 days, being these forces available for quick deployment *wherever is necessary* supporting long distance operations, including war theatres of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. These capacities will likely end the *out-of-area* debate that has contributed to undermine the transatlantic relations, since the Alliance will be able to lead missions outside of the European continent (as already occurs in Afghanistan), though there are still adversaries to what they call an effort to “globalize” NATO. Notwithstanding the kind of force, capacities, schedule and command structure being conceptually defined, some ambiguity remains about the missions, thus revealing the Euro-Atlantic divergences about the amplitude of “preventive/preemptive actions” that *NATO Response Force* should undertake²⁵⁸.

The way in which the USA have dealt with Iran and North Korea, the other members of the “axis of evil”, is also uni-multilateral – demonstrating that Iraq was an exceptional case. Taking on the confrontation initiative and at the same time imposing or maintaining sanctions and implicitly threatening with the use

²⁵⁷ On this subject, see for instance *The Proliferation Security Initiative – An Interdiction Strategy*, in *Strategic Comments*, IISS, Vol. 9, n. 6, August 2003, available on the internet at www.iiss.org, or the governmental websites of the member countries

²⁵⁸ See TOMÉ, Luís L., *A omnipresença militar norte-americana e a nova NATO*, in *Janus 2004*, op. cit. pp.24-25. More detailed information on the NRF is available on NATO's website at www.nato.int

of force, to prevent Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons and make them give up on their nuclear armament and missile technology programs, (although exhibiting military force) the USA' strategies in both cases go through a traditional multilateral diplomatic approach – either in connection with other powers (specially Russia, China, and the EU) and with international regulation institutions, the UNO and IAEA -, to change Teheran and Pyongyang behaviors and reach the conflicts pacific resolution.

THE USA, THE UNO AND THE IRAQ AFFAIR

The US relationship with the United Nations is maybe the most paradigmatic case of uni-multilateralism here described. Most States act both unilaterally and multilaterally: the former in defense of their national security “or influence zone” and vital interests, the latter in pursuit of global and international causes.

The larger a power influence zone and capacities, however, the greater the tendency to act unilaterally and the greater the number of countries affected – this is the USA's dilemma. In fact, despite being able to act unilaterally and sometimes doing it, the USA also look for the benefits of multilateralism.

The United Nations is the multilateral institution in excellence. In this organism, and others, the North American search for “the power of legitimacy”, once they prefer to act in the name of Law and “International Community” rather than to act in the name of the national security²⁵⁹. On the other hand, articulating policies and strategies in the scope of multilateralism allows the United States to maximize its “soft power” attracting and persuading others to adopt the American agenda. Finally, only through truly multilateral mechanisms, particularly under the sphere of an authority such as the United Nations, might some issues be considered as global challenges and threats and the financial and political costs of stabilization projects be shared. On account of these advantages Washington plays many of its strategies within the mechanisms and procedures of the United Nations, and not just because they reject the unilateralism in

²⁵⁹ See THAROOR, Shashi, *Why America Still Needs the United Nations*, in Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003.

favor of the multilateralism. Similarly that is the base for the USA to have always kept open the way for the commitment of the UNO, despite having acted unilaterally against Iraq.

Except that, in many occasions the United Nations consists of “disunited nations”. Being founded in a substantially different context in 1945, the UNO is not made of neutral or impartial entities but of sovereign States with national interests that are often in conflict. This reality starts in the Security Council five members, which possess the exclusive right to veto. We may note that through “veto”, the United States, France, United Kingdom, Russia and China, or their protected and “friends” will never be under an hostile resolution of the United Nations Security Council. This helps to clarify many of the ambiguities and contradictions of the UNO functioning and its relation with international “legality”. As we saw with Iraq crisis. In this case, the security concerns had rather different levels among Americans and some Europeans, Russians and Chinese; the interests related with the exploration of Iraqi oil were clearly contentious – the French and Russian were the most involved in Iraq oil exploration, being their biggest commercial partners and investors (they inclusively had celebrated huge contracts with Saddam to reinforce the exploration in a post sanctions period), and the American were not indifferent to those resources, which they also wanted. Consequently, the UNO’s “disunited nations” agreed in the threat identification, and as recognized by the UNO’s Secretary General Koffi Annan, “*it seems that, where we disagree is in the way to answer to those threats*”²⁶⁰.

The evolution of the controversy around Iraq led the USA to opt for the “unilateralism”, deliberately surpassing the United Nations to act against Saddam’s regime – since the other powers did not allow doing it with an explicit mandate of the United Nations’s Security Council. However, we should recall countless cases where force have been used against the political independence and territorial integrity of States, by many actors, have not been authorized by the Security Council, and cannot be placed within any reasonable conception of self-defense:

²⁶⁰ ANNAN, Koffi, Opening speech of the 58th Session of the General Assembly of the UNO, September 23, 2003, available on the internet at www.un.org

Anthony Clark Arend elaborated the following list: *the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia (1948); the North Korean invasion of South Korea (1950); U.S. actions in Guatemala (1954); the Israeli, French, and British invasion of Egypt (1956); the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956); the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion (1961); the Indian invasion of Goa (1961); the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic (1965); the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968); the Arab action in the 1973 Six-Day War; North Vietnamese actions against South Vietnam (1960–1975); the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (1979); the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979); the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda (1979); the Argentine invasion of the Falklands (1982); the U.S. invasion of Grenada (1983); the U.S. invasion of Panama (1989); the Iraqi attack on Kuwait (1990); and the NATO/U.S. actions against Yugoslavia in the Kosovo situation (1999)*²⁶¹. In such a roll I cannot resist to include at least Indonesia's invasion of East Timor (1975). And, one could add to this list numerous acts of intervention in domestic conflict, covert and secret actions. In short, **the most powerful States have used force in violation of the basic UN Charter.**

Since the Gulf War Saddam Hussein has disrespected the UNO, violating 17 Security Council's resolutions (including 1441) and **contributing to the institution impuissance**. In the beginning of this crisis, **President Bush was peremptory affirming that the UN SC should be able to enforce the resolutions or the USA would do it:** "*But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted... The Security Council resolutions will be enforced ... or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy (Saddam's regime) will also lose its power. ...*"²⁶². One might think that this determination and unilateralist impetus are exclusive of Bush's administration. However, **in 1994, Madeleine Albright, then USA's ambassador in the UNO, declared with similar spirit:** "*the new policy aims to avoid requesting to the UNO accomplishment of missions that it has no*

²⁶¹ AREND, Anthony Clark, *International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force*, in the *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2003, p.100.

²⁶² BUSH, President George W., Speech on the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 12, quoted by SACHETTI, António Emílio, *Estratégia e Relações de Poder*, op. cit., p. 442

²⁶³ Quoted by JENKINS, Tony, *Nova Desordem Internacional*, in *Expresso* newspaper, May 7, 1994.

*tools to perform and that we will help it to be successful in the missions that we would like to be accomplished*²⁶³. Following this line and aware of the constraints inherent to the UNO's possibilities of efficient accomplishment of its missions and imposition of resolutions **Boutros Boutros-Gali, former UNO Secretary General**, said, regarding to the **"Agenda for Peace"** initiative welcomed in the Security Council and applauded in the General Assembly, referring to several possible modalities of action for Peace defense, including the **"compulsive disarmament"** (essentially dealing with Iraq disarmament): *"The United Nations does not have or claim a monopoly of any of these instruments. All can be, and most of them have been, employed by regional organizations, by ad hoc groups of States or by individual States"*²⁶⁴. In fact, referring to Iraq the USA has formed an "ad hoc group" for this purpose.

Naturally a great defender of multilateralism, **Kofi Annan**, on September 23, 2003 in the opening speech of the 58th General Assembly of the UNO, following to the crisis and the American intervention in Iraq, **showed displeasure towards the Bush administration** considering *"This logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty-eight years"*²⁶⁵. Although he has a point, we must admit that **the challenge comes "from this logic" as much of the new threats and the UN unreadiness or inability to answer them**. Effectively, **this logic leads to the other**. Being unable to obtain a second Security Council's resolution expressly authorizing the use of force against Iraq, the USA moved forward "unilaterally", according to their interests and security but also to put in force the UNO Security Council's resolutions, continuously violated by Saddam. **It is a cruel paradox: to impose the respect on international law, the USA have acted above that law**.

The existence of weapons of mass destruction has not been proved therefore harming Bush Administration and Tony Blair government's credibility. And, in general it also harms the confidence in the West secret services compromising

²⁶⁴ BOUTROS-GALI, Boutros, *Agenda for Peace*, 2nd edition, Information Dpt., United Nations Information Center, 1995, p. 13, quoted by SACHETTI, António Emilio, *Estratégia e Relações de Poder*, op. cit., p. 443

²⁶⁵ Annan, Kofi, Address to the General Assembly, September 23, 2003, Available on the internet at www.un.org

those who have supported the intervention on that basis. By the way, I recall an interview of **Hans Blix**, former UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), for Iraq disarmament, on middle April 2003, or after Saddam's removal. He was interviewed by *Expresso* newspaper, where he affirmed **that weapons of mass destruction were the fourth reason that made the American go to war** because *"it had left behind the terrorism, the war against an immoral regime and the change of regime, but the American wanted a guaranty. They feared that Iraq had kept weapons of mass destruction, and that together with the September 11 experience and the fear of a terrorist operation (...)"*²⁶⁶. When asked **if the USA were willing to cancel the invasion**, he gives a laconic reply: *"Yes. I think they were always willing to cancel any preparations, if the Iraqi were decided to enter into a broader cooperation"*²⁶⁷. **About Iraq uncooperative behavior** he said: *"If they did not have it (WMD), or if they only had fragments and remains of the past, we should ask why have they not acted differently (...) I confess that I meditate a lot on that and wonder. One of the reasons that I always thought of is pride. Would there have been a wish to defy the USA and UNO? If this is not the reason then it is hard to understand"*²⁶⁸. In what concerns the **reasons for the war (WMD)**, Hans Blix, former UN Chief-inspector refer *"I think that an authorization of the Security Council would be enough justification for an armed intervention, indeed. After all, Iraq had violated a non proliferation treaty and also failed cooperation for fulfilling of 687 Resolution"*²⁶⁹.

Currently, **more than a year and a half after President Bush has declared "the end of war" in Iraq**, the USA heighten the pressure to involve the United Nations on the resolution of the multiple problems related with the current and future situation of that country. Obviously, the environment was also very pressured by the American presidential elections; by the successive errors during stabilization and reconstruction phases in Iraq; by the serious insecurity atmosphere in the country made of daily attacks and confrontations; by the unstoppable increase of "casualties" among North American and Coalition militaries (having

²⁶⁶ Interview by JENKINS, Tony, *Expresso* newspaper correspondent in New York, published in *Unica* magazine, April, 18, 2003, p. 72

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 70

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 71

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 70

the large majority decreased during “stabilization”); by the meaningful decrease of domestic support to the North American military presence in Iraq (before most of the North American said that the USA were right to go to war; in April 2004 53% still had the same opinion; in May that number drop off to 48%, and 46% affirmed that war was a mistake²⁷⁰); or by the scandal around abuse of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison, Baghdad. It is also true that on and on the White House has requested the approval of additional budgets from the Congress (in September 2003, in the amount of 87 billion USD – 66 billion USD to support the ongoing military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other aspects of the “war against terrorism”, and 21 billion USD for assistance in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq – request that has followed the supplementary 70 billion USD approved in April 2003) and is loosing space on this issue. Also important is the “return of power to Iraqi” and a new transitory period that should hold elections (January 2005), expected to have great turbulence and new problems. In effect, to be able to declare the “mission accomplished” soon the American would like to withdraw their troops from Iraq, and if possible to leave a democratic, safe, wealthier and non-hostile country. Thus the **intuition that the USA are only involving the UN to detach themselves and not be liable for “Iraq muddle”** is understandable. However and independently of the existing divergences about the military intervention in Iraq, today the situation demands good sense and hard work to find the adequate alternatives for the solution of many problems. Evidently, these **alternatives will always pass through the United Nations**. To avoid aggravating Iraq situation and worsening of international atmosphere is fundamental. We should also notice that UNO is involved in a fraud and corruption scandal related with the management of the “Oil for Food” program, with allegedly involved UN officials in business (making the Security Council to deliberate on this matter in Resolution 1538, approved on April 21, 2004²⁷¹). The bottom line is to find out if the “disunited nations” of UNO have overcome their squabbles, allowing the organization to arrogate its role in Iraq stabilization and reconstruction – for the benefit of the Iraqi people and safeguard of the collective action defense.

²⁷⁰ Data quoted in *Bush Prisioneiro de Guerra*, in *Visão* magazine, nº 585, May, 20 to 26, 2004, p. 85

²⁷¹ Resolution 1538, approved by the UN Security Council in the 4946th session, on April 2004. Available on the internet at www.un.org

Conclusions

“No nation can build a safer, better world alone”

US National Security Strategy, September 2002

*“I think that the main difference between European and American is the September 11th”*²⁷²

Hans Blix, former UN Chief of inspectors for the Iraq disarmament (UNMOVIC), April 2003

“We must show that those concerns (security in response to the threats) can, and will, be addressed effectively through collective action”.

Koffi Annan, UN the Secretary-General, September 2003

The new world's geopolitical outline derives from the effects caused by two “detonator” events – the end of Cold War and the September 11th – and by other “revealing” event – the Iraq crisis. Detonators have produced deep changes in the international system and led to substantial changes in the world's power structure, in the extent that both were seized by the USA to expand its strategic sphere. However, if the **superpower relations with China and Russia have improved significantly in the aftermath of the September 11th and the “war against terror”**, the **transatlantic relations had a descendent movement**, due to the aggravation of divergences about adequate strategies to face new threats. **The crisis around the military intervention in Iraq was mainly a ”revelation” of those squabbles between American and European**, with tremendous consequences for the authority and prestige of the United Nations, Atlantic Alliance and European Union cohesion. On the other hand, the Iraq affair also disclosed the United Nations inability of imposing the international law with respect, and the USA's propensity to act “unilaterally” if that is considered to be useful or necessary. Notwithstanding, after a fast and successful military operation that removed Saddam's regime, **Iraq's situation evolution demonstrated to American the risks of unilateralism** and the crucial role developed by the allies in security, reconstruction, stabilization and imposition/peace keeping management.

²⁷² Interview by JENKINS, Tony, Expresso newspaper's correspondent in New York, published in *Única* magazine, April 18, 2003, p. 72

Following to these events, the **uni-multipolarity that currently distinguishes the world's power structure gets along with two large geopolitical movements: the game of "multiple containment"**, between the USA's hegemonic pressure and those striving to contain or even oppose that hegemony; and, on the other hand, the **new world war** between the "new type of terrorism" and those determined to make the "war against terror".

One can argue that the terrorist threat is not new in this era, as it exists since long. The truth is that the **"new type of terrorism" has specific characteristics, enjoying of important advantages and resorting to "hyper-means"**, which makes it different from the "traditional terrorism" and considerably more dangerous. Actually, the dangers coming out of terrorism are dissociable of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation: the coincidence of these two threats – terrorism and WMD – exponentially increases the danger. These are not merely "challenges": we should be aware that new asymmetric actors that we face might dispose of extraordinary lethal means, capable of violence of apocalyptic dimensions. Those threats are not exclusive of States and militaries – on the opposite. Among other things, **this conditions the change of strategic and geopolitical behavior patterns, the re-evaluation of defense and security doctrines and mechanisms, the re-thinking of mediation in the sense of "avoid war" or "make peace"...** If a part of threats and risks do not come from States and if there is a type of "war" going in which one of the sides is not a State or a coalition of States, this will change many things. For instance, deterrence will not work for the containment or prevention of certain kind of aggressions. It might be worth between States but it will not be valid for several "lords of war", against radical groups or organizations such as the Al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the opposite might happen: there is a tremendous risk of a State or coalition being dissuaded (or blackmailed) by any terrorist group or a "lord of war". Besides, the preparation of an aggression does not disclose the aggressor, as the traditional concentration of forces does not exist nor the "early warning" is similar. Finally, the relation with this type of threats and aggressors does not include the appeal to preventive diplomacy or negotiated solutions. Hence, there is an important remark: **the main responsibility to eliminate, reduce or weaken those threats and risks belongs to each State individually and above all, to the concert of States through collective action.** The States are still the guaranty of domestic and international security, no

matter how asymmetric and diffuse the threats are. Apparently not all of them take it in the same way.

Threats like the “new type of terrorism” and weapons of mass destruction proliferation cannot be duly prevented, contained and eliminated unless there is large international cooperation, the effective commitment of great powers, the engagement of multilateral mechanisms and collective action. This means that **it is impossible for one country alone, regardless how strong and endowed it is, to take over the task of turning the world into a better and safer place, as also recognized by the USA.**

Anyway, the current **huge controversy** going on the international system, particularly between European and American, **is not about the identification and recognition of threats** (although there is a distinction also) **but on the strategies and adequate actions to face them.** Moreover, if on the one hand, there is the question of military action and on the other, if the target is a State, some persevere on the exclusivity of actions within the scope of treaties, international conventions and formal multilateral mechanisms – particularly the United Nations -, while others underline the obstacles and limitations inherent to these procedures, considering independent action.

The “unilateral option” is clearly part of the USA’ strategy if the vital interests are in cause and are not properly protected through formal multilateralism. From the beginning, the USA’ singular position at the top of the world’s power hierarchy created unilateralist tendencies, because “they can act alone” – and the geopolitical logic makes them preserve maximum capacity to be able to do it. This tendency is not entirely new, as it already existed since the first half of the 90’s. Meanwhile, **the brand new factor was the September 11th**, which has underlined the reality and dimension of the “new type of terrorism”, has disclosed the powerful USA’s vulnerability before their adversaries’ asymmetric processes, and made the superpower determinedly predisposed to fight and eliminate new threats.

Feeling vulnerable and a preferred target in the asymmetric war, **the USA developed a new strategy**, in the scope of the “war against terror” **that includes some especially polemical questions.** Of these, we can highlight, on the one hand, the principle stating that the mission determines the coalition, conditioning the implementation of the “floating coalitions” or “will coalitions”, and on the other, the revision of the “direct and imminent threat” concept putting in the

“prevention’s” ambit the possibility of preemptive actions. Just very recently, and after the intervention in Iraq, have the American leaders clarified that their perception of “preemption” is only applicable against non-State actors, such as terrorist groups and not against States.

However, **multilateralism and unilateralism are not self-excluding and may even be complementary for the USA.** The difficult part is finding the right balance that allows associating the power of force and the power of legitimacy and engaging other powers, specially their allies, in the decision about global questions without disregarding their vital interests. This balance is not compatible with running over the International Law and international organizations whenever the partners and allies put obstacles to their objectives. The frequent use of *hard power* makes the American lose legitimacy before third countries, increasing the mistrust, the anti-Americanism, and even the hostility, thus reducing the USA’ scope of action on the international relations, and ultimately harming their own security. After decades of a powerful presence looked upon as benign, nowadays seems that not even the allies are very sure of the American intentions. The appropriate strategy for the USA **must be to emphasize the collective power and the security architecture grounded in unprecedented cooperation level or the support for the war against terror might fall off.** Hence, *soft power* is not only a way to regain popularity, but is mainly the proper way for the USA to obtain from other countries the requested cooperation. It is obvious that other countries cooperate in the extent of their own interests, but this cooperation might be as big as the “attraction power” of the USA. If by chance the USA insist on undervaluing the formal multilateral frames, particularly the transatlantic link, or on imposing a really unipolar rule of the world they will push back crucial support that they now enjoy and need and will also promote an antagonist strategic axis, for instance, such as China-Russia coalition and/or between Russia, France and Germany.

To other powers the dilemma of the relationship with the hyperpower is also very delicate. Feeling often “contained” by the USA’s policies, the European Union, Russia and China search for the recognition of bigger international and regional status by Washington. On the other hand, being unable to coerce the USA due to its enormous power, all they can do is to oppose the American leaders determination – above all when there are population support and vital interests in question – increasing their preference by the unilateralism. On that account,

great powers like the European Union, Russia and China carry out anti-hegemonic strategies – although they are all different and hazard of each other – simultaneously with policies to “multilateralize” the United States. In this sense, **they look at Treaties, Conventions, International Law and formal multilateral mechanisms as the main way for “containing” the USA and to the United Nations’ Security Council as the mean to “multilateralize” the American actions.** Sometimes, for those powers the multilateralism represents an end in the relation with Washington.

Dilemmas in the USA’s relationships are sharper with Europe because it implies both the transatlantic relations, between allies, and inter-European relations. In general, lately the European have become fierce defenders of multilateralism and *soft power* strategies. However, this clear commitment seems to be less concerned with finding appropriate answers for new threats than with attempting to mitigate their own inability and mainly to contain the USA’s unilateralism and hegemonic practices.

Europe’s appropriate strategy in the relationship with the hyperpower must be to prevent that the “eagle flies alone”, trying to influence America’s decisions and use the so much self-admired *soft power*. This is incompatible with the anti-American crusade spirit, with the growing disparity of forces and abilities, and persistence of different perceptions about the threats level. On the other hand, **Europe should invest more on the strengthening of its abilities than on its “autonomy” and should stress out the complementarity** in detriment of the rivalry with the USA. If Europe and the USA are not truly complementary and/or if NATO and the European Union are not efficient in the management of their relation and tasks split, then many changes will occur: the Atlantic Alliance would lose political and military effectiveness, no longer being a corner stone of the Euro-Atlantic security, or even taking the risk of diluting; the European Union will face even more difficulties to carry out an external policy and a common security and defense policies, also taking the risk of fragmentation; and, the international system would no longer count with the cohesion of the “Western light”.

If Europe insists on the weakening of the transatlantic link it might definitely push the USA to unilateralism and/or to look for other great strategic partner that can eventually be Russia. Remains the comfort that even in a specially tense and difficult period such as this we have lived with Iraqi crisis, it was possible to launch initiatives with a great extent like the *NATO Response Force*, the *Proliferation*

Security Initiative, to have EU led missions in the Balkans, or making Eastern enlargements either in the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union. **The work accomplished must not be thrown away.** In cause is the cohesion of the “transatlantic community” until now fundamental for the security and stability of Europe and the world. **The end of the Euro-Atlantic cohesion and solidarity**, as it seems sometimes, **through the “new type of terrorism”, the weapons of mass destruction proliferation or some “evil State”, that would be tragic.** That is why it is necessary to show that security concerns and answers to threats may and will be dealt with through the collective action and the transatlantic cooperation. Thus, **the possibility of assistance to NATO’ security mission in Iraq, similarly to what happens in Afghanistan**, with the duly and explicit cover of the United Nations and the participation of other countries, namely Arabs, should be seriously considered as a way to reduce transatlantic divergences, help to restore the confidence in the collective action, support the United Nations and, fundamentally help the Iraq’s pacification and reconstruction.

After all, as defended by Condoleezza Rice, quoting the German chancellor Gerard Schroeder, “*we certainly all agree that we only need a pole for the global policy by which we are guided, the pole of freedom, peace and justice*”²⁷⁴

²⁷⁴ RICE, Condoleezza, President Bush’s counsellor for National Security at date, quoting the German Chancellor Gerard Schroeder – in the end of her speech *Responsibilities of Freedom*, in the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Arundel House, London, June 26, 2003.

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Annex 1
The Alliance's Strategic Concept
Approved by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.
on 23rd and 24th April 1999

(...)

Part I - The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance

NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region.

The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realise their essential national security objectives.

The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance does not seek these benefits for its members alone, but is committed to the creation of conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political objectives.

To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.

In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. The Alliance does not consider itself to be any country's adversary.

Part II - Strategic Perspectives

The Evolving Strategic Environment

The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of

the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organisations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

(...)

Security challenges and risks

Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.

The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.

The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to proliferation remain. The Alliance recognises that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. Some states, including on NATO's periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass

destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be difficult. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.

The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance's growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO's superiority in traditional weaponry.

Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.

Part III - The Approach to Security in the 21st Century

The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to build a European security architecture in which the Alliance's contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these other international organisations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the

forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security and stability by: the preservation of the transatlantic link; the maintenance of effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions; the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises successfully; its continued openness to new members; and the continued pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other nations as part of its co-operative approach to Euro-Atlantic security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The Transatlantic Link

NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share. The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible. Thus the Alliance's commitment to the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defence of its members is fundamental to its credibility and to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

(...)

Part V - Conclusion

As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance's security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence arrangements, and will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment. In an uncertain world the need for effective defence remains, but in reaffirming this commitment the Alliance will also continue making full use of every opportunity to help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe whole and free.

(...)

Annex 2
Resolution 1441 (2002)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on
8 November 2002

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,

(...)

Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,

Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,

Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

(UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,

Deploing also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,

Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,

Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,

(...)

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

2. *Decides*, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced

inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;

3. *Decides* that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, subcomponents, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material;

4. *Decides* that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;

5. *Decides* that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume

inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;

(...)

8. *Decides* further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

10. *Requests* all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

11. *Directs* the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;

12. *Decides* to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;

13. *Recalls*, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex 3

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002

(...)

V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.”

President Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002

The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States—with our allies and friends—to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation.

Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defense that until recently were inconceivable.

But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today’s security environment more complex and dangerous.

In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states

that, while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states:

brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers;

display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations.

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.

Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:

Proactive counterproliferation efforts. We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities—detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities—are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.

Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction. We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD,

and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to \$20 billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step forward.

Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states. Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.

In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.

Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an

attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will:

- build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;

- coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and

- continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.

Annex 4

PROGRAMMATION MILITAIRE 2003-2008 DE LA FRANCE

CHAPITRE 3

(...)

Le cadre général de notre politique de défense

Comprendre notre environnement de défense et de sécurité

Conformément aux analyses évoquées dans le Livre blanc de 1994, l'évolution du contexte stratégique tout au long de la décennie 1990 a démontré que notre pays bénéficiait désormais d'une profondeur stratégique à l'Est, se chiffrant en milliers de kilomètres, situation qu'il n'avait jamais connue tout au long de son histoire. Mais, contrairement à certains espoirs, crises et conflits n'ont guère cessé à travers le monde, selon des logiques, dans des cadres et avec des acteurs souvent inédits et inattendus, générant une fragmentation et une multiplicité des menaces, souvent asymétriques, c'est à dire exercées par des acteurs étatiques ou non, disposant d'un potentiel militaire inférieur et qui cherchent à contourner nos défenses et à exploiter nos vulnérabilités par tous les moyens possibles, y compris non militaires. Suivant les circonstances, ces menaces peuvent prendre la forme du terrorisme, de conflits infra-étatiques aux logiques complexes, de la prolifération balistique ou nucléaire, radiologique, biologique ou chimique (NRBC), des agissements de la criminalité organisée ou de trafics aussi multiples que variés.

Des menaces qui touchent directement les Français

La période ouverte par les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, par leur violence et le nombre des victimes, a consacré l'émergence d'un terrorisme de masse. Ces attentats ont ouvert la voie à des conflits d'un type nouveau, sans champ de bataille et sans armée clairement identifiée, où l'adversaire, prêt à utiliser des armes de destruction massive, vise clairement les populations.

La France est une société développée, ouverte et à haut niveau technologique. Elle est donc particulièrement vulnérable aux nouveaux types de menaces. Engagée par ailleurs dans un ensemble de solidarités politiques, de communautés d'intérêts et d'alliances, elle constitue une cible potentielle.

L'accroissement de nos vulnérabilités sur le territoire, en matière d'infrastructures et de centres de décision, ou en ce qui concerne les populations, devra être pris en compte dans toutes ses dimensions. C'est ainsi que le caractère urbanisé et technologique de nos sociétés nous expose plus facilement aux attaques, par la

concentration des populations, le fonctionnement en réseaux interconnectés (eau, électricité, télécommunications), et le développement spectaculaire de l'usage des moyens informatiques.

La distinction entre terrorisme interne et international s'estompe. Les réseaux sont transnationaux, avec des implantations ou des soutiens à l'étranger mais également dans nos pays occidentaux. Ils disposent de financements importants provenant partiellement du crime organisé, d'une large autonomie d'action et sont motivés par une hostilité profonde à l'égard des Etats occidentaux. Ils exploitent les frustrations de certaines populations, reposant sur des situations de crise régionales - historiques, économiques ou sociales -, ainsi que sur les difficultés de certains éléments de communautés expatriées à s'intégrer dans nos pays.

Ces réseaux peuvent, comptant sur l'effet de surprise, voire de saturation, déclencher simultanément plusieurs attaques massives sur un même espace ou territoire. Les populations sont ainsi menacées tant à l'extérieur (Français à l'étranger) qu'à l'intérieur, par des acteurs implantés indistinctement sur notre territoire ou dans des zones très éloignées et difficilement identifiables.

L'abolition des distances, l'abaissement des frontières et le développement du terrorisme en une forme de guerre contribuent à un effacement partiel de la limite entre sécurité intérieure et extérieure.

Un monde durablement imprévisible

Les facteurs d'instabilité internationale vont continuer à se manifester pour longtemps encore.

Les sociétés en transition dans les régions situées à la périphérie de l'Europe resteront marquées par des tensions fortes, aggravées par les difficultés économiques et d'importants flux migratoires (migrations). Les intérêts de sécurité des pays européens s'en trouveront affectés. L'instabilité dans ces régions, comme dans d'autres plus lointaines, continuera de se traduire par des réactions identitaires violentes, teintées de nationalisme ou de fondamentalisme religieux.

Des États défailants, résultant d'un processus de désintégration politique, sociale et économique, dans l'incapacité de contrôler leur territoire et d'assurer leurs fonctions régaliennes, tendent à devenir des havres où se développent les activités illicites (trafics de stupéfiants, d'êtres humains, criminalité), générant des déstabilisations internes ou dans les pays voisins, provoquant dans certains cas des désastres humanitaires, voire exportant diverses formes de violence particulièrement menaçantes.

La fin des années 1990 a par ailleurs été marquée par *un développement accéléré des potentiels balistiques et d'armes de destruction massive* dans certaines régions du monde particulièrement sensibles. Dans le même temps, le processus de désarmement s'est ralenti et la lutte contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive reste insuffisante.

Les stratégies ayant recours à des menaces asymétriques, menées par des acteurs étatiques ou non étatiques, peuvent aussi bien viser le territoire national que les forces en opérations. Les risques correspondants comprennent les agressions contre les systèmes d'information, les diverses formes de prolifération, la menace terroriste de niveau stratégique, le développement de la criminalité organisée.

La suprématie militaire occidentale rend l'affrontement direct peu probable. Les adversaires potentiels s'attacheront dorénavant, afin de contourner nos défenses, à développer toutes les capacités possibles de nuisance, hors de toute contrainte du droit international. Ils seront prêts, par exemple, à exploiter les potentiels de nos propres équipements civils ou à se servir d'armes de destruction massives détournées pour frapper les populations au cœur même de nos sociétés. Ils pourraient disposer un jour d'armes nucléaires, radiologiques, biologiques ou chimiques (NRBC). La diffusion rapide des savoirs (Internet) ou des techniques et la disponibilité des matériels (technologies duales notamment dans le domaine des missiles, précurseurs chimiques) leur permettront d'avoir plus facilement accès à ces capacités.

Un environnement stratégique en mutation

(...)

Les États-Unis modifient leurs choix stratégiques. En témoignent leurs décisions de compléter leur arsenal de défense par un ensemble de moyens défensifs (antimissiles) et offensifs, conventionnels et nucléaires. Après le 11 septembre 2001, ils ont annoncé l'accélération de la transformation de leurs forces. Il s'agit, pour eux, face à des menaces moins prévisibles et qui peuvent les toucher directement, de disposer d'une large gamme de capacités rapidement projetables, d'accéder aux théâtres en toute circonstance et de s'assurer une maîtrise totale de l'information depuis le territoire national américain, notamment avec l'appui de leurs réseaux spatiaux.

Un des éléments essentiels de cette nouvelle donne américaine réside dans la volonté de disposer de moyens d'agir seuls, le cas échéant, sans contrainte liée à

des alliances ou des engagements multilatéraux. Cette stratégie n'exclut cependant pas des actions en coalition.

À cette ambition mondiale répond un renforcement massif de l'effort de défense qui bénéficie principalement à la recherche et au développement de nouveaux systèmes de défense, accentuant le fossé technologique et militaire entre l'Europe et les États-Unis.

(...)

Les fonctions stratégiques

Les grandes fonctions stratégiques dont découle notre modèle d'armée (dissuasion, prévention, projection – action, protection) conservent toute leur pertinence. Sur cette base, il convient, dans le contexte actuel et prévisible de risques et de menaces, de porter une attention particulière aux missions de protection et aux moyens qui permettent de prévenir ou d'empêcher une agression dans le cadre de la prévention et de la projection.

La dissuasion nucléaire reste notre garantie fondamentale. Parallèlement, la stratégie générale militaire se décline en actions de prévention, protection et projection-action afin de pouvoir faire face, avec la flexibilité nécessaire à d'autres types de menaces. Les forces armées doivent être à même de conduire les actions militaires décidées pour garantir la sécurité de nos intérêts et de nos populations, sur notre territoire national comme à l'étranger. Leur protection est un impératif. Elle repose, entre autres, sur le développement d'une capacité anti-missiles de théâtre.

À l'extérieur de nos frontières, dans le cadre de la prévention et de la projection - action, nous devons donc être en mesure d'identifier et de prévenir les menaces le plus tôt possible. Dans ce cadre, la possibilité d'une action préemptive pourrait être considérée, dès lors qu'une situation de menace explicite et avérée serait reconnue. Cette détermination et l'amélioration des capacités de frappes à distance devraient constituer une menace dissuasive pour nos agresseurs potentiels, d'autant que les réseaux terroristes transnationaux se développent et se préparent à l'action le plus souvent à l'extérieur de notre territoire, dans des zones non contrôlées par des États, voire avec le soutien d'États ennemis.

Sur le territoire national, dans le cadre de la protection, les capacités des forces armées à remplir leurs missions de protection des approches aériennes et maritimes doivent être renforcées. Par ailleurs, toutes les formations et les moyens

militaires peuvent être requis d'apporter leur concours pour des missions de surveillance et de sauvegarde, et pour participer aux opérations de gestion des conséquences d'un attentat majeur.

Dissuasion

La dissuasion est au cœur des moyens garantissant à la France l'autonomie stratégique qui est l'un des fondements de sa politique de défense. Elle représente un facteur important de stabilité internationale et constitue la garantie fondamentale contre toute menace sur nos intérêts vitaux qui pourrait provenir de puissances militaires majeures, animées d'intentions hostiles et prêtes à recourir à tous les moyens nécessaires pour les concrétiser. Elle doit permettre de faire face, notamment, aux menaces que pourraient faire peser sur nos intérêts vitaux des puissances régionales dotées d'armes de destruction massive du fait de la prolifération balistique et du développement de nouvelles armes, nucléaires, biologiques ou chimiques.

Elle reste caractérisée, dans notre stratégie, par un concept de non-emploi. Elle implique de disposer de moyens diversifiés permettant d'assurer sa crédibilité face aux évolutions des menaces, quelles que soient leur localisation et leur nature. Elle repose d'une part sur des missiles balistiques emportés par des sous-marins nucléaires et, d'autre part, sur des missiles aérobies emportés par des avions. Le développement des moyens de simulation préservera l'adaptation des forces nucléaires à l'évolution technologique et donc la crédibilité et la pérennité de la dissuasion. Cette dissuasion doit enfin pouvoir contribuer à la sécurité de l'Europe en tenant compte de la solidarité croissante des pays de l'Union.

Prévention

La prévention constitue la première étape de mise en œuvre de notre stratégie de défense, dont les choix sont confortés par l'apparition de menaces asymétriques. Elle est aussi un instrument au service des objectifs de notre politique étrangère à la recherche de la paix et de la stabilité internationale. Elle est une nécessité permanente contre la réapparition de grandes menaces, directes ou indirectes, le développement de situations de crise ou de conflits susceptibles de mettre en cause notre sécurité et nos intérêts et ceux de nos partenaires de l'Union européenne et de l'Alliance atlantique. Elle doit permettre, par le renseignement, de disposer d'une capacité d'anticipation et d'une capacité autonome d'appréciation de la situation.

La prévention nécessite, donc, la poursuite des efforts en matière de renseignements d'origine humaine ou technique et de ceux nécessaires pour nous doter des systèmes permettant l'acquisition du renseignement au niveau stratégique et sur les théâtres d'opération. Dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme, la coordination interministérielle des analyses et des actions sera poursuivie.

La capacité de veille et d'alerte doit être coordonnée, d'abord au niveau européen, en particulier par des échanges et soutiens réciproques accrus, et au niveau international, pour mieux surveiller les nouveaux réseaux d'acteurs transnationaux. Le renseignement est en outre indispensable pour faciliter l'adaptation permanente des moyens et de l'organisation de notre défense et orienter la préparation du futur.

La prévention doit pouvoir disposer des moyens d'information, de commandement et de contrôle adaptés à la compréhension des situations et à la préparation des actions. Les outils développés doivent permettre l'échange des informations et des analyses avec nos partenaires.

La diplomatie de défense, à travers le développement des relations de défense et de sécurité avec nos partenaires étrangers, qu'il s'agisse de dialogue stratégique, d'échange d'informations, d'assistance ou de coopération militaire, participe également de la prévention. Une approche coordonnée de notre diplomatie de défense avec nos alliés européens sera favorisée.

La prévention s'appuie également sur le maintien d'un dispositif interarmées de forces pré-positionnées, de façon permanente ou temporaire, qui facilite l'analyse des situations, l'exploitation des renseignements et la réaction immédiate dans les régions considérées.

Projection - Action

La projection et l'action ont structuré la conception du modèle d'armée. La capacité à projeter des forces, aussi bien en Europe qu'à l'extérieur du continent européen, et notre aptitude à engager rapidement et à soutenir dans la durée des groupements de forces interarmées, capables d'imposer rapidement une supériorité sur un théâtre, en sont les clés.

Il s'agit de pouvoir faire intervenir, à plusieurs milliers de kilomètres, avec leur soutien et leur logistique associés, des groupements de forces interarmées, sous commandement interarmées, dans un cadre national ou multinational.

Pour ce faire, les leçons tirées des crises et engagements récents ont confirmé le besoin de disposer d'une capacité autonome de projection initiale, terrestre, aérienne et maritime, permettant de mettre rapidement en place les premiers éléments. Ceux-ci doivent en général être d'une haute spécialisation et extrêmement mobiles. La période de stabilisation nécessite ensuite le déploiement de troupes plus polyvalentes et plus nombreuses et peut se chevaucher avec la période de reconstruction qui nécessite l'engagement de personnels très spécialisés puisés majoritairement dans la réserve. L'action de ces forces doit pouvoir être précédée, complétée ou appuyée par des actions, y compris de frappes dans la profondeur. Des efforts sont faits pour améliorer les capacités spécifiques permettant à la France de tenir un rôle de nation - cadre au sein d'une coalition et de supprimer les lacunes susceptibles de compromettre les engagements.

Annex 5

US NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

February 2003

Introduction

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in Washington, D.C., New York City, and Pennsylvania were acts of war against the United States of America and its allies, and against the very idea of civilized society. No cause justifies terrorism. The world must respond and fight this evil that is intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedoms and our way of life. Freedom and fear are at war.

The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. Those who employ terrorism, regardless of their specific secular or religious objectives, strive to subvert the rule of law and effect change through violence and fear. These terrorists also share the misguided belief that killing, kidnapping, extorting, robbing, and wreaking havoc to terrorize people are legitimate forms of political action.

The struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war in our history. We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might. We must fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around the world, using every instrument of national power—diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes—some seen, some unseen. And we will always remain vigilant against new terrorist threats. Our goal will be reached when Americans and other civilized people around the world can lead their lives free of fear from terrorist attacks. There will be no quick or easy end to this conflict.

(...)

Goals And Objectives

Goal: Defeat Terrorists and Their Organizations

(...) Objective: Identify terrorists and terrorist organizations.

(...) Objective: Locate terrorists and their organizations.

(...) Objective: Destroy terrorists and their organizations.

Goal: Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists

The National Strategy's second front stresses denying terrorists the sponsorship, support, and sanctuary that enable them to exist, gain strength, train, plan, and execute their attacks. The United States has a long memory and is committed to holding terrorists and those who harbor them accountable for past crimes. The states that choose to harbor terrorists are like accomplices who provide shelter for criminals. They will be held accountable for the actions of their "guests." The strategy to deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary is three-fold. First, it focuses on the responsibilities of all states to fulfill their obligations to combat terrorism both within their borders and internationally.

Second, it helps target U.S. assistance to those states who are willing to combat terrorism, but may not have the means. And finally, when states prove reluctant or unwilling to meet their international obligations to deny support and sanctuary to terrorists, the United States, in cooperation with friends and allies, or if necessary, acting independently, will take appropriate steps to convince them to change their policies. The goal of this front is to choke off the lifeblood of terrorist groups—their access to territory, funds, equipment, training, technology,

and unimpeded transit. This approach will therefore weaken terrorist organizations and their ability to conduct operations. Of particular importance is working to prevent terrorists from acquiring the capability to use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, or high-yield explosives.

Non-state actors play an important role in the international environment. Nongovernmental organizations are important in combating international terrorism and we will work with them to prevent terrorists from taking advantage of their services.

Objective: End the state sponsorship of terrorism.

The United States will assume a clear and pragmatic approach in prosecuting the campaign against terrorism. This will include incentives for ending state sponsorship. When a state chooses not to respond to such incentives, tough decisions will be confronted. At all times within this new dynamic we will balance a nation's near-term actions against the long-term implications and consequences.

The United States currently lists seven state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya,

Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan. We are firmly committed to removing countries from the list once they have taken the necessary steps under our law and policy. A checkered past does not foreclose future membership in the coalition against terrorism. It is important for all countries to adopt a "zero tolerance" policy for terrorist activity within their borders. In the new global environment it is also important for states to understand how terrorists and their supporters may use legitimate means of communication, commerce, and transportation for illegal activities.

Each state that gets out of the business of sponsoring terrorism represents a significant step forward and offers a tangible measure of success. America will never seek to remove states from the sponsorship list by lowering the bar; instead, these states should be encouraged—or compelled—to clear the bar.

We will not have a single, inflexible approach to handling the recognized state sponsors of terrorism. Each case is unique, with different interests and legacy issues involved. Each situation demands specifically tailored policies.

We will be open to overtures from states that want to put their sponsorship of terrorism behind them, but we will not compromise on the essential principle that there are no "good" or "just" terrorists. We will be relentless in discrediting terrorism as a legitimate means of expressing discontent.

(...)

Persuading Reluctant States: In waging the campaign against terrorism, the United States will also confront difficult cases involving countries that, although capable, prove reluctant to comply with their responsibilities in the fight against terror. Some countries will cooperate on some fronts but not others. This unwillingness can spring from many sources, such as external threats, internal schisms that enable one faction to use the state to extend tacit or active support to

terrorists, or cultural or political differences that lead to disagreements over what constitutes “terrorist” or criminal activity.

These cases will be the most delicate. The United States recognizes that some governments might place themselves in the crosshairs—and not just figuratively—by joining the war against terrorism. Therefore, constructive engagement, with sustained diplomacy and targeted assistance will be used to persuade these regimes to become more willing and, eventually able, to meet their international obligations to combat terrorism.

Compelling Unwilling States: The unwilling states are those that sponsor or actively provide sanctuary to terrorists. Those states that continue to sponsor terrorist organizations will be held accountable for their actions.

(...)

Goal: Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to Exploit

The third component of the 4D strategy is made up of the collective efforts to diminish conditions that terrorists can exploit. While we recognize that there are many countries and people living with poverty, deprivation, social disenfranchisement, and unresolved political and regional disputes, those conditions do not justify the use of terror. However, many terrorist organizations that have little in common with the poor and destitute masses exploit these conditions to their advantage.

(...)

The United States does not propose to undertake this difficult challenge alone. The United States has neither the resources nor the expertise to be in every place in the world. Moreover, the struggle against terrorism is not solely an American struggle. Our friends and allies face many of the same threats. It is essential for America to work with its friends and allies in this campaign.

(...)

Annex 6
Resolution 1483 (2003)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4761st meeting, on
22 May 2003

The Security Council,

(...)

Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the “Authority”),

Noting further that other States that are not occupying powers are working now or in the future may work under the Authority,

Welcoming further the willingness of Member States to contribute to stability and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the Authority,

Concerned that many Kuwaitis and Third-State Nationals still are not accounted for since 2 August 1990,

Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Appeals* to Member States and concerned organizations to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country, and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with this resolution;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international

organizations for Iraq and to help meet the humanitarian and other needs of the Iraqi people by providing food, medical supplies, and resources necessary for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq's economic infrastructure;

(...)

10. *Decides* that, with the exception of prohibitions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related materiel other than those arms and related materiel required by the Authority to serve the purposes of this and other related resolutions, all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq and the provision of financial or economic resources to Iraq established by resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, including resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992, shall no longer apply;

(...)

15. *Calls upon* the international financial institutions to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction and development of their economy and to facilitate assistance by the broader donor community, and *welcomes* the readiness of creditors, including those of the Paris Club, to seek a solution to Iraq's sovereign debt problems;

(...)

22. *Noting* the relevance of the establishment of an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq and the desirability of prompt completion of the restructuring of Iraq's debt as referred to in paragraph 15 above, further *decides* that, until December 31, 2007, unless the Council decides otherwise, petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas originating in Iraq shall be immune, until title passes to the initial purchaser from legal proceedings against them and not be subject to any form of attachment, garnishment, or execution, and that all States shall take any steps that may be necessary under their respective domestic legal systems to assure this protection, and that proceeds and obligations arising from sales thereof, as well as the Development Fund for Iraq, shall enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those enjoyed by the United Nations except that the abovementioned privileges and immunities will not apply with respect to any legal proceeding in which recourse to such proceeds or obligations is necessary to satisfy liability for damages assessed in connection with an ecological accident, including an oil spill, that occurs after the date of adoption of this resolution;

(...)

26. *Calls upon* Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute to the implementation of this resolution;

(...)

Annex 7
Resolution 1511 (2003)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4844th meeting, on
16 October 2003

The Security Council,

(...)

Underscoring that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq, *reaffirming* the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, *reiterating* its resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly, and *recognizing* the importance of international support, particularly that of countries in the region, Iraq's neighbours, and regional organizations, in taking forward this process expeditiously,

Recognizing that international support for restoration of conditions of stability and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and

welcoming Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003),

(...)

Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

(...)

13. *Determines* that the provision of security and stability is essential to the successful completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the implementation of resolution 1483 (2003), and *authorizes* a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of the timetable and programme as well as to contribute to the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure;

14. *Urges* Member States to contribute assistance under this United Nations mandate, including military forces, to the multinational force referred to in paragraph 13 above;

(...)

19. *Calls upon* Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to Iraq, arms for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists, and *emphasizes* the importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries of the region, particularly neighbours of Iraq, in this regard;

20. *Appeals* to Member States and the international financial institutions to strengthen their efforts to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction and development of their economy, and *urges* those institutions to take immediate steps to provide their full range of loans and other financial assistance to Iraq, working with the Governing Council and appropriate Iraqi ministries;

21. *Urges* Member States and international and regional organizations to support the Iraq reconstruction effort initiated at the 24 June 2003 United Nations Technical Consultations, including through substantial pledges at the 23-24 October 2003 International Donors Conference in Madrid;

22. *Calls upon* Member States and concerned organizations to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people by providing resources necessary for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq's economic infrastructure;

23. *Emphasizes* that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) referred to in paragraph 12 of resolution 1483 (2003) should be established as a priority, and *reiterates* that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a transparent manner as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 1483 (2003);

24. *Reminds* all Member States of their obligations under paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution 1483 (2003) in particular the obligation to immediately cause the transfer of funds, other financial assets and economic resources to the Development Fund for Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people;

(...)

Annex 8
A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD
EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY
Brussels, 12 December 2003

Introduction

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.

(...)

The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own.

(...)

I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS

(...)

Key Threats

Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.

Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk.

The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.

Regional Conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict.

State Failure: Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon, that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.

Organised Crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism. Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90% of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade world wide. A new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention is the growth in maritime piracy.

Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.

(...)

II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

(...)

Our traditional concept of self-defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export

controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

(...)

AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER BASED ON EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM

In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.

(...)

III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE

The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others.

(...)

Conclusion

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

Annex 9
EU STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION (Dezembro 2003)

(...)

CHAPTER II. THE EUROPEAN UNION CANNOT IGNORE THESE DANGERS. IT MUST SEEK AN EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALIST RESPONSE TO THIS THREAT.

(...)

15. Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organisations form the first line of defence against proliferation. When these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role.

A) Effective multilateralism is the cornerstone of the European strategy for combating proliferation of WMD.

16. The EU is committed to the multilateral treaty system, which provides the legal and normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts. The EU policy is to pursue the implementation and universalisation of the existing disarmament and non-proliferation norms. To that end, we will pursue the universalisation of the NPT, the IAEA Safeguard agreements and protocols additional to them, the CWC, the BTWC, the HCOC, and the early entry into force of the CTBT. The EU policy is to work towards the bans on biological and chemical weapons being declared universally binding rules of international law. The EU policy is to pursue an international agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU will assist third countries in the fulfilment of their obligations under multilateral conventions and regimes.

17. If the multilateral treaty regime is to remain credible it must be made more effective. The EU will place particular emphasis on a policy of reinforcing

compliance with the multilateral treaty regime. Such a policy must be geared towards enhancing the detectability of significant violations and strengthening enforcement of the prohibitions and norms established by the multilateral treaty regime, including by providing for criminalisation of violations committed under the jurisdiction or control of a State. The role of the UN Security Council, as the final arbiter on the consequence of non-compliance – as foreseen in multilateral regimes – needs to be effectively strengthened.

(...)

B) Promotion of a stable international and regional environment is a condition for the fight against proliferation of WMD

20. The EU is determined to play a part in addressing the problems of regional instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie behind many weapons programmes, recognising that instability does not occur in a vacuum. The best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them. If possible, political solutions should be found to the problems, which lead them to seek WMD. The more secure countries feel, the more likely they are to abandon programmes: disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programmes can lead to an arms race.

(...)

C) Close co-operation with key partners is crucial for the success of the global fight against proliferation

25. A common approach and co-operation with key partners is essential in order to effectively implement WMD non-proliferation regime.

26. Co-operation with the US and other key partners such as the Russian Federation, Japan and Canada is necessary to ensure a successful outcome of the global fight against proliferation.

(...)

CHAPTER III. THE EUROPEAN UNION MUST MAKE USE OF ALL ITS INSTRUMENTS TO PREVENT, DETER, HALT, AND IF POSSIBLE ELIMINATE PROLIFERATION PROGRAMMES THAT CAUSE CONCERN AT GLOBAL LEVEL.

29. The elements of the EU's Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction need to be integrated across the board. We have a wide range of instruments available: multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally-coordinated export controls; cooperative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers (including trade and development policies); interdiction of illegal procurement activities and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter. While all are necessary, none is sufficient in itself.

We need to strengthen them across the board, and deploy those that are most effective in each case.

The European Union has special strengths and experience to bring to this collective effort. It is important that the EU's objectives, as set out in this strategy, be factored in its policy approach in each area, so as to maximise its effectiveness.

30. In implementing our strategy we have decided to focus in particular on the specific measures contained in this chapter. It is a "living action plan" whose implementation will be constantly monitored. It will be subjected to regular revision and updating every six months.

A) Rendering multilateralism more effective by acting resolutely against proliferators.

(...)

Annex 10
Resolution 1546 (2004)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4987th meeting, on
8 June 2004

The Security Council,

Welcoming the beginning of a new phase in Iraq's transition to a democratically elected government, and *looking forward* to the end of the occupation and the assumption of full responsibility and authority by a fully sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq by 30 June 2004,

Recalling all of its previous relevant resolutions on Iraq,

Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq,

Reaffirming also the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources,

Recognizing the importance of international support, particularly that of countries in the region, Iraq's neighbours, and regional organizations, for the people of Iraq in their efforts to achieve security and prosperity, and *noting* that the successful implementation of this resolution will contribute to regional stability,

(...)

Recalling the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003, and *affirming* that the United Nations should play a leading role in assisting the Iraqi people and government in the formation of institutions for representative government,

Recognizing that international support for restoration of stability and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and *welcoming* Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003 and resolution 1511 (2003),

Recalling the report provided by the United States to the Security Council on 16 April 2004 on the efforts and progress made by the multinational force,

Recognizing the request conveyed in the letter of 5 June 2004 from the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq to the President of the Council, which is annexed to this resolution, to retain the presence of the multinational force,

Recognizing also the importance of the consent of the sovereign Government of Iraq for the presence of the multinational force and of close coordination between the multinational force and that government,

Welcoming the willingness of the multinational force to continue efforts to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in support of the political transition, especially for upcoming elections, and to provide security for the United Nations presence in Iraq, as described in the letter of 5 June 2004 from the United States Secretary of State to the President of the Council, which is annexed to this resolution,

Noting the commitment of all forces promoting the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with international law, including obligations under international humanitarian law, and to cooperate with relevant international organizations,

Affirming the importance of international assistance in reconstruction and development of the Iraqi economy,

Recognizing the benefits to Iraq of the immunities and privileges enjoyed by Iraqi oil revenues and by the Development Fund for Iraq, and *noting* the importance of providing for continued disbursements of this fund by the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority,

Determining that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Endorses* the formation of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq, as presented on 1 June 2004, which will assume full responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004 for governing Iraq while refraining from taking any actions affecting Iraq's destiny beyond the limited interim period until an elected Transitional Government of Iraq assumes office as envisaged in paragraph four below;

2. *Welcomes* that, also by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty;

(,,)

9. *Notes* that the presence of the multinational force in Iraq is at the request of the incoming Interim Government of Iraq and therefore *reaffirms* the authorization for the multinational force under unified command established under resolution 1511 (2003), having regard to the letters annexed to this resolution;

10. *Decides* that the multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism, so that, inter alia, the United Nations can fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi people as outlined in paragraph seven above and the Iraqi people can implement freely and without intimidation the timetable and programme for the political process and benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation activities;

11. *Welcomes*, in this regard, the letters annexed to this resolution stating, inter alia, that arrangements are being put in place to establish a security partnership between the sovereign Government of Iraq and the multinational force and to ensure coordination between the two, and *notes also* in this regard that Iraqi security forces are responsible to appropriate Iraqi ministers, that the Government of Iraq has authority to commit Iraqi security forces to the multinational force to engage in operations with it, and that the security structures described in the letters will

serve as the fora for the Government of Iraq and the multinational force to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership between Iraqi security forces and the multinational force, through close coordination and consultation;

12. *Decides further* that the mandate for the multinational force shall be reviewed at the request of the Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this resolution, and that this mandate shall expire upon the completion of the political process set out in paragraph four above, and *declares* that it will terminate this mandate earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq;

13. *Notes* the intention, set out in the annexed letter from the United States Secretary of State, to create a distinct entity under unified command of the multinational force with a dedicated mission to provide security for the United Nations presence in Iraq, *recognizes* that the implementation of measures to provide security for staff members of the United Nations system working in Iraq would require significant resources, and *calls upon* Member States and relevant organizations to provide such resources, including contributions to that entity;

14. *Recognizes* that the multinational force will also assist in building the capability of the Iraqi security forces and institutions, through a programme of recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring, and monitoring;

15. *Requests* Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military forces, as agreed with the Government of Iraq, to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people for security and stability, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and to support the efforts of UNAMI;

16. *Emphasizes* the importance of developing effective Iraqi police, border enforcement, and the Facilities Protection Service, under the control of the Interior Ministry of Iraq, and, in the case of the Facilities Protection Service, other Iraqi ministries, for the maintenance of law, order, and security, including combating terrorism, and *requests* Member States and international organizations to assist the Government of Iraq in building the capability of these Iraqi institutions;

17. *Condemns* all acts of terrorism in Iraq, *reaffirms* the obligations of Member States under resolutions 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999, 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000, 1390 (2002) of 16 January 2002, 1455 (2003) of 17 January 2003, and 1526 (2004) of 30 January 2004, and other relevant international obligations with respect, inter alia, to terrorist activities in and from Iraq or against its citizens, and specifically *reiterates* its call upon Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to and from Iraq, arms for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists, and *re-emphasizes* the importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries of the region, particularly neighbours of Iraq, in this regard;

18. *Recognizes* that the Interim Government of Iraq will assume the primary role in coordinating international assistance to Iraq;

19. *Welcomes* efforts by Member States and international organizations to respond in support of requests by the Interim Government of Iraq to provide technical and expert assistance while Iraq is rebuilding administrative capacity;
(...)

30. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council within three months from the date of this resolution on UNAMI operations in Iraq, and on a quarterly basis thereafter on the progress made towards national elections and fulfilment of all UNAMI's responsibilities;

31. *Requests* that the United States, on behalf of the multinational force, report to the Council within three months from the date of this resolution on the efforts and progress of this force, and on a quarterly basis thereafter;

32. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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