

FROM WAR TO PEACE. THE CONTRIBUTION OF MILITARY CORPS WITH POLICE FUNCTIONS: THE GNR IN IRAQ

Pedro Miguel Duarte da Graça

duartedagraca@gmail.com

Major, Permanent Staff of the Officer Corps, Republican National Guard (RNG). Director, 1st Course of Maintenance of Public Order in Angola. Battalion Commander, Multinational Stabilization Force in Iraq/ Multinational Specialized Unit. MA, Studies of War and Peace in New International Relations, Autonomous University of Lisbon, Post Graduate, Law and Security. Auditor, Security, Military Science, and Police Criminology. BA, Military Science / GNR. Current decorations: Military Order of Avis - Degree Knight, Military Merit Medal - 3rd Degree, Military Exemplary Behavior Medal- Silver and Copper Degrees, Special Service Commissions Commemorative Medal with "IRAQ 2004" and "ANGOLA 2006" device, Distinguished Service to Public Safety Medal – Silver Degree, Application of Public Security Medal with star, Military Gold Distinguished Service Medal with Palm - collective.

Abstract

The nature of conflict is changing. The occurrences of formal international intervention, in a complex theater of operations with operational requirements, necessitate the engagement of international forces with military and civilian capabilities, namely a distinctive type of police force. Since the end of the last century, the Portuguese Republican National Guard (GNR) has deployed to stabilize various conflicts throughout the world.

The GNR contributed when UN resolutions mandated constabulary requirements, but this participation was never framed within a multinational force of NATO. However, the GNR works under the same NATO doctrine for force employment constituted on the basis of military units with police functions, called the *Multinational Specialized Units*.

The Guard is a military organization with the expertise to contribute to peace. This unique competence stems from capabilities over the entire spectrum of police functions within unstable environments, including a unique ability to overcome the *Security Gap*. Likewise, by concurrently deploying with the military forces, the GNR demonstrates the ability to use force in a legal manner by fostering a comprehensive approach within the security and judiciary system.

This holistic capacity goes beyond a purely institutional approach. By executing police functions in unstable environments the GNR contributes to the pursuit of credible Portuguese foreign policy interests in Peace-Enforcement Operations..

Key Words:

Military, Police, Unstable Environment, Peace, Security Gap

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Introduction

In 2003, with the advent of war in Iraq, Portugal established a political position in the future of conflict by deploying supporting forces for *Operation Iraqi Freedom*. The ad-hoc military coalition was formed outside of NATO article invocation but based on Alliance doctrine. Within the Portuguese foreign policy framework, the choice of a constituted force fell on the Republican National Guard (GNR).

Much has been written and said regarding the sending of this military corps to Iraq, allegedly to the detriment of the armed forces (FFAA). If the reasoning of this institutional analysis argument is illogical, then there must be a better reason, functional, envisioning a comprehensive approach (NATO, 2010b: 2-11). This method is specifically oriented to state-building and the creation of a *jus post bellum* required of modern conflicts, while safeguarding these processes in an unstable environment. (Kaldor, 2006: 6)

Ten years have passed since GNR involvement in the Iraqi conflict. However, the present discussion is of singular scientific relevance because it goes beyond the institution regarding the role of police in unstable international environments and the Guard's contribution to the pursuit of Portuguese foreign policy (Guedes A. M. & Elias L., 2010).

I. Peace Studies


The Norwegian Johan Galtung, considered the creator of the mid 20th century Peace Studies, adopted, conceptually, a dual vision of peace: negative peace "(...) absence of war (...)" and positive peace "(...) integration of human society (...)" (1964: 2) The objective of Peace Studies is to understand violence and non-violence, beyond studies of war (Galtung, 1969: 168-174; Boulding, 1990: 4-5).

Later, the author designed another model, the Violence Triangle, coinciding with the earlier Peace Triangle. Each vertex indicates a type of violence: direct, structural (1969) and cultural (1990), which opposes a form of peace. To summarize, direct violence (personal) is an act of intentional aggression, structural violence (indirect) is a reflection of the social structure, and cultural violence (symbolic) inculcates the legitimization of direct and structural violence (Galtung, 1996: 2).



The socially productive field of Peace Studies confirmed the theoretical underpinnings for the UN on the issue of peace as a practical framework commensurate with institutional suppositions. This basis resulted in the document, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping." (UN, 1992) incorporating the concepts of peacebuilding and peace enforcement, reflecting Galtung's theory, "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding." (Galtung, 1975)

Illustration 1 – Triangle of Peace



Source: Galtung (1990) – adapted

Kofi Annan's approach to security builds on Galtung's concepts; to focus the same security theory on the State, including the individual, designated as human security (UN, 2000). In this context, Galtung identifies military training as essential to deal with violence and police training for the maintenance of public order. He argues in a conflict:

"[m]ilitary training is indispensable: to contain violence. Knowledge of the means of violence and the mentality behind their use is needed. But, for 'crowd control' police training may be better, more based on a show of authority and minimum use of violence (...) come active nonviolence training, also training to train the local population, and training in conflict mediation techniques (...)" (Galtung, 1996: 270).

The UN welcomed the concept of Galtung's positive peace. Given the need to achieve security and to ensure peace - acknowledging the current threats - begs the question: how can peace enforcement operations be designed in response to an unstable environment, and how are operations outlined and enforced by NATO (or were, at the time)?



II. Peace Enforcement - The Unstable Environment

1. Security Threats

The emergence of "new wars" (Kaldor 2006), more than the originality thereof, identifies the risk associated with the decline of the State, based on latent threats from the Cold War, finally confirmed. (Rasmussen, 1999: 43)

Currently, the UN defines the threats (UN, 2004: 12) and identifies a serious concern with six types:

- (i) War between states;
- (ii) Violence within states like civil wars, massive human rights violations, and genocide;
- (iii) Economic and social threats such as poverty, infective contagious diseases, and environmental degradation;
- (iv) Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons;
- (v) Terrorism;
- (vi) Transnational organized crime. (Idem: 32)

These "new threats", are a mixture of

"(...) war, crime and human rights violations (...)" (Idem: 12), require an approach between the mission of the soldiers and the police, the context in which "[the] army and the police seem to be changing roles (...)" (L'Heuillet, 2004: 199).

Within unstable and unpredictable environments, the growing number of transnational risks and consequent challenges seem to justify the emergence of a third approach. This role must have the capacity to act on internal state security, while being prepared to deal with threats and external influence internally, such as the transnational organized crime, drug trafficking or terrorism. (Lutterbeck, 2004) These forces are, in essence, the product of the 19th and 20th century struggles between the internal Westphalian and international orders. They evolved maintaining law and order on a domestic level as a primary objective yet able to act in external conflicts. Descendants of the French *Gendarmerie*, these forces, organized militarily with police functions, prove to be an excellent instrument for effective post-conflict intervention.

As Richard H. Solomon identifies, particularly in the Iraq conflict, the specific problem is that:

"(...) military peacekeepers are able to stop conflict by separating



combatants or by ousting hostile, repressive regimes; like always, they are not trained or equipped to restore self-sustaining order and stability to the society in the post conflict environment" (Perito, 2004: ix).

The basic principle of conquering, the main task of the armed forces, is not enough to establish order. Another force must uphold order while respecting civic freedom. This requires a holistic, comprehensive and integrated approach rather than an exclusively military response. In post-conflict, the *Gendarmeries* emerge, demonstrating a unique aptitude to betake minimum force in situations of maximum violence (Zimmermann, 2005), ensuring public order through the rule of law.

Military organizations with police functions "(...) can serves as a bridge between the military and civil police and can handle tasks that do not clearly fall within either camp" (Perito, 2004: 5). This link, of an institutional and functional character, can and should be maintained in different phases of the conflict, especially in situations where the Western world needs a new approach to the use of forces in post-conflict operations (Field & Perito, 2002-03).

2. Peace Enforcement, Unstable Environment - an approximation

The national legal system, by Decree 87/99, of December 30, 1998, defines the counties whose classification allows identification of operating environment permissiveness. This classification is graded "A" to "C", the latter being more complex and unstable. The peace enforcement operations fall under the class "C":

"The countries or territories in a state of war, armed conflict or internal widespread insecurity and even those where serious health conditions"¹².

Within peace operations, including peace enforcement, forces encounter the condition of the *Security Gap*.


III. Security Gap

Current conflicts increasingly require an approach that, among others, integrates the military instrument and the police, "(...) between soldiering and policing" (Kaldor, 2006: 133). Peace operations are the preferred method supported by the international community in recent years and "(...) have increasingly required the participation of both military personnel and civilian police" (Oakley, Dziedzic, Goldberg, 1998: 6).

The *Security Gap* is the inability to perform the most basic functions of the State to protect its citizens. The multinational forces' responsibility - to restore law and order, and the law with justice - objectively encounters three facets of the *Security Gap*: The *Deployment Gap*, the *Enforcement Gap*, and the *Institutional Gap* (Idem: 8-16).

¹ Article 1, part c of Port^a. n.º 87/99, December 30th.

² Serious health conditions - Article 2 and 3 of Port^a. n.º 87/99, December 30th.

**Illustration 2- Conceptual Framework**

Source – (Oakley, Dziedzic, Goldberg, 1998: 5)

Order, law, and justice are necessary for ensuring peace. (i) Order draws the direct level violence - physical aggression, verbal or psychological - away from rapid and dramatic effects. (ii) Law and justice deal with the level of structural violence (indirect), aiding in the consolidation of a fair social structure by diminishing the asymmetry between the real and the potential. (iii) Law and justice also act at the level of cultural violence, promoting values, norms and behaviors that delegitimize the direct and structural violence.

An international force with military capability is required to restore order. Subsequently, order obliges the law as the essential foundation of police functions. The time lag between the two capacities is called *deployment gap*, and can be reduced, if possible by the integration of these forces.

In the next phase, it is necessary to carry out functions that are not purely performed by either the military or police instrument. In this case it is essential to ensure a functional and institutional continuity in unstable environments, surmounting the *enforcement gap*.

The third stage emphasizes the rebuilding of local structures. To this end, the institutions with expertise in the required field should be involved in each area, corresponding to its core business. For this, it is necessary to fill the *institutional gap*, by using forces for missions that meet daily in their home countries, utilizing a *comprehensive approach* in order to create the conditions for the development of a sustainable and secure peace.

Bridging security gaps requires forces with military unit capacity and police functionality. They might be designed in unstable environments with the military



instrument performing police functions, fulfilling the ground work permanently linked to the legal system, in the promotion and construction of the security system. A military corps with police functions is known as *Gendarmerie*, *Carabinieri*, *Guardia* or *Constabulary*. (Jayamaha *et al.*, 2010: 148; Oakley, Dziedzic, Goldberg, 1998: 519-520, 330; Perito, 2004: 5).

The security gap is also filled by basic police services, although with less efficiency in more polarized cases (Elias, 2006). In both situations, what is in question is *state-building* backed by an emerging *jus post bellum* (Guedes, 2011).

IV. Military Corps With Police Functions

The origin of police institutions dates back to the fourteenth century French *Maréchaussée* during the Hundred Years War. These marshal troops had a dual function, maintaining order and judicial procedure. Today these functions reflect juridical-policing.

Over time, these troops earned an actual military status and designation - *Gendarmerie*. This original model gave rise to similar institutions in several countries, such as the *Royal Guard of Police* in Portugal, the *Carabinieri* in the Kingdom of Sardinia, the *Marechaussee* in Holland and the *Guardia Civil* in Spain. As common characteristics, the military and the police functions are identified, in both cases *avant la lettre*.

The Anglo-Saxon countries, often cited, have a different description: *Constabulary*³. As the American Robert Perito states,

"[t]he ambiguous and conflicting definitions of a constabulary can be clarified by looking at the specific organizations and functions of constabulary forces in democratic countries [, like] France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain (...)" (Perito, 2004: 37).

These definitions differ from terms such as paramilitary, militarized or military police, the latter as police responsible for discipline within the armed forces (Scobell & Hammitt, 1998).

1. Military

The "military corps" classification denotes a unit of professional soldiers, with an institutional culture subject to political power. The corps centers on three elements: duties, by statutory approach; constraints, with regard to the restriction of rights; ethics, through principles.

2. Police Functions

³ In the former USSR, these forces were dubbed "Troops of the Interior Ministry."



According to the doctrine, police functions are categorized as judicial and administrative. The latter police function subdivides into "general" and "special" administration (Correia, 1994: 407).

Repression of illicit criminal activities falls under the judicial function. Carrying out criminal investigations requires an adept criminal police organization (OPC), exercising functionally under Judicial Authority.

General police responsibilities cover necessary safeguards to public order and security. Special police exercises authority in relation to a particular branch of the law (Castro, 2003: 97).

The Republican National Guard, as a military body, implements the aforementioned police functions. The GNR possess the

"(...) ability to adapt to different scenarios and different situations. In short, they have a versatility incomparably greater, in the classical sense, than either the armed forces or the civilian police" (Branco, 2010: 37).

3. Continuity, Proximity, Duality

A military corps with police functions is characterized by a military nature and operational versatility, both military and policing. The *Gendarmeries*, the model for Republican National Guard, is still characterized by three principles: continuity, proximity, and duality (Branco, 2013). The first two refer to the functional genesis of *Gendarmeries* while duality is consequential.

Continuity presupposes: (i) an established standing, by the permanent connection between the military and civil institutions; (ii) the versatility to transition between the military and police functions; (iii) the ability to manage performance in unstable environments.

Proximity results from force dispersion throughout the national territory like a spatial network. The features of this employment, like a "power grid", are the effective knowledge of the terrain, the people, and the infrastructure. Likewise, proximity

"(...) which, combined with the continuing availability that characterizes the 'gendarme' and in conjunction with the principle of the barracks, creates a closeness to the public" (Idem: 207).

Duality is a consequence of the military bodies with police functions sharing power with constabularies. This principle comes from the decentralization of institutional police power while conversely strengthening the judiciary in exercising control of police activity and of penal action, the latter, by OPC's choice of those specifically considered competent for criminal investigation.



V. Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU)

The complexity of theaters of operations and concurrent demands demonstrate that the occurrences of formal international control require the commitment of international forces with military and civilian capabilities.

From the experience of the *Stabilization Force in Bósnia* (1998), NATO identified the need to fill the gap that existed between the military and non-military, between the activities of military forces and the civilian police, who were unarmed and unable to enforce the law, perpetuating the *Security Gap* (Paris: 2004).

The proposed course of action advocated the use of military units with police functions (*Gendarmeries* or *Carabinieri* type). The Italians, already developing the *Multinational Specialized Units* model (Carabinieri: 2003; Paris: 2004), immediately accepted the idea. Generally, the concept integrated: (i) *Unit* - groups formed on a temporary basis, to fulfill a mission as part of a military force, and to act within the framework for a peace operation; (ii) *Multinational* - based by virtue of the composition of a military corps with police functions from several countries; (iii) *Specialized* – as a specialized capability of the military instrument allowing the *Joint Force Commander (JFC)* to act before the *Security Gap* occurs.

NATO, through the MSU, integrates an expertise that actuates redirection of negative peace to a positive peace, through the distinctive competence of military units with police functions.

VI. The GNR In Operation Iraqi Freedom

1. Situation

After combat phase completion in May 2003, the United Nations, through resolution no. 1438, and later, resolution no. 1511 created a peace enforcement mission to Iraq. The purpose of this mission was for the development of security conditions and stability to allow humanitarian aid and reconstruction of the country. The Portuguese Government decided to participate in the mission, but faced a difficult problem, since the president as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, refused to approve these operations in Iraq. The solution was simple. The government, after the Lajes Summit, was keen to join the US-led coalition and agreed to support the effort by sending the GNR, since this organization depended organically (as presently) on Ministry of Internal Administration (MAI) and not the presidency.

On 15 July 2003, the Portuguese government, by Port.^a n.º 1164, decided to "(...) provide support to coalition forces in the maintenance of peace and order in Iraq (...).", setting the duration for six months, with the possibility of an extension for the same period. The order described Iraq as a type "C" country. A force was constituted for this purpose, called the Sub-group ALPHA, composed of a maximum of 140 military personnel.

The Republican National Guard remained in Iraq through four rotations in the period between November 12, 2003 and February 10, 2005.



2. Operational Area (OA)

The GNR area of responsibility (AOR) encompassed the entire province of *Dhi Qar* covering approximately 200 km by 140 km with 1.8 million inhabitants. The principal cities were *Ash Shatrah*, *Suq Ash Shuyukh*, and the capital, *An Nassiriya*.

3. The Capabilities of the GNR MSU company

Analyzing the ability⁴ of the GNR MSU Company, the following are noted:

Doctrine

The GNR used NATO doctrine, employment of a military force with police functions. (Carabinieri, 2003: 3-4; annex A; NATO, 2001: 4-10, 4-11; 2010a: 3-9; 2010b: 2-8)

Organization

Sub-group ALPHA consisted of the following composition: a commander and deputy commander, four platoons (a support and three intervening), a Section of Special Operations (SOE), a team of Inactivation of Improvised Explosive Devices (EIEEI), and a team of instructors.

Training

In addition to standard vocational training, the GNR received additional operational and tactical military training. The standardization of military doctrine was necessary for mission accomplishment and crucial for ensuring, particularly, "force protection" before any attack.

Equipment

The equipment was functionally identical to the Italian kit, both military and the police. Both contingents possessed non-lethal /less lethal weapons. The system of transmissions/communications was a decisive capability (GNR, 2010: 36).

Leadership

The Portuguese contingent fell under the US chain of command, with the Secretary of Defense of the United States (SECDEF) on top, followed by the commander of *Central Command* (CENTCOM), and the commander of the *Combined Joint Task Force* (COMCJTF). Operational control was exercised over the MSU regiment by the *Multinational Division on South-East* (MND), through the Italian brigade. Operational command was exercised within the Portuguese chain of command. Because of prior

⁴ "(...) Set of elements that are articulated in a harmonious and complementary manner and contribute to the realization of a set of operational tasks or effect that is necessary to reach, encompassing parts of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, infrastructures, interoperability, among others."(MDN, 2011: 4), (DOTMLPI).



experience, the GNR seamlessly integrated into the different forms of military and police authority.

Staff

Recruitment was carried out on a voluntary basis. After the expansion of auxiliary diagnostic tests, the appointment proposals ensued. (GNR, 2010: 14) All chosen personnel were dedicated professional military soldiers, grouped hierarchically into officers, sergeants and guards/regulars. Additionally, one physician deployed during the first, second and third contingent. Finally, this staff was experienced. As Portuguese police officers, all personnel held an extensive background in law enforcement, authority, and criminal investigation.

Table 1 - Active Guard per contingent

Contingent	Date	Active				
		Officers	Sergeants	Regulars	Civilian	Total
First	NOV03-MAR04	6	12	110	1	129
Second	MAR04-JUL04	5	14	121	1	121
Third	JUL04-NOV04	5	13	109	1	128
Fourth	NOV04-FEV05	5	13	109		127
	Total	21	52	449	3	505

Source: GNR (2010)

In terms of morale and welfare, the unit generated a "Committee on Monitoring and Support for Families of Military serving in Iraq".

Infrastructure

Sub-group ALPHA deployed initially to *Libecchio* Base in *An Nassiriya*, and subsequently to barracks at *Camp Mittica*, in *Tallil*, the former Iraqi Air Force base. Regarding barracks, the Portuguese contingent received five brick accommodations, formally belonging to Iraqi Air Force officers, five kilometers from the province capital (Cruz, 2010: 346).

Interoperability

Interoperability depended on the following factors:

- (I) Force employment of the same type, military units with police functions;
- (II) Standardization and normalization of NATO military doctrine, allowing the interoperability of operational and logistical tactics, techniques and procedures;
- (III) A modular and flexible organization (MSU), based on the organic type common to NATO countries;
- (IV) Identical military and police training;



- (V) Previous joint training with the Italian forces reinforced during missions;
- (VI) Functionally identical equipment, the light infantry security force utilized less non-lethal / less lethal weapons and armored vehicles of the same make and model;
- (VII) Clear delegation of authority: Operational Command, Operational Control and Tactical Control;
- (VIII) Force constitution with military personnel integrating the respective national military corps, with daily experience in employing police functions, a *comprehensive approach* to the police and judiciary system;
- (IX) The presence of Portuguese liaison officers connected at different levels and sharing information.
- (X) The interoperability of Portuguese communications systems with communications centers common to the Italian and Romanian forces allowing enhanced command and control (C2) and information sharing.

4. Operational Activity Established in Iraq

During the mission, Sub-Group ALPHA was assigned the following operations/policing tasks (Cross, 2010: 347-349; Silverio, 2004: 3-5):

Guards

In addition to other missions, the police ensured 24-hour force protection, guarding the GNR work and living installations, first in *Libeccio* and later, *Tallil Base*, *Camp Mittica*.

Radio On Call (ROC)/ Quick Reaction Force (QRF)

The force appointed for this service consisted of a reserve prepared to operate statically or dynamically. The first task consisted in maintaining a prevention unit at *Camp Mittica* and *Tallil Base* ready to respond to unexpected situations, typically related to a serious disruption of public order. The QRF strengthened or replaced the local police. Likewise, the unit remained ready to provide support to a force on an external mission. The second task was support, in the vicinity of the unit tasked with a mission (GNR, 2004).

Re-establishment and maintenance of the public order

These operations attempted to reestablish law and order to guarantee the state social stability (GNR 2004). The GNR succeeded during several interventions.

Check-points / Road blocks

This task implemented the monitoring and supervision of cars, individuals, and transported materials, related to serious crimes (GNR, 2004), specifically, arms trafficking and works of art.



Escorts

These missions safeguard the movement of personnel outside the unit, namely: Portuguese dignitaries visiting the Portuguese contingent, the commander, MSU instructors, Italian army leadership, detainees, and others.

Physical Security

Service conducted to guarantee "(...) security, locations, areas, itineraries, facilities or entities (...)" (GNR, 1996b: IX-106) during the local and national electoral processes predominantly occurring in the province of *Dhi Qar*.

Inactivation of Unidentified Explosive Devices (UXO)/ Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

The Portuguese and the Italian EOD developed a strong link by the interoperable nature of this function. The teams executed the destruction of explosive substances seized in police operations, inactivated explosive devices, implemented preventive recognition of explosives, and expanded technical advice related to the work. The most relevant example occurred on November 10, 2004 when the team neutralized a car bomb filled with 65Kg of explosives.

High-risk operations (Search and Seizure)

High-risk police operations aim to impede violent criminal activities. Performed by the Special Operations Section, these tasks consisted of searching for objects related to crime, seizing possible evidence, and detaining suspects (GNR, 1996b: IX-37-59). These missions included high-risk entry into residences with considerable security to comply with judicial mandates.

Female inspections

In regards to contact between men and women, well-defined social standards in Arabic culture require consideration. Without ostracizing the force and simultaneously transmitting modern police values, the creation of a female inspection team composed of three military females was established (the only women in the MSU regiment). The mission of this team required the search of Iraqi women whenever necessary. Essentially, there were two situations: daily inspection of self-employed Iraqi women who worked in *Tallil* and support of police operations throughout the MSU regiment.

Service Auto GRILL

Ensuring a regular supply of fuel to the population required the stemming of price inflation and smuggling. This operation verified compliance by checking the amount of fuel remaining in the tanks, compared to the amount recorded as output with the sale receipt, the selling price, and the arrangement (GNR, 1996b: I-5 - I-12).



Patrols

These duties included standing and vehicle patrols, as a means of proximity policing. The patrols protected the local population and property by ensuring compliance with the legal mandate, encouraging the normal societal functions. Essentially preventive in character, patrolling constituted an excellent way of obtaining information (GNR, 1996b: I-13). The two main objectives of patrolling included: monitoring and advising the Iraqi police regarding the police roles and providing security to the same, as well as the province and city.

Security Sector Reform

In the *Dhi Qar* province, the local and traffic police lacked technical training and respect from the population. The Coalition Provisional Authority guided and defined a program in which the reorganization, training, and monitoring of the police fell under the responsibility of the MSU. The GNR participated and helped develop Security System Reform in three areas: creating instructional materials and physical conditions for the performance of police functions, concomitant with the training and *mentoring*.

Formation / Training

The Portuguese and Italian police administered the training. The Portuguese team consisted of three instructors, a sergeant and two guards, which commuted daily to the traffic police and the training premises in *An Nassiriya*. The program contents were: human rights, prisoners' rights, police ethics, and technical police work, and other subjects.

After the classroom training, the Iraqi police returned to regular police duty. In the first phase, the trainers, and subsequently MSU patrols, accompanied the Iraqi police, verifying an increase in the quality of the work and respect for the police. The Portuguese cooperated actively in Iraqi police training, instructing over 1800 police officers in less than a year.

Mentoring

This duty verified work conditions, analyzed needs, and identified manpower requirements per squadron. Likewise, mentors conferred and monitored the delivery of identity cards, uniforms, and weapons, particularly, to the police stations in the localities of *Al Islah*, *Sayyid Dakhil*, *Al Fuhood*, *Al Fudlija* and *Al Tar*. After providing the real conditions for the performance of the functional police training, the second phase of training focused on police ethos and the respective procedures. The GNR's comprehensive approach to police work and the judicial system ensured the successful development of this mission.

Military Missions

The GNR was not in Iraq to "execute military tasks", due to domestic political pressures adduced. However, based on military training, the GNR exercised force protection,



when attacked, on the basis of the military techniques, tactics, and procedures or when assigned a mission critical to force protection⁵ ⁶. They fulfilled:

Surveillance missions and linkages between fixed or mobile forces - anti mortar patrols: Following the incidents of 14, 15 and May 16, 2004, anti mortar patrols commenced to prevent mortar attacks. The teams accomplished this duty in vehicle patrols, within a five-mile radius around the outer perimeter of the *Tallil* base. The Portuguese patrols discovered at least two positions used for launching mortars and rockets.

Special operations missions: During the incidents on May 14-16, 2004 and, the SOE supported the exfiltration of units subject to enemy fire.

"Under constant fire by 100 militiamen, Carabinieri parachutists and Portuguese gendarmes arrived at the Libeccio base in a column of 16 military vehicles and two Centauros to facilitate evacuation" (Cappelli, 2005: 60).

This type of mission occurred again on August 5-6, and 29, 2004.

Missions securing rear areas: Assessing the incidents from April 6, May 14-16, and August 5-6, the taxonomy below correlates the operations/ policing tasks performed by the GNR in Iraq with the respective apex of the *Violence Triangle* and corresponding *Security Gap*.

Table 2 – Correlation of GNR tasks in Iraq with the Violence Triangle and The *Security Gap*

Operation/ Tasks	Violence			Security Gap		
	Direct	Structural	Cultural	Deployment	Enforcement	Institutional
Guard duty	X				X	
Radio On Call	X	X			X	X
Reestablishment and maintenance of public order	X	X			X	X
Check-point/ Road Blocks	X	X			X	X
Escort	X	X			X	X
Physical Security	X	X			X	X
Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD)	X	X			X	X
High risk operations	X	X			X	X
Female Inspection	X	X	X		X	X
Auto GRILL	X	X	X		X	X
Patrol duty	X	X	X		X	X
Formation/training		X	X			X
Mentoring		X	X			X

⁵ Article 150 of the RGSGNR, Order No. 10393 of the GNR Commander-General of 05 May 2010, DR, 2nd series - number 119 - June 22, 2010

⁶ It may be worthwhile in this context to compare the missions of the GNR in Iraq, with the Portuguese Special Forces in Afghanistan (Pires, 2011).



An analysis of the overall mission concludes that the GNR tasks correlated to the areas of the Violence Triangle, specifically, in the vertices of structural and direct violence. Despite accomplishing fewer specific tasks related to cultural violence, the “seeds” of new cultural awareness should minimize future violence across the spectrum.

Regarding the *Security Gap*, the activity of the GNR contributed to eradicating the *institutional gap* and the *enforcement gap*. This observation is due to two factors: (i) the GNR aiding in the consolidation of the social structure, based on daily experience from Portugal, by using a *comprehensive approach* to the security and legal system; (ii) the continuity of the Guard’s versatile implementation derived from the ability to transition between the military and police duties, and institutional positioning by permanent connection between the military and civil institutions. Although not tasked to fill the *deployment gap*, the GNR remained prepared.

Sub-group ALPHA operated as a rapid intervention motorized unit, always available to respond to operational requirements and proficiently handle threats to peace, in the context of assigned missions (Silverio, 2004: 5).

The Portuguese contingent, throughout the period in Iraq, maintained a high level of readiness and availability, while surviving several attacks with zero casualties. Due the successful deployment, the GNR received public praise from several international and national organizations, honoring the country and the Guard organization. The unit was awarded the first Portuguese Gold Medal for Distinguished Service with a Palm leaf for action in support of peace missions⁷. As stated by the former Prime Minister, Pedro Santana Lopes,

“We are proud of the role that GNR Sub-group Alpha performed in this process (...) Portugal demonstrated, once again, that it is an important contributor to the maintenance of international peace and security (etc.)”⁸.

VII. Conclusion

In recent years, the Republican National Guard intervened in various conflicts around the world. This participation was always after a mandated resolution, but never framed in a multinational Force of NATO. However, the GNR worked under doctrine for the employment of trained forces, on the basis of military organizations with police functions, called the *Multinational Specialized Units*.

The Guard, as an operational military and police capability with continuity, can integrate with an enabled international organization to use force. The permanent connection between the military and civil institutions ensures this continuity by the smooth transition between the military and police tasks, and the performance of the latter in an unstable environment.

⁷ Diário da República, December 16, 2005, Notice No. 11435 (2nd series).

⁸ Public elections in Iraq, January 30, 2005.



The training guarantees the integration of military doctrine in conjunction with the armed forces. This preparation for permanent military and international joint missions, where only the territorial scope of activity may change, applies the comprehensive approach to the security and judiciary system.

As a military unit, the GNR provides a continually committed capability in a diverse range of conflicts. The Guard works to achieve peace; the regular functioning of democratic institutions, including peace enforcement operations in countries classified as "C", in compliance with police functions.

The GNR demonstrates a unique capacity to cope, across the entire spectrum of police functions, with direct, structural and cultural violence, within an unstable environment. This capability is derived from military training, giving it a distinctive competence. Paradoxically, the refusal of the President of the Republic to consider Iraq in what he considered to be an illegal intrusion, gave the GNR the opportunity to show their value in the military field, as well as police work.

The Guard can assist other institutions, including the courts, the military, and the police in the strict and narrow sense, to better fill the *Security Gap*. The GNR helps to eradicate violence, contributing to peace: (1) by the ability to act in conjunction with the military instrument in the first phase of the conflict (*deployment gap*); (2) The capability to ensure the institutional continuity between the functional military / civilian police, in an unstable environment without breakdowns or setbacks, with recourse to force in a legal manner (*enforcement gap*); (3) capacity arising from daily tasks in the performance of police duties, in the framework of its mission in the security system, with the permanent connection to the judicial system, with different levels of authority, allowing a comprehensive approach in the promotion and construction of the secure system (*institutional gap*).

The NATO doctrine used to fill the *Security Gap* is the *Multinational Specialized Units*. The Republican National Guard has all the characteristics necessary to constitute or integrate into an MSU. It is a military organization performing the police role, with the capacity to act in an peace enforcement operation overcoming the *Security Gap* with practical experience working under MSU doctrine.

The GNR is a credible instrument in support of Portuguese foreign policy in peace-enforcement operations, oriented to *state-building* by the creation of a *jus post bellum*. (Silverio, 2014) This contribution is genetic; a military body with police functions. In the case of Iraq, intervening in a devastating post conflict scenario at the international level, the Guard provided the necessary support. The GNR fulfilled the police functions demanded of it, successfully defending against several surprise attacks while planning missions to deal with high levels of violence, with zero casualties; a truly remarkable achievement.

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