EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF PORTUGAL (1960-2002)

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Abstract
Portugal's accession to the EEC in 1986 was a natural and important stage in the restructuring of the international scenario, once the empire had been lost and the political and party structures were established following the revolutionary period. However, the movement towards Europe does not start in 1976, during the period of Estado Novo important steps are taken to open the dialogue with Europe, though at that time the objectives were to establish economic links, in a predominantly pragmatic strategy. The commercial agreement in 1972, designed during the government of Marcelo Caetano, is a natural follow-up to EFTA, which was viewed by Salazar, and in particular by the minister Corrêa d’Oliveira, as a complement to the international character of the regime, in the footsteps of its ally, England, and, especially, protecting the country's colonial interests. When the most extremist factions had been defeated and the military had returned to their posts, the several constitutional governments, among which those led by Mário Soares in 1976 and 1983 (Bloco Central) and Sá Carneiro (1980), advocate stronger positions regarding the place of Portugal in the EEC, and move forward with the negotiating process in 1977. The governments of Cavaco Silva and António Guterres, in different contexts, also aimed to evidence the country's role in Europe, though never neglecting our peripheral character. So as to understand Portugal's place in the European Union (EU) also requires an analysis of the nature of the organization, which we will carry out at the beginning of this paper. The EU is a changing political system which has drawn special attention of experts in political science and international relations. In this debate, we shall focus on European federalism and the positions of the Portuguese State.

Keywords
Portugal; European Union; Federalism; Political integration; State

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European integration is, first of all, a political process. Therefore, to reduce its capacity to intervene to the financial and economic field is to crush the expectations of those who believe that the European Union (EU) is the last stronghold of peace and prosperity for Europe in the past sixty years. Globalization seems unstoppable, emerging powers (already an anachronistic name) evidence their strength in an ever changing political agenda. The European integration process began in the postwar period (after 1945) and its initial aims were to re-establish the political and economic balance which had led to World War II. The European example, pioneering and innovative, became a model for several regional integration experiences throughout the globe.

According to Philippe Schmitter, whatever the task or the powers of the functional organization, integration will allow the national and regional actors to: develop relationships of trust; enjoy a better status; draw political dividends through cooperation; create significant material prizes; participate in larger and smaller States as formal equals; distribute the initial benefits of cooperation and interdependency with equity so as to avoid the discrepancy between what is at the hand of larger States and of smaller and economically more vulnerable States (Schmitter, 2010). Portugal's accession to the EEC in 1986 would allow the country to establish a new position within Europe and integrate a very specific organization. This specificity is visible in the qualification of the European Union's political system, in the political consequences of the integration (Europeanization), in the role of Member-States, in the dynamics of interests and the role of European institutions.

In this paper, we aim to clarify the positions of the several Portuguese governments in terms of European federalism, in terms of the European Communities during the period Salazar was in power up to this century, i.e., in the period Portuguese democracy is already consolidated. Thus, we will identify and analyze the most significant moments of Portugal's integration in the European unification process since 1960 (accession to EFTA) up to 2002 (end of the government by António Guterres). From the early stages of European integration up to now, European federalism has been in political debate within the community: believers still fight for its full constitutional acknowledgement; opponents advocate the contribution of Member-States, each with its own perspective and interests. Portugal's approach to the Communities arises from the need the country has of international repositioning. Since the Communities were founded, their federal nature has been discussed. Therefore, it is relevant to understand the position of successive Portuguese governments at important moments, such as when treaties were revised. In fact, we contend that Portuguese governments acknowledged the
implications of European integration, in particular, of European federalism, and that Portugal would be called on to contribute as all other Member-States.

The present study is divided into two parts. The first will focus on the analysis of European federalism, more specifically, its different names, since to study the history of European federalism implies to study of a very specific type of federalism. In this first part, we will also refer to the two opposing theories in international relations in terms of the debate on recent developments in European integration, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism (Bache and George, 2006). In the second part, we will summarize some of the positions taken by Portuguese governments in the European integration process since Estado Novo up to the negotiation and accession process and to the governments of Cavaco Silva and António Guterres. In this sense, ours is a structured approach and we will provide an encompassing perspective of Portugal’s approach to and as a member of the Communities.

The European Union as a political model

The construction of Europe was designed on the rubble of WWII as a process which would lead to a European federation. To attain this objective, many steps would have to be taken, as it would be difficult to unify a culturally rich but diversified Europe (Steiner, 2005), filled with tradition at political level, which cannot be overlooked to meet the desires of those, surely visionaries, who aimed at an eventual political union.

Experts on European studies still question the nature and objective of the European project. This debate appears never-ending since, on the brink of a new enlargement, the process is still not moving forward. International relations have taken part in this theoretical debate, which further justifies the exceptional character of regional integration, in particular in Europe, as well as the sui generis character of this international organization which has no unanimous classification. The fact that the issue of its name is at the core of the discussion is rather surprising.

Many have contributed to the classification of EU’s federalism. Advocates of neo-confederalism believe the European Union has a specific ethos, i.e., it is more than the simple union of States, yet less than a union of individuals, the watermark of traditional federations (Burgess, 2000: 41-42). Though in practical term the European Union functions, challenges are posed at a theoretical level, referred to as "an intellectual maze" (Schmitter, 2000: 40-47). Others question whether the EU is rather a neo-federal entity (Camisole & Lobo-Fernandes, 2005: 55-60; Pinder, 1993: 45-66).

The European integration has also been analyzed from the point of view of cooperative federalism, which places in evidence the responsibilities shared at supranational and national levels, proving this is a common project that requires commitment from both parties (Vandamme, 1998: 128-137). Another point of view is that of regulatory federalism, whose partnership is based on a transnational socialization process, consolidated with time. National decision-makers and bureaucrats are instructed to solve national problems, at national level, and are led by these problems to find community solutions at supranational level. The decision-making process is bottom-up, i.e., regulation agencies and informal agents promote them and provide the boost which will lead to decision-making by politicians (Majone, 1996; Cunha, 2005: 1053-1063).
The EU is rather viewed as a federation without a State which requires a constitutional reunification of European integration. This can cause friction with those who believe that underlying this idea is the creation of State-like structure. The solution lies in viewing the development of the EU as a federation which has not yet given origin to a federal State. According to Koslowski, the European Union is already a federation, though not a federal State. This transformation has occurred through a constitutional engineering process (Koslowski, 1999: 561-578). McKay qualifies the development of European integration as a highly peripheral federalism (McKay, 2002: 93) as Member-States have a very influential role while supranational institutions have limited assertiveness. Based on the analysis of the most important moments of the EU since the 1990s, and drawing a parallel with the foundation of the USA, McKay considers the EU "almost a federal State", as taxes are not included in the supranational competences and budget policy is decentralized (McKay, 1999: 154). Vila Maior points out that the decentralization elements are one of the specificities of European federalism. The category of stateless federation includes important elements which should be considered, such as the rejection of a State EU, thus taking into account the specificities that make the EU different: a federation of States rather than a federal State (Vila Maior, 2007: 58-59).

Currently, there are four strategies used in defining EU federalism: the first is designated constitutional, based on constitutional law and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the constitutionalization of the treaties (Sweet, 2004; Maduro, 2006); the second dis-joining, as it considers that the EU cannot be viewed as a completed federation but rather evidences features of a federacy in specific policies, inspired by regulatory and taxation federalisms (Mastromarino, 2010; Scharpf, 1999); the third distributive, focused mainly on the distribution of power between the centre and its units as well as among its units. As rather unclear competences developed and the subsidiary was announced in Maastricht, the strategy of recovering federalism received a significant boost (Pollack, 1994: 95-145; Swenden, 2004: 371-392); the fourth essentialist, for it attempts to understand the essence of federalism. It is therefore crucial to research the type of federalism the EU represents or how the present idea of federalism should be altered to encompass the case of the EU, as well as other similar cases. According to this strategy, the link between federalism and statism, which expanded from the normative to the analytical sphere, should be severed (Elazar, 1995: 5-18; Kelemen and Nicolaidis, 2006: 304-307).

Unlike the American federal unit, the EU is not based on the utopia of one people or even on the idea that its creation would make it real. Experts in identity policy in Europe acknowledge that the European feeling of belonging may be mixed with national and sub-national identities to form more marked multiple identities (Risse, 2010). Other authors suggest that the diversity of cultural and political identities in Europe is not opposed to a federal perspective if that perspective is that of a federal union (rather than a federal State) and aims to develop a new idea of democracy (Nicolaidis, 2004: 97-110).

In the European Union, unlike what happens in the USA, supranational, national and sub-national level work together is a "joint governance" system (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 341-378; Amaral, 1998). James Caporaso is one of the authors who claim that the European integration process gave rise to a structure similar to that of an "international State". The author accounts for his opinion based on three items: 1) the
EU has an important mediation role among Member-States; 2) supranational institutions may act independently from the control of Member-States; 3) supranational institutions aim to expand their relations and influence beyond the national governments so as to establish relations with private interest (NGOs, pressure groups...). The aim of the EU as an "international State" is to accommodate international external factors the Member-States, on their own, cannot solve at national level (Caporaso, 1996: 29-52).

The progress of European integration cannot break away from the stigma of "Westphalian State" as it was created after 1648. Countering this perspective and from a rather naive point of view, Jan Zielonka shows how the enlarged EU is gradually becoming more like a neo-medieval empire rather than a classical (federal) Westphalian type of State. For the author, in the future EU borders will be less and less territorial, less physical and visible, as the borders will become areas where people and identities mix. The concept of border was unknown in the Middle Ages, borders were seen as geographical and open areas rather than lines. Besides, in that period there were no administrative, economic, military and cultural borders as such (Zielonka, 2007)1.

For Isabel Camisão and Luís Lobo-Fernandes, the EU is halfway between the State-nation and the international system, the political macro-region, which goes beyond the classical Westphalian sovereignties as a new territory formula in international relations (making it a new international actor). The political macro-region inevitably implies meeting a set of conditions, such as regional identity, a unique currency and an integrated defense system. To meet the criteria of macro-region proposed by the authors, the EU must improve its coordination significantly, put in motion the implementation of common policies and increase the number of areas in the integration process (Camisão and Lobo-Fernandes, 2005: 241-242).

In the first stage of European integration, neo-functionalism appeared to be in the lead of the theoretical debate. In fact, it aimed to explain the how and the why States voluntarily join and associate with their neighbors though aware that they will lose part of their sovereignty and learn new techniques to solve conflicts among themselves. There are four key elements in the neo-functionalist argument: i) the concept of "State" is more complex than realists had suggested; ii) the activities of interest groups and bureaucratic actors are not confined to national political scenario; iii) non-state actors are important in international politics; iv) European integration is attained through "spillover" pressures.

According to the "spillover" concept, once the first steps are taken by national governments towards integration, the process moves on its own and is irreversible. As Lindberg stated,

«in its most general formulation, "spillover" refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the

1 We will briefly refer to the work of Rui Cunha Martins who, in the past few years, has studied to concept of border at historical, legal and political levels. In one of his recent papers (Martins, 2008), he draws on the core of the concept, highlighting its mutability and operationability, its priceless limitation potential, as well as its ability to become a mechanism of resistance against the totalitarianism of societies unable to create boundaries.
original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth» (Lindberg, 1963: 10).

However, the development of events, and specifically the assumption by Member-States of what is at stake with the reinforcement of European integration, has led to this no longer being a widely accepted perspective. Therefore, the use of veto by De Gaulle which led to the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-66 was a major setback for neo-functionalism (Bache and George, 2006: 8-12) in its original meaning. From then onwards, national governments vest themselves as responsible for moving the European integration forward, determining its nature and scope (for their seminal work on neo-functionalism, Haas, 1968).

Hoffmann rejected the neo-functionalist perspective that governments would be ultimately oppressed by pressures to integrate of elites in interest groups. Hoffmann based his argument in classical realism, according to which States were treated as unique rational actors, home politics not been given much attention to. Hoffmann's intergovernmental position was a step ahead of that of realists; his political awareness was also more acute than that of functionalists who aim to adopt a plural simplified vision of political processes. For the author, European integration was a mere component of the development of international politics and, as the realists, focused on external limitations to autonomy: States were viewed as independent actors but governments were limited by the position of State in world system (Hoffmann, 1966: 862-915).

Andrew Moravcsik highlights the complexity of communal political process, claiming that more theories are necessary that explain national responses to international interdependence. Liberal intergovernmentalism - just as Hoffmann's approach - stated that States were rational actors but, like traditional realism, did not see the State as a black box. A national political process would establish its national interest. Once the process was clear, this would be the basis for international negotiation. In a second stage, this was also the basis for reconciling national interests in the Cabinet. Moravcsik's perspective on national politics, which he designated as liberal, was essentially the same as that of neo-functionalists, the so-called plural perspective. The determining reason for a government's preference was the balance in terms of national economic interests. Moravcsik was frequently criticized because of this limited view of the national political process (Bache and George, 2006: 14; see pioneering paper on liberal intergovernmentalism in Moravcsik, 1993: 473-524).

According to José Manuel Pureza, throughout the last decades, Europe has been the center stage for rebalancing of power in international relations, which has led it to consider itself the champion of a post-realist world order (Pureza, 2003). Joschka Fischer bases this self-representation of Europe in the fact that, after 1945, it rejected system that continued Westphalia; Romano Prodi draws attention to the role of Europe in world governance, a role which implies replicating its experience at global level; Chirac advocates the reinforcement of European unity though safeguarding the intergovernmental features of the organization; Milliband identifies a model power in Europe but does not project a superpower on the EU; Eduardo Lourenço believes that, presently, Europe is nothing more than a Europe of Nations, it has not yet attained the
goal of being a Europe-Nation. A Europe of "reasons" but equally disillusioned and at odds with its fate, an incomplete work (Lourenço, 2003). Considering that, in the building of Europe, States are actors and considering that Portugal has experience in this process besides the period after 1986, we shall now focus on the process from within and analyze some political positions taken by Portugal in relevant moments.

Estado Novo and its approach to the Communities

The regime led by Salazar was a right-wing, nationalist and catholic dictatorship, close to fascism in certain areas, just like other southern and eastern European nations in the period between the two world wars. The ideology was based on authority, on there being one party only and censorship so as to build a new man. This required an economic support. Though the country's motto was "proudly isolated", the need was felt for economic openness, though restricted, as well as a change in its development model. This is what is at stake in the change from EFTA to the EEC.

The British proposal of a free trade zone, submitted in July 1956, was seen by the six as well as by other member of the OEEC as an attempt to question the results achieved at Messina. This was confirmed in September 1956, when the British proposed a fusion between the EEC negotiations and the free trade zone. When the free trade zone was presented at OEEC, the British authorities informed the Portuguese counterparts that the project would include only the industrialized countries within the Organization and Portugal could not be a participant. Considering the Portuguese economy and that this was a free trade zone for the industry and excluded agriculture, it did not seem very appealing to Portugal.

Despite the constraints, the Portuguese government declares being interested in being represented at the negotiations. According to Costa Pinto and Severiano Teixeira, Portugal accepts the general political objective of a freer market; unlike other peripheral countries, it had no financial problems. Finally, the issue of the colonies, which could be sensitive rather plays for rather against Portugal, as England, who is interested in including the Commonwealth, saw Portugal as a potential ally on this matter (Pinto and Teixeira, 2005: 23).

One of EFTA's core objectives was to negotiate with the EEC as a whole. As the EEC did not respond, Great Britain evidenced more and more interest in bilateral negotiations (Wilkes, 1997). Switzerland and Portugal were the countries which were more strongly opposed to this new position saying that the rights of other EFTA members should be protected. Portuguese export and imports with the EEC, in 1957-1958, corresponded to 32% and 44% of external trade, respectively. In case Great Britain accessed the EEC, those percentages would be even higher, 49.3% and 68.3%. The official statistics of these two years show that the trade with other EFTA countries was not relevant. Similarly to what would occur to other EFTA members, Great Britain's change in European policy would seriously compromise the future of Portugal (Leitão, 2007: 127-128).

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2 In a context of uncertainty and apparent inability to react, Eduardo Lourenço does not identify a centre in Europe, which is why it cannot be an actor. Eduardo Lourenço in an interview in the newspaper Público (section P2, 5 April 2010. Interviewed by Teresa de Sousa.
At economic level, Portugal would have to ensure a specific regime so as to protect its economic development. The turnaround of the Portuguese government in terms of its accession to the EEC resulted from the government not having any alternative than to follow Britain as far as European policy was concerned. Nicolau Andresen Leitão refers to

"the non-existence of a narrative is evident in the fact that Corrêa d'Oliveira accepted, right from the start, that only continental Portugal would request accession and that the common exterior criteria would have to be applied. Though the minister responsible for European policy stated that there was political and economic unity between Portugal and its colonies, these core concepts in Salazar's government would be publicly sacrificed so as to ensure the economic development of the nation through accession or association with the Community" (Leitão, 2007: 130).

Therefore, the reasons explaining this change towards the EEC were internal.

Opening to the external market and the increase in commercial relations with countries from the area rather than with the colonies led to the weakening of protectionism and constraints and allowed the fostering of yet unexplored economic relations, such as the creation of foreign companies in Portugal and foreign investment. Accession to EFTA had a significant impact on trade, exports increased to 52% and imports to 40%. The rates in the remaining Member-States were 30% or lower. As a result of the accession to EFTA, Portuguese economic growth took off between 1960 and 1973, this being the period of highest growth in terms of production and income per inhabitant in the history of Portugal (Alípio, 2006: 93-94).

In the summer of 1968, Marcelo Caetano takes on a more European country in terms of commercial trade and evidences some liberating intents. Marcelo Caetano, though neither a democrat nor a liberal, was a reformer within the regime since the end of World War II, highlighting the regime's ability to adjust to circumstances but unable to resist to context. Caetano would become the leader of this reforming group. However, he aimed to change within the regime, not negate or alter it.

What Caetano was really concerned about were the overseas territories (Ultramar) and finding a means of their defense within the framework of a wider defense of Europe or the West, which was surrounded by international communism, also established in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. This would justify the Portuguese colonial policy as well as its need for support within NATO, by definition an organization which defends the West (Castilho, 2000: 120).

As in previous European negotiations, namely for the creation of a free trade zone (1956-1958) and for the expansion of the Community (1961-1963), the government assigned an investigatory committee in March 1970 to study European economic integration, which presented its report in September that year. The Community is referred as the most relevant European element, in opposition to EFTA, able to join in a political and economic group all the European non-communist resources. The
The document acknowledged the possibility that the Community could be the first step towards a federation of the United States of Europe.\(^3\)

According to the report, the association was the most adequate means of regulating the relations between Portugal and the Community. This was the most convincing option for economies whose developing economies did not allow for immediate accession. The association would pose political problems, considering that a recent report from the European Parliament evidenced reservations to the accession of non-democratic countries, mentioning the cases of Spain and eventually Portugal. An opinion from the European Commission, from 1969, established the difference between countries ready to establish association agreements with and those which would only have the opportunity to sign commercial agreements, implying that this would be the case of the Iberian countries. The report detailed that the association agreements would put in place the first step towards a future accession.

On 22 July 1972 an agreement on free trade was signed between Portugal and the Community. Considering the specificities of the Portuguese case and the practice of the Community in these circumstances, the agreement included a clause which opened the "possibility that relations develop and increase when, in the interest of both economies, it is deemed useful to expand them to areas not covered by this agreement" (this clause was important after 1974 in terms of the Community providing financial support and ease the commercial conditions imposed to Portugal by the 1972 agreement).

Portugal's move towards Europe, whether during the government of Salazar or during that of Marcelo Caetano, the strategies used to establish closer links with the EEC were all of a pragmatic nature. This trend is made most evident in July 1972, as the commercial agreement to come into force in January the following year did not establish any political link but the mere exchange of goods, in particular of industrial goods. Guided by continuity, we may state that the gap between Portugal and Europe was not different in January 1960 (formal accession to EFTA) and in July 1972 (signing of Commercial Agreement between Portugal and the EEC and the ECSC) Castilho, 2000: 228; Silva, 2000: 62).

**A democratic Portugal in Europe and its role in political integration**

Once the parallel diplomacies of the period after 1974 (Período Revolucionário em Curso - PREC), the radical speeches and the political actions in the summer of 1975 (Verão Quente), USA hesitation in helping the country after the vaccination Kissinger talked about, once all this had been overcome, the "international relevance" of the Portuguese case did in fact contribute heavily for the democratic transition. Evidence of this is the involvement of the Community, of some European countries, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany and France, of international organizations, of moderate political parties and of the USA.

The "European option" was politically declared by the first Constitutional Government led by PM Mário Soares, and having José Medeiros Ferreira as the minister of Foreign Affairs. The first step was the request for accession to the Council of Europe in August 1976, which took place in September that year. Once a member of the Council of

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\(^3\) AHD-MNE, report of the Study Commission on European Economic Integration, September 1970, 3-6.
Europe, once the Portuguese democracy was internationally acknowledged, the next and decisive step was taken: the request for accession to the EEC. From 1976 onwards, Portugal took on its western country condition, both Atlantic and European. The good relations with the USA, the bilateral plan, more participation in NATO, the multilateral plan, all evidenced the Atlantic condition of the country. The "European choice" is a strategic option and a political project, as the merely pragmatic and economic association perspective, which existed during the dictatorship, was over. Travelling around Europe, the Portuguese PM aimed to raise his counterparts' awareness that the democratic process in Portugal was completed, that the country was committed to become a member of the EEC. Considering that the Communities had expressed a positive opinion in May 1978, the following years up to 1985, were devoted to more or less committed negotiations by the Portuguese governments.

In an interview to The Times Soares declares

"he is a patriot but also an advocate of a true Europe rather than of a mere association of States based on economic development or economic concerns. (...) I am so much for a political Europe with true supranational institutions that I believe the accession of Southern European countries represents a major contribution to this Europe".

On future negotiation difficulties, he states that:

"In a community of Free Nations, there should be solidarity which should rise above strictly national and selfish criteria".

If Europe does not accept Portugal, that would be a "disaster" for the Portuguese people and for the democracy, which is why "in the current financial difficulties we face, this could lead to new authoritarian regime. If Europe closes the door on us, it would be responsible for both our future and that of Europe". In an interview to O País, Soares is adamant: Portugal's accession to the EEC is the logical corollary for the country's development, considering that decolonization process is complete and Portugal is now a democracy.

The 1970s are often portrayed as a lost decade in the history of European integration. However, it was rather a preparatory decade for the political and economic boost of the 1980s. There are more than plausible reasons for the supposed "euro-sclerosis". These include the disintegration of the international monetary system in the early 1970s, the 1973 oil crisis and the following stagflation, as well as the intense British obstructionism to the EEC as successive governments attempted to solve the British budget issue. In isolation, these factors would explain the fluctuation in terms of destiny of the EEC in the 1970s and the early 1980s, with or without the added impact of a more active and authorized European Court. Historical determinism does not begin or end at the moment a decision is taken. This way, the simple fact that nothing very

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relevant was decided during those years should not be viewed as period nothing was done. Griffiths claims that the developments of the 1970s paved the way to the renewed "dynamics" of the Community in the late 1980s, under the strong leadership of the Commission's President, Jacques Delors (Griffiths, 2006: 172).

In a speech during parliamentary debate of the 6th Constitutional Government, the Vice-Prime-Minister and minister of Foreign Affairs, Freitas do Amaral, declares that most Portuguese and Portugal's allies see the foreign policy in the last year and a half with doubt and perplexity. The Portuguese Foreign Affairs Ministry states that

"... our foreign policy will clearly be pro-European and pro-Western. It will definitely not be third-world, non-alignment or reservation or distancing towards or Atlantic solidarity, consciously accepted and freely maintained.".

The fast and complete integration of Portugal in the European Economic Community, as a full member by right, will from then onwards be "the priority within priorities" of Portuguese foreign policy. For the first time in Portugal, the position was created of Secretary of State on European Integration and one single minister was given the main responsibility of foreign policy and European integration.

In an interview to the newspaper Tempo, the prime-minister Sá Carneiro, leaves a notice and a certainty as far as the future in the building of Europe:

"people tend to see a Europe of difficulties in the EEC, in the Europe of the Communities today. (...) It would be a tragedy for the World if Europe stopped believing in itself, if it did not resolve its internal difficulties and did not rapidly enlarge to Twelve members. I am sure that the difficulties will be solved and that the enlargement will go through rapidly. The restructured and enlarged Europe will receive a new impulse I am very confident that this new impulse, this new dimension of Europe, in the important role played in the world by Common Market Europe and other European countries which are not part of it, in contact with our allies, in contact with Arab countries, in contact with China and Japan".

In December 1980 the agreement between Portugal and the EEC was signed on a "pre-accession aid" for Portugal in the amount of present 130 million Euros, to which another 65 millions would be added in the second stage in 1984. These were the first "community funds" from Brussels to Portugal, a few years before the country becoming an effective member of the European Community.

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7 Francisco Sá Carneiro in an interview to newspaper Tempo, 18 September 1980.
In a political and party framework not fully peaceful, the 9th Constitutional Government (known as Bloco Central) will lead the negotiation process towards the accession of Portugal as full member of right up to its conclusion. It is during the period between 1983-85 that most technical files are negotiated and, in October 1984, the accession of Portugal to the EEC becomes irreversible. Relevant contributors include Jaime Gama, António Marta and Ernâni Lopes. To make up the backlog, Mário Soares claims Portugal needs "the shock of integrating the EEC". The Europe of the EEC Founding Fathers

"was a Europe of complementarity, a solidarity economic space, politically united, with a united and independent voice, in which each State's values and contributions are wealth rather than weakness, are unity in plurality".

Soares sees the future of his country "intimately linked to the enlargement and the building of a transnational Europe, because this is how Portugal wants to fulfil its potential, to be one with peoples they are connected with through the centuries and through unbreakable solidarity".

The accession of Portugal and Spain to the EEC in 1986 has political, economic and even symbolic implications for both countries and for the EEC, at an important time for community life. The implementation of the Single European Act and the creation of an internal market have unforgettable consequences which will influence the next steps in European integration. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure economic and social cohesion in a growing Community (Silva, 2002: 179). Cavaco Silva is aware that the reinforcement of political unity in the Treaty of Maastricht, which proposed a greater commitment by community institutions and a clearer definition of the geopolitical role of Europe, could lead to federalist theories being more accepted. Cavaco Silva is against these theories, stating: "(...) for a better coherence in the Community's foreign action - which is crucial - we should move forward in a pragmatic and gradual manner, in search of common areas of foreign policy and security which correspond to common interests of Member-States" (Silva, 1991: 284). The prime-minister will later recall that the European integration is characterized by its gradual progress towards a political organization of Europe. However, to "establish, at this time, any final model would be both untimely and inadequate" (Silva, 1995: 69).

The enlargement is a challenge for Portugal and the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Durão Barroso, claims that the institutional reform of the European Community can only take place after the enlargement. Considering the enlargement of the EU and the new weighting of votes the under-represented countries claim, Barroso defends that the Union is not a federal State. Yet, the governments by Cavaco Silva will take advantage (Franco, 1994) of Portugal being a small peripheral country, in which development is the key in the effort towards the accession to the EEC, that makes it a true public policy (Vicente, 2008).

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The government by António Guterres is the least enthusiastic period of European project, as focus is being given to the enlargement to eastern countries, to reforming institutions and make community policies feasible in the context of a multitude of national sensitivities. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice evidence what was not yet speeded up and how much was yet not implemented. The second Portuguese presidency of the European Community Council, an important step in the Portuguese commitment and the initial drive in the Lisbon Strategy and inspired Strategy 2020 now in force, evidence the action of Portugal in Europe. The Secretary of State of European Affairs, Francisco Seixas da Costa, who knows European policy and diplomacy well, regrets that "daily life shows that the main priorities of the most powerful Member-states tend to be imposed on the remaining states. This does not occur more frequently because there are often differences among those very same States. The creation of a Board would be increasingly inevitable and the introduction of qualified majority voting within the framework of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) would add to the trend. Resuming a classic, we could say that this perspective tends to consider the functioning of the Union as if it was the board of predominant countries' common interests" (Costa, 2002: 49-50).

The opinion of José Magone on the Portuguese negotiation strategy in that period is conclusive:

«(...) the position of Portugal within the negotiation has improved considerably. Although Portugal is not one of the main players of the European integration process, it was able to upgrade its ability to make an impact on the whole process. This can be said particularly for the introduction of a social dimension and employment policy onto the agenda of the IGC 1996 and 2000 in conjunction with other countries as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Citizens. The main trend was a gradual overcoming of the isolationist position of preserving national sovereignty towards one of shared sovereignty. One can speak therefore of a limited bottom-up Europeanization which is highly flexible and open for negotiations» (Magone, 2004: 42).

In fact, Portugal will benefit if it has a strategy and an idea for Europe.

**Conclusion**

The history of European integration, the difficulties of its Member-States, is so rich that, also due to the specificities of its model, political scientists have developed several studies on regional integration and continue to analyze the EU as a structure that, bearing in mind the contexts, can be replicated in other areas of the globe. Though
there is no unanimous classification of the EU, the importance Member-States assign to it is visible, in particular countries like Portugal which would not be able to project themselves politically and economically alone. Nevertheless, the EU is also often the scapegoat for unpopular measures national governments must implement.

During the time period we analyzed in this paper the European project gave steps forward and backward. In general, the several Portuguese governments, both during the dictatorship and the democracy, acknowledged that the political process in European integration was incomplete. Thus, more integration could imply the loss of sovereignty which many governments were not willing to relinquish. The European strategy by Salazar and Caetano focuses on the economic, since most trade exchanges are carried out with Europe rather than the colonies. Hence, the commercial agreement signed in 1972. The period between 1977 and 1985 is particularly intense in the negotiation process for the accession to the EEC. A small group of politicians was involved in the process but noteworthy are considerations by Mário Soares, Jaime Gama or the short intervention by Sá Carneiro). The governments of Cavaco Silva correspond to the golden period of European integration. This is a period of strong leaders, some of which linked to the reinforcement of European federalism. Cavaco Silva was not truly an enthusiast of European federalism and placed the national State at the core of community dynamics. Already in a different period of Europe, the governments of António Guterres deepen the commitment with the European project, with new proposals and the strong belief that the EU belongs to all Member-States, big and small, and the enlargement would lead to deep institutional reforms which had been repeatedly delayed.

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