

## **USING THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A CHANGING PARADIGM**

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### **Abstract**

The characteristics of current armed conflicts have grown in complexity, and the operations carried out to solve them are often performed without the agreement of all of those involved. Accordingly, the traditional use of military forces in the resolution of conflicts seems to be undergoing a rapid evolution. In face of this mounting complexity, peace operations began to be considered as broader "military operations" guided by principles that in the past were limited to the execution of combat operations, materialized by the implementation and application of a complex set of techniques and activities. In this new paradigm, the same "peace" operation may comprise a wide range of activities, ranging from conflict prevention to medium and high intensity fighting operations, and including also parallel humanitarian support activities. For this reason, and in accordance with the concept of employment and the functions to be carried out, the performance of the military forces in current peacekeeping operations is based on the simultaneous completion of a set of tasks that are required to attain the required final military goal. In the presence of the wide range of tasks that need to be performed, a military force should have the resources and be organized based on multiple capacities and characteristics. Areas that in the past used to support the actual force have now assumed increased relevance and are perceived as being crucial, given that the main role of military forces is that of creating and maintaining a safe and stable atmosphere that enables the remaining sectors participating in the process to act. In an integrated approach system to conflict, the aim is that military forces attain and ensure safety conditions, and guarantee the necessary support so that other agents can come up with the most appropriate solutions to address the causes of conflict.

### **Palavras-chave**

Strategic context; Armed Forces; Military Instrument; Peacekeeping Operations; Conflict Resolution

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### **Introduction**

The international community, namely the United Nations with the support of some regional organizations,<sup>1</sup> has increasingly intervened in the resolution of conflicts. This became not only an opportunity but, rather, one of the priorities for the use of the military instrument by States.

Conflict resolution is defined by Fetherston<sup>2</sup> (1994) as "the non-coercive application of negotiation and mediation measures by third parties, with the goal to disarm hostilities among adversaries and to support a lasting end to violence among them." From this definition, we evoke the main characteristic of conflict resolution: third parties, who are not involved in the conflict but use their means to resolve it.<sup>3</sup> Their role is essential to identify and give assistance to the parties in conflict and to attain possible peace in more complex processes, in a credible and transparent manner. (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall, 2006: 12). This characteristic is also found in the definition of "peace operations" mentioned in the *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* (2009: ix), which describes them as operations "authorized by a multilateral body, multinational in their make-up, with a substantial military component, and launched primarily with the goal of supporting a peace process or managing a conflict."

The characteristics of current armed conflicts involving several participants, of whom populations have been the most important, have amplified their complexity, and often the operations launched to solve them fail to have the support of all parties engaged. Thus, the traditional use of military forces in the resolution of conflicts seems to be undergoing a rapid evolution, which calls for a revision of its role in this context.

With the present text, we aim to analyse the role of the military instrument in the resolution of conflicts within the present strategic circumstances, namely in reference to the use of military force and the necessary characteristics to act in that context, considering the change of the paradigm which circumscribes its use.

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<sup>1</sup> With particular emphasis on NATO

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by David (2001: 284).

<sup>3</sup> According to Jones, this definition (2009: 7) is the fundamental factor, since an inadequate understanding, confusing, for instance, conflict resolution with combat operations against terrorism, usually leads to failed operations.



To that end, we have organised our research into three parts: the first part opens with the conceptualisation of the resolution of conflicts and the analysis of the reference models, primarily centred on the use of the military instrument; in the second part we address the challenges the current nature of conflicts presents to those models and their impact on the use of military force; thirdly, after approaching this issue, we examine the characteristics and capabilities military forces must possess to act in this new context.

## 1. Traditional approach to peace missions.

Through its Charter, the United Nations (UN) defined various measures anticipated and accepted by its members for the resolution of conflicts, either peacefully, as addressed in Chapter VI, or through the use of force, as described in Chapter VII.

The international situation in the post-Cold War era presented the UN with the challenge of re-evaluating its domains of intervention in the area of international security. Therefore, in 1992, Secretary-general Boutros-Ghali announced the Agenda for Peace<sup>4</sup>, in which the Organization officially commits, for the first time, in a conceptual context, to the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts that would become known as "peace operations."

Based on lessons learned, in January of 1995, the UN published the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. This document rearticulates the instruments for controlling and solving conflicts among States and intra-States, in the following manner: (i) preventive diplomacy<sup>5</sup>, and peacemaking<sup>6</sup>, (ii) peacekeeping<sup>7</sup>, (iii) post conflict peace building<sup>8</sup>. (iv) disarmament, (v) sanctions, and (vi) enforcement actions;<sup>9</sup> (UN 1995: paragr. 23).

The UN does not claim the exclusive use of these instruments and anticipates their use by regional organizations, *ad hoc* coalitions, and States in an individually manner (UN 1995: paragraph 24). This way, NATO, while considered as a regional organization, approved doctrine in this matter, designating the use of these instruments as Peace Support Operations<sup>10</sup> (PSO).<sup>11</sup> The operations carried out by the Atlantic Alliance follow

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<sup>4</sup> A/47/277 - S/24111. *An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. New York.

<sup>5</sup> It consists of "actions by third parties with the goal to avoid conflict escalation and the outburst of violence, to avoid the spreading of existing conflicts to neighbouring areas, and to avoid the rekindling of conflicts under control" (Branco, Garcia e Pereira (org), 2008: 121).

<sup>6</sup> "Action aimed at reconciling hostile parties, essentially through such peaceful means as those identified in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, at least during an initial phase, without excluding, at later times, the use of measures of coercive nature". *Peacemaking* is devoid of activities that involve the use of force, and is limited to the use of diplomacy. Sanctions and enforcements that were part of peacemaking are treated as independent, outside that umbrella" (Branco, Garcia e Pereira (org), 2008: 126).

<sup>7</sup> It consists of the projection of a UN presence in a given territory, up until this point with the agreement of all parties involved, and usually involving the presence of military forces and or/police forces, often civilians (idem: 121).

<sup>8</sup> "Group of actions destined to support the structures used to solidify peace in order to avoid the reoccurrence of hostilities" (Ibidem: 121).

<sup>9</sup> These are of a coercive nature and applied without the consent of the factions involved in a conflict, or when that consent is no longer a certainty.

<sup>10</sup> The doctrine followed by NATO is outlined in one of its joint publications, AJP 3.4, and identifies five major instruments: (i) conflict prevention; (ii) peacemaking; (iii) peace building; (iv) peace-imposition; (v) and peace consolidation. NATO considers PSOs as multifunctional operations that encompass a large range of political, military, and civil activities, executed in accordance with international law (including international human rights), that contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflicts and crisis management.



the same line of action as the UN, both in terminology and in anticipated instruments. However, its concept is more "muscle-up", as it considers military force as its primary means of action.

The role of military force in the application of the various instruments, and through the use of individualized mechanisms identified by the UN and by the current doctrine of the Atlantic Alliance, is relatively well typified.

Thus, the prevention of conflicts depends primarily on the availability of credible information that will ensure the availability of a quick warning system to anticipate the development of crisis situations in real time, and evaluate possible responses, so that the most adequate and quick response in each case can be applied in each particular situation (Castells, 2003: 31). Military means usually focus on support to political and development efforts to mitigate the causes of conflict.<sup>12</sup>

"Though the military actions must be directed toward meeting political and development demands, usually they fall into the following categories: (i) forewarning; (ii) surveillance; (iii) training and reform of the security sector; (iv) preventive planning; and (v) imposition of sanctions and embargoes" (IESM, 2007: 22). The goal of peace imposition is to compel, subdue, and persuade the factions to carry out a certain type of action. Despite being a compulsive mandate, a force of peace imposition seeks to implement an agreement among the parties, when "due to unexpected procedures or other circumstances, one or more parties want to renege on their obligations in face of the accord, or reject the presence of the force. The force may ignore such opposition or even utilize its coercive means in order to impose the peace agreed upon" (Baptista, 2003: 743). Backed by the mandate, the force will be used to ensure that the peace objectives are met. "If necessary, it will take the side of one of the rivals and stay on the field against the will of one of the parties that violated the terms of the agreement or does not accept that it be forcefully executed against its side" (Baptista, 2003: 742).

The objective of peacemaking is to re-establish a cease-fire or a quick and peaceful appeasement, focusing on the diplomatic activities carried out following the outbreak of the conflict, not excluding military support for diplomatic activity through the direct or indirect use of military means.

Peacekeeping seeks to keep a cease-fire and prevent hostilities from reoccurring. These operations are used to monitor and facilitate the execution of a peace agreement (Branco, Garcia and Pereira (org), 2008: 134). It is under these terms that military force is employed, with the primary goal of facilitating diplomatic action, conflict mediation, and ensuring basic security conditions to reach a political solution (Branco, Garcia and Pereira (org), 2008: 143).

In peace building scenarios, military forces operate primarily after political solutions to conflicts have been attained. In general, their role centres on creating a safe and stable

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<sup>11</sup> The Atlantic Alliance expressed its doctrinal basis for the execution of NA5CRO in AJP – 3.4 (Non-Article 5 – Crisis Response Operations) dated March 2005. The principles and typology of such operations are defined in this publication. This doctrinal publication is undergoing a reformulation process based on NATO's new doctrinal position.

<sup>12</sup> In this context, military activities are usually carried out according to chapter VI of the UN charter, but military forces may also be used to dissuade or subdue the parties involved, which may require a mandate based on Chapter VII. This reinforcement by mandate stems from the need to give credibility to the necessity of the use of force.



environment that allows civilian agencies to focus their efforts on reconciliation and the process of peace building (IESM, 2007: 28). Conflict resolution experts defend that the presence of military forces after the signing of a peace agreement is fundamental, and if their presence does not occur in an effective manner within six to twelve weeks following the signing, the agreement may lose its effectiveness (Durch, 2006: 589). The previously described approach to operations is based on a sequential conceptualization, based on the idea developed by Fisas (2004: 33) that when a conflict crosses the threshold of armed violence and enters the "reactive" phase of its resolution, the objective of the first phase is to reach an end to violent hostilities, and then enter into the phases of peacekeeping and peace building, until reaching a stable peace.

Thus, under their current doctrine, both organizations (UN or NATO)<sup>13</sup> recognize different activities related to the resolution of conflicts as non-concurrent activities. That is, politically, they ascertain they are confronted with a certain type of operation, and that the means and measures to be used, as well as circumstances for the use of force, are in tune with it. At the same time, whenever there is a transition to a different type of operation, this context changes, namely regarding the military instrument.

In the current context, particularly shaped by the prevalence of intra-state conflicts, the conceptual break-down of a conflict into phases in order to apply one of the particular instruments mentioned above, becomes extremely difficult and complex. This was first identified in 2000, in the Brahimi Report,<sup>14</sup> according to which the current peace support operations distance themselves from the "military matrix operations of surveillance, cease-fire, and separation of rival forces that follow an intra-state conflict, to incorporate a complex model with many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace, in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars" (Brahimi, 2000: paragr. 12).

Peace Support Operations<sup>15</sup> now involve a wide range of players with different objectives, agendas, understandings, capabilities, and motivations. At this level, the dynamic relationship among the three groups who are key players in the whole process should be stressed: "(i) *peace forces*, seeking stabilization; (ii) territorial elites, who want to hold on to power; and (iii) the sub-elites who seek autonomy from the State and want to maintain their power in certain regions of the territory. The ability of each player to reach individual goals depends on the strategies and behaviours of the other two. (Barnett e Zurcher, 2009: 24)".

These players act together with others, namely local populations, International Organizations (IO), organs of third countries, police and law enforcement agencies, military agencies and private security firms, and NGOs. They all work and participate in the same scenario of operations, almost always without spatial limitations among them and they may support, be neutral, or oppose<sup>16</sup> the peace mission. Furthermore, these positions may shift with time or be affected by changes within the respective organizations. We are in face of what Brahimi (2000: paragraph 13-18) called "complex peace operations" which represent a junction of activities ranging from peace keeping

<sup>13</sup> Together these two organizations represent 88% of the military personnel employed in "Peace Support Operations" (Jones, 2009: 3).

<sup>14</sup> Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-s/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

<sup>15</sup> We keep the designation used by NATO.

<sup>16</sup> Support or opposition may be active or passive.



to peace building. Complexity increases even more when, in the current conflicts, we witness situations in which certain areas are only partly pacified, or when the parties involved resist the terms of the agreement to safeguard their interests and, directly or indirectly, incite their supporters to resume violence (Durch and England, 2009: 13).

All this alters the paradigm of traditional "peace support operations." These cease to be seen as the application of a series of specific tasks and techniques in face of the instrument adopted, in accordance with the systematisation of the UN or NATO, to be viewed as "military operations" in a broad sense, and may become shaped and guided by principles previously reserved for traditional combat operations.

## **2. Challenges of complex peace support operations**

The "peace support operations" of the current generation<sup>17</sup> started to be viewed as a group of activities of variable intensity executed across the wide spectrum of action of military forces. However, and despite the growing risks associated with it, the "peace support operations continue to focus on temporary security presence or on the role of supporting agent for the disarmament of belligerent factions and the reorganization of local security forces in trust building activities between the parties involved (Durch and England, 2009: 15). This supports Edelstein' statement (2009:81) "Without security, the essential task of the political, social, and economic sectors can not be carried out." This way, and in generic terms, the military force continues to be used to create a stable and secure environment. What is changing are the challenges its activity faces.

For a long time, the biggest challenge international forces faced when they intervened in support of the resolution of an intra-State conflict lie, essentially, in the operational environment resulting from the stage of operations. Special relevance was given to the security of the ethnic groups in conflict, particularly as related to ethnic-based revenge (Binnendijk and Johnson, 2004: 8). In the meantime, a group of factors, some internal and others external to the conflict, presented the military forces with a new series of ever more complex challenges.

From an external perspective, the first factor results from the process of launching the operation and propagation of force. Its use, under the conditions we have been analysing, usually results from the International Community's decision to intervene in a certain conflict. These operations are planned considering an environment with a series of non-controllable <sup>18</sup>factors on the part of the force projected, as they result from the management of individual interests of existing relationships among several participants, internal and external, in which some States or multilateral organizations attempt to bring the parties closer based on common objectives. The lack of an organizational coherence specific to these operations is reflected in its essentially practical basis, shaped by historic instances and the almost unilateral political-military commitment of some States,<sup>19</sup> instead of an organizational system based on the international organizations that sponsor these operations. Although decisions to launch or support

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<sup>17</sup> Considered the third phase since 1994 (David, 2001: 318).

<sup>18</sup> As are, for example, the internal characteristics of the conflict proper or the external environment, stressing the geopolitical interests of third parties. This matter will be addressed in more detail later in this article.

<sup>19</sup> Despite being organized under the aegis of an international organization - usually the UN - each State has its own agenda in face of intervention in specific conflicts.



peace operations rest with the organizations (UN, EU, NATO), ultimately the States impose a series of conditions and political restrictions for their execution, as they contribute with human resources - police and military. As operations become riskier and more complex, estimates by each individual State regarding maintenance costs, risk assessment for its troops, and internal support for participation in the mission, will have an increasing impact on the availability of forces and mission coherence (Durch and England, 2009: 16).

Another problem that has characterized recent interventions of the International Community using military forces, particularly in situations of greater risk, "is the lack of political will to employ force instead of simply *deploying* forces - which reflects a *near zero* will" (Smith, 2008: 288) to assume risks against the forces projected. For participation in the resolution of conflict to be effective, it requires, simultaneously, not only forces with much greater preparation and capabilities, but also the willingness to assume other risks, primarily political, in face of potential increase in casualties.

Current operations, on the one hand, require that soldiers act together with a diverse range of civilian and non-governmental entities (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 54). This environment renders peace operations relatively fragile in terms of unity of command and, above all, unity of action (Durch and England, 2009: 13), making their execution even more complex, due to the large number of players and their particular interests and agendas. This implies that military strategy must be an integral part of a deliberation focused on the goals to achieve, as military objectives are subject to an ever more complex system of constraints and, as such, need to find a dynamic balance with non-military objectives (Alberts, 2002: 48).

Challenges in the resolution of intra-State conflicts are, apparently, more serious than those encountered in inter-State conflicts (David 2001: 305). Military forces have had mandates to execute missions of peacemaking, peace-imposition, or peace building in high-risk conditions, often when neither party subscribes to such operations. Accordingly, the intervention of "peace forces" may, in some cases, lead to the execution of a range of activities with an even broader reach, which, simultaneously, shape maintenance characteristics, peace-imposition and peace building, as well traditional combat.<sup>20</sup> Thus, in some instances, contrary to the definition of conflict resolution, the military force ceases to be seen by some of the contenders as a third party to the conflict.

This is where the concept of "war on three blocks" defended by Krulak (1999) seems to apply, according to which, in confining physical spaces,<sup>21</sup> in close moments in time, a small military force may have to: (i) provide food and clothing to displaced populations or refugees, give humanitarian assistance to a group that needs support; (ii) separate hostile factions, carry out peace-imposition or peace building tasks; (iii) fight, using lethal force against a threat to its own presence. Thus, as exemplified by the doctrine evolution of NATO and that of some States considered powerful, the segregation of peace and combat operations is collapsing.

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<sup>20</sup> Nowadays, this situation starts to show serious consequences since, contrary to the past, 80% of military and police forces deployed in operations under UN leadership act under protection of Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Durch and England, 2009: 12).

<sup>21</sup> Which Krulak defines them as "blocks".



However, despite the increasing range of options and activities, as well as a "toughening" in the execution of missions, three interrelated principles continue to distinguish the use of military forces in peace operations from other types of operations: consent of the parties in conflict, impartiality, and restrictions imposed on the use of force. The great change is that, despite their being the core and better defined principles of these operations, when military forces are used in the resolution of conflicts, besides respecting the specific principles of peace operations, they must also take into consideration the general principles of military operations, many of which were previously limited to combat operations.

Thus, the use of military force in the resolution of conflicts depends on the strategic context in which they are carried out, but is usually based on the implementation of a series of operations of complex and concurrent nature. Consequently, the success of the force intervention seems to be related to the non-sequential, concurrent<sup>22</sup> execution of a series of activities to prevent conflict,<sup>23</sup> as well as intervention in the conflict,<sup>24</sup> regeneration,<sup>25</sup> and maintenance<sup>26</sup> following the conflict to attain the final military goals desired.

However, since military force is only one of the components used, success depends essentially on the political decision to intervene in the conflict, which defines the end to which the force will be used (Smith, 2008: 42). This end, (final military state) is primarily a facilitator in attaining the final political state defined in the mandate, and it is based on the latter that the final military state is assessed.

Success in the resolution of conflicts is, usually, connected to the achievement of a group of strategic objectives of different dimensions, and which shape the final political scenario desired.<sup>27</sup> This (and the extent to which it is achieved) becomes the defining agent of the criterion for total success of the operation, including that of the military mission. In this context, it is fundamental that the use of the military instrument be articulated in a holistic use of all instruments of power, so that all are empowered, and the success of military intervention, may be exploited at each moment.

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<sup>22</sup> This concurrency of actions depends on the situation, primarily on progress and set-backs in the process.

<sup>23</sup> Prevention requires actions to monitor and identify causes of conflict and activity to prevent occurrence, escalation, and rekindling of hostilities. This activity is primarily of diplomatic and economic nature, but the military instrument must be used as a dissuasive element, establishing an advanced presence to dissuade *spoilers*.

<sup>24</sup> Intervention in the conflict requires actions to implement or maintain an agreement or cease-fire, or even to impose the terms of the mandate. It must involve the coordinated execution of political, economic, military and humanitarian measures. The military instrument is usually employed to establish an environment of security conducive to the execution of all others measures in order to attain the global objectives of the operation.

<sup>25</sup> Regeneration requires a group of actions geared to the execution of the conditions identified in the mandate. It must begin as early as possible, starting with the security sector and needs that require immediate intervention; it must, then, shift priorities to the regeneration and development of infrastructures, institutions, and specific components of the mandate. The primary task of military forces will be the organization, training, and outfitting of the "new" local security forces.

<sup>26</sup> Maintenance refers to the group of activities of support to local organizations to keep or improve the final state defined in the mandate. It occurs when local structures, forces, and institutions start to assume responsibility for the populations and territory in a sustained manner.

<sup>27</sup> As part of a global strategy, it is fundamental to introduce measures and actions of diplomatic and economic nature and empower them through social networks, in a system of *rapprochement* integrated in the conflict (Rasmussen, 1997: 45). This way, the introduction of rules of law that allow for a decrease in human rights violations, the development of structures that increase governability and reduce arbitrary behaviours, the creation of a market economy that allows for a decrease in corruption and parallel economy, are mechanisms that contribute to the dissipation of conflict causes and toward the restoration of a state of peace.





In face of this new paradigm and the challenges it presents, we face questions of how to use military force in this context, and what characteristics and basic capacities must be considered in its organization and preparation.

### **3. What military force should be used in the resolution of conflicts?**

Larry Waltz carried out a series of studies<sup>28</sup> with the military instrument as the cornerstone of resolution in the conflicts studied. When you isolate that instrument, the success of operations is easier to ponder, as success in the military perspective, related to the achievement of previously identified military goals, is easily measured. In this context, and according to Smith (2008: 208), military objectives at strategic and operational level have to do with shaping or changing the will of the people, and not that of an enemy, and are usually related to establishing a safe and self-sustaining environment for the local population, the territory, and region where it is located, marked by a gradual decrease of the projected military forces. The analysis of the progress of these objectives, based on measures of effectiveness, permits to monitor the level of success of the intervention.

According to Binnendijk and Johnson (2004: 7), the success of military interventions in the context of resolution of conflict relies, essentially, on three controllable factors: (i) resources allocated to resolve the conflict; (ii) strength of military force used by peace contingency; (iii) time attributed to the process of resolution of conflict; and two non-controllable factors: (i) internal characteristics and (ii) geopolitical interests of third parties.

One of the lessons learned from the different cases studied is that there is a close correlation between the volume of resources employed and the degree of success. That volume is closely related to the resources allocated, but also to the internal success of contributing countries. Since internal success is intrinsically related to the number of casualties from participation in missions,<sup>29</sup> the strength of the force allows for increasing measures of protection to the force, thus minimizing risks. This is, however, one of the dilemmas of executing any operation - a high number of forces helps security but introduces the risk of stimulating local resistance to foreign presence. On the other hand, a reduced number of forces minimizes the impact of nationalist impulses against its presence, but may not be very effective in developing and keeping a stable and safe environment in the territory (Edelstein, 2009: 81).

Another controllable factor is the amount of time the international community allows for the success of the operation. Studies suggest that the maintenance of resources for a long period does not guarantee success, but a quick withdrawal contributes to failure (Binnendijk and Johnson 2004: 4 e 5). This creates the dilemma of maintaining a presence<sup>30</sup> to avoid the restart of hostilities and opportunism in face of weakened

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<sup>28</sup> Larry K. Wentz analysed a series of conflict cases such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo and his conclusions were published by Binnendijk and Johnson.

<sup>29</sup> Studies also show that when the size of the force is higher, the number of casualties is lower.

<sup>30</sup> Usually the presence of an international force is divided into three periods: (i) the period during which the population considers its presence fundamental to the resolution of conflict, mainly to the creation of security conditions; (ii) a second period when the population starts to question the need for the international force and tolerates it, rather than lending it its unconditional support; and (iii) the phase in which the population starts to view the force as an obstacle, or an intrusive element, to its interests (Edelstein, 2009: 83).



local institutions, or withdrawing forces to avoid the period of resistance by local populations to its drawn-out presence (Edelstein, 2009: 82). Historical examples point to a time period of five years as the minimum necessary to foster a long-lasting transition to peace (Binnendijk e Johnson 2004: 5). Combining the above-mentioned factors, Wentz, in a study of RAND,<sup>31</sup> states that a high number of forces for an extended period of time promote success, citing as examples the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, where there are notorious indications of success in the resolution of the respective conflicts (Binnendijk and Johnson 2004: 6).

On the part of those engaged in the resolution of conflicts, the non-controllable factors consist, on the one hand, of internal characteristics and intrinsic aspects of the territory where the conflict takes or took place, the result of the culture and agendas of different players; on the other hand, those factors stem from the geopolitical interests of external players, usually the States.

Considering these circumstantial factors, the military force must be organized and prepared taking into account a series of characteristics and capabilities that will allow it to carry out effective action in face of the operational environment in which it will be used. In the implementation of current peace operations, where it is not the only player on the field,<sup>32</sup> the military force is required to accomplish an ever-growing multitude of tasks. These may include: help local populations by assisting with the return and placement of refugees and displaced persons, ensure the security and protection of ethnic minorities, help with reconstruction, provide medical assistance, execute combat missions to impose certain conditions, help remove landmines, protect cultural and religious landmarks, provide safety and public order, ensure border security and protection, support the setting-up of civilian institutions, law and order, guarantee the functioning of the judicial and penal system, the electoral process, and other aspects of the political, economic, and social life of the territory. This wide panoply of activities shows that a force must have the means to be organized with multiple capabilities. It stresses the increasing importance of areas that in traditional combat operations had primarily the role of support to the force proper, and now have become fundamental to work in an operational environment where the primary objective is to conquer the will of the populations.

Considering the paradigm currently used, the traditional military capacities that allow the force to execute combat tasks will be the basic matrix from which it should be prepared and organized to be used in this context, as they are what ensures protection and versatility to adapt to the wide spectrum of missions.

However, given the growing number of players the military force interacts with and the fluid nature of the operational environment in which it operates, it must be agile in several areas besides those traditionally associated with combat, namely in the cognitive and social fields (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 68). To this end, its operational elements must be recruited, trained, and prepared to that end (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 68) since, as David (2001: 193) states, "(...) the training and development of troops still make the difference between an effective and an ineffective force, more so than the presence or absence of emergent technologies." In this area, and in specific terms, there are several characteristics and capabilities that must be focal points of

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<sup>31</sup> Rand Corporation - available at <http://www.rand.org/>.

<sup>32</sup> Probably it is not the most important, either.



development, with particular attention to flexibility and interoperability, subversion and counter-subversion, intelligence, cooperation with civilian players, and media relations.

In face of the multinational configuration that surrounds their use,<sup>33</sup> the forces to be employed in this environment must possess two characteristics which are interrelated and transcend any mission or operation: flexibility and interoperability (Alberts and Hayes, 2003: 8). In this context, the military force must have "great mobility and rapid projection, versatility and flexibility of architecture of equipments and weapon systems, modularity, speed and unit adaptability, interoperability<sup>34</sup>, and increasing coordination among all forces" (Espírito-Santo, 2002: 94).

One of the trends that characterise the operational environment of intra-State conflicts is the ever more frequent engagement by some of the players in subversive techniques, knowing that this will draw out time to resolve the conflict (Smith, 2008, 339). Experience tells us that conflicts of a subversive nature are not won through military action, but are lost by military inaction (Garcia and Saraiva, 2004:111). So, the force must also be organized, equipped, and trained to act and use techniques beyond those of conventional activity.

Information collection is another core element in this type of operations (Smith, 2008:373). One of the difficult tasks and, at the same time, one of the most important ones for the execution of the operation, is that of outfitting the peace force with an effective system for collecting, producing, and communicating information. It plays an important role in protecting and use of the actual own force, as well as in supporting the other players.

These new operations have also created new possibilities and opportunities in terms of relationships among States, UN agencies, NGOs, military forces, and private agencies (Duffield, 2007:77). So, in terms of the force, civilian-military cooperation and coordination<sup>35</sup> is ever more important. There is, simultaneously, a need for military forces to have at their disposal the means to develop the capacity to act in this context. This should be accomplished by creating and training teams to carry out these tasks (Smith, 2008: 442).

On the other hand, considering that nowadays the media is a useful and essential element in reaching the desired goals, particularly that of conquering the will of the population (Smith, 2008: 333), with its consent and cooperation, according to Espírito-Santo (2002: 94), the military force must know how to fight "the information battle" and how to counter media manoeuvres, and align them to political and diplomatic decisions and actions.

The basic idea to manage a force to be employed in the resolution of conflicts is to build that contingent upon a group of capabilities that allow for the execution of multiple tasks, in which the most delicate and complex consists of confronting the threats it encounters. Thus, forces must have, at least, four basic competencies: (i) make a correct assessment of the situation; (ii) work or operate in a coalition environment, including non-military sectors; (iii) possess adequate means to respond to specific

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<sup>33</sup> The rule of the States in study is to employ military troops along with other States, forming a "combined force."

<sup>34</sup> Interoperability means the necessary measures for successful cooperation among the different organizations and national resources (Smith 2008:366).

<sup>35</sup> Usually designated CIMIC (acronym for Civil Military Coordination).



situations it encounters; and (iv) manage the means to respond in opportune and adequate time (Albert and Hayes, 2003: 54). With such competencies, it will be possible for the military instrument to respond in an adequate manner, combined with the other instruments, to attain the political situation desired and identified at the beginning of each intervention.

## Conclusions

The United Nations defined the different actions anticipated and accepted by States to execute its activity to resolve conflicts. NATO, as a regional defense organization, and one of the most supportive of the UN, also approved doctrine in this matter. Its concept is more "muscle-up" than the UN's, foreseeing the possibility of using military means to dissuade and coerce the parties in conflict, proposing the possibility of a combat posture to fulfil a mandate, under the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. Despite differences in approach, both organizations base their doctrines in the employment of certain instruments depending on the specific stage of the conflict.

In face of the increase in complexity, peace operations began not to be considered not with a specificity restricted to the application of one of the instruments, adopted according to the systematisation of the UN and NATO, but rather as broader range "military operations", guided by principles previously reserved for the execution of conventional operations and carried out through the execution of a complex series of activities and techniques. This type of operations became known as complex peace operations that represent the merging of traditional activities of typified instruments to resolve conflicts.

From this new paradigm, one may conclude that a wide range of activities, from conflict prevention, to humanitarian support, and combat operations of medium and high intensity, may develop concurrently in the same "peace support operation". Accordingly, depending on the concept of application and the functions to be executed, the activity of the military force in current peace operations is based on the simultaneous execution of a series of activities. These include activities of conflict prevention, conflict intervention, and regeneration and maintenance following the conflict, to achieve the desired final military state.

Influenced by this context, the concept of success in resolution of conflict, and the way to attain it, has also undergone some changes. Success is thus related to reaching objectives in the political, economic, military, and social domains which, when integrated, provide conditions for reaching the desired final political state. This state, and the extent to which it is reached, is the primary defining factor of criteria for the success of the whole operation.

In face of the vast panoply of activities, a military force must have the means and be organized based on multiple capabilities and characteristics, stressing the increasing importance of areas that were, previously, areas of support of the force proper, and now become crucial to act in an environment where the objective is to conquer the will of the populations.

In this context, the fundamental role of military forces is that of creating and preserving a safe and stable environment that allows the execution of activities by other intervening partners. The expectation is that, in a system of integrated



rapprochement to the conflict, military forces reach and ensure security conditions, and ensure the necessary support, so that other agents may find the most adequate solutions to the causes of the conflict.

Keeping in mind the current strategic context, the military instrument continues to play a relevant role and its use is currently considerably more valuable due to its broader range. It is the fundamental support and credibility instrument for other instruments of power.

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