

# **United Nations Security Council primacy over military interventions in Africa and the African Peace and Security Architecture\***

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\* Research for this paper was partly in the context of the project “Monitoring Conflicts in the Horn of Africa” of the Center of International Studies (ISCTE), Lisbon University Institute (PTDC/ AFR/100460/2008) funded by the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation. The author would like to thank comments by Luís Valença Pinto, Xavier Sousa, João Correlo, John Cameroon, Farzane Zarepour, colleagues at the Research School of Peace and Conflict at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and comments made at presentations, in particular the seminar in Addis Ababa on 17 December 2012 at the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA); any remaining errors are the author’s.

A first version of this paper was presented in January 2012 at an expert workshop (Sousa R. R., unpublished 2012a) and proposed that there is a challenge in law and policy to UNSC primacy. A participant insightfully asked for the empirical cases to evaluate the claim. A new version of the paper was first presented in June of that year at a conference in Madrid containing a dataset with 83 interventions for the period between 1990 and 2010 (Sousa R. R., unpublished 2012b). The results identified no improvement on the percentage of interventions without UNSC authorization when comparing the two decades. Revised versions of the paper were presented at conferences with slightly different titles. The dataset presented in this paper was updated and extended to 2015 and contained a total of 126 interventions, confirming the 1990 to 2010 trend, but it identifies a new trend from 2010 onwards.

Suggested citation:

Sousa, Ricardo Real P. (2017) United Nations Security Council primacy over military interventions in Africa and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), in Moita, Luís and Pinto, Luís Valença (Coord.) Espaços económicos e espaços de segurança. Lisboa (519-572): UAL; OBSERVARE. <http://hdl.handle.net/11144/3037>

## **United Nations Security Council primacy over military interventions in Africa and the African Peace and Security Architecture**

The Westphalia system relies on the observance of the principle of sovereignty among nation-states, meaning that a state has the authority to govern itself without interference from other states. The most serious breach of sovereignty is when an external actor deploys troops within a country's border without its explicit consent. Only the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has the authority to decide on military interventions, something referred to as UNSC primacy. With the end of the Cold War there is a reassertion of regionalism in the international system. Africa is a special case as it took the initiative to establish a security apparatus dedicated to the prevention and resolution of conflict in the region. In 2002, the African Union (AU) replaces the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and starts to develop the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as an institutional framework operationally independent from other actors, particularly in the quick deployment of military missions in ongoing conflicts. The APSA has its own Peace and Security Council and integrates the African sub-regional organizations (SROs) with a military component in the African Standby Forces (ASFs). In 2015 four of the five ASFs acquired Full Operational Capacity (FOC). In the past, states, regional organizations (ROs) and SROs — in particular the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) — have initiated military interventions in conflicts, sometimes without UNSC authorization.

Justified by the urgent need to contain domestic conflicts, military interventions can be initiated while waiting for UNSC authorization, effectively reformulating UNSC primacy, and with it, the principles of the global governance security system.

In 2015 the AU directly addresses this issue stating

*that the challenge for the AU and the UN is how to apply the spirit of Chapter VIII [regarding regional action] without prejudice to the role of the UNSC, on one hand, and without undermining or otherwise curtailing the efforts of the AU to develop its own capacity to provide adequate responses to the peace and security challenges in Africa, on the other* (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2015, p. 1).

This paper investigates this challenge, particularly how UNSC primacy on military interventions is being reformulated in Africa with special reference to the APSA.

Previous research has dealt with different components of these issues such as: the use of force (Coleman, 2004), legality and legitimacy of military interventions (Price & Zacher, 2004), global and regional security (Adibe, 2003; Langenhove, Felício, & Abass, 2012; Graham & Felicio, 2006; Hettne & Soderbaum, 2006), UN and Peacekeeping operations (Bellamy & Williams, 2015), the AU and APSA (Engel & Porto, 2010) or the SROs (Berman & Sams, 2003), “regional complexes” (Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Brosig M., 2013), and subsidiarity (Knight, 1996; Job, 2004; O’Brien, 2000; Voeten, 2005; Møller, 2005).<sup>1</sup> To my knowledge, the focus of this research has only been dealt through legal lenses (for instance De Wet (2014; 2015)) and two works present a dataset of military interventions according to their authorization by the UNSC (Brosig M., 2013; Bellamy & Williams, 2015) with an analysis of its trends.

Through an historical approach, this paper uses a theoretical model resting on three interconnected categories of factors that shape the behavior of actors — states and international organizations (IOs): ideas and norms; institutional law, policy, and practice of military interventions with a new dataset for Africa for the period between 1990 and 2015; and the capability of actors and their willingness to intervene. This model is applied at four levels of analysis: the global level at the UN, the regional level at the AU, the sub-regional level at SROs, and at the state level.

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<sup>1</sup> References are indicative as many scholars have engaged on these topics.

## THEORY

Before proceeding a clarification is due on the object of analysis. The focus of this paper is on the legality of military interventions based on the criteria of UNSC authorization. The framework of analysis does not consider if the intervention can have other forms of legitimacy or legality.

An intervention could also be legal if the military action in another state is made upon the request of a lawful government, is neutral, or has the consent of challenging groups (for instances, traditional peacekeeping operations). But the definition of a lawful government, neutrality, or consent can be subjective, especially in some countries with open challenges to the government, disputed election processes, spoilers, changing operation mandates, or without a consensual recognition of the government by the international community.

Legitimacy can also be argued in cases of interventions by IOs in response to gross systematic human rights violations or as a result of an unconstitutional change of government. Regarding the former, the World Summit Outcome of 2006 adopted by the UN General Assembly considered that such interventions require UNSC authorization and nothing in the UN Charter grants military intervention justified without UNSC authorization in the latter case.

In this sense we have a very restrictive definition of legalization, strictly based on UNSC authorization. Nevertheless, because France is the country that most intervenes independently in Africa and there is reliable data of interventions and defense agreements, we single out these characteristics of French interventions.

In order to identify patterns and changes of behavior in decisions over military interventions one needs to have an historical approach. An historical approach is particularly suited for cases where a reconfiguration of power relations is occurring, as is the case with the process of African states' empowerment in matters of peace and security. This is a long historical process where the agglutinating principles of OAU and African diplomacy have been the shared history of "humiliation and colonization by the white race" (Mazuri, 1977, p. 27).

Our framework of analysis is a revised version of the historical structure of Cox (1981) with elements of conventional constructivism. The framework highlights a configuration of forces that influences and constrains the action of actors in a non-deterministic way. Three categories of forces linked in a reciprocal way are identified by Cox (1981): ideas, institutions, and capabilities.

Ideas are constitutive intersubjective meanings or collective meanings. Constitutive intersubjective meanings refer to the nature of social relations that perpetuate habits and expectations of behavior. This is the case for the principle of sovereignty in the Westphalia system and the patterns of behavior that emerge between states such as cooperation, negotiation, confrontation, war, or interventionism. Intersubjective meanings emerge out of actor interactions and constitute the “culture,” “social norms,” and “identities” that inform the behavior of actors, in this case the foreign policy of states (Wendt, 1992). This is the case for the idea of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that since the 1990s has been promoted as an international norm of behavior in international relations.<sup>2</sup>

Collective images refer to the nature and legitimacy of prevailing power relations. In contrast to intersubjective meanings that are broadly shared in a historical period, there can be several contrasting collective images within a specific historical period. It is out of these contrasting images that visions of alternative structures are promoted and pursued and can therefore account for historical changes. This is the case for the tension between historical UNSC primacy and African states’ claim for more power in matters of peace and security, either through a reform of the current structure — as with the bid of African states for two seats at the UNSC with veto rights — or through the development of APSA — with the potential to represent an alternative structure to the UN.

Institutions are “a means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order” (Cox, 1981, p. 219). They reflect the power relations between states and constitute a mechanism to manage conflicts between them, minimizing the use of force and in some cases legitimatizing its use. They serve a specific function in the production of “norms,” “ideas,” and “collective images.” Institutions vary in terms of their legalization — expressed in a series of hard and soft laws — with different levels of obligation, precision, and delegation (Abbott & Snidal, 2000).<sup>3</sup> For this paper we will focus on the dimension of obligation. A hierarchy can be established where the legal framework — like the charter of an IO (UN, AU, or SRO) — is a case of the strongest obligation for member states, followed by official policy decided in a meeting by heads of states, and then, the looser obligation, a policy report of an IO.

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<sup>2</sup>The doctrine of the R2P was presented globally in 2001 and adopted at the 2005 World Summit. R2P is a norm claiming that sovereignty is not a right but involves responsibilities for states to provide security for their populations. If states fail to fulfil those responsibilities it can be the international community, through a UN mandate, that performs them.


<sup>3</sup>In hard law there is strong obligation, precision, and delegation, while in soft law one of these dimensions is looser..

Adding to this definition of legalization Finnemore and Toope (2001) propose that one should have a “richer view of legality” and also consider customary law and the legitimacy of law. The concept of customary law is useful to frame actions that are done for a long time without objection, as can be the case for military interventions without UNSC authorization or crisis without interventions. In some cases an organization’s constitution is amended through practice (De Wet, 2015). Legitimacy of law allows for the framing of challenges to UNSC primacy in terms of historically situated processes through which the UNSC was established, not congruent with current geopolitical realities.

Capability in Cox’s (1981) framework is the productive and destructive material potential of states. For the sake of this paper we consider that military and economic capabilities of states are the most significant factors in determining state capacity, which can then be utilized in foreign policy initiatives based on a state’s willingness to intervene, in this case through military intervention. Alongside this “hard power”, states may also exercise “soft power” when they have the capability to non-coercively co-opt other states and institutions to do what they want, using political values, culture, and foreign policy (Nye, 1990).

We also conceptualize institutions as actors in their own right, not only as instruments of states or secondary to the state. This is not because of the material capabilities available to them, which are often dependent on states’ contributions, but instead because they are “bureaucracies” with institutional and discursive resources — operational guidelines and a mandate capable of defining norms and values (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). The UN is a prime example of a “bureaucracy” and the R2P an illustration of the norms and values that it can promote.

Picture 1: Framework of analysis



The framework considers that states' material capabilities and their intentions can influence ideas and institutions through the exercise of hard and soft power and that IOs have mainly a normative capability to influence ideas and institutions that frame state (and IOs) behavior.

## IDEAS

At the time of the establishment of the UN one regional and one global model were proposed. The regional model conferred strong security functions to regions in the spirit of international idealism (Adibe, 2003). One of its advocates was Winston Churchill who proposed "several regional councils, august but subordinate, [and] that these should form the massive pillars upon which the world organization [the UN] would be founded in majesty and calm" (Claude, 1984, p. 113). The global model was centered on the UNSC based on hegemonic realism and with the United States as a key proponent (Adibe, 2003). Critics of the regional model consider it to be a mechanism for the United Kingdom to perpetuate its empire and that it facilitates the development of regional hegemons (Morris & McCoubrey, 1999). The global model prevailed in the configuration of the UN, leading to UNSC primacy. Nevertheless, concerns over the preservation of regional identity were recognized and a compromise was reached allowing regional autonomy in the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Although literature on regionalism flowered in the 1960s, the intensification of the Cold War and the overwhelming preponderance of the realist global perspective over the East-West divide caused the debate to recede (Lake & Morgan, 1997). Only with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s did the debate over a regional approach to security re-emerge.

The new regionalist model of regional multilateralism considers that regional and inter-regional organizations have their own right and do not seek their mandate from above — at the undemocratic UNSC level — but "from below and within," from civil society and cooperating states (Hettne & Soderbaum, 2006). The globalist model of orthodox multilateralism continues to be based on UNSC primacy as a guarantee of legality and impartiality in international security operations, but allows regional initiatives as long as they are part of UN-based multilateralism, linking the global to the state. Some hybrid proposals combine the two models such as with the "regional-global security mechanism," where regional agencies are responsible for security in the regions but also have permanent membership at the UNSC (Graham & Felício, 2006).

This debate initiated in the 1990s occurs in a period of unprecedented demand for peace missions in Africa. Alongside the high incidence of civil wars (civil war initiations peak in 1993) there is UN disengagement from the region in the aftermath of the Somalia intervention in 1993. This security vacuum was in some cases filled by states and IOs that intervene militarily in conflicts in Africa in the 1990s and early 2000s, in some cases without UNSC authorization. This was the case in the Second Congo War, Lesotho, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone.

As a result there was a perception of a loss of UN legitimacy and some perspectives consider that the hierarchical position of the UN vis a vis ROs was in danger of unravelling (Job, 2004). There was a concern over the UN's "laissez-faire" attitude regarding the enforcement of its own rules (UNSC primacy) and how empowering ROs might undermine the ability of the UN to pursue its core objective (Boulden, 2003).

In order to integrate these new security actors there is an attempt by the UN to establish a systematic relationship between the UN and ROs through a series of inter-organizational meetings and policy reports (Langenhove, Felício, & Abass, 2012); however, such UN initiatives would be stopped in the early 2000s for two reasons: first because a "consensus" develops that instead of finding alternative sources of authority one needed to "fix" the orthodox multilateralism by maintaining UNSC primacy on military interventions and finding mechanisms for the council to work better (ICISS, 2001); and second because the UNSC process of reform, key to any reconfiguration of security, stops in 2005. These developments would be consolidated with the election of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the new leadership of the Department of Political Affairs in 2007, with whom the UN regionalist policy became less ambitious and was restricted to Africa (Bellamy & Williams, 2005; Langenhove, Felício, & Abass, 2012; Tavares, 2010).

The UN disengagement in the 1990s from Africa and in particular its lack of intervention in the 1994 Rwanda genocide led to a concerted response by African states that, in 2002, extinguished the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was designed for the decolonization process, and created the African Union (AU), designed to make the security of African states more autonomous.

During the time of the establishment of the OAU in the 1960s an institutional debate within Pan-Africanism opposed the "Casablanca group," which advocated a centralized model, to the "Monrovia group", which endorsed a sub-regional approach based on "state nationalism" (Van Walraven, 2010). The latter decentralized model prevailed in 1963 and with it the reinforcement of the principle

of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, which meant a freeze on the debate over the possibility of “peace enforcement” interventions and a focus on the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Around the time of the establishment of the AU the earlier debate re-emerged contrasting centralized and de-centralized views. For instance, a proposal for a “peace pyramid” (Nhara, 1998) with the UN at the top, followed by the OAU and then SROs, was criticized on the basis of the centrality of nation-states which made “fruitless” attempts for above-state-level institutional coordination (Malan, 1999). Other proposals suggested the further involvement of the AU in sub-regional security (Boulden, 2003) or a more centralized model of a regional government union (Murithi, 2008).<sup>4</sup>

The new AU is established in 2002 with peace and security assuming a central place in the organization and the right of humanitarian intervention (in line with the R2P<sup>5</sup>) is included at the core of the change of its charter from the OAU to the AU (Powell, 2005). Even if the AU is based on state nationalism, for the first time states in Africa accepted, as a principle, military interventions in their countries in cases when mass atrocities occur. This would mean the erosion of the classical definition of sovereignty based on “non-interference” in the internal affairs of states (Kindiki, 2003). The AU would come to represent the security principles of African unity, R2P, and “try Africa first” (Chissano, 2011).

In the following years, some clarification on the AU’s relationship with the UN (and UNSC primacy) was reached, but a consensus on the relationship between the AU and SROs within the APSA was not (more on this in the section on institutions).

These developments occur in the aftermath of the failure of the international community to intervene in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the failure to secure UNSC authorization for the military interventions that occurred in 1999 in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and in 2003 in Iraq by the USA. These events raised significant issues over the interpretation of law and of the UN Charter as well as over the differentiation between the legality and the legitimacy of interventions (Price & Zacher, 2004; Coleman, 2004). The normative developments that became institutionalized globally reflected a wider concern about an unresponsive international community if faced with genocide than on avoiding unauthorized interventions (Thakur, 2004).

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<sup>4</sup>The centralized model would not see significant developments with the exception of a decision taken at the 12th summit of the AU in 2009 that considers the transformation of the African Union Commission into the African Union Authority. Nevertheless, such a decision did not translate into the AU Charter as required.

<sup>5</sup>See footnote 2.

## INSTITUTIONS

### Obligation

It is generally accepted that the UN Charter entrusts the UNSC with the primary responsibility for the decision of enforcement action — military interventions — even if other actors (for instance RO, SRO or states) can implement them upon UNSC request or UNSC authorization (Knight, 1996; Simma, 1999).

UNSC primacy is stipulated in the UN Charter (1945) in Article 2 (4) which states that “members [states of the UN] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” with two exceptions: the right to self-defense (Article 51) or if a decision is made by the UNSC in cases of a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or act of aggression (Chapter VII). Because the commitment of UN member states to the UN Charter prevails over other agreements or obligations states may have (Chapter XVI, Article 103), these stipulations of Article 2 confer a primacy to the UNSC on decision over the use of force.

An embryonic form of regional security was already part of the formulation of the 1945 UN Charter. In Chapters VI and VII and particularly in Chapter VIII, the possibility of a RO devoted to the maintenance of international peace was identified, although it would have to be in line with the purposes and principles of the UN. It accepts their first involvement in the pacific settlement of local disputes before referring them to the UNSC (Article 52.2) and determines that the UNSC

*can utilize regional arrangements<sup>6</sup> or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the UNSC* (Article 53.1).

The same chapter further stipulated a duty of the regional agency to fully inform the UNSC of the “activities undertaken or in contemplation . . . for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Article 54).

The academic debate in the 1990s over regional and global models also had expression in the UN. Upon the request of the UNSC, in 1992 the UN report “Agenda for Peace” identifies possible contributions of a RO (and SRO) to security, including in functions of preventive diplomacy,

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<sup>6</sup> Regional arrangements or sub-regional arrangements in this paper are used interchangeably with ROs and SROs.

peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building. While safeguarding the Council's primary responsibility for peace and security, the report considers that "regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United Nations" could support the work of the Council and "contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs" (64). The report further considered the possibility of UN support (for instance logistic or financial) for RO initiatives when authorized by the Council. The follow-up UN report of 1995, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace", further details the possibilities for cooperation between the UN and a RO in the fields of consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, and joint operations.

Lewis and Marks (1998) identify the division of labor as the main departure of the report from its earlier version of 1992. The Council retains the authority to authorize Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) in all cases and the UN only implements those not requiring the use of force. These later Chapter VII-type peace enforcement operations are to be implemented by "contract" in an existing RO/SRO or an ad hoc coalition led by a leading nation (Lewis & Marks, 1998, p. 13), with NATO being the main candidate for enforcement operations at the time.

Many of the proposals of the reports were not implemented by the end of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Tavares, 2010), with the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur established in 2007 as the only hybrid mission of the two organizations setup until today. It is only as a reaction of developments in Africa during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century that the spirit of the UN and RO/SRO relations envisioned in the reports begins to be implemented.

The AU Charter of 2000 defines a clear mandate to "promote peace, security, and stability on the continent" (Article 3, f) (African Union, 2000).<sup>7</sup> The amendment to the AU Charter in 2003 introduces the principle of the R2P, whereby the AU can intervene in a member state if decided by the AU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government in situations of "war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity [or if there is] a serious threat to legitimate

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<sup>7</sup>The OAU was an organization with few security provisions. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (Cairo Declaration) established in 1993 made some reference to human suffering and state collapse, but OAU military involvement was limited to consensual observer missions and would refer to the UN in case situations deteriorate.

order” as a way to restore peace and stability (Article 4 (h)).<sup>8</sup> Even if such a principle has not been used to date it constitutes a significant normative development enshrined in law that claims the right to intervene militarily.

It would be in 2002 that the main AU structure solely dedicated to peace and security is established with the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). The “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU” only makes brief reference to the UN Charter, stipulating the guiding principles of the Charter such as the ones enshrined “in the Constitutive Act, the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Article 4) and refers to the relationship as one of partnership (Article 7, k). Moreover, the AU Charter had only a brief reference to the UN in its objectives, “encouraging cooperation [between the two organizations], taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations” (Article 3, e).

The omission in the AU Charter and constitutive documents of a more explicit connection to the UN (and UNSC primacy) is a reflection of the political environment after the Rwandan genocide wherein African governments (especially from the Great Lakes region) were keen to marginalize the UN from political involvement in the region’s affairs (United Nations, 1998). These omissions alongside the right for military interventions in Article 4 can accommodate an understanding that AU enforcement action can occur without UNSC authorization (Graham & Felício, 2006; De Wet, 2015).


The Protocol develops a full configuration of functions (which become referred to as the APSA): peace promotion, early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace support operations, and intervention (pursuant of Article 4 (h) and (j) of the AU’s Constitutive Act), peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; humanitarian action and disaster management; and any other function decided by the Assembly (Article 6). It intends to have a “close harmonization, co-ordination, and co-operation” between Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and the Union (Article 7(j)); a “partnership for peace and security” between the Union and the UN (Article 7 (k)); and that “any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of the Union’s objective and priorities” (Article 7 (l)). To perform its functions, the PSC

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<sup>8</sup>These formulations in the AU Charter are in tandem with the classical principles of sovereign equality (Article 4 (a)), non-interference by any member state (Article 4 (g)) and the new “right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security” (Article 4 (j)).

establishes an African Standby Force (ASF) with full capabilities (Article 13.1 and 13.3), a Panel of the Wise (Article 11) and a Continental Early Warning System (Article 12). It further considers the possibility of ASF cooperation with the UN or other organizations (Article 13.4) and that the PSC will cooperate and work closely with the UNSC (Article 17). In Article 16, RMs are formulated for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and are considered part of the AU's security architecture with a "primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa" (Article 16.1). These RMs are the sub-regional organizations for each ASF, with a geographical configuration and membership slightly different from the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). See Table 1 and Map 1 for a comparison of REC and the ASF's RMs and the membership of the ASF.<sup>9</sup>

**Map 1 – Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RMs)/African Standby Force (ASF)**



Source: Boutellis and Williams (2013).

<sup>9</sup> In this paper we refer to the African Union as a RO, to the United Nations as a global organization, and to the RECs/RMs as SROs.

**Table 1: African Standby Force (ASF) membership**

<b>FORCE MULTINATIONALE DE L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE (FOMAC)</b>	<b>SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDBY BRIGADE (SADCBRIG)</b>	<b>EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE (EASF)</b>	<b>NORTHER AFRICA REGIONAL STANDBY BRIGADE (NASBRIG)</b>	<b>ECOWAS STANDBY BRIGADE (ESF)</b>
Angola		Burundi	Algeria	Benin
Burundi	Botswana	Comoros	Egypt	Burkina Faso
Cameroon	Lesotho	Djibouti	Libya	Cape Verde
Central Africa Republic	Madagascar	Ethiopia	Mauritania	Côte d'Ivoire
Congo (Brazzaville)	Malawi	Kenya	Tunisia	Gambia
Chad	Mauritius	Rwanda	Western Sahara	Ghana
Democratic Republic of Congo	Mozambique	Seychelles		Guinea
Equatorial Guinea	Namibia	Somalia		Guinea Bissau
Gabon	Zambia	Sudan		Liberia
São Tomé et Príncipe	Zimbabwe	Uganda		Mali
	Swaziland			Niger
	South Africa			Nigeria
	Tanzania			Senegal
				Sierra Leone
				Togo

Notes: Eritrea suspended its EASF participation and Mauritania withdrew from the ECOWAS in 2000.

The policy framework for the establishment of the ASF, the military component of the APSA, is approved in 2003 with a series of guidelines for UN-AU coordination and requirements for the AU to have support from the UN. The recommendations are for the AU to be the sole African mandating authority for peace operations (3.15.1.a) (African Union, 2003, p. 22 part I) in a hierarchical format where control is centralized or dependent on the AUPSC (3.17 and 3.18) (African Union, 2003, p. 25 part I) but with a division of responsibilities among the AU, sub-regions, and member states based on mission scenarios.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Six conflict and mission scenarios are considered (1.6) together with the assigned organizations (2.10). Scenario 1 relates to AU/sub-regional military advice for a political mission; scenario 2 is an AU/sub-regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission — in both scenario 1 and 2 the AU possesses limited capability for deployment; scenario 3 is a stand-alone AU/sub-regional observer mission; scenario 4 relates to an AU/sub-regional peacekeeping force from Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions — in both scenarios 3 and 4 the UN would also be able to make a deployment; scenario 5 is an AUPKO for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission-low level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts), this is a scenario wherein the ASF should concentrate in particular on the military component; scenario 6 relates to AU intervention in situations of, for instances, genocide, where the international community does not act promptly. This scenario could also require a capable nation that is prepared to assume leadership. Scenarios 1 to 4 should be able to be deployed in 30 days; scenario 5, the military component, in 30 days, and full deployment in 90 days; and scenario 6 in 14 days (2.9), with either the UN or the AU being assigned different scenarios (2.10) (African Union, 2003, p. 3 part I).

In the relationship with the UN there is some division of responsibilities as the ASF is devoted to small-scale rapid-response interventions that are to be replaced by UN missions (Brosig & Motsamai, Unpublished). An ASF is composed of about 5,000 personnel with more than two thirds being troops and the remaining being civilian and police.

Regarding the autonomy in decisions on military interventions, the protocol that establishes the AUPSC makes explicit recommendations for non-enforcement missions to be undertaken solely after AU approval. Specifically, it says that “the OAU [AU] could undertake peace support operations excluding peace enforcement with a mandate from the Central Organ and/or within the framework of joint operations with the UN and Sub-Regional Organizations” (19.1) (African Union, 2003, pp. a6, part II)<sup>11</sup>.

Concerning the possibility of peace enforcement, it reaffirmed the recommendation made by the African Chiefs of Defense Staff in a meeting in 1997 that a peace support operation should be consistent with the charters of the UN and OAU (1.4.a) and that

*the conflict situation should guide the level at which the OAU considers involvement. In an emergency situation, the OAU should undertake preliminary preventive action while preparing for more comprehensive action which may include the UN involvement. The emphasis here is for speed of action and deployment. As a principle, the OAU should take the first initiative in approaching the UN to deploy a peace operation in response to an emergency in the continent. If the UN is unresponsive, the OAU must take preliminary action whilst continuing its efforts to elicit a positive response from the world body (1.4.b)* (African Union, 2003, pp. 1, part I).

A similar position was taken by African heads of state in 2005 with the “Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations” (the Ezulwini Consensus).

The African position would be recognized in the 2004 UN report “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.” In the report the UN reaffirms ROs as vital within the primary responsibilities for peace and security of the UN and identifies a series of measures to organize action between the two organizations, stating that “authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations, recognizing that *in some urgent situations that authorization may be sought after such operations have commenced* [emphasis added]” (United Nations, 2004, p. 71).

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<sup>11</sup> Although the reference is from a 2003 document, it quotes a policy document from 1997 when the AU was the OAU.

Even if these African and UN policy positions are not enshrined in their charters, they have some degree of obligation and constitute an exception to UNSC primacy in cases when the UN is unresponsive.

The unfolding of this hierarchical position of the UN in relation to the AU does not trickle down to the hierarchical position of the AU vis a vis SROs. The configuration of relationships within the APSA and of the governing principles of sub-regionalism remain unclear and insufficiently considered (Laurie Nathan December 2010 interview quoted in Ancas (2011)).

In 2003 the AU would not explicitly grant the same type of *ex post facto* authorization to SROs (specifically the ASF), and it would actually refer to Chapter VII and VIII (2.2) of the UN Charter where “it is to be expected that while the AU will seek UN Security Council authorization of its enforcements actions, African Regions [in this paper SROs] similarly will seek AU authorization of their interventions” (African Union, 2003, pp. 4, part I). And more explicitly that “all PSOs [Peace Support Operations] conducted by sub-regional organizations in Africa should be endorsed by the OAU.” (African Union, 2003, pp. a1, part II).

In a more recent 2012 report the AU instead considers that the principles of subsidiarity (which presupposes that the lowest unit of governance should take action in all cases except when a more centralized unit is more efficient) that apply to the relationship between the UN and the AU should also apply to the relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs (the SROs) (African Union, 2012).

These agreements on normative changes regarding the relationship between the UN and the AU lead to a convergence of material support for the APSA in three developments that are initiated in 2008: the UN recognition that it could support AU operations, the guidelines for the coordination between the AU and SROs, and the reinforcement of European Union (EU) support for the APSA.

In 2008, the UN produces the *Report of the African Union-United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations*,<sup>12</sup> which recognizes the possibility of the UN financing and logistically supporting AU operations. It follows the 2005 AU “Ezulwini Consensus” with a request for the UN to finance AU operations (African Union, 2005) and two UN reports from 2005 and 2006 with a vision for modalities of coordination between the UN and the AU.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Better known as the *Prodi Report* as Romano Prodi was its chairman.

<sup>13</sup> The 2005 UN report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* and the 2006 UN Report *Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities*.

The 2008 report recommends the use of UN-assessed funding to support the Council's approved AU operations with two conditions: (1) each case of support is approved independently by the Council and UN General Assembly; and (2) that the AU mission would be handed over to the UN within six months. The report emphasizes UN primacy in peace and security, its relationship with the AU, AU capacity, and the need to have resources (also financial) in order to respond quickly to crisis and to engage with the AU requirements "at the continental level while acknowledging the implications at the sub-regional and national level as the building blocks of African peacekeeping capacity." Additionally, the report singles out the ASF's role within the APSA, considering it a "major undertaking" that could easily "lose direction" and calling for the AU to drive such process in terms of setting the objectives with clarity and realism (United Nations, 2008, p. 6).

Also in 2008 the AU signed the Memorandum of Understanding with RECs and RMs, enabling the operationalization of the APSA. The memorandum recognized the AU's primary responsibility for peace and security in Africa and adherence to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage (Article 4.4) (African Union, 2008). Among other initiatives, it considered the existence of representation in each other's offices (AU in RECs/RMs and vice versa) with the efforts of coordination vested in the AU (Article 21) along with the responsibility to inform the UNSC of the activities of all.

Finally, as part of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy agreed at the African-EU summit in Lisbon in 2007, in 2008 the EU became a main contributor to the African Peace Facility (which finances the APSA) with the 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund.<sup>14</sup> In its directives, the EU Council considered that "the African sub-regional organizations are the pillars of the overall security architecture of the" AU wherein "regional components are key elements of the Continental Early Warning System and of the African Standby Force" (2.2 p. 5) (European Union, 2008). About two thirds of the funds are directed to AU peace support operations with the bulk of the remaining funds directed to the operationalization of the APSA and Africa-EU dialogue (European Union, 2008; European Union, 2011). The beneficia-

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<sup>14</sup> A total of € 600 Million has been budgeted and equally divided by the two programs of 2008-2010 and 2011-2013. The 2003 EU European Security Strategy affirmed its commitment to multilateralism, UNSC primacy, and the importance of the AU (European Union, 2003).

ries of the funding facility are the AU and the African SROs, which can independently request the support, although SRO requests need to have the political approval of the AU (European Union, 2008, p. 5.3 and 5.6). The normative changes alongside these developments constitute a significant regional institutionalization of security in Africa. On one hand the UN makes itself available to support African regionalism but establishes a financial link that allows the UNSC to maintain some leverage over such autonomy. On the other hand the financially weak AU stays anchored in the UN but is able to intervene in its region. In a recent policy document the AU proposes the use of UN-assessed contributions to fund AU-led peace operations,

*premised on the conviction that the UNSC retains the primacy for the maintenance of international peace and security and that, in undertaking peace operations in the continent, the AU is responding to an international obligation and acting on behalf of the UN [emphases added]* (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2015, p. 10).

In this way AU places itself as an UN contractor for peace and security in observance of UNSC primacy after having secured the right to intervene when the UN is unresponsive.

For the European Union (EU) the development of an effective APSA answers their own security concerns over migration and terrorism related with its proximity to Africa. This combination of wills results in quicker APSA development, in particular of the ASF component.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Although we focus on the APSA it is relevant to briefly highlight the legal framework of the three most developed SROs: ECOWAS, SADC, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Founded in 1975, ECOWAS is an organization that adopted a security focus in its founding treaties, establishing a structure of collective self-defense, with a reference to the UN in the spirit of cooperation. The 1999 peacekeeping protocol states that ECOWAS will inform the UN of any military intervention, a wording that suggests the possibility of ECOWAS intervening militarily without explicit UNSC authorization. The SADC is established in 1992 and mainly focuses on economic issues. Subsequent legal development added security functions to the organization with the 14 August 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defence, and Security cooperation explicitly committing enforcement action of the SADC to UNSC authorization (Article II, 3,(d)) (De Wet, 2014). IGAD was formed in 1996 with a focus also on economic issues and a security mandate that does not include peace enforcement. Its security initiatives have been in pastoral cross-border conflict, early warning and response, terrorism, and peace mediation processes for Sudan and Somalia (Sousa R. R., 2013).

## Practice

There are four broad periods of institutional security practice in Africa.<sup>16</sup> The first period started with the UN's inception in the post-World War II period and is linked to decolonization in Asia and the Middle East characterized by little UN intervention.

A second period started with the decolonization of Africa that is symbolically associated with the year 1960, but is mainly related to the UN intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the early sixties (1960-1964). The aftermath of this crisis led to the end of significant UN and institutional peacekeeping involvement in Africa in the three subsequent decades.

The third period starts in 1990 with the end of the Cold War and is characterized by uncertainty over security responsibilities. The beginning of the decade saw increased UN and SRO activity, but the 1993 Black Hawk incident in Somalia freezes UN involvement in the region. From this date onwards ROs and SROs attempt to fill in the space left by the UN. In particular ECOWAS and SADC were actively assuming peace and security roles. ECOWAS was involved in PKOs in Liberia in 1990, in Sierra Leone in 1991 and 1997, in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, and in the Côte d'Ivoire in 2002. The SADC was involved in PKOs in Lesotho in 1998, some of its members in the DRC in 1998, and the SADC acquired competences in early warning from the late 1980s onwards. All of these military interventions were marked by controversy over legality and motivation (Berman & Sams, 2003).

The establishment of the AU in 2002 in order to structurally deal with the security challenges in the region marks the beginning of the fourth period. In this fourth period AU capabilities in security are significantly reinforced, especially since 2008 with the initiation of structured capacity processes in the APSA. This fourth period is characterized by institutional overlap of actors where different IOs have similar security mandates and share member states (UN, AU, RECs/RMs). These actors operate and intervene in the same geographical area and it has become a recurrent practice to have more than one actor involved in the same crisis at the same time or replacing each other. The institutional overlap occurs without a settled hierarchical relationship (for instance between

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<sup>16</sup>This is based on Adebajo and Landsberg's (2000) three phases: 1960-1964, 1990-1994, and after 1995. A further significant differentiation could be made in 2001 to account for changes in security issues (increased terrorism concerns) but such did not had significant changes in the UN and APSA structure.

the AU and RECs/RMs) or enforcement mechanisms for hierarchical ordering (UN and AU or RECs/RMs) in what has been labeled as a “regime complex” (Raustiala & Victor, 2004) of partially overlapping, non-hierarchical and decentered relations.

The military interventions of these actors, particularly since the systemic change that occurred in 1990, have been done with and without UNSC authorization. Table 3 in the annexes presents a dataset of the legality of military interventions in Africa between 1990 and 2015.<sup>17</sup> It considers a military intervention as the deployment of troops (peacekeeping operations and troops) in a country where an intra-state conflict process is ongoing, targeting the authority structures of the country influencing the balance of power between the parties through either supporting one side (government or opposition) or taking a neutral stance (Sousa R. R., 2015). The definition of peacekeeping and troop deployment follows the standard definitions of Heldt and Wallensteen (2007) and Högladh et al. (2011), respectively.<sup>18</sup>

The legality of military interventions is of three types: if the intervention started with UNSC authorization (UNSC primacy was observed); if the intervention started without UNSC authorization but after was recognized in a UNSC decision or UNSC presidential statement (UNSC primacy was not observed but some UNSC legitimacy was maintained<sup>19</sup>); and if the interventions was not authorized or recognized by the UNSC. Additionally the dataset classifies the agency of the intervening actor as: UN, regional arrangements (ROs and other regional groups), sub-regional arrangements (SROs and other sub-regional groups), and individual states.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>The majority of interventions are in intra-state conflicts.


<sup>18</sup>A Peacekeeping operation is a third-party state intervention that: involves the deployment of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in a target state; is, according to the mandate (as specified in multilateral agreements, peace agreements, or resolutions of the UN or RO), established for the purpose of separating conflict parties, monitoring ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones, and taking responsibility for the security situation (among other things) between formerly, potentially, or presently warring parties, and; is neutral towards the conflict parties, but not necessarily impartial towards their behavior (Heldt & Wallensteen, 2007, p. 11). Deployment of troops is when “a state has sent combat troops to fight alongside a primary warring party (...). This does not apply to troops sent as technicians in support of equipment sent or loaned (...), or as military trainers, military specialists, planners, experts etc. Further, this does not covers joint operations or alliances between non-state entities, or between a non-state external supporter and a government primary warring party or if the secondary supporter is engaged on its own in a conflict with a common enemy” (Högladh, Pettersson, T., & Themnér, 2011).

<sup>19</sup>Even if in the UN Charter this practice is not identified it has been argued that there can be an *ex post facto* authorization. In this paper we consider this situation recognition by the UNSC of the intervention.

<sup>20</sup>Data files and codebook with sources of this dataset can be found on the webpage <https://sites.google.com/site/ricardosousa2000/research>.

A total of 126 military interventions are identified between 1990 and 2015, 38% started with UNSC authorization (48 interventions), 21% were recognized by the UNSC (26 interventions) and 41% were never authorized or recognized by the UNSC (52 interventions). This means that 59% of the interventions have some sort of legitimacy (either authorized or recognized) and 62% start without UNSC authorization (see Picture 2).

**Picture 2: Legality of military interventions in Africa (1990-2015)**




The dataset distinguishes the interventions made directly by France in a country with whom it has a “defense agreement” (or “defense cooperation agreement”) (Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces, 2016).<sup>21</sup>

Not considering the French interventions where there is a defense agreement the results are slightly different: 42 % of interventions are authorized by the UNSC (47 interventions), 20% are recognized by the UNSC (23 interventions) and 38% are not authorized or recognized by the UNSC (43 interventions).

<sup>21</sup> Other types of bilateral French agreements or treaties are not singled out. France accounts for 16% of interventions in the dataset.

Individual states have the most number of interventions (49 representing 39% of interventions) and also account for the majority of non-authorized or recognized interventions (40 interventions representing 77% of all non-authorized or recognized interventions). Of the 4 authorized interventions by individual states 3 were led by a UNSC permanent member — France. Non-UN multilateral action is more frequent than UN interventions, with 46 and 31 interventions respectively. The UNSC does not authorize more than a particular agency (with the exception of sub-regional arrangements which were only authorized twice) but recognizes more interventions by regional and sub-regional arrangements (11 and 8 times respectively) (see Picture 3).

**Picture 3: Agency and legality of military interventions in Africa (1990-2015)**



These results give the idea of a challenge to the legitimacy of the UNSC, but the pattern of legality over time provides a more nuanced account. Table 2 presents the patterns of legality of ongoing military interventions between 1990 and 2015. There are two distinct periods. Between the 1990 and 2009 there are a significant number of ongoing not authorized or recognized military interventions. Furthermore the pattern under-represents what was the even higher number of non-authorized or recognized military interventions initiated each year. This is because, on average, non-authorized or recognized military interventions have shorter duration than other types of interventions (2,44 years for non-authorized, 3,96 years for recognized interventions and 4,38 for authorized interventions).

Since 2010 the trend shifts significantly to authorized or recognized interventions with only one military intervention non-authorized or recognized (the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) for Sinai initiated in 1982). Among the recognized interventions an increased proportion is recognized through UNSC president statements rather than through a UNSC decision, as it was the case before 2010.

Both of these trends are independent of French interventions in countries with a defense agreement. The French interventions in countries with a defense agreement denote also a change in pattern for increased UNSC authorization or recognition. Since the late 1990s France identified new guidelines for their military engagement in Africa with a refusal of unilateralism and acceptance of the UN framework. This led to the involvement of French troops in multilateral operations<sup>22</sup>. In the situations when France still intervened outside multilateral operations, the interventions started to be more often recognized by the UNSC since 2003 and authorized by the UNSC since 2013, with no ongoing intervention not authorized or not recognized by the UNSC since 2007.

**Table 2: Legality of ongoing military interventions in Africa (1990-2015)**

AGENCY AND LEGALITY	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
UN	1	3	4	8	9	6	4	4	4	6	5	4	4	6	8	8	7	7	7	7	8	8	7	8	10	10	
Non-UN, UN SC authorized	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	1	2	3	3	4	3	1	3	3	5	4	2	
France – UN SC authorized – defence agreement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	
UN SC recognition	1	2	3	4	3	2	2	4	4	4	4	1	3	4	5	4	4	4	3	1	1	2	3	2	2	3	
France – UN SC recognition – defence agreement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
UN SC not authorized or recognized	5	7	4	2	1	1	1	6	7	8	4	7	9	4	4	2	4	4	6	6	1	1	1	1	1	1	
France – UN SC not authorized or recognized – defence agreement	0	2	2	1	2	3	3	3	2	4	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

<sup>22</sup> UNOSOM I and II in Somalia; MINURCA in Central Africa Republic; UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea; UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire, and; contributions to EU-organized operations in Artemis in DRC and EUFOR in Chad/CAR (Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces, 2016).

The changes in the pattern of interventions legality are not explained by the agency of interventions, as all different types of agency (UN, regional and sub-regional arrangements, coalition and individual states) of interventions started and are ongoing in the period between 2010 and 2015. The possible explanation for this trend can be found mainly on the supply side of the military interventions.

On the supply side of interventions two processes increase their likelihood of UNSC authorization. One process was actors' political convergence in the first decade of the 21st century supporting the APSA and establishing criterion for exceptions to UNSC primacy, which led to the global, regional, sub-regional, and state buy-in of the security architecture under development, bringing Africa and the UNSC much closer together.

Another process was the 2008 financial crisis which affected the resources available for potential interventions. For potential interventions to occur one either had to get the buy-in of the UNSC as a requirement for access to funds or negotiate multilateral arrangements in order to share the burden (also increasing the likelihood of UN authorization or recognition).

On the demand side, in Africa there is an upwards trend since 2005 in the number of ongoing state-based conflicts (and from 2010 onwards of non-state-based and one-sided conflicts in Africa) (Erik & Themnér, 2016). This can be contrasted with the decreasing number of average interventions per year: between 1990 and 2009 there was roughly 5 interventions per year while between 2010 and 2015 there was a decrease to about 3 interventions on average per year.

## CAPABILITIES

The capacity of a IOs to undertake military missions is determined by financial resources, the number of troops, military equipment, and the logistics available for a mission as well as organizational know-how. Because IOs are dependent on member states their agency is limited by the convergence of political will of member states to approve a mission as well as their capacity to finance and staff a mission.

## UN

UN peacekeeping operations increased significantly with the end of the Cold War. In the first 44 years of the UN, between 1945 and 1989, the UN initiated 18 peacekeeping operations while in the following 23 years, between 1990 and 2013, the UN initiated 50 peacekeeping operations (United Nations, 2014). This upward trend is reflected in the UN peacekeeping budget, which increased eight-fold between 1990 and 2015 from about US\$ 1 billion to US\$ 8.27 billion (United Nations, 2015). The vast majority of operations are located in Africa with nine peacekeeping missions in May 2015, more than 8,000 troops (80 percent of total UN troops in missions) and 15,000 civilians (Renwick, 2015). The growth of UN peacekeeping operations demonstrates that the UN has organizational capacity and can gather the resources for unparalleled growth.

The main contribution of African states to the UN peacekeeping operations have been in the provision of troops. No African state is within the top 10 UN peacekeeping funders but African states are consistently among the top 10 countries contributing with troops to the UN. As of December 2015 Ethiopia, Rwanda, Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria were among the top 10 troop, police, and observer contributors, representing about 50 percent of total contributions (International Peace Institute, accessed 2016/11/22). Nevertheless, this African capacity is not directly transferable to potential non-UN African interventions. Many of the African contributor countries prefer UN-led operations in part because, on average, they provide better logistical support and reimbursement rates for equipment and troops<sup>23</sup> (Boutellis & Williams, 2013). In fact, Bellamy and Williams (2005) considered that the main implication of non-UN peace operations is that it may reduce the likelihood that poorer parts of the world will enjoy the benefit of high-quality peace operations.

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<sup>23</sup> UN reimburses more than \$1000 per soldier per month while only in 2009, two years after being established, did the reimbursement rate of AMISOM troops increase from \$550 to \$1028 per soldier per month in order to reach the authorized strength, as it was lacking in the commitment of troop by contributing countries (Renwick, 2015; Sousa R. R., 2014).

## APSA

The creation of the AU and the APSA is testimony to the willingness of African states to manage security challenges in the region. Despite political will, in little more than 10 years of existence of these initiatives, they have not reached the minimum requirements for self-sustainability. Although capability has been progressively built, financial and organizational shortfalls still prevent the full operationalization of the APSA.

Since 2003 the AUPSC has authorized and lead missions in Burundi, Comoros, Sudan, Somalia, Central Africa Republic, as well as the African Union-led regional cooperation initiative for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army. A significant increase of missions but which have suffered from a lack of resources bringing to light the "major gap between the PSC's willingness to authorize such missions and the AU's ability to implement them" (African Union, 2010, p. 26 para. 68).

The overall budget for 2016 AU operations is estimated to be US\$ 1.2 billion (AMISOM accounting for \$900 million) with only less than 3 percent of the AU's budget coming from AU member states (Renwick, 2015). In theory, funding for interventions should come from contributing contingents in the first three months after which the AU refunds the expenses incurred by the states and then proceeds to finance the intervention in the expectation that the UN takes over. In practice, funding for interventions has been decided on a case-by-case base and originate from four main sources: the African Peace Facility, financed through the European Development Fund; multi-donor trust funds; bilateral financial support to troop-contributing countries; and UN-assessed contributions (Thierry, 2013).

In terms of organizational capacity several donor initiatives have been supporting the development of APSA,<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, the operationalization of the ASF has been delayed, something which was evident in the incapacity to have a Western sub-regional response to the conflict in Mali in 2012. As a result, in 2013 a concept of a rapid deployment force is created by the AU: the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). This force is designed to be ad hoc, smaller, more manageable, affordable, and

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<sup>24</sup> Among others, since 2004 the USA Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) (which includes the long-standing African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program), the EU's African Peace Facility and the UN ten-year capacity-building program for the AU (2006-2016) continued with the Framework for a Renewed UN/AU Partnership on Africa's Integration and Development Agenda 2017-2027 (PAIDA).

flexible with a voluntary approach to collective security in contrast to the ASF regional character, which has a comprehensive and institutionalized approach (Warner, 2015).<sup>25</sup>

The ACIRC was championed by South Africa but the initiative did not get a consensual buy-in from African states.<sup>26</sup> In practice the ACIRC has never been deployed and when in 2015 the AU decided to fight Boko Haram it set up the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and did not use the ACIRC, even if this force was supposed to be ready for deployment. The deployment of ACIRC would bypass RECs/RM, centralizing approval and the running of operations in the AU Commissioners and AUPSC.

A debate developed whether the ACIRC could be an interim mechanism until the operationalization of the ASF (and its Rapid Deployment Capability — RDC) and a duplication of it afterwards, or if the ACIRC is complementary to ASF and that some of its components are likely to be incorporated into the ASF once operational (Warner, 2015; Cocodia, 2016). This debate gained more relevance with the confirmation in 2015, for the first time, of Full Operational Capacity (FOC) for four ASFs (RECs/RM).

The AMANI AFRICA-II Exercise conducted in 2015 in the context of the operationalization of the ASF validated the FOC of the Eastern, Central, Western and Southern Standby Forces (EASF, FOMAC, ESF, SADCBRIG respectively) in conducting multidimensional peace operations under scenarios 5 and 6 (see footnote 11 for a description of the scenarios) (African Union, 2016).

This is an important milestone in the development of the APSA's capacity and allows new institutional solutions to be found when political wills converge for intervention. The *APSA Roadmap for 2016-2020* reinforces the spirit of collective security and self-reliance, ownership, consensus, and synergy between the AU and RECs/RMs and AU leadership of the process (African Union, 2015). The roadmap was welcomed by the UNSC, reaffirming among other collaborative initiatives that the two councils should work on a case-by-case basis in dealing with situations of conflict in Africa (United Nations Security Council, 2016).

With particular relevance to UNSC primacy, which has direct implications on the level of support to AU operations, the cooperation between the UNSC and the AUPSC has been mainly done through joint annual consultative

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<sup>25</sup>The ACIRC is composed of five motorized battalion groups (between 1500 and 8000 troops) with full combat service and combat service support capabilities, should be able to intervene in a robust way and sustain operations for at least 90 days.

<sup>26</sup>Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda have also joined the initiative.

meetings (ongoing since 2006) and the establishment in 2010 of the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa, bringing closer the two bureaucracies.<sup>27</sup> In practice, cooperation has developed on specific cases leading to UNSC authorization of missions and a division of labor whereby the AU provided the troops and the UN and other partners provided logistical and financial resources.<sup>28</sup> The challenge is now to move from context-specific collaboration to predictable mechanisms of institutionalized collaboration at three levels: politically between the two councils; between the two organizations' bureaucracies; and within the AU regarding the AU Commission, the PSC, and the AU member states (Boutellis & Williams, 2013).

### Countries<sup>29</sup>

A key determinant of military interventions is the capability and willingness of specific African states. We presented above that a series of African states have the military resources to undertake interventions but lack the financial resources or will to fund such operations. Also in table 3 there is an account of past engagements. Here we aim to determine the pool of potential African states which may lead military interventions. In order to do so table 4 (see the annexes) identifies the capability of countries (measured in terms of population, GDP, and military spending) and, building on this capability, a measure of their possible willingness to intervene (as demonstrated by past military interventions and constrains emanating from internal conflict in the country)<sup>30</sup> or utilize "soft-power." Naturally these conditions operate in context-specific geopolitical settings.

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<sup>27</sup> Cooperation between the UN and AU also occurs with the AU-UN Joint Task Force and desk-to-desk exchanges, "collaborative field missions" between the councils of the two organizations, capacity building for mediation, as well as electoral assistance (United Nations, 2014; Boutellis & Williams, 2013).

<sup>28</sup> Examples of context-specific collaborations are in 2012 the UN support and the UN-AU planning process of the AMISOM mission in Somalia or UNSC authorization of the African-led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, the latter after a joint assessment by the UN and AU.

<sup>29</sup> For reasons of space we do not analyze non-African states here.

<sup>30</sup> We do not adopt an approach to identify a particular country as a regional or sub-regional "hegemon," "pivot-state," or "emerging regional power." Such analysis would go beyond the objective of this paper, which is to identify not the main powerful state but the states that may engage in military interventions. Nevertheless there is some similarity in our analysis with the criteria for regional hegemony, which can be defined by the: provision of public goods, projection of values and interests, internal and external perception of the regional power as a state with a responsibility and capacity to impact processes in its sphere of interest, and material preponderance (Prys M., 2008b).

The shaded cells identify the country/factor that is more favorable to interventionism. In the variables population, GDP, and military expenditure, the shaded cells identify the top 10 countries. In the countries variable, the shaded cells identify countries that have been involved in operations in the last 10 years (individually or with a significant role in a multilateral initiative) or are among the top 10 contributors of troops to the UN peacekeeping forces (on December 31, 2015). The column conflict identifies the countries where domestic conflict has occurred between 2010 and 2015.

Historically, and also evident in this table, there are two candidates for an interventionist policy: South Africa and Nigeria.

South Africa remains a potential “leader” that can shape the regime of military interventions in both the southern sub-region and African region. Absent of domestic conflicts, it has the capability requirements based on a diversified economy, and has been positioning itself as a regional player (both in terms of the self-perception of the state as well as in the expectations of other states). But its ambitions for an increased role are constrained by rivalry of secondary powers in the sub-region, particularly Zimbabwe, and fears about hegemony from other countries (Nathan, 2004). Region-wide, the failure to deploy ARCIC in the Mali conflict in 2015 is testimony to Nigerian concerns about the reach of South African influence.

Nevertheless South Africa’s leadership is unquestionable; it has been engaged in military action in the past (unilateral and bilateral, with and without UNSC authorization), is a champion of ARCIC, promoted conflict resolution mechanisms, and has exercised its “soft-power” way beyond its sub-region. A later testimony is the election in 2012 of South African Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as AU Commission chairperson, South African’s important role in the reform of SADC and AU, promotion of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),<sup>31</sup> the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the African Renaissance, the bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC, or being one of the five emerging economies – BRICS (Prys M., 2008a).<sup>32</sup>

Nigeria has one of the longest track records of military interventions in its western sub-region, contributes significantly to UN operations, is the largest economy and one of the most powerful military in Africa, and is often referred

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<sup>31</sup> This program focuses on economic cooperation and development and is one of the two special programs of the AU together with the security-oriented Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) championed by Nigeria and which led to the signing of a MoU between the AU and RECs in 2002.

<sup>32</sup> Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

to as a potential “hegemon” in the African region (alongside South Africa). Its leadership role can be attested in its bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC, the establishment of ECOWAS as a sub-regional policy framework, or being a champion of CSSDCA.<sup>33</sup> But Nigeria is currently constrained in its foreign policy ambitions by a set of internal and external factors. The democratic process initiated in 1999 ending a long period of military rule, the Boko Haram insurgency initiated in 2002, and internal challenges for control of its main revenue source – crude-oil – pressure the regime’s policy to focus inwards. Externally its foreign policy has been contested by Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal in its sub-region as well as by South Africa. It would be expected that Nigeria’s foreign policy would prioritize its sub-region in initiatives that utilize its “soft power” and multilateral arrangements, than to initiate unilateral non-authorized interventions.

Other states with capability and past engagements are Angola, Kenya, and Sudan as well as, eventually, Ethiopia and Tanzania, but these countries are handling political instability or domestic conflict that limits their foreign policies.

Angola does not have a track record of contributions to multilateral initiatives but has been involved in unilateral interventions without UNSC authorization in two countries in its sub-region (Congo, Brazzaville, in 2002 and Guinea-Bissau in 2011). Despite its capability — in particular the fact that it has a strong military with the capability to project its force abroad — the wealth of Angola derives mainly from oil exports, which are subject to fluctuations of revenue. Its geographical position linking it to both Central and Southern Africa (with membership in both RMs) can be an opportunity but also a limitation leading to strategic dispersion. Furthermore, the transition that will occur when President José Eduardo dos Santos steps down will necessarily focus the regime on domestic issues as contestation to the MPLA rule is growing within the country.

Sudan and Ethiopia face open challenges to their regimes from within and their interventionist policies are limited to key strategic neighboring locations, small localized interventions in Uganda for Sudan and in Somalia for Ethiopia. Kenya and Tanzania’s domestic conflict is of a much smaller scale than in Sudan and Ethiopia, but these countries’ interventionist policies have been limited to interventions in neighboring countries, a UN-authorized intervention in Somalia by Kenya and AU-authorized and short interventions in Comoros by Tanzania. Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya all belong to the

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<sup>33</sup> See footnote 31.

Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), where a history of tensions between the countries in this sub-region, in particular between Ethiopia and Eritrea, prevents the emergence of a sub-regional leadership (Sousa R. R., 2013).

Countries in the Northern sub-region, with the exception of Mauritania, have a strong capability but have not been involved in military interventions abroad recently. The regimes in this sub-region are handling the effect of the “Arab Spring” and their focus is inwards. Additionally, divisions over the Western Sahara issue inhibit institutional cooperation among the countries. Libya is the country with the most interventions to its name, mainly occurring in the 1990s, a policy much connected to the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi.

Any of the above countries may intervene in the context of multilateral initiatives alongside other countries not mentioned before (in particular the remaining countries shaded in table 4<sup>34</sup>), in order to fight common transnational threats or to deal with crisis in specific countries. Examples of these initiatives are the UN-approved interventions or coalitions that emerge around the France-led Operation Barkhane to fight terrorism in 2014, the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram in 2011, or the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army in 2011.

## CONCLUSION

This paper makes an analysis of the way in which UNSC primacy over military interventions has been observed and challenged through ideas, institutions, and capabilities in the global and regional security governance system.

The first three decades after the end of the Cold War in 1991 are marked by significant challenges to UNSC primacy in all three dimensions: the regionalization of security re-emerged as an idea; the AU is created without explicit reference to UNSC primacy and claims the right to military interventions; and states and IOs are capable, willing, and intervene militarily, often without UNSC authorization. In the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century about 40 per cent of military interventions had no UNSC authorization or recognition, a similar pattern of the one registered in the decade following the end of the Cold War.

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<sup>34</sup> Mauritania, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Senegal.

This pressure from below led to the definition of an exception to UNSC primacy in the cases of emergency — the AU may intervene while awaiting a UNSC response. This in fact consubstantiates a reformulation of the classical configuration of sovereignty and of the UNSC as the main guarantee of the principle of non-interference.

This agreement allowed a convergence of actors (UN, AU, SRO, EU, states) to develop African capabilities for military intervention through the APSA and a change in the pattern of legality of military interventions ever since, with no military intervention occurring without UNSC authorization or UNSC recognition between 2010 and 2015. This change is also a result of the increased use of UNSC presidential statements to recognize interventions as opposed to the previous practice of prepondering recognitions through UNSC decisions.

If the APSA is operationalized following consistent guidelines it has the potential to inhibit the initiation of civil wars, working mainly as a security guarantee for incumbent governments and decreasing the feasibility of conflict for would-be challengers.

The longstanding debate over the factors explaining the initiation of civil war opposes a feasibility/greed hypothesis to the grievance hypothesis. In the former it is the feasibility of civil war for would-be rebels that determine action and also significant is the profitability of the insurgency enterprise while ongoing and if it succeeds. State strength to prevent and resist a rebellion is a significant deterrent to feasibility and greed factors. State strength can be enhanced by external actors, such is the case of former French colonies under the security umbrella of France, which are significantly less likely to have civil wars (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009). The APSA could work in a similar way to the security guarantee provided by France.

In the grievance hypothesis it is the frustration of people of not meeting material expectations that is the cause of civil war initiation. In particular, horizontal inequalities, inequalities associated with social exclusion, and poverty between groups along identity or regional criteria are found to be statistically significant in the initiation of civil war (Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014). The APSA addresses some of the grievance factors through its exercise of preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and confidence-building strategies or external interventions to secure the commitment to peace agreements. In sum, the APSA targets mainly the military and also the political aspects of conflict. But some of the “root” grievances call for a different set of political, economic, societal, and envi-

ronmental policies that are not within the APSA mandate, policies which secure, for instances, ethnic inclusion and fairer distribution of wealth and public goods within countries.

Notwithstanding, the initiation of military interventions continues to require the buy-in of regional and sub-regional actors, UN approval as a condition to access to UN funding, as well as financial, logistical and, troop resources.

This case illustrates the accommodation of African regional aspirations in the current global governance system and what is left unanswered is the repercussions it may have for the future configuration of security in the world, from the reform of the UNSC to the emergence of other regional security institutions.

## Annexes

**Table 3: Legality of peacekeeping and military interventions in Africa (1990-2015)**

COUNTRY	PERIOD	INTERVENTION	AGENCY	UNSC AUTHORIZATION
Algeria	2004	Mali, Niger, Chad	Individual States	No
	2009	Mali	Individual States	No
Angola	1989-1991	Cuba	Individual States	No
	1999-2001	Namibia	Individual States	No
	1989-1991	UNAVEM I – United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	UN	Yes
	1991-1995	UNAVEM II – United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	UN	Yes
	1995-1997	UNAVEM III – United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	UN	Yes
	1997-1999	MONUA – United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	UN	Yes
Burundi	1993	France	Individual States	No
	1993-1996	OMIB – OAU Observer Mission in Burundi	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	2001-2009	SAPSD – South African Protection and Support Detachment	Individual States	Yes
	2003-2004	AMIB – African Mission in Burundi (AU)	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	2004-2006	ONUB – United Nations Operation in Burundi	UN	Yes
	2006-2009	AU STF – AU Special Task Force (South Africa)	Individual States	No

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COUNTRY	PERIOD	INTERVENTION	AGENCY	UNSC AUTHORIZATION
Central Africa Republic (CAR)	1996-1997	Operation Almandi I and II (France)	Individual States	No
	1997-1998	MISAB – Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (OAU)	Coalition	Recognized
	1998-2000	MINURCA – United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	UN	Yes
	2001-2002	Movement for the Liberation of Congo, Chad, Libya	Individual States	No
	2001-2002	CEN-SAD – Community of Sahel-Saharan States Peacekeeping Force in CAR	Sub-Regional Arrangements	No
	2002-2008	FOMUC – ECCAS Multinational Force in the CAR	Sub-Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	2002-...	Operation BOALI (France)	Individual States	Recognized
	2006	France	Individual States	No
	2008-2009	EUFOR (Chad/CAR)	Regional Arrangements	Yes
	2008-2013	MICOPAX – ECCAS Peace Consolidation Mission in the CAR	Sub-Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	2007-2010	MINURCAT-UN Mission in the CAR and Chad	UN	Yes
	2013-...	MISCA – African-led International Support Mission in the CAR	Regional Arrangements	Yes
	2013-...	Operation Sangaris (France)	Individual States	Yes
	2014-2015	EUFOR RCA	UN	Yes
2014-...	MINUSCA – UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission	UN	Yes	
Chad	1990	Operation Epervier (France)	Individual States	No
	1991	France	Individual States	No
	1994	UNASOG – Aouzou Strip Observer Group	UN	Yes
	2008	France	Individual States	Yes

COUNTRY	PERIOD	INTERVENTION	AGENCY	UNSC AUTHORIZATION
Comoros	1995	France	Individual States	No
	1997-1999	OMIC I – OAU Observer Mission	Regional Arrangements	No
	2001-2002	OMIC II – OAU Observer Mission	Regional Arrangements	No
	2002	OMIC III – OAU Observer Mission	Regional Arrangements	No
	2004	MIOC – AU Military Observer Mission	Regional Arrangements	No
	2006	AMISEC – AU Mission for Support to the Elections	Regional Arrangements	No
	2007-2008	MAES – AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission	Regional Arrangements	No
	2008	Operation Democracy (within MAES-AU)	Regional Arrangements	No
Congo	1997	Chad, Angola, France	Individual States	No
	1997-1999	Chad, Angola	Individual States	No
	2002	Angola	Individual States	No
Côte d'Ivoire	2002-...	Operation Licorne ("Unicorn") (France)	Individual States	Recognized
	2002	Nigeria	Individual States	No
	2002-2004	ECOMICI – ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOFORCE)	Sub-Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	2003-2004	MINUCI – UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	UN	Yes
	2004-...	UNOCI – UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	UN	Yes
Djibouti	1992	French force in Djibouti	Individual States	No

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COUNTRY	PERIOD	INTERVENTION	AGENCY	UNSC AUTHORIZATION
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	1997	Uganda, Rwanda and Angola	Individual States	No
	1998-2001	Chad, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia	Individual States	No
	1998-2001	Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi	Individual States	No
	1999-2000	OAU Observer Mission in the DRC	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	1999-2010	MONUC – UN Organization Mission in the DRC	UN	Yes
	2003	ARTEMIS / IEMF – EU Military Operation in the DRC / Interim Emergency Multinational Force	Coalition	Yes
	2005	EUPOL Kinshasa	Regional Arrangements	Yes
	2006	EUFOR RD Congo	Regional Arrangements	Yes
	2010-...	MONUSCO – UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC	UN	Yes
Ethiopia, Eritrea	2000-2008	UNMEE – UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	UN	Yes
	2000-2008	OLMEE/AULMEE – AU Liaison Mission and OAU Liaison Mission	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
Guinea Bissau	1998-1999	ECOMOG-Guinea Bissau (ECOWAS)	Sub-Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	1998-1999	Senegal, Guinea	Individual States	No
	2011-2012	MISSANG-GB (Angola)	Individual States	Recognized
	2012-...	ECOMIB – ECOWAS Mission	Sub-Regional Arrangements	Recognized
Lesotho	1998-1999	SADC Combined Task Force – Operation Boleas	Sub-Regional Arrangements	No
Liberia	1990-1999	ECOMOG-Liberia ECOWAS Monitoring Group	Sub-Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	1993-1997	UNOMIL – UN Observer Mission	UN	Yes
	2003	Joint Task Force Liberia (USA)	Individual States	No
	2003	ECOMIL – ECOWAS Mission in Liberia	Sub-Regional Arrangements	Yes
	2003-...	UNMIL – UN Mission in Liberia	UN	Yes
Libya	2011	Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector (Coalition and NATO)	Coalition	Yes

COUNTRY	PERIOD	INTERVENTION	AGENCY	UNSC AUTHORIZATION
Mali	2012-...	AFISMA – African-led International Support Mission	Sub-Regional Arrangements	Yes
	2013-2014	Operation Serval (France)	Individual States	Yes
	2013-...	MINUSMA – UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission	UN	Yes
Mozambique	1989-1990	Zimbabwe	Individual States	No
	1992-1994	ONUMOZ – UN Operation in Mozambique	UN	Yes
Rwanda	1990	Zaire, Belgian, France	Individual States	No
	1991	MOG – OAU Military Observer Group	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	1992	NMOG I – OAU Neutral Military Observer Group I	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	1993	NMOG II – OAU Neutral Military Observer Group II	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	1993-1994	UNAMIR I – UN Assistance Mission	UN	Yes
	1993-1994	UNOMUR – UN Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda	UN	Yes
	1994-1996	UNAMIR II – UN Assistance Mission	UN	Yes
	1994	Operation Turquoise (France)	Coalition	Yes
	2009	Democratic Republic of Congo	Individual States	No
Sierra Leone	1991	Nigeria	Individual States	No
	1991-1992	ECOWAS Monitoring Group – Sierra Leone	Sub-Regional Arrangements	No
	1997	Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana	Individual States	Recognized
	1997-2000	ECOMOG – Sierra Leone ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOWAS)	Sub-Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	1998 – 1999	UNOMSIL – UN Observer Mission	UN	Yes
	1999-2005	UNAMSIL – UN Mission	UN	Yes
	2000	Operation Palliser (United Kingdom)	Individual States	Recognized

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COUNTRY	PERIOD	INTERVENTION	AGENCY	UNSC AUTHORIZATION
Somalia	1992-1993	UNITAF – United Task Force	Coalition	Yes
	1992-1993	UNOSOM I – UN Operation	UN	Yes
	1993-1995	UNOSOM II – UN Operation	UN	Yes
	2006–2009	Ethiopia	Individual States	No
	2006	Eritrea	Individual States	No
	2007-...	AMISOM – AU Mission	Regional Arrangements	Yes
South Africa	1992-1994	CPAG – Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
Sudan	1991-1992	Iran	Individual States	No
	1997	Uganda, Rwanda and Angola	Individual States	No
	2002-2004	JMC/IMU – Joint Military Commission/ International Monitoring Unit	Coalition	No
	2003	Chad	Individual States	No
	2004-2007	AMIS – African Mission (AU)	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	2005-2011	UNMIS – UN Mission	UN	Yes
	2005-2007	EU support to AMIS 2 (EU-AU)	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
	2007-...	UNAMID – UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur	UN-AU	Yes
	2011-...	UNISFA – UN Interim Security Force for Abyei	UN	Yes
South Sudan	2011-...	UNMISS – UN Mission in South Sudan	UN	Yes
Uganda	2002	Sudan, DRC, CAR	Individual States	No
	2005	Sudan, DRC, CAR	Individual States	No
	2008	Sudan, DRC, CAR	Individual States	No
	2009	Sudan, DRC, CAR	Individual States	No
Western Sahara	1991-...	MINURSO – UN Mission for the Referendum	UN	Yes
Several	2015-...	MNJTf Multinational Joint Task Force (AU)	Regional Arrangements	Recognized
Several	2014-...	Operation Barkhane (France lead coalition)	Coalition	Recognized
Several	2011-...	RCI-LRA – CAR-DRC – South Sudan-Uganda	Coalition	Yes

**Table 4: State capacity and willingness to intervene**

COUNTRY	POPULATION (ROUNDED UP TO THOUSANDS)	GDP (ROUNDED UP TO CURRENT US\$ M.)	MILITARY EXPENDITURE, CONSTANT (2014) US\$ M.	MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	DOMESTIC CONFLICT
	2015	2015	2015	2015	2010-2015
Northern sub-region					
Algeria *2	39 667	166 839	10 231	6.2%	x
Egypt	91 509	330 779	5 361	1.7%	x
Libya	6 279	29 153	3 288	7.3%	x
Mauritania *4 *10	4 068	5 443	143	3.9%	x
Morocco	34 378	100 360	3 741	3.2%	
Tunisia	11 108	43 016	1 079	2.2%	
Central sub-region					
Angola	25 022	102 644	3 994	3.5%	
Cameroon *2	23 345	29 199	415	1.2%	x
Central African Republic *4 *10	4 901	1 504	62	2.5%	x
Chad	14 038	10 889	254	1.9%	x
Congo *5 *11	4 621	8 554	705	5.7%	
Democratic Republic of Congo	77 267	35 238	487	1.0%	x
Equatorial Guinea *4 *10	846	9 398	167	1.1%	
Gabon	1 726	14 340	203	1.3%	
Sao Tome and Principe	191	338			
Southern sub-region					
Botswana	2 263	14 391	437	2.7%	
Lesotho	2 136	2 182	49	2.2%	
Madagascar	24 236	9 981	70	0.6%	
Malawi	17 216	6 566	42	0.8%	
Mauritius	1 263	11 511	33	0.3%	
Mozambique *2	27 978	14 689	181	1.0%	x
Namibia	2 459	11 547	623	4.4%	
South Africa	54 957	312 798	3 882	1.1%	
Swaziland	1 287	4 061	83	2.0%	

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COUNTRY	POPULATION (ROUNDED UP TO THOUSANDS)	GDP (ROUNDED UP TO CURRENT US\$ M.)	MILITARY EXPENDITURE, CONSTANT (2014) US\$ M.	MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	DOMESTIC CONFLICT
Tanzania	53 471	44 896	585	1.5%	x
Zambia *4 *10	16 212	21 202	487	1.9%	
Zimbabwe	15 603	13 893	383	2.7%	
Eastern sub-region					
Burundi *6 *12	11 179	3 086	63	2.2%	x
Comoros	789	624			
Djibouti *2 *7 *13	888	1 590	44	3.7%	
Eritrea	4 790	2 608	836	20.9%	
Ethiopia	99 391	61 538	405	0.6%	x
Kenya	46 051	63 399	1 003	1.5%	x
Rwanda	11 610	8 096	97	1.1%	x
Seychelles	93	1 438	19	1.2%	
Somalia *2	10 788	5 953			x
South Sudan *1 *3 *8 *14	12 340	9 016	968	13.8%	x
Sudan	40 235	84 067	2 701	3.4%	x
Uganda	39 033	26 370	340	1.4%	x
Western sub-region					
Benin	10 880	8 477	109	1.2%	
Burkina Faso	18 106	11 100	204	1.6%	
Cape Verde	521	1 630	11	0.5%	
Côte d'Ivoire *2	22 702	31 753	548	1.5%	x
Gambia	1 991	851	14	1.6%	
Ghana *4 *10	27 410	37 865	194	0.5%	
Guinea	12 609	6 700	255	3.7%	x
Guinea-Bissau	1 845	1 057	22	1.7%	
Liberia	4 504	2 053	13	0.7%	
Mali	17 600	13 101	362	2.9%	x
Niger	19 900	7 143	73	1.0%	x
Nigeria	182 202	481 067	2 299	0.4%	x
Senegal	15 130	13 780	256	1.6%	x

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COUNTRY	POPULATION (ROUNDED UP TO THOUSANDS)	GDP (ROUNDED UP TO CURRENT US\$ M.)	MILITARY EXPENDITURE, CONSTANT (2014) US\$ M.	MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	DOMESTIC CONFLICT
Sierra Leone *4 *10	6 454	4 475	37	0.8%	
Togo *9 *15	7 305	4 003	83	1.7%	

Notes: Population – World Development Indicators (WDI), \*1 – data for 2011; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – WDI, data for \*2-2014 and \*3-2011; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) – Military Expenditure, Data for \*4 – 2014, \*5-2010, \*6-2006, \*7-2008, \*8-2003 and \*9-2012; SIPRI – Military expenditure as percentage of GDP, data for \*10-2012, \*11-2010, \*12-2006, \*13-2008, \*14-2003 and \*15-2012; Conflict UCDP state based, non-state and one-sided conflict; St. Helena, Réunion, and Western Sahara are not represented in this list. Countries in the sub-regions are indicative and do not match sub-regions based on security (like the ASF), political (like the UN groupings), or economic groupings.

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